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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"
• . . in knowledge, that man only is to be
condemned and despised who is not in a state of
transition.
"
Lord Acton's Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge , 1895
•
In recent years historians have expressed a growing
interest in the study of the history of historical thought.
As early as 1938, James Shotwell of Columbia University had
attempted to arouse interest in this task with his two vol-
ume History of History , and had taken a very strong position
on the matter by defining the "history of history . . . [as]
that part of the human story which one should master first
if one would ever learn to judge the value of the rest."
In 1936 Charles Beard, deeply involved in controversy over
historical method found it advantageous to define truly
qualified historians as those "who try to comprehend the
intellectual operations which they themselves are perform-
ing." 2 And his colleague in several of the controversies,
Carl Becker, argued from the perspective of a life-time of
historical work "Now that I am old the most intriguing
Barnes Shotwell, The History of History (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1939) , p. 1.
2Charles Beard, The Discussion of Human Affairs
(New York: Maomillan, 1936) , p. 10.
2aspect of history turns out to be neither the study of his-
tory [i.e., the mechanics of research] nor history itself
[i.e., the significance of events]
. . . but rather the study
of the history of historical study." 3 Herbert Butterfield
goes beyond these general arguments for the importance of
this kind of study to suggest that "history of historiography
may be better training for the young research student than
the marshy ground of social and intellectual history." 4 His
ideas on the use of the study of history as a training ground
may be exemplified in several recently published books which
contain analyses of a series of major historians.^
These arguments may be sufficient grounds for inves-
tigating the methodological odyssey of a contemporary histo-
rian such as Arnold J. Toynbee. They are supported by the
fact that Toynbee' s career and work has an intrinsic interest
and importance for present day historians. Thomas Africa,
historian from the University of Southern California,
3Carl Becker, "What is Historiography," American
Historical Review , XLIV (October, 1938), 20.
4Herbert Butterfield, Man on His Past (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1955) , Preface xvi.
5 For example, see: Herman Ausubel, J. Bartlet Breb-
ner and Erling M. Hunt, editors, Some Modern Historians of
Britain (New York: Dryden Press, 1951); S. William Halperin,
Some 20th Century Historians (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1961) ; Frederick Maurice Powicke, Modern Historians
and the Study of History (London? Oldhams Press, Ltd., 1955);
Berna3otte e. Schmitt. Some Historians of Modern Europe
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942) .
describes Toynbee as "probably the most famous historian in
the modern world." 6 Another historian, Roland Stromberg, in
his book European Intellectual History says of the first half
of the twentieth century, "If the future does not call it the
age of Lenin and Hitler, it may decide to know it as the age
of Toynbee and Sartre." M. F. Ashley Montagu, albeit one of
Toynbee ' s most vocal critics, assesses A Study of History as
"undoubtedly the most widely known work of contemporary his-
torical scholarship," and, "One of the most famous and most
widely discussed books of its time." As a reason for editing
a major collection of critical essays he advances the argu-
ment that "Toynbee is already, and will be for some time to
g
come, a power in the world to reckon with." This observa-
tion about the widespread influence of Toynbee has been put
in a more perceptive framework by C. Vann Woodward when he
comments that Toynbee 's fame is assured by the "disturbance
that he has caused," and by the "distinction of his crit-
ics." 9
6Thomas W. Africa, Richard E. Sullivan and J. K.
Sowards, Ancient Times to 1648 , Vol. I of Critical Issues in
History , ed. by Richard E. Sullivan (2 vols.; Boston: D. C.
Heath, 1967)
, p. 49
.
7Roland Stromberg, European Intellectual History
Since 1789 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts , 1968), p. 6.
8M. F. Ashley Montagu, ed., Toynbee and History
(Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1956) , Preface vii
.
9 C. Vann Woodward, "Outstanding Books 1931-1961,"
American Scholar , XXX (Fall, 1961), 628.
\
4Whether one takes an admiring or a hostile position
on Toynbee, it is safe to say that he is a major figure in
the history of historical writing in the twentieth century,
and worth considerable attention from this perspective. One
of the most judicious students of contemporary historical
theory and of the Toynbee controversy, W. H. Walsh, remarks
with regard to the recent spate of work on speculative phi-
losophy of history that "Much of the discussion centres round
the views of Toynbee, a knowledge of which is indispensible
for intelligent contemporary evaluation of the subject.""^
One could accept the argument that a surge of inter-
est in historiography is now valid and necessary, and that
Toynbee has gained considerable fame in the twentieth century
without accepting the argument that we need a study of Toyn-
bee ' s methodological struggles at this time. One could argue
along with Harry Elmer Barnes in 1948 that the Toynbee effort
is a dead-end street, the dying flicker of an older metaphys-
ical and theological tradition in historiography. But this
view of the Toynbee phenomenon may be regarded more as a
self-serving hope than as a reasoned analysis of the current
state of affairs. Barnes tended to see the culmination of
the history of historical writing in his own "New History,"
and he quickly dismisses any deviation or radical departure
10W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of
History (London: Hutchinson House, 1951), p. 170. (Herein-
after referred to as Philosophy of History .)
5from his own criteria.
Fritz Stern suggests an alternative view of the
resurgence of interest in the broad and comprehensive his-
tories and the philosophies of history that are exemplified
by Toynbee and others. He points to the sociological pres-
sures on the historical profession in a time of crisis,
, * * just as the historian was getting ready
to become an academic monk, shut up in his
study with his sources, the world about him
sought him as a preacher .
H
And this pressure from society is matched by a "demand from
within the profession that history must once again become
broader, more inclusive , more concerned with the deeper
aspects of human history . " All of which means, according to
Stern, that "we are on the threshold of another period of
reconsidering the purposes and methods of history x *
Walsh offers a similar description of the forces and
pressures on the historian of the first half of the twen-
tieth century, and seeks to explain Toynbee ' s work and popu-
larity as the outgrowth of the need of man who when con-
fronted with the spectacle of history needs to show that the
1
3
miseries men experienced were not in vain."
It is not my purpose to enter into a discussion of
13
-Fritz Stern , The Varieties of History (Cleveland:
World Publishing Company, 19 56) , p. 12
.
12 Ibid.
13Walsh, Philosophy of History , p. 121.
6the sociological and psychological forces which helped to
shape contemporary historical writing and theory, as valuable
as such a study would be. It is legitimate to argue that we
are too close to these social and psychological forces to be
able to evaluate the situation properly, but we can begin a
fruitful study of the methodological changes which took place
in the work of one of the very influential historians of the
first half of this century. There is value and legitimacy in
doing some of the spade work, so that later historians can
hazard the more difficult task of re-constructing the psycho-
logical and social world which shaped Toynbee and to which he
himself reacted and contributed.
In this study, I intend to examine changes in Toyn-
bee ' s methodology by viewing him in relation to the crisis of
methodology that emerges in British historiography in the
opening decades of this century. As a participant in the
struggle, he has been a catalyst around whom the methodologi-
cal arguments group and re-group. Whatever men of the next
century may have to say about the continuing or ephemeral
influence of Toynbee 1 s views, about the usefulness or unreli-
ability of his "challenge and response," and whether it is
worthwhile or not to consult his Study of History , it will
still be important for them to review the methodological
quest of Toynbee in order to understand what was occurring in
the historical profession and in the nature of historical
7thought in this century.
Any attempt to unravel the methodological shifts and
changes in Toynbee 1 s historical thought may easily slip into
oversimplification on the one hand, or obfuscation on the
other. If one uses a developmental approach, such as
"early," "middle," and "later" views of Toynbee, the result-
ing account is mechanical and inaccurate. Such an approach
would ignore the dynamics of the historian 1 s struggle and
must deliberately suppress the evidence of recurring "early"
views in the later periods. In short, it presents a mislead-
ing view of the working historian
—
quite the opposite of what
Marc Bloch urges historians to do. He advises them to turn
away from the inhibitions caused by prejudice and false mod-
esty and "to expose the honest gropings of our methods before
a profane public." 14 The truth of the matter is that one
cannot trace a simple change (from an early to a later posi-
tion) in Toynbee during the twenty-seven year period in which
he wrote A Study of History . Even in his use of the term
"science of history" he goes through a process of defining,
attacking, redefining, repudiating and reinstating which well
illustrates Bloch' s description of the "honest gropings" of
14Marc Bloch, The Historian's Craft , trans, by Peter
Putnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) , p. 87.
8the historian. If, on the other hand, we use a chronologi-
cal approach which would try to account for Toynbee's every
shift in position, and every doubling back to readopt earlier
views, we would only succeed in reproducing doubts and confu-
sions already existing in the mind of the reader from his
reading of the original text.
We may be able to gain an intelligible view of the
methodological struggles of Toynbee by studying motifs in his
work. A number of fine scholars working in intellectual his-
tory and philosophy such as Jaeger, Kristeller, Grunebaum and
Dooyweerd have made excellent use of motif studies . Jaeger,
in his study of Origen, states the matter as follows:
If we really want to understand Origen, it will
not help much to measure him by the single dog-
matic issues (Trinity, Incarnation, and so
forth) of the following centuries and to ask how
far he has anticipated each of them or to observe
how inarticulate or wrong he appears with regard
to some of them. Nor is it sufficient to apply
to him the good old-fashioned methods of nine-
teenth century Quellenanalyse and ask who are the
philosophical authors who have influenced him
most. Rather, we have to face the structure of his
thought as a whole and to ask what is the function
^Toynbee himself acknowledges how difficult it has
been to keep track of his themes and ideas throughout the
Study . In the last paragraph of Volume Ten, he expresses his
thanks to his wife for preparing the three indexes to his
volumes, which have given him a "fortifying sense of assur-
ance that, after all, his book cannot be altogether nonsense,
since some sense seems to have been made of it bona fide by a
mind whose critical power is as well known to him as its
charity." Vol. X, 242.
that certain leading ideas have in it.
These critics rightly protest against the common error of
forcing our categories of thought on others, and the need to
let the subjects speak for themselves.- An example of this
approach can be found in Kristeller f s analysis of the Renais-
sance and in his argument that "a study of the self-inter-
pretation of the Renaissance has shown us a way out of the
17impasse of the so-called problem of the Renaissance." In
a motif study of Toynbee we can account for his acceptance
of viewpoints at various points in time and with varying
degrees of acceptance ; sporadic advances and abrupt changes
rather than the systematic progress which we optimistically
imagine is the norm for a professional historian. By a motif
study , a tracing of the recurrent thematic elements, we may
be able to account for the existential aspect of his work,
as distinct from the discussions of the coherence of the
inner principles of historical method in his work. A lead-
ing Dutch historian of this century, Pieter Geyl, whose views
have been tempered by his experiences in the concentration
camps of the second World War, expresses this existential
aspect of historical thoughts
16Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961) , p. 68.
17Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Changing Views of the Intel-
lectual History of the Renaissance Since Jacob Burckhardt," in
The Renaissance , ed. by Tinsley Helton (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1961)
,
p. 36.
History is often thought of as a study contentedly
remote from the present, or as a hobby of scholars
who have elected to fly from the world around them
into the dead and gone past. The truth is rather
that history is an active force in the struggles of
every generation and that the historian by his
interpretation of the past, consciously or half-
consciously or even unconsciously, takes his part
in them, for good or for evil.
Although the critics of Toynbee frequently disagree
about the strengths and weaknesses of A Study of History
,
there is considerable agreement about some of the more gen-
eral aspects of his writing. Few fail to mention the daz-
zling procession of metaphors and similes which fill the ten
volumes, and for good or ill, seem to be an integral part of
Toynbee ' s thought processes. The problem of style in the
Study is so important that undoubtedly it will draw the
attention of later students of Toynbee, especially those who
are concerned with literary aspects of historiography. Yet
since our concern is primarily methodological, we will limit
19
our discussion to those metaphors and descriptive phrases
Pieter Geyl, Debates With Historians (Groningen:
J. B. Wolters, 1955), p. 236.
1
9
Several contemporary historians have successfully
used a study of metaphors as a clue to the intention or mean-
ing of a particular author. H. T. Wade-Gery, a life-long
friend of Toynbee, has a very instructive study of the simi-
les and metaphors in the Iliad ( Poet of the Iliad ) as a way
of deciphering the problem of authorship. H. Stuart Hughes,
in his discussion of Freud ( Consciousness and Society ) argues
that "a thinker is, after all, partly judged on the basis of
figures of speech he uses, and in Freud's case, the thought
never got beyond a fairly simple vocabulary drawn from nine-
teenth century physics."
11
which Toynbee uses to express his own self-consciousness as
an historian.
When we concentrate on the self-portraits which are
repeated on many occasions, rather than the casual metaphor,
four images come from the Study with enough clarity and
forcefulness for us to say that Toynbee sees his role as
that of an explorer, social scientist, student of life, and
Christian historian.
In the discussion that is to follow, we will devote
a major section to each one of Toynbee " s self-designations,
prefacing the whole with a brief account of the British his-
toriographical scene of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century.
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN HISTORICAL SCIENCES
IN GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1870 TO 1910
"I can look forward to some future meeting of
this association when . . . the most conspicuous
place on the programme will be assigned to some
gifted young historical thinker who . . . will
propound and explain to the satisfaction of all
his colleagues some new and far-reaching law or
laws of history. » • . "
E. P. Cheyney's Presidential Address to the
American Historical Association, 1923
Before beginning an analysis of Arnold Toynbee 1 s
methodological struggle it is important to consider the
recent English historical trends which form the background
of his life as an historian . Toynbee himself does not dodge
the question of environmental influence , and indeed uses the
question as the introduction to his Study when he asks whe-
ther the influence of the social environment on historical
thought is absolute or can be transcended.
It is difficult to select a defensible chronological
point of entry into recent English historiography. If we
choose Toynbee "s date of birth in 1889 we act arbitrarily
with regard to significant developments in English histori-
cal thought, in spite of the fact that 1889 marked a signifi-
^Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London:
Oxford University Press, 1934) , I, 16.
12
cant era in France with the death of Fustel de Coulanges
(1830-89) and in Germany with the death of Doellinger (1799-
1889)
.
Again while it may be of general interest to note the
birth of another noted contemporary like Adolph Hitler in
1889, or a more historiographical event such as the coming
into being of the American Church History Society in the same
year, we are still merely chronicling rather than locating
the point at which an intelligible discussion of emerging
trends may take place
. It is necessary to go back to the
decade of the 1870' s to find the most reasonable chronologi-
cal starting point for a survey of the English historiography
which formed the background of Arnold Toynbee's A Study of
History ,
The student of history in the mid- twentieth century
is apt to overlook the fact that historical work in its pres-
ent form is of comparatively recent origin . The institution-
alizing of "history" in universities, in seminars, in histor-
ical institutes , in journals , in associations and in congres-
ses is for the most part a product of the late nineteenth
century. These organs were regarded with considerable skep-
ticism even into the early decades of the twentieth century
by the literary and non-academically oriented historians.
Only when one comes across the complaints of a non-academi-
cally oriented historian such as Toynbee, or goes back to the
literary historians of late nineteenth century England can
14
one realize how recent in origin are many of the commonplaces
of modern historical research. In 1913, G. M. Trevelyan
(1876-1962), who could boast of at least two great literary
historians in his ancestry, inveighed against the institu-
tionalizing of history, although he himself found refuge in
the academy fifteen years later:
The last fifty years have witnessed great changes in
the management of Clio's temple. Her inspired pro-
phets and bards have passed away and been succeeded
by the priests of an established church; the vulgar
have been excluded from the Court of the Gentiles;
doctrine has been defined; heretics have been excom-
municated; and the tombs of the aforesaid prophets
have been duly blackened by the new hierarchy.
Disregarding the complaint of Trevelyan, his recog-
nition of the "great changes in the management of Clio's
temple" provides a useful introduction to our task of iden-
tifying changes in late nineteenth-century English historical
thought* While one may use the general descriptive phrase
the "institutionalizing of history" to designate these
changes, it should be clear that the last quarter of the
nineteenth century saw the emergence of the modern science of
history and its problems. By the term science of history, we
mean the emergence of historical studies in its present sys-
tematic form, replete with a self-conscious methodology and
some awareness of the structure and limits of its field. The
George Macaulay Trevelyan, Clio, a Muse (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), p. lW.
15
term includes several methodological subdivisions within Eng-
lish historiography, embracing primarily all those historians
who used the term "scientific" in connection with their
method, as a way both to gain the prestige currently being
accorded the natural sciences and to distinguish themselves
from their less scientific fellow historians.
This perspective on English historiography since the
1870' s should enable us to see Arnold Toynbee * s work in its
proper light. We will not be inclined to dismiss him as a
religious mystic, a pessimistic prophet, a manifestation of
twentieth-century crisis hysteria, a speculative and charming
journalist, or a disappointed ex-professional historian. All
of these are possible interpretations of Toynbee, as demon-
strated by the essays and articles of the critics, but they
suffer from a highly selective view of Toynbee* s thought and
writings. It can be said that Toynbee ' s desire to appeal to
a wide audience, his use of dramatic metaphors and penchant
for predictions, often make these interpretations appear
more plausible than they are. We begin to move from the
realm of opinion and subjective reaction when we attempt to
reconstruct the historiographical struggles of the time, and
see Toynbee in terms of the developing science of history and
the intense Methodenstreit which necessarily accompanied it.
16
The Institutionalizing of History
in the British Universities
The decade of the 1870' s may be regarded as the cru-
cial era in the emergence of modern English historiography
because it spans the years when historical science gained
status in the universities, when historical research became
increasingly institutionalized, when leadership began to
move from the amateur to the professional historian, and when
foundations were laid for the later profusion of historical
societies and journals.
The 1870' s witnessed a number of educational changes,
some of which had a direct bearing on the development of the
historical sciences. The Education Act of 1870 inaugurated a
reform of educational practice and institution which was to
have wide effect on the English scene. Ensor speaks of the
decade as the start of a period which "saw the conversion of
the English as a whole into a school-taught and literate
3people . " The Gladstonian reform of the universities in the
Religious Test Act of 1871 opened the way for a reconsidera-
tion of the purpose and curriculum of Oxford and Cambridge.
Herbert Fisher (1865-1940) , Oxford scholar, then lecturer and
historian of Modern European History, and finally Warden of
New College, discussed the Oxford experience in his Unfinished
3
R. C. K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1936)
,
p. xx.
17
Autobiography
.
Commenting on the restriction of the curricu-
lum to the classics, mathematics, law, and theology, he notes
the changes of the 1870' s.
Up until the later part of the nineteenth century a
university career had always been regarded as some-
thing of a rich man's luxury.
. . . Oxford and
Cambridge
. . . were until the abolition of relig-
ious tests in 1871 regarded as nurseries of the
national church, and training-grounds for the land-
owning gentry.
The fight to throw open the universities to the whole country
irrespective of creeds was led at Cambridge and Oxford by the
younger dons, enrolling such stalwarts as Dicey (1835-1922)
,
Sidgwick (1838-1900), Bryce (1838-1922), G. 0. Trevelyan
(1838-1928) and Henry Jackson (1839-1921). These educational
reforms helped to free the educational structure for the
growth of new academic disciplines, although the impetus for
historical science came from a new set of historical ideals
advocated by a rising group of historians centered especially
in Oxford and Cambridge.,
The Oxford situation reveals much about the changes
in English historiography. While there was official recogni-
tion of the place of history in the curriculum as early as
the establishment of the Regius Professorship of Modern His-
tory in 1724 by George I, this bore little practical result
until the brief tenure of Thomas Arnold (1795-1842) in 1841.
4
H. A. L. Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography
(London? Oxford University Press, 1940) , p. XTT7~
Charles Oman (1860-1946) has compiled an interesting and
humorous account of the trials of the Regius Professors at
Oxford, pointing out the chronic problems that afflicted the
political incumbents of the office down to the formation of
the new Honours School of Law and Modern History in 1850. 5
The new discipline did not gain enough strength to stand
alone until the separation of Law from History in 1873.
Leadership for the "New History" was provided by
Stubbs (1825-1901), Freeman (1823-92) and Green (1837-83),
and can be dated with some accuracy by the appointment of
William Stubbs to the Regius Chair in 1866. Mandell Creigh-
ton's experience at Oxford during the early years of Stubbs'
teaching career offers considerable insight into the changes
taking place. Creighton (1843-1901) had his earlier train-
ing in the School of Litterae Humaniores
,
but then in 1866
began to read for the School of Law and History. Examined
by Bruce, Stubbs and others, he became a history tutor and
took the initiative in the organization of the Association
of Tutors in 1868-69. The changes in those two years
involved the decision to open lectures in each college to
the other colleges, the organization of tutors, and the sys-
tematic arrangement of lectures to cover the various fields
of learning. By 1892, when Creighton had gained considerable
5Charles Oman, On the Writing of History (London:
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1939).
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success as professor of ecclesiastical history at Cambridge,
as editor of the English Historical Review, and as author of
a notable History of the Papacy
, his reflections on English
historical studies included the observation that:
With Stubbs began the scientific pursuit of modern
history, as he impressed his views upon us younger
men. We worked out among us a scheme of lectures
covering the whole field, and were the pioneers of
the 'Intercollegiate Lectures* which now prevail
at both Universities.
Gooch (1873-1968) calls Stubbs the first trained his-
torian to hold the post of Modern History at Oxford, 7 and
records the enthusiasm with which his work was received on
the Continent as the leader of the "exact school of history"
in England. What is of great interest to us is his role in
the establishment of the methodological ideals of the German
historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) in English historio-
graphy. By his assertion that "I don't believe in a philo-
sophy of history," he tried to clear the epistemological
ground for the historian so that "sovereign impartiality"
might be the basis for his historical views. The Rankean
ideal as employed by the English historians was largely nega-
tive, and expressed itself in boasts such as those made about
Louise Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell
Creighton (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1904)
, pT 61.
^George P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nine -
teenth Century (2d ed. ; London s Longmans , Green and Co.
,
1952)
, p. 318.
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Stubbs that although he was "steeped in clerical and con-
servative principles, " no one could tell his politics from
reading his books. Maitland (1850-1906) credits Stubbs with
doing more to introduce the methods of German scholarship
into England than any other man.
This self-conscious adoption of the pattern of Ranke
led Creighton, one of Stubbs* disciples, to adopt a stance
which was deceptively simple for himself, yet devastatingly
critical of his predecessors. His wife sums up the "absolute
impartiality" of the bishop in the phrase, "He did not wish
to prove anything, to maintain any theories, to make any
brilliant generalizations , his aim was simply and straight-
9forwardly to tell what happened, to get at the truth .
"
Creighton elaborated his epistemological position in a con-
versation with a student in 1871 when he described histori-
cal methodology as the gathering of a number of detached
facts 9 then come the principles which will seem to drive out
the facts, until "finally you will find the facts will begin
10
to cluster around the principles."
York Powell (1850-1904), Regius Professor at Oxford
from 1894 until his death in 1904, expressed this negative
8 Ibid.
9
Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton,
p. 226 •
10
Ibid.
, p. 61.
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ideal in his arguments against his predecessor James Froude
(1818-1894). He insisted that history be distinguished from
literature and ethics because it is an "absolute science."
In his 1903 address on "A General Survey of Modern History,"
scientific method is described in the following way:
... it collects and sifts facts, gets them down
as correctly as it can, classifies, them, and then,
making hypotheses, tests and tries these till it
arrives at conclusions that stand every test and
trial it can apply. 1
York Powell shared with his Oxford predecessor, Freeman, an
abhorrence of metaphysics, and a desire to "let the facts
12
speak for themselves." This version of the Rankean ideal
was passed to his successor in the Regius Chair, Charles
Firth (1857-1936). Firth's biographers speak of him in
terms of the same negative ideal; as one who avoided judg-
ments, who desired to tell the whole story without comment,
to "let the facts speak for themselves." Firth is also des-
cribed as one who never subscribed to any school of history
13
and was not concerned with general ideas.
James Bryce uses an interesting metaphor to express
the ideal of the "passionless man" in his introduction in
1
1
Oliver Elton, Frederick York Powell (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1906) , II , T.
12 Ibid
. ,
I, 245.
13Eleanor Smith Godfrey, "Sir Charles Firth," Some
Historians of Modern Europe, ed. by Schmitt, pp. 146-147.
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1901 to the English translation of Helmolt's History of the
\ World . Comparing the encroachment of theory or presupposi-
tion in a working historian to a "seduction/ 1 he says that it
is the business of the historian "... to set forth and
explain the facts exactly as they are; and if he writes in
the light of a theory, he is pretty certain to be uncon-
sciously seduced into giving undue prominence to those facts
1 4
which make for it."
Before we shift our attention to the developing
Methodenstreit which serves as an intelligible background
for Toynbee's A Study of History
, let us survey the career
patterns of the new historians as they relate to this process
of the institutionalizing and professionalizing of modern
historical science.
Richard Lodge (1855-1936), first to be appointed to
the Chair of History at Glasgow in 1894, entered Oxford in
the stimulating decade of the 1870' s to study under Stubbs,
and listen to Jowett (1817-1893) and Ruskin (1819-1900). A
list of student contemporaries helps to indicate the seed-bed
characteristics of Oxford in relation to the rise of modern
English historiography. With him were W. P. Kerr, R. L.
Poole (1857-1939), H. Round (1854-1928), T. F. Tout (1855-
1929), A. Toynbee (1852-1883), F. C. Montague (1858-1935),
14 Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography, p. 331 0
C. H. Firth and G. E. Buckle ( 1854-1935)
.
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Lodge's career marks out a pattern that is represen-
tative of many who were trained in the "Oxford School."
After Balliol and the influence of Stubbs, Lodge went to
Vienna University, then returned to Oxford as a don and lec-
turer in Modern European History, and finally secured the
post at Glasgow. Charles Firth entered Balliol in 1876, then
studied in Germany, returning to Oxford in 1883 for twenty
years of research and teaching in Modern European History
until his appointment to the Regius Professorship in 1904.
William Ashley (1860-1927) entered Balliol in 1878, went to
Germany in 1880, "83 and "84 for methodological study, and
returned to Oxford in 1885, where he remained until his
appointment to Toronto and Harvard a few years later.
Andrew G. Little (1863-1945), another great name among the
English historians, entered Balliol in 1882, went to Dresden
and Gottingen in 1886 for further study in historical method,
then returned to Oxford for research until his appointment to
Cardiff in 1892. Several others of equal fame followed the
same pattern with the exception of the continental study.
Thomas Tout had entered Balliol in 1874, studied under
Stubbs, continued in Balliol as chaplain after 1876, then in
1881 he went to St. David's College in Wales to hold the his-
15John Davis, "Sir Richard Lodge," Some Historians
of Modern Europe , ed. by Schmitt, p. 201.
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tory post for nine years before beginning his famous career
at Manchester. His fellow professor at Manchester, and
equally responsible for the establishment of its outstanding
school, of history, James Tait (1863-1944), entered Balliol
in 1884, heard that same day the inaugural lecture of
Stubbs' successor Freeman, attended the Oxford seminars of
Firth and York Powell, and then began his teaching career at
Manchester in 1887. The same year that Tait entered Balliol,
Herbert Fisher began his studies at New College, became a
Fellow in 1888 along with Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), went to
Paris in 1889, to Gottingen and Dresden in 1890, and returned
to lecture at Oxford in 1891.
We will not follow the careers of other Balliol men
such as H. W. C. Davis (1874-1928) , R. H. Tawney (1880-1962)
,
G. D. H. Cole (1889-1958), Arthur Lionel Smith (1850-1924)
and G. M. Young who span the intervening years to 1907. But
the above pattern of careers sheds a light on the institu-
tionalizing of history and helps us to understand the climate
of historical studies which prevailed when young Toynbee
arrived at Oxford as a student in 1907.
While the "Oxford School" under the leadership of
Stubbs, Freeman, and Green was beginning to provide an insti-
tutional framework for the new history in the 1870 "s, the
necessary organs of publication were also beginning to emerge.
The English Historical Review had its origins in the Oxford
circle as the result of the initiative of James Bryce and
J. R. Green. Bryce had finished his undergraduate studies
at Oxford, his continental studies at Heidelberg and had
returned to lecture at Oxford by 1865. In an 1866 visit to
the vicarage of J. R. Green (1837-1883)
,
Bryce and the Rev-
erend William Hunt (1842-1931) had discussed the possibility
of establishing a historical journal with Green. By 1867,
Green had discussed the matter in a letter to Freeman, and
Bruce had consulted Stubbs and the publisher Macmillan. But
the financial problems, the matter of competent contributors,
the need for a trained reading public, as well as fear of
competition from the North British Review chilled the enthu-
siasm of the would-be journalists. The same factors may be
regarded as signs that the developing science of history was
not yet ready to support a major publication venture.
Throughout the decade of 1870 the project was frequently dis-
cussed, culminating in a gathering at Oxford in 1885 of
16
Powell, Round, Tout, Firth and Archer (1834-1902). Creigh-
ton speaks of a meeting in Bryce ' s home in which he, Acton,
Dean Church (1815-90), A. W. Ward (1837-1924), and York
Powell worked out some of the details. They asked Creighton
to serve as the editor instead of the over-worked Bryce,
with R. L. Poole as the sub-editor. Five months later, in
16 R. L. Poole, "The Beginnings of the English Histori-
cal Review," English Historical Review, XXXVI (19 21)
.
January 1886, the first issue was published, and Acton's let
ter of congratulation to the editor noted that, "At least
half the great names are there, and I discern the makings of
a sacred band of university workers." 17
The twenty years which elapsed from the first pro-
posal of the Review in 1866 to the first issue in 1886
bespeaks the struggle to establish an autonomous science of
history in England and to give the study an institutional
framework and an organ of publication. Even with Acton's
enthusiasm, Creighton " . . . doubted if there was a suf-
ficiently large public to take an interest in purely histori
1
8
cal questions." His plea to Acton for an article in the
first issue contained a very realistic evaluation:
We must confess that we are not strong in
historical method in England. Our work has
all the advantages and all the disadvantages
of amateur work. . . . You are one of the
very few persons who can add any novelty.
A glance beyond the English borders will give us an
additional perspective on the English scene. In America in
1886 the two year old American Historical Association was
engaged in publishing its own new journal , The American His -
torical Review. Ranke, the German methodological lodestar,
p a 339.
Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton,
had been made an honorary member and was invited to address
the new society. In Germany, Ranke
' s illustrious career came
to a close with his death in 1886. One year earlier the
Dutch historians had organized their historical journal,
Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis
, patterned after the successful
German Historische Zeitschrift
, which had been founded in
1859 by Heinrich von Sybel. The Italians to the south had
given organizational status to their historiographical
efforts with the formation of the Istituto Storico Italiano
in 1883.
Returning to the institutionalizing of modern his-
torical studies in England, we find that the entrenchment and
enlargement of the historians' work in the Universities and
in the English Historical Review was followed several years
later by the formation of national associations. One cannot
suppose that a vacuum existed until the English Historical
Association was formed in 1906. Local historical societies
and the close ties between the historians provided by English
University life promoted interchange of ideas, criticism, and
research„ The forming of over-arching organizations to unite
geographically separated historians began before the end of
the nineteenth century. Maitland rallied the historians of
law around the Seldon Society in 1887; church historians
formed the Church Historical Society in 1894. The early
years of the new century with its series of International
28
Congresses of Historical Sciences in 1903, 1908, and 1913
precipitated the great number of specialized historical
societies like the British Society of Franciscan Studies of
1907, and the Economic History Society of 1926. Specialized
historical journals accompanied the new societies, and the
ever accumulating and accelerating research was given some
degree of order with the organization of the Institute of
Historical Research in London in the year 1921.
Turning from Oxford to Cambridge, we find similar
changes occurring in the study of history. In 1869 Seeley
(1834-95) succeeded Kingsley as Regius Professor of Modern
History and may be regarded as the transitional figure in
the development of the historical sciences in that Univer-
sity. Seeley began his career at Cambridge by denouncing
the dominant literary tradition of the "charlatans" Carlyle
and Macaulay, and extolling the careful scholarship of Leo-
pold von Ranke. He followed the lead of the Oxford dons by
establishing the History Tripos in the University. But his
own overwhelming interest in politics and political lessons,
his indifference to reforms and to the rising dissatisfaction
of the history tutors, meant that the leadership of the new
science of history would pass from Seeley to Creighton. See-
ley had been the only professor of history at the University,
but in 1884 Creighton was appointed to the new post of Dixie
Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Gwatkin (1844-1916),
29
Prothero (1848-1922) and other promising young historians in
the University gathered around Creighton, and worked for the
reforms as embodied in the recommendations of the Board of
Historical Studies of 1885.
By 1888 F. M. Maitland was at Cambridge occupying
the Downing Chair of the Laws of England, and thereby giving
the University a man Acton called the "ablest historian in
England," and Pollard referred to him as "the greatest that
England has possessed." In 1895 Seeley was succeeded by Lord
Acton as Regius Professor who further enhanced and strength-
ened the place of historical studies in the University. As
in the historical school at Oxford, Cambridge witnessed a
similar pattern of developing future strength from the return-
ing history students. John Clapham (1873-1946) completed his
Tripos in 1895, returned in 1908, and by 1928 had become the
first Professor of Economic History at Cambridge. John Hol-
land Rose (1855-1942) , who entered Cambridge before Clapham,
returned as lecturer and reader to climax his professional
and professorial career in 1914 as the first holder of the
chair of naval history at Cambridge. Harold Temperley (1879-
1939) and Denys Winstanley (1877-1947) both had their histori-
cal training at Cambridge under Acton, Maitland and Bury
(1861-1927), then traveled widely and returned as tutors,
house masters, and as in Temper ley's case, University Profes-
sor of Modern History.
\30
If we turn to the situation at Manchester, we may
again add to our understanding of the late nineteenth century
historiographical changes. A chair of history was established
there as early as 1854, but the undifferentiated state of
historical studies is underlined by the fact that the incum-
bent, Richard C. Christie (1830-1901), was required to teach
history, jurisprudence and political economy. By 1866 the
disciplines of history and law were separated, and Adolphus
Ward was appointed to teach history. The school began to
grow under Christie and Ward, although its great reputation
dates from the arrival of two Balliol men, Thomas Tout and
James Tait, who had been strongly influenced by the Stubbs
circle at Oxford. Tait came directly from his Oxford train-
ing to Manchester in 1887 as lecturer and by 1896 occupied
the chair of history. Tout went to St. David's College in
Wales for nine years before going to Manchester as Ward's
successor in 1890. Advanced research facilities were estab-
lished, chairs in economic history and modern history added,
and Tout and Tait, "two of the most distinguished medieval-
20ists in England," led a community of historian scholars
which included such men as George Unwin, Ramsey Muir (1872-
1941) and H. W. C. David (1874-1928).
In the north, James Bryce, an Oxford historian whom
20Powicke , Modern Historians and the Study of History
,
p. 32
.
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we have encountered in the Stubbs circle, and in the Man-
chester school as Christie's successor in 1869, started his
career at Glasgow University. But his historical interests
could hardly be grounded in this educational experience, for
he explains, "History was not taught at all, there was no
professor." 21 But by the year 1894, a chair of history was
established at Glasgow, where a Balliol man, Richard Lodge
(1855-1936)
,
won the appointment. In the same year, Prothero
of Cambridge won the new post established at Edinburgh Uni-
versity. A Scottish History Society had been established in
Edinburgh as early as 1886, but its primary purpose was the
discovery and printing of unpublished documents. By 1903,
the Scottish Historical Review came into being to express the
views and researches of the new science of history.
Flowering of the Scientific School of History in
the First Decade of the Twentieth Century
While we can trace the growth of a science of history
in England in the last three decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the flowering of that movement occurs in the first
decade of the twentieth century.
The self-confidence or even dogmatism of the profes-
sional historians with their new Rankean tools and their
dominance in the universities comes to expression in many
2
1
Herbert A. L. Fisher, James Bryce (London: Mac-
millan and Co., 1927), I, 25.
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places and on many occasions. Trevelyan's plaintive note in
1913 that "doctrine has been defined; heretics excommunicated;
and the tombs of the aforesaid prophets have been duly black-
ened by the new hierarchy" may be taken as a fairly accurate
appraisal of the routing of all opposition from the amateur
and literary historians of an earlier era.
Edwin Hatch 1 s optimism might have been judged some-
what visionary and premature in 1889 when he argued that,
"We may hear, if we will, the solemn tramp of the science of
history marching slowly, but marching always to conquest. It
is marching in our day, almost for the first time, into the
domain of Christian history.
. . . In front of it, as in
front of the physical sciences, is chaos; but behind it is
22
order." But his optimism was reiterated and given a kind
of official sanction and credibility in J. B. Bury's famous
Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge in 1902. Bury reminds his
audience that a revolution is taking place in the science of
history, and that when Ranke 8 s dictum "Ich will nur sagen wie
es eigentlich gewesen ist" has been fully implemented "though
there be many schools of political philosophy, there will no
23longer be divers schools of history." His concluding
2 2Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on
Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957)
,
p. 23
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J. B. Bury, "The Science of History," Selected
Essays of J. B . Bury , ed. by Harold Temperley (Cambridge:
University Press, 1930), p. 12.
remarks bring together his methodological conviction of the
objective scientific character of history and his astounding
faith in the effects of this triumph of the science of his-
tory.
... if, year by year, history is to become a more
and more powerful force for stripping the bandages
of error from the eyes of men, for shaping public
opinion and advancing the cause of intellectual and
political liberty, she will best prepare her dis-
ciples for the performance of that task, ... by
remembering always that,
. . . she is herself sim-
ply a science, no less and no more. '
While Bury could not bring himself to make quite as
extravagant a claim as his French contemporary Fustel de
Coulanges', "Do not imagine you are listening to me; it is
history itself that speaks/" 3 nevertheless he expresses the
sense of culmination and triumph that English historians
were experiencing in the first decade of the new century.
It is possible to see in the publication of the Cam-
bridge Modern History a clear example of the authoritative
voice of history imagined by the practitioners of the new
science of history. In 1896 Lord Acton had been invited by
the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press to become gen-
eral editor of a History of the World . Here was a possibil-
ity of writing a definitive history, of fact gathering by the
24
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34
experts, and of producing the absolutely impartial version of
history. Acton's letter of direction to his contributors was
sent out in 1898 with the strong admonition:
Our scheme requires that nothing shall reveal the
country, the religion, or the party to which the
writers belong.
. . . Contributors will understand
that we are established, not under the Meridian of
Greenwich, but in Long. 30 deg. W. ; that our Water-
loo must be one that satisfies French and English,
Germans and Dutch alike; that nobody can tell,
without examining the list of authors, where the
Bishop of Oxford laid down the pen, and whether
Fairbairn or Gasquet, Liebermann or Harrison took
it up. b
Acton himself died in 1902 just before the first vol-
ume of the Cambridge Modern History was published, but the
work continued on the text until the twelfth volume was pub-
lished in 1910. By 1911 the first volume of the Cambridge
Medieval History had appeared, and this series was followed
by the Cambridge Ancient History and the Cambridge History of
the British Empire .
By 1913, on the eve of the first World War, Gooch had
written the last chapter of the last volume of the Cambridge
Modern History on the topic "The Growth of the Historical
Sciences"
;
While historical science is thus extending its
conquests in every direction, the philosophy of
history lags behind. 27
2 6stern, The Varieties of History
, p. 249.
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A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, Stanley Leathes, eds
.
,
The Cambridge Modern History (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1902) '. XII , 850.
That same year Gooch concluded his History and His-
torians in the Nineteenth Century with the identical state-
ment concerning the triumphs of the new history. He added a
concluding thought that might have given direction to Arnold
Toynbee, then a twenty-four year old historian at Oxford,
who had just returned from a year in Greece to become Ancient
History tutor at Balliol. Gooch asserted that "though it is
not yet possible to formulate laws explaining the purpose and
the plan of human evolution, every true historian contributes
equally with the student of science and psychology to the
2 8progress of our knowledge of man." His hope that historians
would soon reach a law-formulating stage may have provided
the challenge to which Arnold Toynbee responded with years of
research and four volumes of his A Study of History in an
effort to elaborate those laws of human history.
It is interesting to hear the same hope more clearly
articulated ten years later in the presidential address of
the American Historical Association. E. P. Cheyney's yearn-
ing for the "gifted young historical thinker who . . . will
propound . « some new and far-reaching law or laws of his-
29tory. • . . " had some prospect of realization in the work
2 ftGooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Cen -
tury
, p. 594.
29
Edward P. Cheyney, "Law in History," The American
Historical Review, XXIX (January, 1924), 248.
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Toynbee was just undertaking in London in the same decade.
Tensions and Controversies
Among the New Historians
Despite the steady process of the institutionalizing
of historical studies after 1870 in the British Universities,
and the flourishing of the many historical societies and
journals, seminars and theoretical discussion grew more
slowly. E. L. Woodward, in an address given in 1950 to the
British Academy on "The Present State of Historical Studies,"
recognized the general aversion of British historical schol-
ars to the theoretical aspects of historiography. As support
for his own refusal to discuss "the fundamental problem of
the nature of historical knowledge," he argues that "I am in
good company if I evade a master problem of this kind, since
nearly all English historians have evaded it." 30
His estimate is corroborated by another British his-
torian trained at Cambridge in the early years of the twen-
tieth century. Sir Charles Webster recalls that when he was
a student there was no systematic study of history, no
research techniques, no "modern history," and no graduate
instruction at Cambridge. Even though Bury and Westlake were
leading the historical school, and producing monumental stud-
ies, the young historian had only "fleeting contact" with
them, and received no systematic teaching in techniques of
30Stern, The Varieties of History
,
p. 14.
historical research.^
When we go back to review the Oxford experience in
historical seminars and theoretical discussion, we find fur-
ther confirmation of Pollard's complaint of 1904, that,
"There is no real school of research in history in any Eng-
32lish University."" Freeman had attempted a seminar at
Oxford on "Methods of Historical Study." Firth, in his
inaugural address of 1904 complained that Oxford did nothing
to train historians, and then spent the next twenty- two years
of his incumbency trying to establish research methods and
technical training there. His successor as Regius Professor
of Modern History, H. W. C. Davis, credited Firth with the
organization of the seminar, remarking that, "he has every
33
right to be called the father of this new development.
Even though the English scene did not witness the
intense methodological debates that were carried on in Ger-
many at the turn of the century by historian-theoreticians
of the stature of Dilthey, Windelband, Troeltsch, Meyer,
Meinecke, and Weber, it would be a mistake to suppose that
the new history did not soon show signs of major methodologi-
31 Charles Webster, Fifty Years of Change in Histori-
cal Teaching (Pamphlet of the Historical Association, lybbj
,
pp. 36-37.
32 Ibid .
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cal tensions
.
The problems which were inevitable in the simplistic
epistemology of the English Rankeans were not immediately
apparent to the sacred band of professional historians who
were beginning to gather around Stubbs, Freeman, and Green at
Oxford, Creighton and Maitland at Cambridge, and Ward, Tait,
and Tout at Manchester* Yet difficulties lurked just below
the surface in such factual narratives as Creighton* s History
of the Papacy
.
One example is the Anglican bishop's inter-
esting interpretation of the Reformation which is not unlike
certain Marxist interpretations of "real history." In a let-
ter to Mrs. Green in 1884 he expresses mild mcern about his
own non-idealistic interpretation of the Reformation, adding:
If the Pope could have left off pillaging Germany,
I believe that 'justification by faith only 1 would
have created only a languid interest. This is a
very low view. I know that we ought to believe
that mighty movements always swayed the hearts of
men. So they have--when they made for their pecun-
iary interest. But I believe that ideas were
always second thoughts in politics— they were the
garb with which men covered the nudity of their
practical desires.
Collingwood observes that "In the main, English his-
torians of the late nineteenth century thus went on their own
way without often pausing to utter general reflections on
their work; on the rare occasions when they did so, as for
example in Freeman's book on The Methods of Historical Study
(London, 1886) , or here and there in inaugural lectures,
nothing worthy of notice came of it." The Idea of History
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 14T7"
Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton ,
p. 267.
For a man who wanted simply to record what happened in the
historical past, who had no theories to maintain and no
philosophy of history, this rather surprising theoretical
discussion emerges in his letters and was sooner or later to
disclose the hidden postulates of the "neutral observer"
position of the new school of historians.
Looking back at the performance of this first gener-
ation of English Rankeans one is impressed with their power
to mesmerize both themselves and their defenseless amateur-
historian opponents. G. P. Gooch accepts Stubbs' boast that
"no one could tell his politics from [reading] his books,"
and further defines Stubbs' "remarkable impartiality" with
the explanation that "his political and religious beliefs
never obtruded in his work." 36 Yet this is the same man who
in his public (1880) and printed (1887) Lectures on Medieval
and Modern History does not hesitate to describe Turkey as
"the curse of Christendom," and that "it [Turkey] means
nothing, represents nothing but butchery, barbarism and the
37
vilest slavery."
Occasionally the internal methodological strains
became quite evident as in the dramatic Acton-Creighton con-
3 6Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury
, p. 318. ~ "
~~
37William Stubbs, Lectures on Medieval and Modern
History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886), p. 275.
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troversy of 1887. The "sacred band of university workers"
which Acton discerned in the 1886 founding of the English
Historica l Review suffered sharp dissension in the ranks
when Acton wrote a harsh review of Creighton's Papacy
.
Creighton had received very favorable reviews of his first
two volumes from Acton. Consequently, as editor of the
Historical Review
,
he sent Volumes Three and Four to Acton
for what he hoped would be continued favorable reviewing
from the one man in England he considered competent to dis-
cuss the volumes. To Creighton's great dismay, as disclosed
in hurried correspondence to his colleagues, the Acton review
contained a sharp attack on him for refusing to pass judg-
ment on the Renaissance Papacy and the Inquisition. This
controversy was not easy for the nineteenth century contem-
porary historians to understand, and has puzzled Acton and
Creighton biographers since that time. But one needs to
recall the tremendous moral and intellectual struggle through
which Acton had passed as a loyal Catholic scholar in the
Papal Infallibility controversies from 1859 to 1870. Kochan
describes Acton's struggle as the "permanent compromise of
3 8his conscience," and Butterfield speaks of it as the soul-
shaking experience of opposing and then submitting to the
38
"Lionel Kochan, Acton on History (London: Andre
Deutsch, 1954)
, p. 27.
Dogma of Papal Infallibility. 39 it is apparent that Creigh-
ton ' s discussion of the Inquisition touched on points in
papal history of great importance to Acton. Creighton
expected praise from Acton for the fact that a Protestant
clergyman scholar could handle Catholic historical inter-
pretations in such an "objective" or non- judgmental fashion.
Indeed, Acton had noted the Rankean ideal of objectivity in
Creighton' s work:
Nobody should stand better with Mr. Creighton than
Ranke. The late John Richard Green used to com-
plain that it was from him that he had learnt to
be so dispassionate and inattentive to everything
but the chain of uncoloured fact. In reserve of
language, exclusion of all that is not history,
dislike of purple patchwork and emotional effect,
their ways are one.
Instead, what emerged from his historicism adopted
by Creighton, Stubbs and many of their contemporaries was an
ethical relativism that was anathema to Acton because it
undermined his concept of progress— the growth of liberty.
This passage from Acton's review is an indication of how in
Acton's eyes Creighton 's virtue could by degrees become a
vice, how impartiality could be a mask for moral indifference,
how recording and observing could lead to superficial chroni-
cling. Of Creighton, Acton says:
39Herbert Butterfield, Lord Acton (London: Historical
Association Pamphlet, 1948)
, p. 8.
^°John Acton, Book review in English Historical
Review, II (1887), 572.
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He is not striving to prove a case, or burrowingtowards a conclusion, but wishes to pass through
scenes of raging controversy and passion with a
serene curiosity, a suspended judgment, a dividedjury, and a pair of white gloves. 1
And he adds at the close:
He describes the things that vary rather than the
things that endure.
. . . The system, the idea,
is masked by a crowd of ingenious
. . . charac-
ters.
. . .
The inner mind of the papacy has tobe perused.
. . . Without reversing his views,
or modifying his statement, he has yet to dis-'
close the reason, deeper and more interior than
the
. . .
corruption of ecclesiastics, which com-
pelled the new life of nations to begin by a con-
vulsion . 42
What the Protestant clergyman-historian deemed fair-minded-
ness in his desire to put the Inquisition in the best pos-
sible light, the Roman Catholic historian deplored as appli-
cation of a sliding scale, as a lowering of the standard of
moral judgment. Acton argued that:
If we may debase the currency for the sake of
genius or success or reputation, we may debase
it for the sake of a man's influence, of his
religion, of his party.
, . . Then history
ceases to be a science, an arbiter of contro-
versy, a guide of the wanderer;.,
. . it serves
where it ought to reign.
. • u
Creighton* s response to the attacks of a man he regarded with
such high respect as a historical scholar, and with equal
bewilderment as a Catholic historian was the confession that,
41
Ibid
. , p. 573.
42
Ibid.
, p. 580.
43 ,Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton
,
p. 372.
"Perhaps the effort to rid myself of prejudice has left me
cold and abstract in my mode of expression and thinking." 44
This controversy offered an early expression of the
Methodenstreit that was bound to occur as historical scholars
began to work out the implications of their new history. In
this case, Creighton and Acton were two of the most bril-
liant early leaders who agreed on certain basic epistemologi-
cal principles which had come into English historiography
from the Rankean school. One can say that the controversy
marked the limits of their theoretical agreement. Although
they agreed on the negative ideal as a first phase in the new
history as it worked itself out into written history, Acton
recognized the damage it was doing to his other historiogra-
phical principles such as his concept of development. They
had shared an epistemological faith in the "passionless
man"—that true history would come from the historian who
divests himself of passion, prejudice, philosophy, and points
of view. Indeed, Lord Acton's early faith was exemplified in
the "joint-stock history" undertaken in the Cambridge History
series, in the hope that the various authors would not be
visible behind the chapters, that the satisfied reader of any
nationality would not be able to detect where one author left
44 Ibid., p. 375.
off and another began. 45
But the shared ideal of Creighton, Acton, Stubbs and
the growing band of fellow-professionals was primarily nega-
tive, usually expressed in negative terms, and was most
often employed as a polemic against the conventional history
of the nineteenth century English historiography. The three
editors of the first edition of the Cambridge Modern History
could exult that "the long conspiracy against the revelation
of truth has gradually given way; and competing historians
all over the civilized world have been zealous to take advan
46tage of the change." But they seemed as oblivious to the
explosive problems beneath the surface of their new method-
ology as their contemporaries in statecraft were to the fast
approaching first World War.
In 1913 when Gooch, the first major historian to des-
cribe the rise of the modern science of history in England,
and one who shared in the faith and enthusiasm of the move-
ment, turns from narrative to the evaluation of a given his-
torian, he repeatedly uses a negative criterion of the sort
mentioned above. Speaking of Ranke's religious views, he
45Charles Oman, the author of the chapter on Waterloo
in the Cambridge Modern History
,
later recognized how impos-
sible the negative ideal was, and how the "individualities
peep out" even in the most rigorously objective sections.
On the Writing of History
, p. 27.
6A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and S. Leathes, "Preface
to the First Edition," Cambridge Modern Historv, vi.
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dismisses them with the judgment, "Though a thin film of
theology floated on the surface, the main body of the work
was unaffected." 47 when referring to the strong views of
Stubbs on the value of Christianity, Gooch defensively adds,
"But his political and religious beliefs were never obtruded
in his work." 48 m a discussion of Gardiner's political and
religious allegiances, he uses the familiar phrase, "but no
\
one could tell from his work to what Church or party he
belonged." 49 Of Acton's Catholicism, Gooch extravagantly
remarks, "He practiced what he preached, and he never wrote
or uttered a word as Regius Professor which revealed him as
a member of one Church rather than another." 50 Mosheim is
admitted to the modern school of history on the same nega-
tive grounds of having written "without passion or unction,"
and Gooch notes approvingly that the result of the "winning
of ecclesiastical history for science" at Gttttingen was that
"No one learned at Gottingen to love Church history or to
51
reverence the saints." Hefele is commended for passing
the negative test at the end of his work on Church councils;
4 7Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, p. 74. ~~ ~~ '—
~
48
Ibid
.
,
p. 318.
49 Ibid
. , p. 339.
50Ibid
. , p. 362.
51
Ibid.
, p. 491.
for "Looking back on his seven massive volumes he repeats
that he is not conscious of any bias." 52
The early attacks on modern empirical historiography
did not center on the question of whether it was indeed pos-
sible to carry out the epistemological ideal derived from
Ranke of the perfectly neutral, objective, reporting of the
facts. That is to say, the problem of selecting the signif-
icant facts from the vast number of other facts, the question
of representative facts, and the problem of an inescapable
point of view did not emerge immediately as part of the Eng-
lisn Methodenstreit
. The Creigh ton-Acton controversy had
tended to pose, rather, the problem of the adequacy of the
Rankean epistemological ideal. It is evident in Acton's
critique of Creighton in which he states that Creighton sees
only the "passing figures," the "life and action," rather
than the "deeper and more interior" reason, the "inner mind
of the papacy.
"
What troubled the two protagonists was the danger
that the ideal of wanting to show only "what really happened"
might result in an inadequate or superficial view of the
past. In light of their long struggle to establish the new
methodology and an autonomous historical science free from
the traditional biases of the nineteenth century, it seemed
5
2
Ibid.
,
p. 505
most disconcerting to find that the victory might end in
intense internal strife.
Upon closer examination of the controversy, one can
see that Acton's challenge to Creighton concerns the second
problem of the working historian—what principle of develop-
ment to use. One might verify empirically some facts, but to
move from simple chronicling to historical explanation
involved some concept of development and, on this issue,
Acton was not content to follow the Creighton view that some-
how the facts would tell their own story. Acton hoped to
avoid the relativism and scepticism which he felt was ines-
capable in Creighton by holding to an absolute standard of
ethics as a criterion for his concept of development. In his
Inaugural Address of June 1895, Acton argues that, "All that
53
we require is a work-day key to history." His description
of the new school in historiography which is controlled by
the "dogma of impartiality," indicates his admiration but
also his growing sense of its inadequacy.
I speak of this school with reverence, for the
good it has done, by the assertion of historic
truth and of its legitimate authority over the
minds of men. It provides a discipline which
every one of us does well to undergo, and per-
haps also well to relinquish. For it is not
the whole truth. 54
John Acton
,
Essays on Freedom and Power (New York*
Meridian Books, 1955), p. 37.
54 Xbid., p. 42.
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Acton goes on to recapitulate his earlier argument
against Creighton, and his earlier assertion that "it is the
office of historical science to maintain morality as the
sole impartial criterion of men and things." He reaffirms
Froude f s declaration that "History does teach that right and
wrong are real distinctions. Opinions alter, manners change,
creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the
tablets of eternity."
Acton himself had held to the first principle of the
5 6
new historical school; to the "dogma of impartiality," but
the more he labored with the second problem of a concept of
development—an Archimedean standpoint that would escape the
relativising of historicism— the more he insisted upon the
need and the right of the historian to exercise moral judg-
ment. In the summary of his Inaugural Address at Cambridge
University, Acton, after acknowledging his divergence from
the then dominant position of Creighton, states his own final
"cardinal proposition.
"
But the weight of opinion is against me when I
exhort you never to debase the moral currency or
to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try
others by the final maxim that governs your own
lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to
escape the undying penalty which history has the
55Ibid
. , p. 51.
See Herbert Butterf ield * s discussion of Acton's
changing view in Lord Acton,
49
power to inflict on wrong. 57
Acton was correct, at least, in his first assess-
ment—that "the weight of opinion is against me." In the
decades that followed, few English historians were willing to
assume with Acton that the "first of human concerns is relig-
5 8ion," that progress towards freedom is the key to his-
59tory," and that this progress is concomitant with the doc-
trine of Providence and rests upon an absolute morality. 60
Few historians were willing to surrender a hard-won sovereign
impartiality for Acton's insistence that "The inflexible
integrity of the moral code is, to me, the secret of the
authority, the dignity, the utility of history.
. .
.
"
61
But one should not dismiss the Acton attack on the
Rankeans as totally out-dated and irrelevant,, The question
of the relation of moral judgment to history has become a
major problem to a generation of European scholars who lived
through the second World War. Meinecke's distress over rai-
son d'etat in his important study Machiavellism: the doc-
5
^Acton
,
Essays on Freedom and Power
, p . 4 8.
5 8Dalberg-Acton, Lectures on Modern History
,
p. 8.
59
Ibid . 9 p. 12
.
60Ibid .
r p. 11.
6
1
Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, p. 336.
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trine of raison d'etat and its place in modern history
,
62
and
Georg G. Iggers' recent study of the relation of German his-
toricism to a nationalistic philosophy of violence 6 are
only two examples of contemporary re-thinking of this prob-
lem in historical studies. It is also important to note the
renewed interest in Acton as a historian, as evidenced by the
recent studies of Himmelfarb, Kochan, Butterfield and Mathew.
While Acton's position does not appear to be gaining many
adherents, his insights into the problems of the Rankeans
were very perceptive and quite in advance of his time.
6 2 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: the doctrine of
raison d'etat and its place in modern history
,
trans, by
D. Scott (London: Routledge, 1957).
6 3Georg G. Iggers , The German Conception of History
(Middletown
r
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968).
CHAPTER III
TOYNBEE THE EXPLORER
"We have not found the quarry which we are
hunting, but we have fought our way through
the thicket and have come out on the other
side into the open country."
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume One (1933)
With this survey of British historiography as a
background we may turn immediately to the work of Arnold
Toynbee in an attempt to understand the formation of his
methodological position and its subsequent changes. A good
starting point is to focus on Toynbee 1 s frequent identifi-
cation of himself as an "explorer." The explorer motif is,
to be sure, subdued in the early volumes of A Study of His -
tory
,
and made quite subordinate to the notion of the his-
torian as social scientist. Yet it is the startling growth
of the explorer motif that gives a clue to the breakdown of
Toynbee' s initial scientific methodology, and enables us to
see his life-long experiences as both a struggle for a proper
historical methodology and a religious odyssey. Therefore,
we will use an examination of the explorer metaphor to clar-
ify and establish the notion of a change.
In Chapter Four we will move backward in time in
order to pick up the earliest evidences of Toynbee 1 s method-
ological struggle, then follow its formulations in his suc-
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cessive self-identifications as "social scientist," "student
of life," and Christian historian.
Dual Use of the "Explorer" Metaphor
The image of the historian as an explorer has several
variations, but they appear to be minor variations of a gen-
eral theme. Sometimes the traveler is on land, at other
times on the high seas. On one occasion the explorer may be
cutting his way through the jungle, and then again he may
simply be walking through a "wonderland." Also, it may be
noted in a preliminary way that the image has two major
applications which sometimes blend or merge into one. Toyn-
bee speaks of his personal role as an explorer of historical
events. In this usage the jungle or turbulent sea is really
the multiplicity and chaotic appearance of past events.
Occasionally the chaos is enlarged to include the jungle of
interpretations and hypotheses advanced by other scholars.
The second major application of this explorer- image is one in
which Toynbee emphasizes the aimless wandering of Western
civilization . In this case , the historian is the advance
scout , or the "Moses , " or the navigator in the chart-house
who ought to be proposing a new solution to his distraught
fellow-voyagers. In this situation the jungle, wilderness,
or trackless ocean may appear as mankind's moral irresponsi-
bility, or the culmination of his wrong choices, or simply
the vastness of time
.
This dual use of the explorer- image is related to
Toynbee's insistence, as discussed in the next chapter, that
the historian is at once an impartial observer and a fellow
human being. The problem of how to gain detachment from the
bias of one's own time and place, and yet not develop the
sterile intellectualism of detachment, must be numbered as
one of the basic issues in Toynbee's Study
. Our immediate
concern, however, is to trace the use of this image in Toyn-
bee's work.
Appearance and Meaning of the Explorer Role
in A Study of History
Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the
explorer role in Toynbee's Study is its infrequent appear-
ance in the early volumes as compared with its repeated use
in the later volumes and essays of Toynbee.
One may argue that the image of the historian-
explorer is implied in the title of the book and in a remark
made in the Preface to the First Edition (dated sixteenth of
May, 1933) . Toynbee calls his work A Study of History and
indicates in a rather modest note that this book "is an
attempt to expound and illustrate a system of ideas, . . . "
This introductory hesitation is soon set aside in the follow-
ing four volumes as Toynbee applies his "well-trained empiri-
1Arnold Joseph Toynbee, A Study of History (2nd ed.
;
London: Oxford University Press, 1948), I, Preface.
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cal method" to the task of demolishing other systems of ideas
which are a priori, unscientific, or transcendental, and in
developing his universal 'laws' which are non-transcendental,
2empirical, scientific and demonstrable by an empirical sur-
3
vey
.
There are two instances in Volume One where Toynbee
suggests that the historian works as an explorer. In the
highly developed simile of the civilizations as mountain
climbers, a simile which appears to be a master pattern in
Toynbee f s original view but is later quietly dropped in his
radical reorientation , he says
,
. . .
while we, for our part, may liken ourselves
to observers whose field of vision is limited to
the ledge and to the foot of the upper precipice
and have come upon the scene at the moment when
the different members of the party happen to be
in these respective postures and positions. At
first sight we may be inclined to draw an absolute
distinction between the two groups
,
acclaiming the
climbers as athletes and dismissing the recumbent
figures as paralytics; but on second thought we
shall find it more prudent to suspend judgment.
In the process of developing this simile Toynbee compares the
uncertainty of the explorer with the unknown thousands of
ledges which stretch out in the past darkness of the abyss
from which Life came, and to the finite or infinite number of
2 Ibid.
,
I, 426.
3 Ibid. V, 359.
^Ibid. I, 193.
ledges yet to come. In spite of the fact that the heights
which tower above us are quite beyond our powers of estima-
tion, 5 and the fact that the other ledges are "outside our
field of vision," Toynbee does not allow relativism to
replace his faith in the availability of an absolute stand-
point from which a rhythm or pattern is discernible. To
support his argument, Toynbee notes that three other observ-
ers, General Smuts, Gerald Heard, and J. Murphy all testi-
fied that such a rhythm is "fundamental in the nature of the
Universe.
"
7
The second instance of the explorer- image in the
early volumes is found in Toynbee 1 s discussion of the various
theories purporting to explain the genesis of civilizations.
The major hypotheses of environment and race are compared to
thickets which have hindered the historian's search.
We have now drawn the covert of Environment, and
we have had the same experience as when we drew
the covert of Race. We have not found the
quarry which we are hunting, but we have fought
our way through the thicket and have come out on
the other side into open country again. . . . °
This instance could be written off as simply a stylistic
device except for the fact that Toynbee goes on to argue that
5 Ibid
.
, 196o
6 Ibid ,
7Ibid . , 197 0
8Ibid. , 270.
this method of examining various hypotheses may itself be
mistaken. He refuses to allow the metaphor to be dismissed
as a stylistic device or to be interpreted solely in terms c
the scientist who examines and discards hypotheses.
A new way of knowledge is needed by the explorer
in order to get out of the riddle of conflicting
theories. In making a final attempt to solve
the riddle that has been baffling us, let us
follow Plato's lead and try the alternative
course. Let us shut our eyes, for the moment,
to the formulae of Science in order to open our
ears to the language of Mythology. 9
However, it is not until we reach the all-important
turning point in Volume Five that the explorer- image begins
to be used more freely. In the preceeding volumes Toynbee
had worked out very carefully the "intelligible field of
historical study,"
In the preceeding investigation we have estab-
lished the existence of societies which (unlike
their articulations called states) are independ-
ent entities in the sense that each of them
constitutes by itself an 'intelligible field of
historical study ' . 1°
He had confidently set out to collect all the species of
these "social atoms." History appeared to be a fairly
straight-forward pursuit once the parochial elements like
nationalism had been properly removed from the historian's
method and vision.
9 Ibid. , 271.
10 Ibid.„ 51.
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In the light of these conclusions on matters ofhistorical fact, we can draw certain other con-
clusions regarding History as a humane study.
Its true concern is with the lives of societies
in both their internal and external aspects. 11
Now however, in Volume Five
r the whole attempt is
suspect because it appears as though "our approach to the
identification of our twenty-one representatives of this
species of societies was subjective as well as empirical." 12
Parochialism has corrupted the whole process, and the nation
state which was the historian's earlier unit of intelligi-
bility was not completely discarded, but was simply replaced
by civilizational myopia.
By enlarging our field of operations from the
nation to the civilization of which the nation
is a fragment, we have found it possible to
make a study of History in terms of civiliza-
tions and their careers—from genesis to
growth and from breakdown to disintegration.
But the 'relativity of historical thought'
has now caught us out in our turn, as we have
seen it catch out the historians who have
allowed their horizon to be determined by the
narrower frontiers of some single national
community or city-state ; . . . 1
Although Toynbee hastens to assure the reader that this mis-
take was necessary because we could not start our study
except from within "the prison-house in which our modern
H A
Western souls are incarcerated," he well realizes the
1:L Ibid . , 46.
12 Ibid
. ,
V, 373.
1 3 ibid .
14 Ibid.
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implications of the new starting point.
This point about the study of 'higher religions'
is simple and self-evident; but— all the moreimperative on that account— it compells us to
make a radical new departure; for it requires us
to relinquish the basis on which this Study has
so far been built up. 1 ^
Toynbee is at the half-way point in his projected
ten volume Study and the realization that 'history' may be
something other than a "true concern with the lives of soci-
eties" now makes the remainder of the Study quite specula-
tive .
The best that we could do was to peer over the
battlements and extend our field of vision,
beyond the imprisoning walls, as far as the eye
could reach. But we have come now to a parting
of the ways in this mental voyage of exploration.
In this crucial discussion about the change of standpoint,
Toynbee repeatedly calls upon the explorer- image to explain
the transition. The "parochial standing-ground" 17 upon which
he has so far worked is compared to the "squat battlements of
1
8
a national prison-fortress." Then the metaphor is expanded
to include the "falling walls of Jericho" (describing the
failure of contemporary historical method) , and the argument
that the historian should emulate St. Augustine by springing
15 Ibid
.
, 372.
16 Ibid
.
, 374.
17 Ibid .
18Ibid.„ 375.
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out "of the shattered prison-house of the City of Man into
the infinite liberty of an inviolate and inviolable City of
19God." in order to strengthen the contrast between the old
parochial and the new oecumenical standpoint which he wished
to adopt, Toynbee puts himself back in the position of a
national historian, a position which he had long labored to
discredit in Volume One. Contrary to the boast of Volume One
that this Study was not to be limited by the nationalism that
had afflicted contemporary historians, and was to be a uni-
versal history, it now appears as though all this time Toyn-
bee himself has been a nationalistic historian.
The mental—or rather spiritual— feat that is
required of us is to burst the cramping bounds
of our English or French or German or American
social prison-house—whichever of the national-
isms it may be that has been holding us hide-
bound— and to re-occupy the place that belongs
to us in a greater kingdom which was Augustine's
by right of spiritual conquest and is still ours
today by privilege of cultural inheritance. If
once we can escape from the parochial standpoint
of an American or German or French or English
member of a Western brood of nations. ... 0
The illusion under which the first four volumes was
written is now clearly revealed, for the single civilization
which "has worn the appearance of a fully intelligible field
of study," shrivels up, in its turn, into an unintelligible
21fragment of some far larger whole. Now the place of obser-
19 Ibid
.
, 374.
20Ibid
. , 375.
21Ibid.
vation is not a ledge upon which the climbers have fallen,
but is the "mountain-heights of one of the higher relig-
2 2ions." And it should be observed in this changed simile
that Toynbee is not merely shifting the actors in the moun-
tain climb from civilizations to universal churches or higher
religions. This new use of the simile borrows only the lan-
guage of the old master simile. The higher religions are not
climbers but are the mountain-heights themselves. The higher
religions provide the escape from the relativity of any paro-
chial institution to the objective universal standpoint.
To round out the imagery of the historian as an
explorer, there is a corresponding epistemological shift as
the historian moves into the new territory and sees the past
and present with a wider vision. The new standpoint does
more than merely add in a quantitative way to the territory
under surveillance; the mental voyage of exploration and the
mental feat of shifting standpoints involves a "spiritual"
feat. This shift in the historian's epistemology is compared
to the adding of a new spiritual dimension to life, and is
surprisingly enough accomplished "almost without noticing
what we have been doing." The culmination and summary of
this amazing tour-de- force in Toynbee 's spiritual voyage is
best conveyed in his own words
i
22 Ibid.
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In. a mental voyage of discovery which takes itsdeparture from a church and not from some paro-
chial political community, it is evident that
the 'intelligible field of study* will be of an
altogether higher order of magnitude than that
of the single civilization which has sufficed
us hitherto. Possibly we shall find that our
new field also extends into a different spiri-
tual dimension—but this is a possibility which
we can now examine at our leisure; for, almost
without noticing what we have been doing, we
have chosen and taken our course. The Pillars
of Hercules are behind us, and the sea on which
we are sailing, is no longer the familiar land-
bound Mare Nostrum. 3
In Volume Six Toynbee introduces the imagery of the
historian as a sailor who plots a course. 24 On this occasion
the "course" is not identified with the historian's work as a
historian but refers to the action of the whole society in
which the historian functions. Here again the limitations of
the historian because of his standpoint are clearly empha-
sized. Every historian is on a particular ship. He cannot
predict the present position nor future fortune of the ship
in any accurate and comprehensive way because he is limited
by the fact that he lives within her gunwales. The relativ-
ity of time and place, implied in this metaphor, however,
cannot have the final triumph and Toynbee turns to the task
of explicating those patterns and rhythms which seem to be a
fundamental part of the nature of the universe.
23Ibid pp. 375-376.• 9
24 Ibid VI, 313.• 9
.
. .
may there not be some rough-and-ready meansby which even we, here and now, can reckon,
within a margin of error that will not be exces-
sive for practical purposes, approximately where
we stand? And may not a clue have been put into
our hands by the acquaintance with the standard
run of the disintegration-rhythm that we have
gained.
. . .
Z5
Although the point will be discussed in another connection,
it is obvious in this passage that Toynbee hesitates ro
apply his empirically established conclusions to Western
Civilization. Whenever it would appear that the rhythms of
disintegration are at work in Western Society, Toynbee avoids
the normal conclusion of his premise and analysis by advan-
cing the belief that an entirely new situation could develop
and Western Civilization might yet be granted a reprieve.
In Volume Seven Toynbee ! s inquiry turns from the
more prosaic comparative study of civilizations to the "neces-
sary yet hazardously speculative quest" of investigating the
relation between churches and civilizations. The explorer-
image is again appropriate because of the uncertainties
involved in the task. Toynbee reminds himself that "error
lay in wait here to ensnare observers born into this genera-
2 7tion." There is not only the limitation of time that ham-
pers the historian at this point? there is the difficulty of
25 Ibid
. , pp. 313-314.
26
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"reading the significance of the Churches' past." 28 This, of
course, involves the historian in a judgment of value and
allows him to make only an "inevitably tentative judgment." 29
By looking for the "significance" of past events, the histor-
ian must go beyond the limits of an empirical approach, so
again Toynbee uses the explorer-image to describe the histor-
ian's search for the spiritual dimension in history. Both
Head and Heart must be persuaded to concur in this reading of
the significance of the Churches' past. At this point, Toyn-
bee no longer appeals to empirically verified conclusions but
seems to appeal to certain extra-rational considerations
which would make it possible for him to proceed to the last
part of the Study
.
If a generation born into the twentieth century
of the Christian Era might dare to look forward
to a day when Heart and Head would have been
reconciled by a unison of charity, insight, and
faith, they might also hope to persuade Heart
and Head to concur in a reading of the signifi-
cance of the Churches' past; and if our findings
on that point were agreed, they would provide a
starting-point for entering on the last stage of
our inquiry into the relation between churches
and civilizations. 9
One other use of the explorer-image in Volume Seven
is of great importance in our attempt to understand Toynbee 's
28Ibid.
,
506.
29 Ibid. 507.
Ibid. 506.
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Study_. in an annex discussion of the place of the Bible in
higher religions, Toynbee and Martin Wight become involved in
one of their footnote battles. Toynbee quotes and seems to
assent to an argument by Edward Meyer to the effect that the
contents of sacred books are a matter of complete indiffer-
ence to any fully developed religion and that "any book in
the world may become a sacred book through some freak of
chance." 31 Wight argues that this scepticism if adopted by
Toynbee would be inconsistent with other assertions about the
value of revelation in Christianity. Toynbee • s retort is a
lengthy "so what if it is!" in which he again employs the
picture of the historian-wanderer. This tension between Head
and Heart is a necessary part of the historian's quest, for
"the painfulness of a tension between unreconciled dictates
of Heart and Head gives Dipsychus no warrant for evading the
pain by opting exclusively for one or the other of these two
conflicting masters, so long as the price of thus cutting the
knot is the deliberate sacrifice of sincere convictions." 32
Toynbee • s basic uncertainty is heavily underlined by an elab-
oration of the explorer metaphor. The explorer-historian is
compared to Moses who consummated a lifetime of toil and
frustration with only a glimpse of the Promised Land. Here
31 Ibid .
„
Annex, 754.
32 Ibid.
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Toynbee equates his own methodological dilemma with the
spiritual dilemma of Western Man in the twentieth century and
seems to suggest that his role as an historian is inextrica-
bly tied up with the task of finding a way out of the House
of Bondage for his contemporaries.
Volume Eight contains a sustained use of the explorer-
image by Toynbee in which he tries to harness the role of the
explorer with the labor of the scientific historian. This
section in the Study deals with encounters between contempo-
rary civilizations, and their complicated relationships seem
to the historian to be a "formidably intricate maze of his-
33tory." Indeed the thicket is so dense because of the large
number of encounters to be surveyed that Toynbee searches for
some favorable point of entry. He finds this point of entry
in the recent experience of Western Society, for "this liter-
ally world-wide impact of the West may serve our turn as a
'bulldozer 1' for forcing an entry into the historical jungle
of intertwined cultural entanglements which we have set our-
34
selves to explore, . . , " With this bulldozer the tangled
terrain could then be broken up into manageable tracts, and a
35general map of the landscape could then be constructed. So
33Ibid .
,
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at this point the mere fact of the vast numbers of events
does not prohibit an empirically verifiable survey being
made. The element of uncertainty that does intrude itself in
the process however, is the knowledge that this "preliminary
survey of the facts" will be of less avail for our purpose
when we move from arrangement of facts to the "ulterior pur-
pose of attempting to analyze first the plot of the play, and
then the process of psychological action and reaction in the
relations between the actors." 36 Here is then a need for an
explorer-historian who will go beyond the prosaic ascertain-
ment of fact to the deeper questions of the meaning and sig-
nificance of history.
There is another curious and complicated use of the
explorer-image by Toynbee in Volume Eight when he debates the
question of the "Relativity of the Units of Classification"
with Prince Obolensky. The issue was not at all settled by
Toynbee • s heroic first volume attempt to find a unit of study
which would not be subject to the relativisms of place and
national consciousness. The criterion of intelligibility
seemed to resolve itself into the question of whether a unit
in history appeared to be independent and self-explanatory to
the mind of the historian observer, or dependent on a larger
whole. Toynbee sayss "In the preceeding investigation we
have established the existence of societies which . . . are
36 Ibid. , 116.
independent entities in the sense that each of them consti-
tutes by itself an 'intelligible field of historical study.'"
Not only did this attempt at classification come in for sharp
criticism by contemporary critics like Sorokin, but Toynbee
himself disclosed its weaknesses at crucial points in his
later volumes. The question of the significance of one of
these "social atoms/ 9 a matter of utmost importance to Toyn-
bee, did not appear to have an answer unless the historian
could find a greater unit of classification to serve as a
criterion for these civilizations. Thus the significance of
a civilization was measured in terms of its contribution to
the advance of higher religions in history. 37 The appearance
and disappearance of the social atoms in past time did not
suggest pessimism to Toynbee, indeed, "the shuttle which
shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time in a
perpetual to-and-fro is all this time bringing into existence
a tapestry in which there is manifestly a a progress towards
an end' and not just an 'endless repetition' in the likeness
38
of the shuttle's own action."
Toynbee had also raised doubts about the usefulness
of these units of classification when in Volume Five these
civilizations which were so proudly 'intelligible fields of
study fl now shrivel up in their turn " into an unintelligible
37Ibid . IX, pp s 410-411.
38Ibid., IV, 34.
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fragment of some far larger whole.
. . .
"
39
Hence, it is
not a complete surprise to find at the end of Volume Eight an
annex devoted to the relativity of these units of classifica-
tion. Prince Obolensky and B. H. Sumner have challenged
Toynbee's division of Christendom into three separate civi-
lizations: Russian Orthodox Christian Civilization, the main
Orthodox Christian Civilization, and the Western Christian
Civilization. The arguments as to the limits of these par-
ticular units are not our immediate concern but Toynbee's
response with the explorer- image is important. The explorer
role is combined with the scientific role in this dual pic-
ture of the resourceful researcher exploring the "wonderland
of History."
The lesson appeared to be that all such classifi-
cations
t analyses, and dissections were keys which
were useful in so far as they served the practical
purpose of opening locks. Any one of them would
have proved to be a genuine key if it did effec-
tively unlock a door; and some of these keys were
good for opening more doors than one; but there
did not seem to be any master key that rendered
all its fellow keys superfluous by unlocking all
doors alike; and therefore a resourceful researcher
who had been moved by his curiosity to explore the
wonderland of History would keep on adding to the
bunch of keys on his key ring. Whenever he ran
into a closed door barring the way to further pro-
gress in his intellectual quest, his first recourse
would be to try whether any of the keys already on
his ring would turn this next door's lock; but, if
none of them proved to fit, he would neither try to
force the door nor despair of succeeding in opening
it, but would set about casting a new key to fit a
39 Ibid.
,
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lock that had been proved by experiment to be
one of a novel structure. 40
In this imagery the "key" refers to the method of the his-
torian. Toynbee seems to be arguing that history has a cer-
tain order and regularity to it (in this case the historian's
problems are doors and not jungles) and that his empirical
method has limited applicability. The novel or uncertain
elements in the historian's task are accounted for by the
reference to exploring "the wonderland of History" and the
possible need for "a new key."
Toynbee the explorer-historian is very much in evi-
dence in the Volume Nine inquiry into the "Prospects of the
Western Civilization." Again the "exploration" has bearing
on the problem of asking questions about a civilization which
is still alive and therefore not accessible to the usual
techniques of the historian.
Thus in A. D. 1950 an intellectual prospector
could enter on a mental exploration of the
Western Civilization's future with rather more
confidence than that he could have felt in
A.D. 1929? . . . and the writer's own distaste
for his present subject ought therefore to have
been appreciably diminished by the intervening
passage of two enlightening additional decades
of history if it had been merely a recoil from
the risk of a hazardous intellectual adventure. ^
But Toynbee goes on to argue that his uncertainty is not
caused by the unpredictable nature of history, but by the
4Q Ibid . VIII, 673.
41
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fact that his definition of what a historian is might be
invalidated if he attempted to make predictions about the
future of Western Civilization. The historian-pilgrim had
been fleeing from the parochialism of his fellow historians
for the two decades he had spent on this Study
. The pilgrim-
age had taken him from the "naively vulgar native Western
egocentric prejudice" 42 on a voyage of intellectual
revolt, which was also a spiritual discipline/ 4 to the
place where he hoped to "catch and communicate even a glimpse
of the truth." 45 The pole star for steering the author on
this intellectual and spiritual journey was the axiom "that
all the representatives of any species of human society are
philosophically on a par with one another." 46 Toynbee is
convinced that his pilgrimage has been a success even though
the axiom was later proven to be false when these civiliza-
tions were discovered to be "unequal as a matter of histori-
cal fact on the evidence of an assay in which the touchstone
had been the part played by the breakdowns and disintegra-
tions of civilizations in the history of Religion.
. . .
1,47
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We seem to have reached another one of those places
in the Study where even Toynbee has a difficult time in keep-
ing his value judgments from erupting through the facade of
his empirically-established views of history. The imagery of
the explorer seems to be used to convey the impression that
Toynbee is a researcher who has been forced to make these
normative statements by the inescapable logic of his long
mental exploration.
In the brief but important tenth volume of the study
,
Toynbee attaches the explorer-image to the question of
methodology. While this volume might be dismissed as a
"catch-all*" for items which were irrelevant to the main body
of the text, the discussion of the "Inspiration of Histori-
ans" has a great deal of relevancy for this investigation
into methodological and procedural problems. Two sections
are of special interest to us. In the first reference Toyn-
bee carries out a distinction hinted at earlier in the Study .
He divides the historian's task into two discrete functions
with corresponding methods of obtaining knowledge. The task
of assembling the data belongs to the historian as social
scientist „ and the task of ascertaining the meaning behind
the facts belongs to the explorer-mystic. While the methods
of the scientist may be adequate for the gathering of the
data, the higher method of poetry is necessary because: "the
meaning behind the facts of History towards which the poetry
72
in the facts is leading us is a revelation of God and a hope
\ of communion with Him." 48
At this point Toynbee sees his earlier intellectual
difficulties of correctly reading the vast complexity of past
events as a spiritual infirmity of trying to read history
from a "disillusioning anthropocentric angle of vision." 49
One can say that the methodological problems of the youthful
Toynbee are only solved in this "quest for a Beatific
50Vision." This quest for an ever wider angle of vision has
left far behind the superfluous appearance and disappearance
of civilizations like the West which to Toynbee turned out to
be "a vain repetition of the heathen," and in turn has pro-
voked the sharp attack by Toynbee * s critics on his anti-
52Western attitudes. in this connection one may recall
5 3Geyl's charge of blasphemy or Sorokin's criticism of Toyn-
bee as the "undertaker of history." 54
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The last use of the explorer- image in the Study
appears in the "Acknowledgements and Thanks" section of Vol-
ume Ten. 55 m this passage he directs his thanks to Plato
who taught him that he could go beyond the limits of Reason
by using other faculties of the human personality. it might
correctly be interpreted as expressing thanks to Plato for
showing him a way to escape the relativism with which his
contemporaries were afflicted, the blindness of an early
twentieth century Western Zeitgeist
.
Appearance and Meaning of the Explorer Role
in His Post-Study Writings
When we turn to the lectures and writing of Toynbee
since the completion of the major volumes of his Study
, the
evidence points to a continued and more emphatic use of the
explorer-image
.
A Study of History was completed on June 15, 1951 (at
8:25 p.m. according to Toynbee ' s precise notation) but the
publishing of the last four volumes had to wait until Octo-
ber, 1954. In that same month Toynbee wrote an article for
the Royal Institute of International Affairs to be published
in the journal International Affairs . The title of the arti-
cle was provocative and certainly relevant for he called it
"A Study of History, What I Am Trying to Do." The leading
argument is in harmony with the explorer- image and seeks to
55Ibid.
emphasize the modesty, and the tentative nature of the con-
clusions of the massive study
.
... we find ourselves moved, in our time, totake a new look at the new face of history' as
a whole. This is the origin of my book A Study
of History. It is one person's impression ofhistory m the new light in which we can now
see it; and of course a number of other peoplehave been tempted, by the same opportunity, to
take their look and form their impressions.
Each of these individual views will show the
new picture in a different perspective; and
since it has only lately become possible to
take this panoramic view of history, the first
attempts (of which mine is one) are sure to be
revised and corrected and superceded as time
goes on and as more people turn their minds to
this exciting intellectual enterprise . 56
But despite this elaborate disclaimer, Toynbee notes that at
least one of his conclusions will "continue to hold good."
The conclusion is that the Late Modern Western view of his-
5 7tory has been wrong. it is wrong because it was founded on
a Jewish-Christian-Muslim view in which history "had appeared
to be an act of God beginning at the Creation and destined to
end in the Last Judgment, while Israel {or Christendom or
Islam) had been singled out as being the people chosen by God
for carrying out His purposes." 58 This view of history had
been appropriated by historians of the eighteenth century to
the present day with but two changes. The successors of Bos-
56Arnold J. Toynbee, "A Study of History: What I Am
Trying to Do," International Affairs
,
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suet had eliminated God from the picture and had transferred
the role of "Chosen People" to their own particular West
European nation. Toynbee argued that this view was now obso-
lete and a new view had to be introduced. The old view, "the
beanstalk pattern of history/' must give place to the new
view, "a tree pattern, in which the civilizations rise, like
so many branches, side by side." 5 ^
This argument of clearing away an old view led Toyn-
bee to a discussion of the comparative treatment and allowed
room for a review of the use in the Study of his "well-tried
empirical method." It would seem that this comparative view
Toynbee has proposed is the new view needed for, "This com-
parative treatment can be extended to the whole of history;
and it is, in fact, the method of the human sciences." 60
Thus the new comparative treatment avoids the parochialism of
the "Chosen People" view and allows room for all civiliza-
tions to be examined. Toynbee argued that "the human sci-
ences, like the natural sciences, make a comparative study of
their data in order to discover the structure of the facts
and the events." 61 At this point in the article the argument
developed in quite a deceptive, or at least very misleading
manner. If one takes the paragraph at face value, Toynbee
~*^ Ibid
.
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has now committed himself to the comparative method and he
uses the present tense to emphasize his faith in it. it is
not as though he argued that: "I once thought that the com-
parative treatment could be extended to the whole of history;
and it was, in fact, the method of the human sciences."
My argument is that in this case Toynbee is trying to
gloss over a basic shift in his methodology by talking as
though he is using the comparative treatment, which in fact
he had relinquished earlier. The attempt to gloss over the
shift in viewpoint is located in the verbal footwork of the
passages in which Toynbee implies that he has used the com-
parative method successfully except in a few dark corners of
historical study where he has had to go a little beyond
empiricism by means of imagination. For example, this is the
implication of the succeeding passage when he says that, "One
of my aims in A Study of History has been to try out the
scientific approach to human affairs and to test how far it
6 2
will carry us .
"
It would seem that Toynbee cannot argue both of these
positions at the same time. On the one hand he argues that
to
escape from the weaknesses of the old beanstalk pattern and
that this pattern "is suggested by" the fact that in this age
the "tree pattern" or the comparative method is the way
77
our Western civilization has collided with all the other
surviving civilizations all over the face of the planet. 63
On the other hand he argues:
My own belief is that there are some things inhuman affairs that have no pattern because they
are not subject to scientific laws. One such
thing, I believe, is an encounter between two
or more human beings. I believe that the out-
come of such an encounter would not be predict-
able, even if we had a complete knowledge of
all the antecedent facts. I also think that
the poetry and the prophetic vision that well
up out of the subconscious depths of the human
soul are not amenable to law. I think, in
fact, that here we are in the presence of gen-
uine acts of creation, in which something new is
brought into existence, and this leads us back
towards the Biblical view of history.
. . .
°*
If an encounter between two or more human beings has no pat-
tern the question arises, "why should an encounter between
civilizations have a pattern and be subject to a scientific
approach to human affairs"? Toynbee ruled out the validity
of this distinction by his original definition of a society
to the effect that, "the Macrocosm [the Society] is appre-
hended and acted upon by the Microcosm? and the action which
is the theme of human history is the action of individual
human beings on that common ground of their respective fields
of action which we call a society?"
^
With a trace of cynicism one might note that the
63Ibid.
° 4 Ibid.
, p. 4
.
65Toynbee, A Study of History
,
VI, 230
78
argument now comes round full circle from the old "beanstalk-
approach of the Jewish-Christian-Muslim pattern of history
through the tree pattern and its comparative method of study
and back to the beanstalk approach with a few modifications.
Or can some other interpretation be given to his concluding
remark that "this leads us back towards the Biblical view of
history which was accepted in the West from the fourth cen-
tury till the end of the seventeenth." 66 In its simplest
form the methodological situation could be expressed in the
question: "Can Toynbee reconcile the beanstalk pattern of
history with the tree pattern"? It would seem that Toynbee
clearly adopted the beanstalk approach when he discarded the
"axiom that all representatives of any species of human soci-
ety are philosophically on a par with one another" 67 for the
counter-position that the "value of the civilizations known
to have existed up to date had been found to be unequal as a
matter of historical fact on the evidence of an assay in
which the touchstone had been the part played by the break-
down and disintegrations of civilizations in the history of
Religion." 68 W-aw Gftpor^W
It would be unfair to the whole argument not to
66Toynbee, "A Study of History: What I Am Trying to
Do," p. 4.
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acknowledge the change Toynbee makes in the Jewish-Christian
Muslim beanstalk pattern. He tries to preserve his original
pose as the neutral observer by stressing that the religious
position he has now adopted is not the narrow-minded Jewish-
Christian-Muslim standpoint but the broad-minded "Indian
standpoint." He seeks to equate the "Indian standpoint"
epistemologically with the comparative
. method of the early
volumes of the Study by arguing that the Indian religions
"allow for the possibility that there may be alternative
approaches to the mystery of Existence." 69
If this is the implication in the last paragraph of
Toynbee 's explanation of "What I Am Trying to Do," it is of
course a specious argument. The touchstone of the value of
the civilizations is still "higher religions," and the
change is simply from the Jewish-Christian-Muslim beanstalk
to the Jewish-Christian-Muslim-Indian beanstalk.
In a published lecture given at the University of
Minnesota on November 6, 1955, Toynbee proposed to deal with
very live issues for today's historians. The lecture was
entitled: "The New Opportunity for Historians." 70 After
introductory remarks about the distorting influence of time
upon any student of the past, he comes to the crux of the
69 Ibid.
70Arnold J, Toynbee, "The New Opportunity for Histori
ans," Printed by the University of Minnesota, (1956)
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discussion when he argues that: "This new possibility of
studying human life as a unity ought to enable us to embark
on mental voyages of discovery that have hardly been practic-
able in the past." 71 To indicate that this use of an old and
familiar figure of speech is not accidental, the two sen-
tences following this quotation speak about "one of our first
enterprises" as acts of exploring and discovering. Toynbee
seems to be thinking of himself as an explorer in two senses
in this curious essay. He is an explorer first in terms of
methodology of history and then as a healer of the nations.
As is customary he distinguishes himself from the more pedes-
trian historians of the present when he declares that: "For
the first time in history, we now have a chance of seeing two
things. We can now begin to see the history of the civiliza-
tions
. . .
as a whole, instead of being limited, as our pre-
decessors were, to a partial vision of bits and patches of
it. 1,72
These historians who are interested only in the
"academic exercise of disinterring apparently long-since dead
and buried national histories ..." are not only obsolete
73but are actually dangerous. After a passing reference to
the guilt of historians whose act of disinterring national
71^ Ibid
. , p. 12
.
72 Ibid .
73Ibid., p. 14.
histories "was one of the major causes of the eventual break-
up of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy," 74 Toynbee poses the
rhetorical question:
What are these particularist-minded nineteenth-
century historians' grandchildren going to do
for us in our generation? Are they going to
drop on us intellectual bombs that will blow up
the whole world, as the Hapsburg Monarchy was
blown up by the academic activities of some of
their grandfathers? 7 ^
If then Toynbee is not willing to be numbered among
those historians who formerly were just obsolete and paro-
chial but have become dangerous to the future of Mankind, he
must break out a new path for historians. The "new history"
is "to see all aspects of human life as so many facets of a
unitary human nature, instead of having, like our predeces-
sors, to approach the study of Man departmentally
,
by break-
ing it up artificially into a number of separate 'discip-
lines': history, sociology, economics, psychology, theology
and the rest." 76 This declaration seems to be an open
acknowledgment by Toynbee that he is in favor of a major
change in the classical discipline of history. It represents
the culmination of a dissatisfaction which was revealed in
the early writings of Toynbee, and which was expressed in his
view of himself as the explorer-historian.
74 Ibid.
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Although we have not yet treated systematically the
sources of Toynbee 's dissatisfaction, we have pointed out
that the general area of uneasiness centered around the prob
lem of the standpoint of the historian. In this particular
essay he argues that the new methodology he employs is "four
dimensional .
"
When the parties to the encounter are not indi-
viduals but are societies, this four dimensional
picture has to be provided by the historians;
and at this critical moment in history, much may
depend on the pictures that the historians are
going to draw for us . . , and on the prospects
for the future that they are going to open out
before our eyes. 77
The "fourth dimensional" view is also called a "spiritual
dimension" in the essay and involves us in the nagging seman>
tical problem of Toynbee.
We noticed earlier 78 that the "mental voyage of
exploration" was frequently described as a spiritual quest,
indeed as a flight beyond reason. In this essay the seman-
tical indecision remains. Even though the exploration is
described as an intellectual pursuit, it involves faculties
of the soul, and must depend upon both poetry and religious
79inspiration.
The second sense in which Toynbee functions as the
77 Ibid
. ,
p. 14.
78Toynbee, A Study of History
,
VII, 506? V, 375.
79Toynbee, "The New Opportunity for Historians," p. 12
83
explorer-historian is in the relationship and obligation he
bears to his own society. The historian has the possibility
open to him of spinning "mental webs that will weave the
tribes of Man together into a single worldwide family." 80 On
the other hand, the historian's work may "heighten our inher-
ited sense of being mutual strangers.
. . .
»
81
, a situation
so dangerous as to be compared with the dropping of an intel-
lectual bomb "that will blow up the whole world." 82 One
might conclude that Toynbee had finally capitulated to the
relativism of "every man his own historian." Is it true that
one should "write up" the past in terms of its good or bad
influence on one's contemporaries? Even though Toynbee '
s
overpowering desire for the vision of one world makes this
capitulation a strong temptation, he does attempt to limit
the relativism of the historian's judgments to the area of
emphasis. In this mental web that the historian spins in
order to bind man together, the facts are not to be tampered
with in order to construct the web but the historian has a
personal choice of emphasizing one or another trend in the
past.
The historians can emphasize past divergences
and can present these as precious heritages
80 Ibid
. , p. 14.
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which ought to be preserved, even at the price
of heavy sacrifices; or, alternatively, they
can emphasize present convergences and can
commend these to us as valuable innovations
which ought to be fostered and promoted, even
at the cost of considerable risks. 8 3
•
One can sympathize with Toynbee' s hope that the general
effects of historians' work will ultimately be beneficial to
international understanding, but the distinction between
"facts" and "emphasis" does not appear to be a clarifying or
a fruitful one to make. In summary, a reader of this essay
might well conclude that if he follows Toynbee in his explo-
ration of a new historical methodology, he will likewise
become a great benefactor to mankind as one of mankind's
explorers in the universal search for unity.
In a more recent discourse on the problems of histor-
ical methodology Toynbee discusses "The Limitations of His-
84torical Knowledge." 0 It may be that the horde of "captious
critics" has evoked this kind of response from the author of
the Study
, or may simply be the continuation of his previous
attempts to overcome the problems of relativism. The format
of the article makes it clear that the explorer role of the
historian is of key significance for it is the culminating
picture in the discussion. Toynbee proposes to set forth the
83Ibid.
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Knowledge London Times Literary Supplement #2810,
January 6, 1956, p. 37"
various limitations of the contemporary historian. One by
one he identifies the items; the development of better tech-
niques which have opened up vast new fields of research, the
expansion of the historian's vision to include unlimited
social and non-political areas of experience, and the over-
whelming wealth of new material from the archives of govern-
ment and business. These difficulties might have a solution,
Toynbee argues, if the historian could use team work as
devised by the natural scientists, or the computing machines
in order to "read the secrets of human minds and hearts." 85
If the historian tries to understand an historical
event without being able to understand the thoughts and
feelings of the participants, he is divorcing it from its
historical context and hence making it unintelligible. But
to comprehend the thoughts of the participants is virtually
impossible for: "If the thoughts and feelings that occur in
a single soul in a single moment could be recorded in full,
the record might surpass, in quantity, all the documentation
that has been manufactured since civilization began." 86
Eventually the historian is face to face with infinity
because "below that circumscribed documentary surface there
opens up an unfathomable psychic abyss." 87 Into this situa-
85 Ibid .
86 Ibid .
87 Ibid.
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tion where the historian's ignorance is incurable because it
is infinite, Toynbee reintroduces the explorer-historian.
What is the moral that we historians should draw?It is, I think, that we should feel humble and atthe same time be bold. We should feel humble inface of the revelation of the radical imperfec-
tion of our intellectual powers. We should bebold in continuing, nevertheless, to ask the per-
ennial questions that historians are always trying
to answer for the benefit of their fellow-men.
.
There is always a need for all of them, for all of
them are necessary operations in mankind's never-
ending task of trying to take its bearings in a
mysterious universe. In full consciousness of the
infinity of our ignorance, we must have the audac-
ity to go on questioning. 88
Even though the explorer-image has on occasion been made to
suggest that the explorer is somehow reaching universally
valid conclusions, in this case, "empirically justified con-
clusions" are seriously disavowed. According to Toynbee,
"The kind of question on which each historian concentrates
in his own work will be determined by his personal tempera-
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ment and cast of mind."
This modesty in the face of an "incurable ignorance"
is difficult to reconcile with the assured tone of Volume One
where Toynbee seemed to know the correct questions to ask.
Our method in this study is empirical; ... In
our survey of societies, we have spent some time
and trouble in rounding up twenty-one representa-
tives of the species? and now that we are going
to put our mustangs through their paces, are we
Ibid .
Ibid.
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to disqualify nearly half the stud before wehave seen how they run? We prefer to let them
alone and go ahead. yu
Nor can this statement that the "kind of question on which
each historian concentrates in his own work will be deter-
mined by his personal temperament and cast of mind," be
brought into harmony with Toynbee's insistence in Volume Five
that the questions he was asking were genuine and universal.
These questions did not depend on the temperament of the
historian but were somehow present in the nature of the his-
torical experience.
At that point we found ourselves contrained to
pause in order to consider whether we were set-
ting ourselves a genuine problem. ... in
this previous case we found that our impulse to
dismiss a problem summarily on the strength of
an abstract argument a priori was checked—as
soon as we took our customary precaution of
exploring the ground empirically—by an imme-
diate discovery of concrete evidence which
showed, in the mere fact of its palpable exis-
tence, that our problem was not an empty for-
mality after all. The problem of the growths
of civilizations was found to be raised in
practical terms by the enigmatic but substan-
tial presence, in the historical landscape, of
five arrested civilizations,
. . .
While one can trace in this essay on the "Limitations
of Historical Knowledge" the arguments that Toynbee has used
to convince himself of the hopelessness of the scientist-
historian's task, it is interesting to note that there is a
90Toynbee, A Study of History
,
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suggestion that an objective historical view might yet be
obtained. Even though the questions asked by individual his-
torians reflect the subjective temperament of those histor-
ians, Toynbee seems to suggest that in the totality of the
questions asked by the historians of different temperaments,
there might emerge an objective view. After stating that the
specific questions are subjective, he adds the argument that:
It is fortunate that people's characters and
intellectual interests vary, for this insures
that historical questions of all the various
kinds will continue to be asked. There is
always a need for all of them, for all of them
are necessary operations in mankind's never-
ending task of trying to take its bearings in
a mysterious universe. 2
In following the imagery used by Toynbee to describe
himself as an explorer and traveler, we have a final source
to consult. It is his book, An Historian's Approach to
9 3Religion
.
Up to this point, we have tried to follow as
closely as possible the chronological order of Toynbee 's
writings in order to watch the comparative importance of the
explorer role in Toynbee 1 s thinking. This source complicates
the chronological development. The frontispiece (Title page)
indicates that the book was "based on Gifford Lectures deliv-
ered in the University of Edinburgh in the years 19 52 and
1953." The preface indicates that these lectures in turn
92Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 4.
9 3Arnold J. Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to
Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1956)
.
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were based on some of the material covered in A Study of His-
tory. According to the footnotes attached to the chapters of
the book, chapters three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and
nine are based on the more detailed work in A Study of His -
tory. This information raises a question as to the formula-
tion of the views in chapter one, which is the chapter per-
tinent to our present inquiry. Its composition falls some-
where between the Gifford Lectures of 1952-1953 and the com-
pletion of Toynbee's manuscript for the book An Historian's
Approach to Religion which he has dated as December 1955.
The argument of chapter one has a studied inconclu-
siveness about it that probably reflects Toynbee's continued
perplexity as to the historian's role and method. The trav-
eler or pilgrim image is asserted at the two pivotal points
of his discussion on "The Historian's Point of View." In the
first stage of the argument Toynbee deals with man's place in
the universe which he describes as follows:
. . . every living creature is striving to make
himself into a centre of the Universe, and, in
the act, is entering into rivalry with every
other living creature, with the Universe itself,
and with the Power that creates and sustains the
Universe and that is the Reality underlying the
fleeting phenomena. ^4
The self-centeredness that is a necessary penalty of being
born in space and time is in Toynbee's view also a moral
94 Ibid.
, p. 4.
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error. So, "every living creature finds itself in a life-
long quandary." 95
This dilemma of every living creature is not made the
basis for a profound pessimism by Toynbee for he hopes to
escape that conclusion by attaching the dilemma to the trav-
eler motif. Even though we are in this life-long quandary
there may be hope in the deliverance of time. One might
notice parenthetically that Toynbee' s choice of a title-page
quotation is T. S. Eliot's enigmatic phrase: "Only through
time time is conquered." But to return to the use of the
motif of a traveler, Toynbee declares?
A living creature can keep itself alive only in
so far, and for so long, as it can contrive to
steer clear both of suicide through self-renun-
ciation and of euthanasia through self-renuncia-
tion. The middle path is as narrow as a razor's
edge, and the traveller has to keep his balance
under the perpetual high tension of two pulls
towards £wo abysses between which he has to pick
his way.
The pilgrimage of mankind in this simile is described as "Man
in Process of Civilization." This phrase is not new in the
Toynbee corpus and was, in fact, the commonly used phrase in
the early volumes of the Study . But its appearance in his
post-Study book on religion is surprising. To examine the
reasons for the shift in phraseology about mankind's pilgrim-
age would at this stage be premature and would also tend to
9
5
Ibid.
, p. 5
96 Ibid.
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sidetrack the primary investigation of this chapter, but it
is relevant to take notice of the shifts in the pilgrimage
simile. The initial volumes of A Study of History had many
references to "Man in Process of Civilization" and the major
similes were those of the climbers on the side of the moun-
9 7tain,' and the motor-cars on a one-way street. 98 As long as
Toynbee was convinced that civilizations were an intelligible
unit of study, and that a higher religion was the chrysalis
out of which new civilizations could be born, the description
of "Man in Process of Civilization" was adequate. Up to this
point the process of civilization was significant and had a
legitimate goal.
Yet the shuttle which shoots backwards and for-
wards across the loom of Time in a perpetual to-
and-fro is all this time bringing into existence
a tapestry in which there is manifestly »a pro-
gress towards an end' and not just an 'endless
repetition' in the likeness of the shuttle's own
action. This we know from our empirical study
of the outcome of Yin-and-Yang and Challenge-
and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return in the
histories of civilizations."
Once "civilizations" become no longer intelligible as
fields of study, the use of the term "Man in Process of Civi-
lization" loses its right to be a descriptive term for Man-
kind's pilgrimage. At first Toynbee concludes that any fur-
97Toynbee, A Study of History
,
I, 192.
98 Ibid
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, 176.
"ibid., IV, 34.
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ther pursuit of civilization is merely vain repetition.
If civilizations were the handmaids of Religion
and if the Hellenic Civilization had served as agood handmaid to Christianity by bringing thishigher religion to birth before that civilizationhad finally fallen to pieces, then the civiliza-
tions of the third generation would appear to be
•vain repetitions 1 of the heathen. 100
Once Toynbee turned to this standpoint, "civilizations" as a
goal of man's pilgrimage soon became not only superfluous but
a tragedy.
It would be a supreme tragedy, on the face of it,
if a fully-fledged higher religion were to com-
promise its own future for the sake of bringing a
civilization of the third generation to birth,
because it would be sacrificing itself to secure
the reproduction of a secular institution which
was not only intrinsically inferior to its relig-
ious chrysalis but was now also superfluous.
So the argument moves from the discovery that any civiliza-
tions beyond the second are meaningless repetitions, to the
position that these civilizations are actually destructive of
the real goal of history. If "Man in Process of Civiliza-
tion" continues in this search in preference to what Toynbee
might call "Man in search of religion," then he is involved,
in Toynbee ' s own words, in a "second Fall."
Both the need and the opportunity for the epiph-
any of the higher religions had sprung from the
failures of Fallen Man's mundane civilizations
of the first and second generations, and Man's
subsequent abandonment of his allegiance to a
VII, 445.
447.
100
Ibid.
,
101 Ibid.
ssaving higher religion in order to go a whoring
after a mundane civilization of the third gen-
eration wore the aspect of a second Fall. 102
Toynbee concludes the argument with an attempt to
distinguish between civilization as a goal of mankind's pil-
grimage and the Commonwealth of God. He sees a "great gulf
fixed between 'the open society' of the Commonwealth of God
and 'the closed society' that is exemplified not only in
primitive societies but in civilizations,
. . .
" 103 if thi
is a serious distinction in Toynbee ' s system, then it is dif-
ficult to understand why he reverts in his latest volume on
An Historian's Approach to Religion to the descriptive phrase
"Man in Process of Civilization."
In summarizing the first stage of the argument in An
Historian's Approach to Religion we have seen the importance
of the explorer-image to Toynbee 's whole scheme of History,
for mankind is caught in a cosmic quandary and his only hope
of escape is to live and move as a pilgrim in the constant
tension of two pulls towards two abysses. The second stage
of the argument is the identification of the historian as a
pilgrim through this constant tension of all mankind. The
historian is the leader in this attempt to break out of an
inherited self-centeredness because "the historian arrives at
his professional point of view by consciously and deliber-
1Q2 Ibid
. ,
pp. 762-763
103Ibid., 510.
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ately trying to shift his angle of vision away from the ini-
tial self-centered standpoint that is natural to him as a
living creature." 104
The constant tension which the historian shares with
the rest of mankind is expressed in the statement that while
the historian's goal is unobtainable, yet he can make some
gain.
The self-correction through self- transcendence
,
which is the essence of his profession, no
doubt always falls short of its objective? yet,
even so, it is something to the good; for to
some extent it does succeed in shifting the
mental standpoint, and widening the mental
horizon, of an innately self-centered living
creature . 105
When we translate this conclusion into the language
of the earlier discussion, we can say that Toynbee's faith,
that he has discovered the rhythm of history which was some-
how in the very nature of reality, has been badly upset by
the evidence that the "shimmer of relativity" is not merely
in the foreground. This shimmer of relativity, after more
than twenty years of study, has now become an inescapable
"human plight."
When a human being looks at the Universe, his
view of the mystery cannot be more than a
glimpse, and even this may be delusive. The
human observer has to take his bearings from
the point in Space and moment in Time at which
Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion
, p. 4.
105ibid.
he finds himself; and he is bound to be self-
centred; for this is part of the price of being
a living creature. So his view will inevitablybe partial and subjective . 106
Consequently Toynbee
' s faith has been narrowed to the
modest hope that "by comparing notes and putting individual
and professional experiences together, the Collective Human
Intellect can widen Man's view a little, for the benefit of
each and all. " 107
There is a strong similarity between this argument
and the one used by Toynbee a year later in the article on
"The Limitations of Historical Knowledge." As noted in an
analysis of the explorer-image in that essay, Toynbee greatly
strengthens and elaborates the arguments for relativism and
subjectivism in historical studies in this ignorance which
is "incurable because it is infinite." 108 But he reserved,
at the conclusion of the essay, the right to hope that
because there are all types of people that "this ensures that
historical questions of all the various kinds will continue
to be asked. There is need for all of them, for all of them
are necessary operations in mankind's never-ending task of
trying to take its bearings in a mysterious universe." 10 ^
106 Ibid.
, p. 3.
107 T...Ibid.
108Toynbee, "The Limitations of Historical Knowledge,"
p. 4.
109 Ibid.
One other statement of his methodological dilemma
ought to be noted in this survey of the explorer role in
Toynbee. It is found in the closing arguments of the chapter
on "The Historian's Point of View." The explorer-historian
must choose between two alternative ways. These alternatives
are views of history corresponding to the two abysses which
confront mankind. The one view is the Buddhaic-Hellenic
approach to history which "assures that the apparent rhythm
of the stellar cosmos is the fundamental rhythm of the Uni-
verse as a whole." 110 To choose the astronomical view of
History "provides a radical correction of the bias toward
self-centeredness that is innate in every living creature."
This would seem to be the answer to Toynbee 1 s life-long
search to become "an impartial Western observer." 111 It was
expressed in the conviction of his early volumes that "all
civilizations are philosophically equal" and the historian's
task was to look for patterns or rhythms in the histories of
these social atoms. When the crisis was reached in this
search for the patterns of disintegrating civilization, Toyn-
bee introduced the touchstone of religion by which the his-
torian could evaluate the progress or regression of a civili-
zation. 112 This turning point in Toynbee would appear to
110Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion
,
p. 10
111
Toynbee, A Study of History
,
VIII, 259.
112 Ibid., IX, 410,
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allow personal values to enter into the historian's task but
Toynbee hoped to outwit the charge of subjectivism by arguing
that he was open to any religious revelations which did not
claim to be exclusive. He thought this could be done by
adopting the "Indian standpoint" which allowed "for the pos-
sibility that there may be alternate approaches to the mys-
tery of Existence." 113
It is obvious that this argument of the "Indian
standpoint" cannot be seriously advanced by Toynbee to con-
vince the reader that he is still proceeding on an empirical
basis. Although there is a superficial similarity between
the position of "philosophic equality" adopted in the first
four volumes and the opening of the mind to the possibility
of truth in several religions, Toynbee is really saying in
the second case that he will be open-minded to any religion
which holds his values of the unity of mankind in the fellow-
ship of God, and which denies any divisive or exclusive
claims. But whether it be the Buddhaic Hinduism, Mahayana or
the Himayana it has assumed certain values for life and for
history past. 11 '* If this description is a correct descrip-
tion of what went on in the massive A Study of History , then
the following statement by Toynbee must be considered as a
summary of the conclusions he reached at the end of the Study .
113Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do,", p. 4.
114Toynbee, A Study of History
,
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This astronomical view of History provides a
radical correction of the bias towards self-
centredness at the price of taking the sig-
nificance out of History—and, indeed, out
of the Universe itself. 115
The other choice which the historian could make was
to adopt the Judaeo-Zorastrian view of history. As he
argues: "... on this view the fundamental rhythm of the
Universe as a whole is assumed to be identical with the rhy-
thm in the career of an individual human being. It is
assumed to be a drama that has a beginning and an end, that
is punctuated by crises and by decisive events, that is ani-
mated by challenges and responses, and that unfolds a plot
like the plot of a play." 116 This view of history promises
to give significance to past events and thus the societies
which have held this view have rated the study of history at
a high value. But the Judaeo-Zorastrian view offers us an
"escape from one evil at the price of involving us in
another." 11 ^ The abyss which opens up for the historian who
adopts this view is to relapse into self-centeredness
.
Although two secondary views of history are proposed,
discussed, or dismissed by Toynbee, he leaves the methodo-
logical dilemma unresolved and reiterates the theme of the
115Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 10.
116Ibid
. ,
p. 13.
il^ibid.
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explorer-historian who must find a way between the two
temptations
.
Confronted with a choice between these two
alternatives, we may find ourselves shrinking
from choosing either of them when we have
observed the sinister side of each. Yet these
are the two fundamental alternative views that
have been accessible to human souls so far;
and today a majority of Mankind holds either
one of these two views or the other. The dil-
emma presented by the choice between them will
haunt us throughout our inquiry. "8
Summary of the Usages of the Explorer Role
in the Changing Methodology of Toynbee
To summarize, let us recall our initial purpose of
tracing the self-awareness of Toynbee in his historical works
as he describes himself in the role of the explorer-historian.
The use of this imagery in the early volumes was infrequent
and highly tentative. Toynbee thought of himself as an
explorer in the sense that he was breaking out of obsolete
historical methods which were inadequate, a priori, and sub-
jective. As an explorer-historian who now possessed "intel-
ligible fields of study" the old parochial and nationalistic
limitations could be broken. The "shimmer of relativity"
could be pierced by the empirical method to enable the his-
torian to grasp those rhythms or patterns of history which
were in the nature of things. But as we traced the explorer-
image we found Toynbee using it much more frequently and
Ibid.
, pp. 13-14.
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significantly as the arguments for relativity appeared to
grow stronger in Toynbee's thinking.
As the axiom for philosophic equality of civiliza-
tions is reluctantly surrendered for the criterion of relig-
ion, the explorer-historian now must employ a four-dimen-
sional view of history and the work of the historian becomes
a highly speculative quest. The historian must go beyond the
task of the social scientist who assembles the data, to the
task of searching for the meaning behind the facts. To
ascertain "meaning" involves poetry which comes from the
heart rather than the head of the historian. The difficul-
ties of the explorer-historian are increased by the danger-
ous results that may follow from the historian's published
study. So the explorer-historian ought to emphasize those
things which will bind men together with a mental web.
Finally, the explorer-image becomes dominant in the
most recent of Toynbee's essays as he is confronted with the
haunting dilemma of choosing between the two views, both of
which offer an escape from one evil at the price of involving
him in another. The problems of relativism from which the
early Toynbee was confident he could escape are now discov-
ered to be part of the existential or ontological situation--
it is an incurable, infinite ignorance. It is now part of
the price of being a living creature. This is not to say
that the later Toynbee is pessimistic about this methodologi-
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cal dilemma. He seems to have the hope that even though the
historian is a prisoner of time and space, somehow the "col-
lective Human Intellect" will find a universal view of the
past and present. Or, as it might be expressed, if all of
the historians continue to ask all of the questions which in
themselves are determined by personal temperament and cast of
mind, the totality of the subjective questions might produce
an objective answer to mankind's task of taking his bearings
in a mysterious universe.
In the light of Toynbee's first volume observation
that he was pitting an English empiricism against Spengler's
German transcendentalism, 119 it is interesting to notice the
transition in Toynbee as he pushes his methodological problem
back to a problem of Head and Heart in the historian and
finally back to a dilemma which resides in the nature of the
universe. His hope rests now in some form of "self-tran-
scendence." In its simplest form the "egocentric illusion"
of Toynbee's fellow historians in Volume One, which he so
strongly repudiated, has come back to haunt Toynbee himself
who now declares that the historian is "bound to be self-
centred; for this is part of the price of being a living
creature." 120
119 Toynbee, A Study of History
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CHAPTER IV
TOYNBEE THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST
"In the light of the political laws which we
have analyzed above, we can see objectively
that this ['dwarfing' ... of Europe] is the
natural and indeed the inevitable result. ..."
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume Three (1934)
Use of the Term "Social Scientist"
as a Self-Characterization
Our attempt to understand the historical methodology
of Arnold Toynbee through the metaphors and descriptive
phrases by which he clarifies his own role, leads us to a
second image— that of the "social scientist." In the first
image of "Toynbee the explorer/' we followed the passages in
which he saw himself as a traveler in new methodological ter-
ritory, and in which he emphasized the uncertainty and limit-
lessness of the data handled by an explorer-historian. In
this new phrase we move to a discussion of Toynbee 's specific
objections to traditional historical methodology and to the
new methodology which he proposes under the title of a "sci-
ence of human affairs."
Even a casual glance at Toynbee 's major work is suf-
ficient to recognize the duel carried on in the text and
footnotes between Toynbee and a variety of historians past
and present. This duel, initiated by Toynbee, has been
102
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enthusiastically continued and intensified by the historians
who have been able to respond, as well as by several regi-
ments who were not at first so engaged.
Some of the major engagements were with H. G. Wells, 1
Oswald Spengler, 2 R. G. Collingwood, 3 H. A. L. Fisher, 4
Edward Gibbon, 5 and Martin Wight. 6 But these conflicts are
hardly comparable with the skirmishes in which Toynbee chal-
lenges whole armies of historians. The parochial historians,
national historians, neo-pagans, Late Modern Western ration-
alists, antinomian historians, pedestrian historians, modern
liberals, and humanists are one and all the object of attack
in the course of the Study
.
Indeed, the struggle does not
always continue in an unemotional atmosphere, for on several
occasions Toynbee turns on his critics with such thrusts as
"a chorus of derisive voices assails our ears" 7 and "an
arrogantly hypercritical school of latter-day "Western his-
8torians" and "these notoriously captious critics."
1Toynbee, A Study of History
,
I, 4.
2 Ibid.
,
IV, pp. 11-12,- IX, 66, 168, 700, 756; X, 213.
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6 Ibid.
,r see footnotes throughout Vol. VIII.
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After the completion of the ten major volumes, the
controversy tended to increase rather than decrease. Few
figures in the academic world have aroused controversy in so
many and so varied quarters as he. Toynbee found responses
not only in the historical but also the philosophic, socio-
logical, religious, anthropological, scientific and popular
journals as well, to say nothing of the many public debates
occasioned by his publications.
There is some evidence that Toynbee was surprised at
the vehemence of the response to his challenge, but he philo-
sophically accepts it in his post-Study reflections by
regarding the response as the necessary consequence of his
radical methodological innovations.
. . .
the first attempts (of which mine is one)
are sure to be revised and corrected and super-
seded as time goes on and as more people turn
their minds to this exciting intellectual enter-
prise
.
There is
,
though, one negative observation
that will, 1 believe, continue to hold good. As
soon as one looks at the new panorama of history,
one sees that it bursts the bounds of the current
framework within which our Western historians
have been doing their work for the last 250 years.
'
The question of vital importance iss how does Toyn-
bee in the role of a student of the "science of human
affairs" propose to "burst the bounds of the current frame-
work" of Western historians of the last two hundred and fifty
9
Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 2.
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years? Even a casual reader of the Study is likely to be
impressed with the scientific apparatus, tone and proof that
is offered in these volumes. Our task will be to verify this
first impression of Toynbee • s work, find out what he means by
a "science of human affairs/' and then observe him in action
with this "sovereign methodological clue."
Recognition of Toynbee' s "Scientific" Claims
by the Critics
Not only is the role of the "social scientist" so
prominent that the casual reader is greatly impressed, but
the critical reviews and essays on Toynbee ' s work deal fre-
quently and at length with some aspects of this role. For
example, Pieter Geyl has made a persistent attack on the
"pretense" of empirical investigation in the Study .
Repeatedly he returns to a methodological criticism which he
believes is fundamental to any consideration of Toynbee ! s
effort. Geyl speaks of "the pretense of a scientific argu-
ment, or "the pretense of an empirical investigation,
"
that Toynbee "has pretended to investigate the phenomena of
12
communal life." Geyl ' s criticism comes close to being a
charge of hypocrisy. On one occasion he says that "Toynbee 's
10Pieter Geyl, Debates With Historians (London:
B. T. Batsford, 1955)
, p. 158.
''''"Ibid.
, p. 159
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refreshingly frank confession now implies agreement with that
view [Geyl's argument that the Study cannot supply us with
forecasts having universal validity]. I say 'implies' for in
spite of his refreshing frankness he does not go so far as to
admit that his work is not really the scientific investiga-
tion for which he has all along tried, and is in the face of
his change of front still trying, to pass it off." 13
Another critic of the Study hinges his discussion on
Toynbee's claim to have developed a scientific view of civi-
lizations. Like Geyl his criticism is that Toynbee's claim
to scientific objectivity is not substantiated in the text.
In concluding his analysis he observes that:
Perhaps the lasting significance of Toynbee's
study will be found in the stimulus it may
provide, whether as science or fiction, for a
creative response to our present challenge.
Nevertheless, for want of recognizable modern
miracle workers, the average human must work
out his destiny with the best equipment at
hand. It will not help him in meeting the
present challenge if he guides his response by
generalizations based on confusion, in the mis-
taken belief that they have been objectively
and scientifically established. 1 ^
The same question of the validity of Toynbee's scien-
tific method becomes the focal point of the criticism in the
Times Literary Supplement of October 22, 1954, when the
13Ibid
. , p. 165.
14John William Blyth, "Toynbee and the Categories of
Interpretation," The Philosophical Review , LVIII (July, 1949),
370.
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critic observes, "Such a diversity of explanations might not
be unsuitable to a disconnected series of impressionistic
essays, where they could be valued for their suggestiveness
rather than their validity. But in a work that purports to
be systematic, comprehensive and empirical the effect on the
reader can only be one of bewilderment." 15 The same anony-
mous critic observes that "when we attempt to evaluate Dr.
Toynbee's central thesis and to test its empirical validity,
we find that we have set ourselves an impossible task." 16
If these excerpts from the critics are sufficient to
indicate that this is a major issue in the study of Arnold
Toynbee's methodology, it is important to give close atten-
tion to Toynbee's claims to write history in a scientific
fashion
.
Definition of "Scientific" History
Any study of Toynbee's methodology is faced with the
problem of gaining a precise definition of the terms he uses.
One must not move too rapidly from the appearance of the word
"scientific" to the conclusion that the meaning of the term
is self-evident. The first and perhaps most innocuous use of
the term "scientific" is to link it with an attitude or
15Montagu, Toynbee and History
, p. 104
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spirit. Certainly Toynbee would wish to qualify himself as
a scientific scholar in this general sense of the word. For
example he states in Volume One that "our attitude should be
not fanatical but scientific, and our method not dogmatic but
17
empirical." Again late in the Study he uses the word
"scientific" in the same modest way to describe his spirit or
approach to history. Replying to the objection of his anti-
nomian colleagues that the empirical method is unsuccessful
because the data is insufficient, Toynbee says of himself,
"an importunately scientific-minded student of history might
have found himself constrained to admit that an unconditional
surrender was the only honest response to an agnostic-minded
historian's challenge if this had been delivered
. . . some
1
8
four hundred years earlier." It would seem that although
Toynbee might agree with historians such as Herbert Butter-
field who emphasize the value and importance of the scien-
19tific attitude, he himself would apply the term scientific
to a particular method for the historian.
As can be noticed from the Volume One excerpt above,
Toynbee links together the terms scientific and empirical.
On several occasions he speaks of "science's empirical method
17Toynbee, A Study of History
,
I, 246.
18Ibid
. ,
IX, 213.
19Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations
(London: Collins, 1952), p. 157.
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of inquiry by a process of trial and error." 20 The multi-
volume Study abounds with references to his favorite method.
At first it is simply "our empirical method" 21 but in the
process of the study it becomes "our well-tried empirical
method." 22 The regularity of its appearance 23 is certainly
part of the explanation why Professor Geyl reacts with such
obvious emotion to the "pretense of an empirical investiga-
tion."
We have not yet reached a clear understanding of
Toynbee "s scientific method simply by noticing its close
relationship with "empirical." To define "empirical" or
"scientific" as objective observation in opposition to sub-
jective a priori is certainly implicit in Toynbee • s view but
hardly exhaustive. There are passages in the Study in which
Toynbee seems to define a scientific historical method much
as it has been described in standard texts such as Langlois
and Seignobos.
Thus the domain of history was greatly enlarged,
and scientific, that is, single and objective,
exposition began to compete with the rhetorical
or sententious, patriotic or philosophical ideals
20 mToynbee, A Study of History
, VII, 489.
21
Ibid
. , JI| 18.
22Ibid
. , 101.
23
See IV, 126; V, 1; VI, 261; VII, 2; VIII, 2; IX, 440
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of antiquity. 24
Toynbee occasionally uses the term empirical in the
sense of merely "observing." For example, he asks his
readers in Volume One to content ourselves, "with observing,
empirically, the phenomena of Challenge-and-Response in each
particular instance, without postulating uniformity or
expecting to discover a scientific law." 25
On another occasion he attacks Collingwood * s views of
the Renaissance by turning to empirically-minded historians
like J. B. Bury. In this case the word "empirical" is used
in the sense of "factual" as opposed to dogmatic or a priori
historical thinking. Toynbee says he agrees with the view
of Spengler rather than the view of Collingwood but that,
"this will not be because we have taken the hierophant's
oracular dicta on faith; it will be because we have been con-
vinced by the reasoning of soberly empirical-minded histori-
ans who have not disdained to argue their case by appealing
2 6
to the relevant facts."
There are other cases in which Toynbee uses the word
"empirical" in the sense of observing facts or events. For
2 4Ch. V. iianglois and Ch. Seignobos, Introduction to
the Study of History , trans, by G. G. Berry (New York: Henry
Holt & Co.
, 1898) , p. 300.
25Toynbee, A Study of History
,
I, 302.
26
Ibid. IX, 67.
Ill
example he seems to divide the historian's method into the
"findings" and the "interpretation" of the findings, and in
this case the term "empirical" is attached to the first step.
On another occasion he says, "In any case, however cautiously
and conservatively we may feel it wise to interpret the find-
ings of the empirical survey that we have just been attempt-
ing to make,
. . .
" 2 7
One final illustration of this use of the word scien-
tific or empirical may be sufficient. Occasionally Toynbee
uses the term empirical as the antithesis of dogmatic or
a priori when he answers his critics by saying, "Wait and
see. Our method in this study is empirical; and there is no
particular reason at this point for proceeding a priori." 28
But Toynbee s s definition of "our well-tried empirical
method" goes far beyond these occasional references to a
scientific spirit or a method of observation, and it is only
on this deeper level of definition that one can understand
his whole polemic against traditional historiography. Two
significant sections of the Study contain Toynbee * s arguments
about the use of a scientific method. In Volume One and Vol-
ume Nine he combines and explains the role of explorer and
social scientist* The explorer-historian discards tradi-
tional historical methodologies and the social scientist
27Ibid
. ,
V, 8.
28Ibid., I, 146.
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supplies a new and more effective law-making technique for
the modern historian.
In the Volume One discussion he characterizes the
contemporary historiography which he is discarding as the
popular view, 2 9 and as the antinomianism of modern histori-
ans. 30 Toynbee describes it as a nineteenth and twentieth
century view which grew out of eighteenth century philosophy.
.
. .
for the subsequent evolution of the film
of a Late Modern Western Weltanschauung brought
on to the screen the spectacle of nineteenth and
twentieth century Western historians still cling-
ing, in the name of Science, to the eighteenth-
century philosophers' tenet that History does not
make sense, Ji
In a further description of traditional historiography, he
labels it as "Late Modern and post-Modern , " and applies it to
the "predominant" school of modern historians.
General statements, such as this and those that
follow, about the tenets, views and attitudes
of Late Modern and post-Modern Western historians
are, of course, merely descriptions of what, as
the present writer saw it, was the predominant
school of thought among them? and therefore these
statements, even if they were found to be correct
in the main, would never be more than approxi-
mately accurate in the sense of being all embra-
cing. 2
Despite Toynbee ! s modest claim to be describing only
29
Ibid. , 441.
30Ibid.
,
IX, 173.
31Ibid
.
, 183.
32 Ibid.
113
the "predominant" school of modern historians, he manages to
\ include a high percentage of historians among the tradition-
alists. It would seem from his hypothetical case, a few
pages after the above disclaimer in Volume Nine, that most
of the professional or academic histories are to be numbered
among his opponents.
It might be added that, in all Western universities
mid-way through the twentieth century of the Chris-
tian Era, officially established chairs of Logic/
Psychology, Anthropology, Political Economy, and
Sociology were to be seen 'parked' side by side
with no less officially established chairs of His-
tory, without any apparent recognition of the aca-
demically awkward fact that, if the intellectual
creeds of either the professors of History on the
one side or the professors of the Sciences of human
affairs on the other side were to be taken at all
seriously by the academic authorities, a decent
regard for intellectual integrity would constrain
them to rase from the parquet of their aula either
one or the other of these two rows of professorial
cathedrae . 33
This frequent mention of the sharp antithesis between his
work and modern Western histories in general is most notice-
able in Volumes One and Nine. In the Volume One discussion
of the very grave effects of the environment on modern his-
torians, Toynbee sharpens the distinction when he says "This
thesis of 'the Unity of Civilization' in this sense is a mis-
conception into which our modern Western historians have been
led by the influence of their social environment on their
thought.
"
33 Ibid. , 189.
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Also in Volume One Toynbee relates the story of a
"meeting of the Board of Studies in History of a prominent
and cosmopolitan Western University." He stresses the promi-
nence of the University on the one hand and the parochialism
of the subjects offered and accepted for research on the
other. The meeting was suddenly lifted from an insignifi-
cant to a symbolic incident for Toynbee when the Secretary
read out a proposal to investigate the social and political
conditions of India in the age of the Guptas.
This train of thought, which went through my mind
in a flash, was cut short by a titter which ran
round the Board. 'May we ask the Secretary to
read that name again?', said a member on my left;
and, at the repetition of the word 'Guptas', the
titter turned to loud laughter. I found that I
was laughing too— at the laughter of my colleagues--
and, glancing round the room, I caught the eye of
an Orientalist, sitting opposite. Silently we sig-
nalled to each other that we were enjoying a private
joke of our own. 34
The "private joke" between Toynbee and the Orientalist served
to emphasize Toynbee ? s sense of opposition to the traditional
and academic view of the majority of contemporary historians
who have been subject to the "egocentric illusion."
Added identification of traditional historiography
comes from a comparison of passages in Volumes One and Ten.
On this occasion the descriptive term is "encyclopaedism" or
"the pedestrian historian." The mistake of the Modern West-
ern historian is to apply the analogy of a post-industrial
Western factory to the task of historical research. He works
then by "piecing together scraps of information, produced by
a division of intellectual labor, in an intellectual assembly
3 5plant ..." The great illustration of this contemporary
historiography is, of course, the Cambridge History series,
a symbol to Toynbee of the "industrialization of historical
thought." 36
A final characterization of the representatives of
contemporary historiography is that of "parochial" or
"nationalist historians." Again the mistake of traditional
historiography is the result of environmental influences.
The Modern Western historian shares the egocentric illusion
of his time, for "In the Western World of our day, almost
every Englishman, Frenchman, Czechoslovak, and Lithuanian is
influenced in his political feelings, thoughts, and actions
by the irrational assumption that his own national state is
37
a more precious institution than his neighbor's."
An interesting corollary of this argument that the
Modern Western historian has been led astray by dominant
tendencies of our time , is the hopeful note sounded in the
first volume that because the tendencies of our times are
again changing "we may expect to witness in the near future
35 Ibid.
,
X, 28.
3
^Ibid.
,
I, 5.
37Ibid. 160.
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a change in the outlook and activities of Western histori-
3 8
ans." The change that he professes to see is a change from
a dividing nationalism to a unifying ecumenicalism. A critic
looking for regularities in the Study might put this opti-
mistic prediction alongside a whole list of the author's
once-mentioned predictions. Certainly this initial optimism
that Toynbee expresses—the opening of a new era by means of
his exploratory methodological journey--has been dissipated
by the time he writes the ninth volume and sourly describes
"the majority of his fellow historians as an arrogantly
hypercritical school of latter-day Western historians." 39
Toynbee identifies specific representatives among the paro-
chial, national, pedestrian, encyclopedic and antinomian his-
torians. To him traditional historiography in its encyclo-
pedic and manufactured aspect is represented by Ranke , Momm-
sen, 40 and Lord Acton. 41 In its nationalistic aspect it is
represented by Monsieur Camille 42 and H. W. V. Temperley 43
among many others. In its antinomian aspect, traditional
38 Ibid. 9 14.
39 Ibid. 9 IX, 19.
40 Ibid. 9 1/ 4 »
41 Ibid. 9 46.
42 Ibid. 9 11.
historiography has two great spokesmen, H. A. L. Fisher44 and
R. G. Collingwood. 45
There appear to be three reasons for the peculiar
characteristics of the predominant school of modern Western
historians. First Toynbee offers a psychological explanation
In the case of the parochial historian, Toynbee says that his
Western misconception has psychological roots which are
deeper than the temporary influence of a particular social
environment. He argues that "at bottom, the misconception is
founded on an egocentric illusion which is always and every-
where ingrained in human minds." While this statement may
sound like the conclusions of a convinced relativist, in con-
text it is greatly modified. What Toynbee apparently means
in Volume One is that everyone has an ingrained tendency
toward an egocentric illusion. This interpretation of Toyn-
bee 1 s statement is justifiable on the basis of the contextual
argument in which he himself says that "we have learnt to
overcome this illusion in our Study of the stellar uni-
4 f>
verse." His argument continues, "We have taught ourselves
to discount the false appearances arising from our accidental
point of observation"; and a little later, "Again, in our
personal relations with other human beings, we have learnt,
44 Ibid
. ,
V, 414; IX, 195.
45 Ibid
.
, 199.
46 Ibid., I, 160.
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if not to overcome the illusion, at least to be on our guard
against it."
In Volume One (1927) Toynbee is rather confident that
the egocentric illusion can be dispelled by exposing its
ridiculous assumptions, and by showing how the fallacy first
developed. Toynbee devotes several pages to ridicule, intro-
ducing his samples by saying, "The best cure for such insan-
ity is ridicule, and we can apply it by observing how exqui-
sitely ridiculous our 'Anglo-Saxon' attitude looks when it is
struck by other people."' 47 But he rests his strongest hope
that this egocentric illusion can be conquered on a new his-
toriography. It can be said that his primary motivation for
the lengthy study is his conviction that the "shimmer of
relativity in the foreground" of all traditional historical
thinking can be dispelled by a more rigorous application of
the scientific method.
Toynbee' s second explanation for the views held by
contemporary historians is that these men have unwittingly
absorbed strong elements of nationalism and parochialism from
the two dominant institutions of the Western world— the
4 ftIndustrial System of Economy and Democracy. ° But this argu-
ment that contemporary historiography takes its impress from
two dominant institutions of the modern western world is
47 Ibid. , 161.
48 Ibid. , 16.
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double-edged, and hence is difficult to reconcile with the
third explanation of Toynbee as he develops it in Volume
Nine •
Here one must realize Toynbee is dealing with the
philosophical roots of traditional historiography. He is
trying to account especially for the antinomian aspect of it.
The explanation begins with a discussion of the inadequacies
of eighteenth-century philosophy
.
Late Modern Western minds that had risen in
rebellion against the alleged arbitrariness of
God now found Man usurping a prerogative that
the Deity was deemed to have forfeited; for, if
this was Reason's hour, it was also the power
of Darkness
. Even these ingeniously rational
minds had not the wit to make the sovereignty
of Nature affective in every nook and corner of
a Universe throughout which they had now abro-
gated the sovereignty of God; and one of these
newly created residual Alsatias which eighteenth-
century Western philosophers ruefully found them-
selves compelled to abandon to the anarchy of
Chaos and Ancient Night was the field of human
history*
. . •
-
Toynbee argues that an inadequate ontology in the eighteenth
century led to a defective epistemology , and this in turn
made it virtually impossible to do anything with the study of
history other than to dismiss it as unintelligible chaos.
. . . but the Late Modern Western philosophers
had now swept off the altar of Destiny a living
cloth woven on a divine pattern; and, in hastily
setting themselves to cover a shockingly denuded
surface with their own blue-print of 'the laws
of nature*
,
they were disconcerted to find this
49 Ibid.
,
IX, 182.
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paper substitute could not be stretched, however
mercilessly they might rack the scientific imagi-
nation, to extend over the particular field of
events that concerned Man more than any other in
virtue of its being in the field in which Man's
own life was at stake. 50
After completing this discussion of the philosophical
background of the eighteenth century, Toynbee describes the
nineteenth and twentieth-century Western historians as men,
"still clinging, in the name of Science, to the eighteenth-
century philosophers' tenet that History does not make
sense." 51 This third explanation, so difficult as we noted
above to reconcile with the earlier explanations of Volume
One, turns on the assertion that the quaintness of the tra-
ditional Western historians "lay[s] in their apparently
weather-proof imperviousness to the influence of a number of
radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-century changes in
the climate of thought in their own Western intellectual
milieu." 52
The two explanations thus pivot on rather contradic-
tory charges. In the Volume One explanation traditional his-
toriography is at fault because it mirrors the general con-
ditions and tendencies of the modern West, the Industrial
System, and Democracy. These dominant institutions attained
50 Ibid
. , pp. 182-183.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. , 183.
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a supremacy according to Toynbee "at the close of the age
preceding our own/' 53 which is designated in the footnotes as
the two decades between 1860 and 1880. Thus, the "industri-
alization of historical thought" 54 and the "spirit of
Nationality" have combined to make the historian the "slave
of his clay," 55 It should be understood in this "explana-
tion" of Volume One that the "industrialization of historical
thought" is equated with the application of "modern Western
scientific thought" to a study of human activities.
The same method, however, has latterly been
applied in many realms of thought beyond the
bounds of Physical Science—to thought which
is concerned with Life and not with Inanimate
Nature, and even to thought which is concerned
with human activities. Historical thought is
among these foreign realms in which the pres-
tige of the Industrial System has asserted
itself; and here— in a mental domain which has
had a far longer history than our Western Soci-
ety and which is concerned not with things but
with people— there is no assurance that the
modern Western Industrial System is the best
regime under which to live and to labor. 5 °
In brief this application of the "scientific method of
thought" to historical thinking is best demonstrated by the
work of historians, who, patterning themselves after Mommsen
and Ranke, "have given their best energies to the "assem-
53Ibid.
,
pp. 183-184.
54 Ibid. I, 1.
55 T . ,,Ibid. 7.
56 Ibid. 3.
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blage' of raw materials— inscriptions, documents, and the
like— in 'corpora' es and periodicals; and, when they have
attempted to 'work' these materials 'up' into 'manufactured'
or 'semi-manufactured' articles, they have had recourse, once
again, to the Division of Labour and have produced synthetic
histories like the several series of volumes now in course of
publication by the Cambridge University Press." 57
A further explanation of what it was to employ the
"scientific method of thought" to historical thinking is
indicated by Toynbee's description of the seminar or 'labora-
tories' in which the major task is the "discovery or verifi-
cation of some fact or facts not previously established." 58
Toynbee's cure for traditional historiography as
given in his opening volume is to discard somehow the impress
of nineteenth and twentieth-century tendencies on historical
thinking. Hence Toynbee's argument "has been leading us up
to the point of calling in question the analogy between his-
torical thought and industrial production altogether." 5 ^
This faulty analogy has been most dangerous in the area of
method, so Toynbee declares
s
In the world of action , we know that it is dis-
astrous to treat animals or human beings as
though they were sticks and stones. Why should
57Ibid
.
, 4.
58Ibid .
59D
*Ibid.
, 7.
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we suppose this treatment to be any less mis-taken in the world of ideas? Why should we
suppose that the scientific method of thought—
a method which has been devised for thinking
about Inanimate Nature— should be applicable tohistorical thought, which is a study of living
creatures and indeed of human beings? When aprofessor of history calls his 'seminar' alaboratory', is he not wilfully expatriatinghimself from his natural environment? 6 0
Toynbee's objection is further specified in his argu-
ment that, "No practical man, however, would think of con-
ducting a nursery garden on the principles of a factory or a
factory on the principles of a nursery garden; and, in the
world of ideas, the corresponding misapplications of method
ought to be avoided by scholars." 61 Another term for this
misapplication of the scientific method to historical thought
is one suggested to Toynbee by Bergson, "the mechanism of our
intellect.
"
All of this activity of the traditional historian
laboring under the misapplication of methods to his field is,
however, to entitle the historian in his own eyes to the hon-
orable banner of "scientific historian." Indeed it is this
very drive to earn the title which opens the door for the
nationalistic spirit.
To grapple with 'Universal History' on industrial
principles is so evidently beyond the compass
even of the most gifted and the most vigorous
individual that, for a scientific historian, the
50 Ibid.
61 Ibid. , 8
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admission that unity could not be found in any-
thing short of 'Universal History' would be
tantamount to removing unity of vision alto-
gether.
. . .
if, however, he could seize upon
a unit of historical thought which was of more
manageable proportions
. . . and such a solu-
tion appeared to be offered by the Principle of
Nationality. 62 F
The explanation of Volume Nine rests on another
charge against traditional historiography. If in Volume One
traditional historiography is at fault because it mirrors too
closely a nineteenth and twentieth-century social environ-
ment, in Volume Nine traditional historiography is at fault
because of its "apparently weather-proof imperviousness to
the influences of a number of radical nineteenth-century and
twentieth-century changes in the climate of thought in their
own Western intellectual milieu.
In fact the charge is not merely that historians are
"impervious" to the radical changes going on around them, but
that they do not even observe these changes. The revised
version of the plight of modern historiography is stated in
this fashion:
From this antique base, between the opening of
the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and
the middle of the twentieth, Western conquista-
dores [Late Modern Western Scientists! whose war-
cry was the vindication of Nature's legitimate
rights had already reclaimed and annexed at
least four further polders from the Modern
6
2
Ibid. , 10.
6
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Western no-man's-land of human affairs withoutbeing challenged, or perhaps even observed, by
contemporary Western listeners. 64
If the two analyses or explanations for the short-
comings of traditional historiography are based on the alter-
nate charges of "too much influence/' from the present, and
"too little change" from an antiquated past, is the situation
the same in the remedies Toynbee proposes in Volumes One and
Nine?
In Volume One Toynbee protests against the misap-
plication of the scientific method of thought to the world of
ideas. In Volume Nine the remedy for the ills of modern his-
toriography is quite different. Here Toynbee asks the his-
torian to follow the lead of anthropology. If anthropology
had been so successful then "a scientific method of ascer-
taining laws of human affairs that had justified itself
empirically by proving to be valid in this field of ex-primi-
tive culture would also be, to say the least, a promising
line of scientific attack upon the study of societies of the
species, known as civilizations. „ . . ^
Unlike the Volume One situation in which Toynbee
expressed the confidence that the dominant note of our new
age— the sense of being part of some larger universe, would
bring about a change in the activities and outlook of the
64 Ibid
.
, 185.
65 Ibid. , 186.
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Western historians, by Volume Nine these historians appear to
be beyond help.
Mid-way through the twentieth-century of the
Christian Era, most Western historians seemed
still to be contriving to turn as blind an eye
to the social scientists' successive trespasses
on the historians' pointedly placarded preserve
as a Neville Chamberlain had turned in A. D.
1938 to the Third Reich's successive aggressions
in the Western World's political arena. In an
era of appeasement the historians were allowing
the economists to rob the Antinomian World of an
Austria, and the sociologists to rob it of a
Czechoslovakia, from under the Antinomians' eyes,
without betraying, by even the flicker of an eye-
lid, any consciousness of these impudent deprada-
tions that were being committed at the historians'
expense , 66
So Toynbee concludes that the typical antinomian latter-day
Western historian is a relic of an old-fashioned- looking
eighteenth-century Western intellectual environment, who
ought either to "retire from the field or else change
sides . " If he were to change sides he would begin by
entertaining the contemporary Western scientists' hypothesis
that "there are 9 laws of Nature* governing the history of Man
6 8in Process of Civilization," The way of remedy is for
individuals not to hug technological chains but to follow the
example of the social scientists . There is little hope for
66 Ibid
.
, 193.
67 Ibid
.
, 201.
68 Ibid
.
, 202.
69Ibid. , 209.
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traditional historiography for the real battle has already
been fought and won. The culminating and crucial passage in
the argument of Toynbee as to the remedy is the last para-
graph of the section in which he attacks the dominant school
of modern Western historians.
Thereafter, in the present writer's view, the
intellectual battle on this field had been won
for Science by the intervention of the archae-
ologists in the long-since-combatant oriental-
ists' support. As he saw it, the archaeologists
had played here the decisive part that the Prus-
sians had once played on a military battlefield
on which their British allies had been bearing
the heat and burden of the day. At Waterloo an
Anglo-Prussian conjunction of military forces
had proved irresistible, and the united intel-
lectual forces of the orientalists and the
archaeologists had similarly put the historians
to rout. Under a twentieth-century spectator's
eyes, these picturesque antinomian warriors had
gone down to as ignominous a defeat at the hands
of the disciplined champions of Science as their
prototypes the Egyptian Mamluks had suffered on
the 21st July, 1798, in the Battle of the Pyra-
mids, when they had been mowed down by the well-
timed fire of Napoleon's efficiently manoeuvring
Janissaries. The impression made on the writer
by the spectacle of this decisive intellectual
battle was the experience that had moved him to
attempt a study of History; and his answer to the
challenge of the agnostics is presented, not
solely in the present passage, but throughout the
present work. 7u
We have deliberately sharpened the contradictory
aspects of the two explanations of traditional historiography
as found in Volumes One and Nine in order to clarify one of
the methodological ambiguities of the Study . The contradic-
70 Ibid. , 216.
128
tion appears to have two parts. It involves a contradictory
historical explanation and a contradictory remedy for the
dilemma of traditional historiography. The first contradic-
tion may be partially resolved by seeing Toynbee s analysis
as an explanation on two levels; one a psychological and the
other a philosophical explanation. The second contradiction
concerning the remedy for traditional historiography, a con-
tradiction which revolves around Toynbee " s "scientific" pro-
posals, is in our view largely a semantical difficulty which
can be obviated by a more careful analysis.
One may notice that the two explanations for the
errors of traditional historiography are reducible to the
charges that (a) traditional historiography mirrored, or bor-
rowed, the scientific ways of the dominant institutions of
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries? and (b) that
traditional historiography has been impervious to the influ-
ence of a number of radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-
century changes since accepting in the eighteenth century a
false distinction between the "natural" and the "accidental"
events in life. The contradiction may be reduced in part by
observing that "a" is in the nature of a psychological
account of traditional historiography while "b" is an expla-
nation in terms of the philosophical roots of traditional
historiography. But some contradictory aspects remain when
the matter is posed as a question, "If historical studies do
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reflect their social environment, (which was the axiom for
explanation "a") why then are the traditional historians of
explanation "b" so obdurate, blind and impervious to the
influence of the radical changes of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries?" While it seems impossible to adjust the
two accounts in order to harmonize them, it may be possible
to offer an explanation of their presence. The first account
depends upon a derived motif which appears only in Volume
One, and is there employed twice. It does not find a full
flowering in the Study and gives place to the major motif of
Toynbee' s Study—the application of scientific method to the
history of civilizations.
The two occasions on which Toynbee expresses opposi-
tion to the scientific tradition and a rejection of the
scientific method have been quoted in an earlier chapter. In
both cases he relies on insights from Bergson in striking out
at the application to historical thought of the "scientific
method of thought—a method which has been devised for think-
ing about Inanimate Nature. ..." On the first occasion he
observes that we have picked up this fallacy from an indus-
trial environment, and warns himself against falling victim
to it. This warning was part of the initial chapter of Vol-
ume One. On the second occasion, late in Volume One, Toynbee
revives his warning and then asks the question, "Have we not
been guilty of applying to historical thought, which is a
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study of living creatures, a scientific method of thought
which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature?"
It seems apparent that Toynbee does not intend to
develop a full scale antithesis between science and history.
He opposes the scientific method if it means dissection,
mechanicalness, and fragmentary treatment in place of the
romanticists' emphasis upon synthesis, life, and unity of
vision. Casting around in the immediate environment for an
explanation of its origin he finds it in the contemporary
industrial environment. Later on he quietly drops the theory
of environmental influence on traditional historiography in
favor of the philosophic explanation.
The second part of the contradiction between the Vol-
ume One and Volume Nine explanation of traditional histori-
ography is considerably reduced when one realizes that the
term "scientific" is defined in several ways in the Study .
Toynbee objects to the scientific method as employed by tra-
ditional historians because they wish to limit it to "the
idea of ascertaining the facts of Nature" while he sees a
proper scientific method as capable of inferring the laws of
Nature from an unprejudiced, accurate, and exhaustive study
of the facts. Hence the bandying about of the term "scien-
tific" on opposing views of the remedy should not mislead one
into supposing that an ultimate contradiction exists, when a
further analysis of the definitions of "scientific" can
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resolve the difficulty.
The New Methodology Based on the Role
of the Social Scientist
It is possible to see what Toynbee's new methodology
will be by following his direct assertions on the role of the
social scientist, and by observing his use of metaphors which
describe the functions of the historian-social scientist.
The annex of Volume One contains a crucial discussion of the
new science of history that Toynbee is seeking to implement
and exemplify in the Study . The lengthy argument, drawn
largely from Teggart as will be subsequently noted, is
directed against the "popular view" that historians are
objective and scientific because they deal only with the
facts as they are
.
Our survey has perhaps sufficiently disproved
the accuracy of the popular equations between
the employment of certain literary techniques
and the study of certain phenomena of human
life . Each of the three techniques—the ascer-
tainment and record of 'facts 1 , the elucidation
and formulation of ' laws ? , and the creation of
'fiction 1— is employed on occasion in each of
the three studies : in the study of social life
in civilizations which is popularly called
'history 1 , in the study of social life in prim-
itive societies which is the province of
anthropology, and in the study of personal
relations in the branch of literature which
comprises plays , novels 9 and biographies . This
shows that there can be nothing in the intrin-
sic nature either of the studies or of the
techniques to equate any one study with any one
technique a priori. H
71Ibid.
,
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Using this scale of three stages, Toynbee argues that anthro-
pology has now left the fact-gathering stage for the second,
that of "law-making,"
Now six or seven hundred instances of a phenom-
enon, while far from necessitating the employ-
ment of the technique known as 'fiction', arejust enough to enable students to make a begin-
ning in the elucidation and formulation of
general laws; and this is, as we have seen, the
stage which the infant science of anthropology
has reached today.
?
2
The question then arises, has "history" moved out of the
fact-gathering to the law-making stage? To this question
Toynbee answers:
We have discerned that this smallness of the
quantity of the integral 'data' that are to
be found in this field up to date will account
for the fact
. . . that in the study of civili-
zation hitherto the technique of fact-finding
has been predominantly . . . employed. 7 ^
The future in Toynbee ' s eyes is fairly promising, for
to the question "In the study of institutional relations in
civilizations, where the known number of integral facts of
the highest order has not yet risen above the modest figure
of twenty-one, can we seriously hope to apply the comparative
method without having to stultify our efforts by eliminating
all certainty from our results?", Toynbee answers, "Wait and
see. At our own peril, we intend to hazard the attempt. "^^
72 Ibid.
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In thus bringing together the role of explorer and
the role of the social scientist, Toynbee manages to give a
note of tentativeness to his methodology, but it is a tenta-
tiveness based not on a feeling of doubt about the validity
of the scientific method but on the question of whether or
not the study of civilizations is quite ready for the law-
making technique/ The proof of this assertion is in the
argument which follows the suggestion of tentativeness in the
"wait and see." He says that if the quantity of 'data 1
available for the study of civilizations grows beyond the
present modest figure and accumulates ad infinitum
, it will
"not only become possible, without question, to employ in
this study the comparative law-making technique; it will
eventually become patently impossible to employ any technique
except that of fiction." 7 ^
Before passing to later assertions about the use of
the law-making technique in the study of history, it would be
well to note the arguments Toynbee uses to support the new
methodology. He argues by means of analogies with other
studies that it is possible to begin a "science of human
affairs. 1 " For example he points out that, "a science which
makes a comparative study of primitive societies exists under
the name of Anthropology; and no one doubts that primitive
societies are really susceptible of being studied in this
75 Ibid.
134
way." /D From this basis he goes on to argue that "the onus
of proof surely lies with those who assert that the 'facts 1
and 'events' in the histories of one particular manifestation
of Life— the species of societies called civilizations—are
exceptions to the prevailing rule in being incomparable not
merely in some respects, but in all respects whatsoever." 77
In the same context, and arguing by analogy, Toynbee
introduces an argument that has evidently been very forceful
in fixing his enthusiasm upon the law-making technique. The
argument appears in Volume One only in the briefest form, and
with the most emphatic and enthusiastic conclusion drawn from
it. He argues
:
While our Western historians are disputing the
possibility of making a comparative study of
historical facts, our Western men of business
are all the time making their living out of a
comparative study of the facts of life around
them. The perfect example of such a compara-
tive study for practical ends is the collection
and analysis of the statistics on which the
business transactions of insurance companies are
collected and averages are taken for the purpose
of making forecasts, is at the basis of almost
all profitable business enterprises in the West-
ern World nowadays. Now if, in practice, a
comparative study of the facts of life in a
civilization is being made with such effect that
business transactions based on it yield profit,
while business transactions that neglect to make
it are apt to result in loss, this is surely
conclusive and indeed superabundant proof that a
comparative study of such facts is theoretically
76
Ibid.
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possible
. . . and in this adventure, at any
rate, we need not hesitate to follow the lead
of our latter-day masters. ?8
It should be observed that this argument runs counter
to the three-stage development which supposedly distinguishes
the three possible techniques. Toynbee had insisted that the
only distinction which marked out the correct method to be
used in the study of the phenomena of human life was that of
quantity of data. History might differ from anthropology
simply because it did not as yet have enough data to provide
an accurate basis for the elucidation and formulation of
laws. If it picked up enough data, it could then move to the
law-formulating stage* However, if the data continued to
pour in, the subject of History would move out of the law-
making stage into the technique of "fiction." As he expres-
ses it, "The form of artistic creation and expression known
as 'fiction 9 is the only technique that either can be
employed or is worth employing where the "data 9 are innumer-
able." 79 Encouraged by this theoretical analysis, Toynbee
does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that, "without ques-
tion • . o it will become patently impossible to employ any
technique except that of 'fiction/" 80 if the quantity of
data available for the study of civilizations continues to
78Ibid.
,
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grow.
Toynbee tries to carry off this theoretic analysis by
the hypothetical case of a future historian who had specimens
of civilization to the number of 1,743,000,000. The conclu-
sion is that "In this situation, the integral, intelligible
facts in the histories of civilizations would really have
become as unmanageably numerous as our present histori-
o i
ans . „ . erroneously suppose them to be now." The clinch-
ing part of the argument then follows; "To require a special-
ist in universal states to identify our actual Roman Empire
among the 1,743,000,000 extant specimens of the institution
would be to set him Psyche's task. To ask him to formulate
the laws implicit in the workings of universal states would
be to assume him capable of a synoptic vision beyond the
capacity of human intelligence." 82 Perhaps at this point in
the exposition even Toynbee, who is obviously greatly enam-
ored with the theory of three stages and the quantitative
distinction, began to see that quantity of data does not have
a fatal effect on "law-making technique." So the argument
almost imperceptibly shifts to hitherto unannounced condi-
tions. From the statement that it would be impossible to
formulate the laws implicit in the workings of universal
states [if the historian had 1,743,000,000 cases under
81 Ibid
.
, 463.
82 Ibid., 464.
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review]
,
Toynbee shifts to the question, "Then by what tech-
nique could this hard-driven latter-day historian communicate
the results of his studies to his contemporaries' minds?"
And Toynbee supplies the answer to his own question, which
curiously enough fills out perfectly his theoretical three
stages; "only, perhaps, by the technique called 'fiction'
which our dramatists and novelists employ.
. . .
" 83 He has
shifted from the quantity of data needed "to study" a phenom-
ena of life to the quantity of data involved in "communica-
ting" it.
This surely is an odd conclusion to reach—that "his-
tory" will someday become "fiction" because of the unnumer-
able data. It would seem from other references that Toynbee
at this point is caught in the machinery of his own theory.
He grinds out an answer to protect the theory even though in
other passages where the theory is not at stake he draws no
such radical conclusions. A situation of the other sort in
which he is not trying to protect his theory is his use of
the analogy of the businessman to the historian. Toynbee
argues that if a businessman can formulate laws from his
study of business affairs, then certainly the, historian ought
to be able to formulate laws in his field.
According to his theory of the three stages, the
83 Ibid.
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businessman should be dealing with highly fictional situa-
tions, but instead of that conclusion Toynbee argues that the
data can be handled by statistical studies.
In embarking on our survey of apparent evidences
of an amenability of human affairs to 1 laws of
Nature 1
,
it might be convenient to take our
first soundings in the ordinary affairs of pri-
vate people, since in this tract, in which fish-
ing rights had been venturesomely claimed and
profitably exercised by latter-day Western his-
torians, the number of the data was apt, as we
have noticed , to run into comparatively high
figures, rising from thousands to hundreds of
millions, and figures of these orders of magni-
tude are high enough, and at the same time not
too high , to allow of accurate and subtle statis-
tics . Statistically established uniformities and
recurrences are capable , not only of being visu-
alized in mathematical curves, but also of being
verified by being put to the test of being taken
as bases for prediction? • • •
In the important preface to Volume Seven, Toynbee links
together the work of the first two batches of the Study with
the third and final group of volumes. The occasion calls for
a reference to the method followed in the first six volumes,
which Toynbee produces in this fashions
And happily in this case we are in a position
to proceed straight from the formulation of our
question to an attempt to answer it, without
having to go through the laborious process of
seeking, sifting, assembling, and comparing
those historical facts that are indispensable
raw materials for the empirical method of
investigation that we are following in this
Study . Q 5
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This description of what he has been doing might
appear to be the sort of process he has condemned in his ini-
tial attack on traditional historiography in Volume One.
There he condemned as the "industrialization of historical
thought" historians who "have given their best energies to
the 'assemblage of raw materials— inscriptions, documents,
and the like--in 'corpus' es and periodicals? and, when they
have attempted to 'work' these materials 'up' into 'manufac-
tured' or 'semi-manufactured' articles, they have had
recourse, once again to the Division of Labour and have pro-
8 6duced synthetic histories . . . " The difference between
the process which Toynbee adopts and the one he condemns as
"industrializing" historical thought, is found in the phrase
"and comparing those historical facts." If he had followed
Dilthey in this Volume One attack on the scientific method
beyond the irritation he shares with Dilthey over the treat-
ment of historical facts as though they were "raw materials,"
he would never have been able to describe his method in Vol-
ume Seven as the "process of seeking, sifting, assembling and
comparing . . . the raw materials." Instead he would have
sought some method by which he could get inside the facts
through "an intimate communion of the self with the mind of
the individual studied" 87 or through a re-enactment of the
8
6
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,
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History (New York: Columbia university Press, ±yr>b) t p. 80.
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thoughts of the past in his own mind. 88 However we have
argued that the Dilthey influence is a derived motif which
Toynbee briefly considers but never allows to flower in his
own methodology. Toynbee 1 s romanticism is channeled by
Bergson into an attempt to find the "laws of Nature 8 in an
evolutionary framework rather than a mechanistic, life-less
chain of laws.
In Volume Eight Toynbee provides a fairly clear-cut
description of the way in which he sees himself functioning.
The reference is located in an opening section called, "A
Plan of Operations/ 1 under the sub-heading, "A Survey of
Encounters Between Contemporary Civilizations." As he sur-
veys the data to be used in this investigation, Toynbee asks
himself whether or not the modern West would provide a good
specimen for a comparative study . He observes
:
On this showing, a twentieth-century student of
human affairs might expect to find the history
of the encounters between the Modern West and
its contemporaries comparatively un illuminating
,
for the same reason that had condemned the
domestic history of the Western Civilization to
be comparatively unilluminating for a study of
the species of societies of which it was one
representative.
Then follows the "social science" characterization
;
An imperfect specimen is manifestly not the best
choice for the purposes of scientific observation
and research; and, in the science of human
affairs, there is this blemish of imperfection in
88 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London:
Oxford University Press, 1946) , pp. 282-283.
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any historical episode in which less than the
whole story is within the historian's knowledge. 89
In Volume Nine the argument about the feasibility of the
application of the "law-making technique" is reintroduced,
and serves to underscore Toynbee 1 s conviction that he is
developing a "science of human affairs." The reference
reads
:
In thus establishing a third kind of contact
between one civilization and another, the Modern
Western archaeologists had done contemporary
Modern Western historians the invaluable service
of raising the number of known civilizations to
a figure at which it had become just feasible to
make this species of human society a subject of
comparative study . 9 0
The question of how much data the historian needs to
cross the boundary between the fact-finding stage and the
law-making stage goes through several rounds of inquiry. In
Volume One Toynbee was not sure but that "students of a phe-
nomenon of which only one dozen or two dozen instances are
known can hardly do more than tabulate the facts." 91 By Vol-
ume Nine, his doubt on this issue seems to have been allayed.
Toynbee is sure that "history" had passed from the fact-
gathering stage to the "law-making technique":
In the present writer's personal judgment, a
stock of twenty-one significant data was just
"Toynbee, A Study of History , VIII, 124.
90Ibid
. ,
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91Ibid., I, 455.
sufficient to warrant a search for 'laws of
Nature' in the history of Man in Process of
Civilization; and, twenty years after the
publication of Sir Llewellyn Woodward's book,
this judgment had been fortified by the author-
ity of Sir Charles Darwin. 92
The comforting assurance of Sir Charles Darwin was that "a
number no higher than ten would prove sufficient for a com-
parative study and for the induction of 'laws of Nature .'" 93
The assurance bolsters Toynbee's confidence to such a degree
that he is able to mark out the year and the day on which the
battle was won— the day on which "history" could have moved
from a fact-gathering to a law-making study. His point is
that the agnostic historian might have had a chance of win-
ning the battle "as late as A.D. 1798, if his book had been
out of the printer's hands before the 2nd July of that intel-
lectually momentous year."
The opportunity of the agnostic after that day was
lost, for, "Thereafter, in the present writer's view, the
intellectual battle on this field had been won for Science by
the intervention of the archaeologists in the long-since-com-
batant orientalists' support." 94
In Volume Ten Toynbee includes a long list of
"Acknowledgements and Thanks" and at this time tries to
92 Ibid.
,
IX, 216.
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account for the origin of his science of human affairs. The
most arresting note for this study of the role of the social
scientist in Toynbee ' s methodology is the recognition of the
influence of F. S. Teggart. While the entry is brief, and
comparatively obscure in a long list of acknowledgments, it
can hardly be overestimated in terms of a methodological
study. Two aspects of the acknowledgment are important.
First Toynbee speaks of Teggart as the one who rescued him
from an initial methodological wilderness. He says of Teg-
gart" s Theory of History that "it showed me where to find the
entry into my subject after I had been groping for it without
Q C
succeeding in discovering it by my own native lights.' In
a footnote reference to this period of "groping" Toynbee
speaks of the original method that he tried in the summer of
1920 as a "false move" and a "failure." According to his
description this failure was an attempt to cast his ideas in
the form of a commentary on the second chorus on Sophocles'
Antigone „
Teggart v s contribution was methodological in nature,
as Toynbee recalls, "The baffling obscurities in my initial
problem of method and procedure were illuminated for me by
Teggart' s dicta. . . . 9,96 It is sufficient at present to
9 5Ibid
. ,
X, 232.
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notice that the method supplied by Teggart "proved to be a
sovereign clue which has not only initiated me into my sub-
ject but has piloted me through it."
Further discussion of the Teggart influence can best
be undertaken in its own integral argument later in this
chapter.
A look outside the Study tends to confirm the asser-
tion that Toynbee constructs his break with traditional his-
toriography around the role of the social scientist and the
law-making technique. In the essay "What I Am Trying to Do,"
Toynbee observes that:
This comparative treatment can be extended to
the whole of history ; and it is f in fact, the
method of the human sciences: the theory of
knowledge
,
psychology
,
anthropology
,
sociology
,
economics . The human sciences , like the natural
sciences 9 make a comparative study of their data
in order to discover the structure of the facts
and the events; and I believe that here the his-
torians ought to take their cue from the scien-
tists. The academic diversion between history
and the social sciences is an accidental one
which is an obstacle to the progress of under-
standing. We need to break down the traditional
partition, and to throw history and the social
sciences into a single comprehensive study of
Q 7human affairs . '
Perhaps this sequence of claims will serve to demon-
strate the frequency and constancy of the role of "social
scientist" in Toynbee • s thinking, and at the same time serve
to sharpen the methodological trail-blazing that he envisages
Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 3.
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himself as accomplishing in a historical world dominated by
traditional historiography.
In order to see whether the argument for the science
of history as a law-making technique is more than a temporary
polemic or a minor theme it would be well to explore the
Study for examples of the new methodology in actual practice.
At the conclusion of a lengthy inquiry in Volume Two
into the reason for the growth of a civilization, Toynbee
summarizes
:
We have reached a point at which we can bring
our present argument to a head. We have ascer-
tained that civilizations came to birth in
environments that are usually different and not
unusually easy; and this has led us on to
inquire whether or not this is an instance of
some social law which may be expressed in the
formula : 1 the greater the challenge , the
greater the stimulus. 8 We have pursued this
inquiry by our customary empirical method. ^8
A little later , while on the same line of questioning , he
comments s
After finding, by our empirical methods of study,
that, in diverse instances and variations of the
movement of Challenge-and-Response , ' the greater
the challenge the greater the response" appeared
to be a working * law 1 , we then set out to discover
whether this ? law B which we had traced inductively
were valid absolutely , „ « . 9 9
In Volume Three the topic of inquiry is the criterion
of growth. Toynbee discards the notion that the criterion of
98Toynbee, A Study of History
,
II, 259.
99 Ibid., 393.
growth is the geographical expansion of a "civilization," and
in the process he develops a law which relates geographical
expansion to social disintegration. He argues that: "This
is perhaps the explanation of the law, which we have inferred
from empirical observation, that social disintegration is a
more favorable condition than social growth for geographical
expansion.
"
Dealing with the reverse side of the coin, in an
investigation of the dis integration of civilizations
,
Toynbee
again refers to the law that he has found by an empirical
method; " and this accounts for an apparent 9 law" --which has
been revealed in another context by an empirical survey— to
the effect that the geographical expansion of a civilization
is apt to go hand in hand with its social disintegration." 1^
Later in Volume Five two laws emerge from an empiri-
cal survey of the process of disintegration* The conclusion
of the investigation reads z
It will be seen that this history of Islam is a
special case which does not invalidate the
general results of our inquiry. In general we
are evidently justified in concluding from an
empirical survey that, for external proletariats
and for dominant minorities alike 9 an alien
, 101inspiration is a curse • • «
The footnote to the above passage more precisely identifies
100 Ibid.
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the "general results" as social ' laws 1
, for in the words of
Toynbee, "The history of Islam is also a special case in
respect of another social 'law 8 to the effect that religions
bring ruin on themselves by going into politics."
In the annex of Volume Five which contains supple-
mental studies on the above inferred laws , he comments at
greater length on the relation of religion to politics.
Without entering into the merits of the argument it is still
possible to observe Toynbee 1 s intention of bringing a "rule"
or proposition or social law from the empirical survey. He
says
:
The diversity in the fortunes of the several
fractions of the Western Christian Church in
the Modern Age of our Western History is a
piece of evidence which would appear to com-
plete our empirical proof of the proposition
that a religion stands to lose far more than
it can hope to gain by asking for , or submit-
ting to, the patronage of the civil power.
There is, however, one conspicuous exception
to this apparent rule which will have to be
accounted for before the rule can be allowed
to pass muster? <> 102
An additional methodological note in the same discus-
sion emphasizes the intention of the author to develop a rule
without exceptions. After laboring through an extended
explanation of why Islam appears to be an exception to the
social ? law v , he concludes that in reality it is not, "If the
facts that have now been set forth may be considered to
1Q2 Ibid. , 672
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account satisfactorily for the exception which Islam might
appear at first sight to present to our empirically estab-
lished general rule, . . . «103
The Volume Six investigation of the process of dis-
integration leads to a further formulation of the laws of
history. With regard to the attempts of "would-be saviours"
to rescue their disintegrating society by means of a program
of Archaism or Futurism, Toynbee enters into a long survey,
with the following results:
After this review of would-be saviours with the
"time-machine 1 who have taken the direction of
archaism, we must complete our present survey
by reviewing their futurist counterparts ; . . •
To begin with , we have seen that it is in the
very nature of Archaism to defeat itself by
breaking down into Futurism; and we have just
been giving ourselves an empirical demonstration
of the working of this historical 'law' in our
survey, . . .
In the discussion of the attempts of the Futurist to borrow
some cultural element from another civilization in order to
save his own society, the distraight Futurist is face to face
with another law already examined by Toynbee.
The impossibility of borrowing this or that
element of an alien culture at choice, without
eventually making an unconditional surrender
to the intrusive alien force , is a fundamental
law of the contact of cultures which is exam-
ined in this Study in other places. In the
present context we are only concerned with this
'law* in so far as it throws light upon the
103 Ibid., 679.
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cause of the change of orientation from Archaism
to Futurism . . . 10 5
The footnote to this passage refers to an earlier
survey in which Toynbee felt he had discovered another his-
torical law. The note reads, "For the particular operation
of this law in the intercourse between an external proletar-
iat and a dominant minority across the stationary frontier of
a universal state see . . . Vol. V, pp. 459-80. . . . " 106
In a Volume Seven discussion of the causes of regres-
sion from a higher religion to a secular civilization, Toyn-
bee again tries to frame the results of his survey in terms
of historical laws.
s
We have noticed that the successive milestones
in Man ' s spiritual advance that are inscribed
with the names of Abraham, Moses , the Prophets
,
and Christ all stand at points where a surveyor
of the course of secular civilization would
report breaks in the road and breakdowns in the
traffic; and the empirical evidence has given us
reason to believe that this coincidence of high
points in Man's religious history with low
points in his secular history may be one of the
"laws' of Man's terrestrial life. If so we
should expect also to find evidence of the work-
ing of a converse 'law" that the high points in
secular history coincide with low points in
religious history.
The issue of behavior in a disintegrating civiliza-
tion is raised once again in Volume Eight. The context of
the discussion is the question of the consequences of encoun-
105 Ibid. , 229.
iOSlbid.
107 Ibid., VII, 551.
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ters between civilizations. When an aggressive culture
encounters a civilization in the process of disintegration,
it stimulates various kinds of responses, among which,
according to Toynbee 1 s calculations, are the Zealot and Her-
odian types of responses. Toynbee now begins a survey of the
Zealots and Herodians similar to his Volume Six survey of
would-be saviours. In the course of the survey he makes
references to an "empirically established social law" of an
earlier investigation. The substance of the argument is
interesting but not relevant to the present task. As part of
the argument he seeks to gain Owen Lattimore's concurrence in
the judgment that "the latter-day Japanese importers of West-
ern cultural wares were deceiving themselves in so far as
they seriously expected to succeed, by the sophisticated
means of a nicely calculated and strictly regulated dole of
cultural rations,, in eluding our empirically established
social 9 law' that, when once a society's defences have been
penetrated by the radiation of an intrusive alien culture,
'one thing leads to another' inexorably until, willy nilly,
the assembled party has to resign himself to adapting the
108
assailant's way of life in toto ."
It may be instructive also to observe that these his-
torical laws are reflections of the workings of law in the
108 Ibid.
,
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realms of Physical Life and Inanimate Nature. The identifi-
cation is made in the same discussion examined above, when
Toynbee sets out a plan of operation.
It will be convenient to examine the working of
these two apparent 'laws' of cultural radiation-
and- reception in the order in which we have just
introduced them; and in considering first the
'law' that a culture-element which has been harm-
less at home is apt to work havoc if it is iso-
lated and exported, we may begin by observing
that the operation of this law is familiar to us
in the realms of Physical Life and Inanimate
Nature. 109
The examples of this law in the realms of Physical
Life and Inanimate Nature are poorly chosen, and only super-
ficially analogous to the laws of the social structure. For
example Toynbee sees in the splitting of the structure of the
atom an illustration of the law that "one man's meat is
another man's poison." In the matter of civilizations the
social 'law 1 comes into effect when the besieged society
"borrows" an element from the besieging society. In the
illustration from nature as given by Toynbee there is the
possibility of comparing the social situation to the explo-
sion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in which
case one would have to argue that the Japanese "borrowed" one
element of a "hitherto innocuous substance" and therefore
"our meat became their poison." The other possible analogy
is to think of the integral atom as the "elixir of Life" as
109 Ibid. , 530,
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long as it remained in its structural pattern— in an equili-
brium of forces; but as a Pandora's box when the latent
physical energy was released through the splitting of an
atom. Both of these possible explanations of Toynbee 1 s
social-natural law are difficult to accept. In the first
case the splitting of the atom can be either disastrous or
beneficial, whether the splitting is done by the Japanese or
the Americans. It can hardly be the working of a law to the
effect that what is one man's meat is another man's poison.
In the second case the same antithesis of "meat" and "poison"
breaks down. If society is like the structure of an atom,
and if the splitting of the atom is disastrous for itself as
well as anything in the neighborhood , then it follows that if
a neighboring society "borrowed" an element from an intact
society it would blow up both the besieged and the besieging
societies. The splitting of the atom in this case is "poi-
son" for both.
One final instance of Toynbee 9 s search for historical
laws by means of an empirical survey may be found in Volume
Nine. In the "Plan of Operation" section the usual methodo-
logical explanation is stated as follows?
Let us first see how many instances we can collect
of renaissances within the meaning of the term as
we have now defined it, and then let us go on to
use the results of this survey as the basis for an
analytical study of this species of encounter by
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means of the comparative method of investigation . HO
In this attempt to test the full meaning of Toynbee's
role as a social scientist, it is relevant to examine not
only the direct assertions of his "scientific" methodology
but to look at the series of metaphors Toynbee uses to des-
cribe his fact-gathering and law-making technique.
An approach to these scientific "images" may well be
made through an attack which Toynbee launches on contemporary
Western historians. He explains that the "distracted latter-
day Western historians" are so badly off because they are
prisoners of an obsolescent technique and a delusion. The
situation is simply that the historians think they have too
many facts. In Toynbee's words, "The more confident they
became of their technical ability to handle the facts, the
less confident they remained of their intellectual ability to
apprehend these facts, not to speak of making any sense out
of themj and these two conflicting psychological forces found
their resolution in a concentration on professional technique
both as an end in itself and as a mental city of refuge . "H
1
The close relationship between the illusion of the modern
historian to the effect that he was confronted with a "uni-
verse of an incomprehensible complexity" and the old method-
ology of "fact-gathering" is explained by Toynbee. Actually
11Q Ibid
. ,
IX, 6
111 Ibid., 208.
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the obscurantist technique seems to be the cause of the con-
temporary antinomianism. This is expressed rather plainly in
the statement that:
The nightmare vision of Reality from which they
were seeking shelter in the sand-heap of tech-
nique was an illusion generated by this obscur-
antist technique itself. The apparent dissolu-
tion of a once stable world into a Protean chaos
of infinitesimally small vagrant electrons,
which would re-form into an infinitely complex
universe if they were ever to re-form at all,
was not the apocalypse of an appalling Reality?
it was the illusory optical effect of a dis-
tortingly diffractive lens. 112
Against this distortion and delusion of traditional histori-
ography Toynbee posits a "single" solution. In his words,
"the nightmare could be dispelled in an instant by the single
salutary act of dropping this delusively sophisticated appa-
ratus and reverting to the effective use of the naked
113
eye." One would like to believe that it were this simple,
but of course the antithesis in the passage is largely rhe-
torical. What Toynbee evidently refers to is not the adop-
tion of some extreme form of naive realism, but that the his-
torian ought to look for the integral fact rather than the
complexity of numberless events. Agreement on the "integral
fact" is assumed by Toynbee in this recommended solution for
the distraught Western historian. Throughout the Study this
"simple salutary act" of "reverting to the effective use of
112 Ibid.
,
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the naked eye 11 is employed in a number of interesting method-
ological metaphors
.
One of the first to appear is a comparison of civili-
zations with mustangs in a performance test. The historian
in this instance is an observer and the image carries the
clear implication that objectivity and law-making are natural
results of observation.
In our survey of societies, we have spent some
time and trouble in rounding up twenty-one
representatives of the species; and now that
we are going to put our mustangs through their
paces, are we to disqualify nearly half the
stud before we have seen how they run?
. . .
Whatever may happen, we shall learn more about
horseflesh by watching each and all of them in
action, seeing how they shape, and comparing
their performances than we can expect to learn
if we make an arbitrary selection beforehand
on points. 114
The use of this social science imagery suggests that
the new historiography is not concerned with the gathering of
facts about the mustang as an individual animal „ but rather
in a comparative study or "law-making" study about mustangs
in general* Of course the assumption that civilizations are
the true "integral facts" and are therefore as comparable as
a herd of mustangs underlies the whole passage
.
A second interesting simile of the social science
variety is located in Volume One. The simile is introduced
in order to avoid value judgments in assessing the worth of
114 Ibid., X, 146,
civilizations. "Value," to Toynbee "is intrinsically sub-
jective," 115 and he wishes to avoid any form of the egocen-
tric illusion. His escape from this egocentric illusion is
gained by turning to the comparative method. He reasons that
"In order to obtain a value-scale for civilizations which,
instead of being simply relative, is in some sense absolute,
we must compare them in respect of value, not only with one
another, but also on the one hand with the common goal of
their endeavors, and on the other hand with the primitive
societies from which they are distinguished by a common spe-
cific difference." 116 The simile which expresses this com-
parative study, again implies that the historian need only
observe and compare the respective performances of the "inte-
gral facts" of the past. In this case the civilications are
pictured as motorcars on a "one-way street." The comparison
follows
:
If we apply this simile to our twenty-one civi-
lizations, we see that none of them to our know-
ledge, has ever yet succeeded in travelling over
the whole length of the street and passing out
through the exit; and that fourteen of them have
come to grief by reversing, in defiance of the
rule, before they had completed their transit
and then either colliding with one another or
being warned off the road as dangers to the pub-
lic. 117
115 Ibid
.
, 175.
116 Ibid
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, 176.
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The assumption implicit in this simile is that the "common
goal of civilizations" is somehow empirically determined and
universally agreed upon. In the light of Toynbee
• s later
radical reversal of view that civilization's raison d'etre is
to give birth to higher religions and then to disappear, this
early view about his ability to avoid value judgments is
somewhat optimistic and naive.
A third simile of methodological significance is
introduced in Volume One and developed in Volume Three. In
line with the two common features of these similes, as noted
above, Toynbee expresses the objectivity of the scientific
observer, and the hope of developing a comparative study of
civilizations in the simile of the rock-climbers. The simile
has many applications for the author of the Study which are
not relevant to our methodological interests. It is impor-
tant to notice the relation of the "observer" to the civili-
zations rather than the action of the civilizations them-
selves. The simile is as follows:
Primitive societies, as we know them by direct
observation, may be likened to people lying
torpid upon a ledge on a mountain-side, with a
precipice below and a precipice above; civili-
zations may be likened to comparisons of these
'Sleepers of Ephesus ' who have just risen to
their feet and have started to climb on up the
face of the cliff; while we, for our part, may
liken ourselves to observers whose field of
vision is limited to the ledges and to the foot
of the upper precipice and who have come upon
the scene at the moment when the different mem-
bers of the party happen to be in these respec-
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tive postures and positions . H8
This simile is in most respects a companion to the "one-way
street" simile, especially with regard to the relation of the
historian to his history, for as Toynbee comments, "We are
watching, here, under a new guise, the same spectacle that we
watched before when we saw civilizations in the likeness of
drivers seeking to pass out through the exit from a one-way
street." 119
In Volume Three the rock-climber simile takes even a
stronger methodological turn. Here it is employed to stop a
trend toward relativism which has been developing throughout
the section on "Differentiation Through Growth." Toynbee had
been bringing together in this section numerous instances of
120
variety in the experience of different civilizations.
Turning from the varieties of historical studies to the vari-
ety of artistic styles in the different civilizations, he
finds himself in agreement with Spengler that "every Society
in process of civilization creates a unique and unmistakable
artistic style of its own." Toynbee finds it difficult to
resist the surging relativisms of Spengler who "maintains
that the relativity which we have recognized in the domains
of Art and of Historical Thought is also recognizable in the
118 Ibid .
,
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domains of Mathematics and of Physical Science; and he even
imports his dogma of relativity into the Kantian Categories
of Thought in general, and into the realm of Ethics into the
bargain." 121 The counter-attack is directed against Speng-
ler's claim that civilizations have an absolute qualitative
difference, a position which would wreck the foundations of
Toynbee' s "'comparative, law-making technqiue." So Toynbee
checks the "magnificent logic" of this "formidable antago-
nist" with the assertion of his own position
:
If a civilization is a movement from one kind
of being to another, and it is not a thing in
itself, then surely, again, it cannot be
absolutely unique * Logic or no logic
r
we cannot
follow Spengler as far as this. 1 22
Toynbee concludes Volume Three, which was published with Vol-
umes One and Two as the first major installment of the Study
,
with a statement of confidence in his scientific methodol-
,
123
ogy.
His optimism in the opening chapter of Volume One to
the effect that there must be "some constant and absolute
object of historical thought" behind the "shimmer of relativ-
ity," is reintroduced by an expression of the same hope of
outwitting relativity through the law-making technique 0 He
introduces the simile of the rock-climbers with the pleas
121Ibid.
,
380.
122 Ibid. 383.
123Ibid. 390.
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Yet if we were merely to dwell on this point
once again, [that the study of history is
governed by the dominant tendencies of time
and place] we should be ending this part of
our Study on a false note; for, as we have
observed in our critique on the concept of
Race, the variety that is manifested in Human
Nature and in human life and institutions is
a superficial phenomenon which masks, without
impairing, an underlying unity.
Then he launches immediately into the simile of the rock-
climbers :
We have compared our civilizations to rock-
climbers; and on the showing of this simile
the several climbers, though they are certainly
separate individuals, are also representatives
of a single species and are all engaged upon an
identical enterprise. They are all attempting
to scale the face of the same cliff from the
same starting-place on a ledge below towards
the same goal on a ledge above
.
- The underlying
unity is apparent here;
. . .
-^4
Even though we are engaged at this point primarily
in an elucidation of the "Social Science" role in the Study
,
a passing criticism of this simile may be in order. The sim-
ile is quite misleading if it is supposed to make "apparent"
the "underlying unity." The notion of unity is really con-
veyed by speaking of civilizations as "people." Once having
made this assumption, then one can argue by analogy that just
as the variety of races is a superficial masking of the
underlying unity of humanity, so the variety of civilizations
masks the underlying fact that they are all of one mankind.
124 Ibid
\un
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It is strange to find Toynbee using this argument by analogy
because he repudiated it in an earlier context when he
refused to go along with Spengler's organismic view of cul-
ture .
The other basis of "underlying unity" is the common
goal or "identical enterprise" of this single species of civ-
ilizations. Once again it is worth noticing that this
examined assumption of a common goal is severely criticized
d rejected by Toynbee in the course of his later re-evalua-
tion of civilizations. 126 Using the value scale of higher
religions, the civilizations prove themselves to be of three
species. Only civilizations of the second generation are
chrysalises of the higher religions, and civilizations of the
third generation are "vain repetitions of the heathen." 127
Thus the "common goal" can hardly serve as a basis of "under-
lying unity" on Toynbee 's own showing.
There is a third methodological metaphor that Toynbee
uses on four occasions in the Study . Perhaps even more than
in the metaphors of civilizations as motor-cars and civiliza-
tions as rock-climbers there is in the metaphor of the
reviewing stand a strong emphasis upon the historian's com-
parative and law-making technique. .
125 Ibid. , 230.
126 Ibid
. ,
V, 371.
127Ibid., VIII, 87.
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In Volume Five, the attempt to trace the process of
disintegration has led Toynbee to a consideration of "Schism
in the Body Social." "m the course of a long empirical sur-
splits itself into three fractions— a Dominant Minority, and
an Internal and External Proletariat. Narrowing his search
to the Internal Proletariat, he concludes on the basis of
another survey that the Internal Proletariat display their
creative power in the creation of 'higher religions' and of
universal churches. In order to find the source from which
the inspirations of these creative works are derived, Toynbee
calls together all of the higher religions for a march in
front of the reviewing stand.
It will be seen that our assembly of religions
with an indigenous inspiration remains singularly
small, even when we have brought in the stragglers
from the highways and hedges. If we now inspect
our recruits, we shall find that two of them
really belong to the 'alien' class after all, . . .
What Toynbee is attempting here is not a "history" in the
usual sense, but a comparative study to determine the laws
which are in operation during the process of disintegration.
In this specific case, Toynbee argues, our empirical Survey
has led us to the conclusion that an alien origin is a help
and not a hindrance to a 'higher religion' in winning con-
vey, ..128 he concludes that the disintegrating civilization
128Ibid V, 338.
129 Ibid. 369.
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The next instance of the "reviewing stand" metaphor
has a particularly interesting emphasis upon objectivity.
Toynbee wishes to find the pattern of action which is common
to the various "saviours" of mankind— a task which might well
deter the most courageous historian. However the concept of
a reviewing stand, of surveying according to performance
seems to provide an objectivity similar to the judgment of
the distance the rock-climbers had advanced, or the motor-
cars had progressed along the one-way street. In all three
cases the criteria of development were not established by the
historian but were somehow in the very nature of things. As
the historian watches objectively from the reviewing stand
The first to march past will be the tragic bat-
talion of would-be saviours with the sword who
have slashed—with blades as futile as the Dan-
aids' sieves— at the welling wars of a 'Time of
Trouble '
.
As Toynbee has already pointed out, even the parade arrange-
ments have not been subjectively settled upon by the histo-
rian in order to give an advantage to one contingent as over
against another, for:
The association between the histories of universal
states and the careers of would-be saviours with
the sword does not merely testify in a general way
to the inefficacy of force as an instrument of
salvation: it enables us to survey the evidence
empirically by giving us a convenient clue for
130 Ibid. , 366
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sorting out the would-be saviours of this kindand marshalling them in an order in which itbecomes possible to pass them in review. 131
The would-be saviours with a sword are living with a hope
that is an illusion, concludes the reviewer of the parade,
"for it is only in fairyland that swords cut Gordian knots
which cannot be untied by fingers. "132 The reviewers 1 van-
tage point in the stands gives him the ability to formulate
the results of the performance in definite fashion, for as he
sees it, "'all they that take the sword shall perish with the
sword' is the inexorable law of real life. "133 0r in summary
fashion the reviewer may write down:
This ultimate failure of all attempts to win
salvation with the sword is not only proclaimed
in poetry and myth and legend; it is also demon-
strated in history;
. . .
134
In Volume Eight the methodological imagery of "pas-
sing in review" the civilizations, or institutions, or
leaders of society, is employed twice. The first problem is
to survey the principal alternative types of reaction which
could take place in the encounters between civilizations.
Calling the reviewing-stand metaphor back into operation,
Toynbee sayss
131 Ibid.
,
VI, 182.
132 Ibid
. , 178.
133Ibid
. , 179.
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In surveying the alternative types of reactionit may be convenient to begin with those that
are retorts in kind to the action by which theyhave been evoked, and to pass the rest in reviewm an ascending order of degree of their differ-
ence in character from the challenges to which
they are responses. 135
What surprises a reader of this "parade" metaphor is
the change which takes place between the announced purpose of
the "passing in review" technique, and the announced results
after the parade is over. From the introductory paragraph
one would suppose that Toynbee intended to mark out the types
of response that are made under specified conditions. His
division of the section into "(a) Agents and Reagents"; "(b)
Alternative Possible Reactions"; and "(c) Alternative Pos-
sible Denouements" further emphasizes that the "passing in
review" of Part (b) is a "scientific" testing procedure in
order to establish certain regularities of behavior on the
part of these civilizations. But at the end of Part (b) we
find the results of the review phrased in terms of the "rela-
tive efficacy of divers types of reaction," and we are thrown
right into the middle of a problem of values. The switch
from a search of possible types of reaction to a question of
good or bad reactions comes in the concluding paragraph:
If, in this account, we leave the epiphanies of
higher religions out of our reckoning in reviewing
the alternative possible reactions to an initiative
taken by one of the characters in a play in which
the dramatis personae are civilizations, we can
135Ibid.
,
VIII, 466
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perhaps arrive at the following conclusions con-
cerning the relative efficacy of divers types of
reaction as alternative methods of wrestling theinitiative out of the original agent's hands.
We may conclude that the least effective reply
is the retort in kind, particularly when it is a
retort to force by force; that the negative retort
of isolationism is less effective than positive
retorts on either the economic or the cultural
plane; and that, of the divers alternative pos-
sible cultural retorts, a pliant receptivity to
the culture of a militarily or politically domi-
nant aggressor is of less avail than the resiliant
spirit that turns the tables on the military con-
queror by taking him culturally captive. 136
On the basis of Toynbee ' s previously announced deci-
sion to use the "touchstone of religion" as his source of
value judgments, the question of the efficacy of military,
political and economic reactions appears to be quite irrele-
vant. As he expresses it in Part (c) , the outcome of a
cultural conflict between Hellenism and the contemporary
Oriental civilizations was a matter of spiritual indiffer-
ence. 137 However Toynbee maintains the fiction of going
through an objective and significant review of the evidence
by the ambiguous statement at the close of Part (c) that we
seem to have two dramas in two different languages.
It will be seen that our religious and our secular
dramas are written in two different languages
which each defy translation into the other. From
the religious standpoint of the preachers of
spiritual salvation the secular drama is a vanity
of vanities; from the secular standpoint of the
136 Ibid., 476.
L37J/ Ibid., 480.
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parties to an encounter between civilizations
the religious drama is unto the Jews a stumblinq-block and unto the Greeks foolishness. 138
A second instance of the "reviewing stand" metaphor
in Volume Eight is rather highly developed. The occasion for
its use is a discussion of the "consequences of encounters
between contemporaries." When in the course of encounters
between civilizations the assailant is successful, the
assaulted party undergoes severe schisms, and forces upon the
individual members of its society the need for personal
response. In an examination of the types of response open to
individuals, Toynbee turns to a metaphor which expresses a
"scientific" attitude toward the facts, and the anticipation
of reaching beyond appearance to regularities or laws of his-
tory. The metaphor is introduced by saying:
If we now proceed to take stock of the impressions
left on our minds by the spectacle that we have
just been watching, we may find that these impres-
sions are confused and that our minds are corre-
spondingly bewildered. As we took the salute from
the mixed force under review, the Zealot and the
Herodian components of these motley troops both
made a parade, as they presented arms in passing
the saluting point, of the distinguishing marks
blazoned on their respective accoutrements. In the
conspicuousness of these badges and the emphasis of
these gestures alike, they were insisting with one
accord upon their diversity from one another; yet
this unanimous assertion of theirs was being contra-
dicted all the time by the evidence of our own
observant eyes? . , .
138 ibid.
139 Ibid., 610.
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The results of this empirical maneuver is not expressed in
terms of the social laws of the early volumes, but in general
references to uniformities of behavior.
It would be superfluous to call up again the rest
of our muster of Zealots and Herodians to demon-
strate that the same pair of psychological reac-
tions resulted in the same failure in all other
encounters between an assaulted society and an
assailant culture in which the tragedy had
already been played out to its conclusion by the
time of writing; for these repetitions of Jewry's
classic experience stand on record in this workin our foregoing survey of encounters between
contemporaries
.
14 0
Or again, the conclusion is drawn in terms of the question,
"Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and Herodianism
the last word that the oracles of History and Mythology had
to speak when asked for light on the spiritual consequences
of encounters?"^-'-
While the above methodological figures of speech are
the most frequently employed, several others make their
appearance in the Study
.
Toynbee stresses the objectivity of
his approach to the data, along with the hope of discovering
uniformities of action when he describes himself as an inter-
rogator of the civilizations in a court-room metaphor.
In a treatment of renaissances, he states in the
preface that, "We shall also put into the witness box, one
after another, all the other civilizations of third genera-
140Ibid. , 622.
141Ibid., 623.
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tion that have come within our cognizance—and these are all
that come into question in our present inquiry, since these
alone had been en rapport with their predecessors on the
comparatively intimate terms required for making the feat of
evocation a possibility." 142
The united testimony of the witnesses in the witness
box yields for Toynbee certain uniformities and regularities.
In spite of the differences observable in the renaissances,
there is a standard pattern.
The necromancer's feat of evoking ghosts from
the dead pasts of extinct civilizations has been
found to have different effects in these diverse
departments of a living social milieu; but there
is one feature, of a geographical order, that is
common to all the cases that we have reviewed so
far. Whatever differences these divers kinds of
renaissance may display in other respects, they
all uniformly manifest themselves in changes in
the life of a living society that take place
within the limits of the society's native geo-
graphical habitat. 143
Before leaving this survey of methodological figures
of speech in Toynbee, it might be useful to observe that
these dominating similes and metaphors are strong evidence
that the hostility which Toynbee expresses in Volume One to
the historians' scientific method understood as fact-gather-
ing does not lead Toynbee into the Collingwood or Dilthey
anti-positivistic position. It is evident that the metaphors
142 Ibid.
,
IX, pp. 6-7.
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in which Toynbee depicts his role as historian are strongly
anti-Collingwood and anti-Dilthey
. For example, we have
noted Toynbee »s insistence that he was a spectator to the
events of history. Again and again he attempts to put him-
self as an observer over against the facts of the past. This
was the thrust of the imagery of "inspecting recruits," of
"passing in review," of "sitting in the reviewing stand," of
putting the civilizations "in the witness box," of "reading
the map from a non-Western point of view," of "Putting the
mustangs through their paces," and of observing rock-
climbers. This methodological procedure is, of course, the
very antithesis of Collingwood
' s approach, and he never tires
of attacking historians who, like Toynbee, regard "history as
a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and
recorded by the historian, phenomena presented externally to
his gaze, not experiences into which he must enter and which
he must make his own." 144
Similarly when Toynbee addresses himself to the task
of "sifting, assembling, and comparing those historical facts
that are indispensable raw materials for the empirical method
of investigation," 145 he can hardly be accused of agreeing
with the Collingwood attack on the treatment of historical
facts as though they were "raw materials" from which one
144
Toynbee, A Study of History
,
VII, 2.
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, p. 163.
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could discover the causal connections. 146
Roots and Motivation of the
New Scientific Methodology
This chapter on "Toynbee the Social Scientist" would
not be complete without a treatment of the question of why
Toynbee turned to a scientific method. We have observed var-
ious reasons in his attack on traditional historiography, and
in his choice of the role of an historian-explorer. But it
is necessary to trace the early methodological struggle of
Toynbee in order to understand how he arrives at a "science
of human affairs," and how he values it as the sovereign clue
to the meaning of history.
As an opening observation, it is important to note
that Toynbee developed his "science of human affairs" in con-
junction with his major contribution to historical thought,
A Study of History
. This work was not his first effort to
write history, in fact it was preceded by a number of books
and essays on history and current events. As early as 1913
he had written an article on "The Growth of Sparta" for the
Journal of Hellenic Studies 147 while studying and teaching at
Oxford c Shortly thereafter he had entered government ser-
vice, working in the Political Intelligence Department of the
146Collingwood, The Idea of History
, p. 128.
147Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Growth of Sparta," Journal
of Hellenic Studies, XXXIII (1913).
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Foreign Office. As a student of Turkish affairs, he was
commissioned by Lord Bryce to investigate and publish the
documents relating to The Treatment of Armenians in the Otto -
148man Empire. The volume contains a 60-page historical sum-
mary of the antecedents of the Armenian people, and is, in
general, framed in the traditional style of the national his-
torians. There is one introductory passage which catches the
attention of anyone studying the problem of method in the
Toynbee of the Study
. The passage cannot be considered as a
significant harbinger of the "law-making technique" that
Toynbee later seizes upon as his "sovereign methodological
clue," but it does indicate an important psychological prepa-
ration for his later discovery. The brilliant style and the
dramatic touch of the Study are noticeably present here,
although one's attention is primarily drawn to the early
appearances of historical pessimism in this essay of 1913.
Such a relation has suddenly been created between
us by the War, and it is one of the strangest
ironies of war that it fuses together and illuminates
the very fabric it destroys . The civilization in
which we lived was like a labyrinth, so huge and
intricate that none of the dwellers in it could
altogether grasp its structure, while most of them
were barely conscious that it had any structural
design at all. But now that the War has caught it
and it is all aflame, the unity and symmetry of the
building are revealed to the common eye. As the
glare lights it up from end to end, it stands out in
its glory, in matchless outline and perspective; for
148Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment of the Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire (London: Sir Joseph Causton and Sons,
Ltd.
, 1916)
.
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the first time (and possibly for the last) we
see its parts simultaneously and in proper rela-
tion, and realize for one moment the marvel and
mystery of this civilization that is perishing—
the subtle, immemorial, unrelaxing effort that
raised it up and maintained it, and the impossi-bility of improvising any equivalent structure
in its place. Then the fire masters its prey;
the various parts of the labyrinth fall in oneby one, the light goes out of them, and nothing
is left but smoke and ashes. This is the catas-
trophe that we are witnessing now,
. .
.
One might simply write off this dramatic and evi-
dently intense emotional shock that Toynbee describes, as
"war reaction" or as a pessimism natural to a reading of
documents filled with unrelieved suffering and brutality,
but this would be an inadequate explanation. The sense of
impending catastrophe, of the tragedy of impermanence , had
been expressed by Toynbee at least three years earlier— two
years before the outbreak of the War.
As early as the 23rd May, 1912, while Toynbee was on
a walking tour of Greece, and just prior to his return to
Oxford as a tutor in ancient history, he had had an "authen-
tic minor personal experience," like Gibbon's in the ruins of
Rome and Volney's in the ruins of Palmyra. Near the site of
ancient Sparta, Toynbee came across a sight which "convicted"
him "of a horrifying sense of the sin manifest in the conduct
of human affairs." Speaking of himself, Toynbee says:
The sensuous experience that activated his
Ibid
.
, p. 593.
historical imagination was not a sound of litur-gical chanting; it was the sight of the ruinsamong which he had wound his way upwards to thepeak; and this spectacle had been appalling; for,in this shattered fairy city, Time had stood
still since that spring of A. D. 1821 in whichMistra had been laid desolate,
.
Needless to say, the writer of this Study had
made no progress towards reading the cruel riddle
of Mankind's crimes and follies by the time whenhe was forced down from the heights of Mistra bythe twofold pressure of hunger and nightfall
.
15u
The experience of Toynbee at 23 years of age, "as he brooded
over the catastrophe," was significant in his preparation for
the Study, for he had "won from the Laconian landscape an
intuition that was the germ of the present work. 151 in the
same section he seems to identify this germinal intuition as
two lasting lessons made on his mind by the impact of the
Laconian landscape— "one concerning the historical geography
of Continental European Greece and the other concerning the
morphology of the history of civilizations." 152
A second example out of the four recorded experiences
of Toynbee in the year 1912, is the experience of rounding
the shoulder of a mountain on the east end of the Island of
Crete on the 19th of March. 153 Like an earlier "unbearable
spectacle" from which the "harrowed participant from another
150Toynbee, A Study of History
,
X, 108.
151Ibid. , 109.
152 Ibid. , 110.
153Ibid., 136.
world" averted his eyes, this experience too has a strong
effect on the youthful Toynbee. From the three accounts of
the story 154 the second contains the clearest reference to
methodology. Leaving out the irrelevant geographical descr
tions the story reads:
The present writer received his first intimation
of the mortality of the Western Civilization in
an experience ... on the 19th March, 1912.
Rounding the southern shoulder of a mountain, he
was startled at suddenly finding himself face to
face with the ruins of a country house.
. . .
What was startling and disturbing for a Western
observer in A. D. 1912 was to see a piece of
architecture which, in his mental picture of his
native country, was associated with the living
world of his own generation standing here in
Crete as starkly dead and deserted as the monu-
ments of an Hellenic architecture.
. . . This
inevitable comparison awakened his imagination
to the truth that, on this island, a civilization
which was his own, and which on his own island
was then still self-conf idently alive, was already
as dead as the civilizations that had come and
gone in earlier generations of this species of
society. "5
The sense of impending tragedy is emphasized in Toynbee '
s
first use of the story. The sight of the desolate habita-
tions reminded him of an English poet's lines.
He reflected that the four and a half centuries
for which Venice had been mistress of Crete were
a longer span of time than the present age of his
own country's rule over the earliest acquired of
her overseas dominions; and his ears seemed to
catch an echo of Galuppi's music among the Cretan
crags
.
154The account found in IV, 282; IX, 431; and X, 136.
155 Ibid.
,
IX, 431 and footnote.
'In you come with your cold music till I
creep in every nerve'. 156
These "intuitions of the mortality of the Western
Civilization" which were so intense that Toynbee is able to
repeat them in detail more than thirty years later, are
strongly reinforced by his subsequent war experiences. From
his travels in Greece, Toynbee returned to Balliol College to
take up a tutorial fellowship in the autumn of 1912. His
study and teaching up to the time of his entrance into gov-
ernment service in 1915, led to the publication of the arti-
cle noted above on "The Growth of Sparta." Although there
are certain overtones of the Study which can be found in the
article, such as a reference to the inadequacy of the small
political units, and the use of the metaphor of growth, there
appears to be very little suggestion in the article of the
Toynbee who repudiates traditional historiography in favor of
the law-making technique. One would be more inclined to see
in it the first evidence of a young scholar working along
traditional lines to advance the research of a particular
1 S 7
segment of parochial history.
Along with this study of early Greek history, Toynbee
maintains an interest in recent Greek history, to the extent
that the article on Sparta is followed a year later by a
156Ibid
. ,
IV, 282.
For a critique of Toynbee 's essay by a contemporary
classics scholar see W. den Boer's "Toynbee and Classical His-
tory," in Toynbee and History 9 p. 223.
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pamphlet on Greek Policy Since 1882 . 158 This thirty-five
page essay gives the background of the contemporary Greek
struggle for liberation and concludes with an estimate of the
future of the modern Greeks. He predicts that, "We are here
in the presence of one of the most interesting tendencies of
the present age:
. . .
she has found a new spirit to inform
it; the Hellenism that inspired the nineteenth century will
insensibly yield place to the "Americanism" that is destined
to be characteristic of the twentieth, ..."
But again a reader in search of the roots of the
methodology of the Study finds little of significance in this
type of journalistic writing.
In the year that Toynbee enters government service
and begins to produce the series of atrocity studies, a book
comes from his hand entitled Nationality and the War . 159
This five hundred page study has certain arguments and illus-
trations very familiar to a reader of the Study . But again
we look in vain for the methodological roots of the later
Toynbee, What we do find is a psychological preparation, a
receptivity or mental conditioning which helps us to under-
stand Toynbee ' s later delight in the "science of human
affairs." Nationality and the War is an attempt to review
^ 58Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Policy Since 1882 (London:
Oxford University, 1914)
.
Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London:
J. M. Dent, 1915)
.
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problems of Nationality in the area affected by the War,
according to his preface. He speaks of himself as a "profes-
sional historian" and mentions the fact that he will not con-
fine himself to "narrative" altogether. 160 Aside from these
fragmentary notes on method, we do find a repetition of the
"Intimation of mortality" that had already formed the think-
ing of the traveling historian in 1912. In the preface a
familiar phrase expresses this note of pessimism, "we are
walking in a trance across the ruins." The war is described
as a "revaluing of all our values," and the present predica-
ment as an "affair of life and death." 161 The opening tone
of chapter one is abrupt and dramatic; "For the first time in
our lives, we find ourselves in complete uncertainty as to
the future." Towards the end of Nationality and the War
the same sense of impending disaster is expressed in the
explanation, "The old Europe is dead, the old vision van-
ished, and we are wrestling in agony for new inspiration.
That has been the narrative of this book." 163 And the con-
cluding words of the volume equates the catastrophe of the
present with the fate of the Greeks.
160Ibid
. , Preface v.
161 Ibid.
162 TK .,Ibid
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If they can profit by the present crisis to lib-
erate their energies for higher ends, then theKingdom of Heaven is at hand: if inspiration
fails them in this hour, then we are witnessing
the beginning of great evils for Hellas; and theSovereign Nations of Europe are doomed to the
same destruction as the Sovereign Cities of
Greece
.
104
The series of "atrocity" accounts which flow from the
pen of Toynbee at the Foreign Office in the next five years
are fairly unimportant as far as revealing "our well-tried
empirical method" of the Study
.
They indicate an author who
tries to adopt a "straight narrative account" breaking into
the account occasionally with judgments as to which witness
is telling the truth. 165 These accounts covered The Treat-
ment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 166 and The Destruc-
tion of Poland167 in 1916; and in 1917, The Murderous Tyr-
anny of the Turks
,
168 The Belgian Deportations
,
169 The German
164 Ibid
. , p. 500.
ire
Arnold J. Toynbee, The German Terror in Belgium
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), preface.
166 Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians
.
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'Arnold J. Toynbee, The Destruction of Poland (Lon-
don: T„ Fisher Unwin, 1916)"! ~
168Arnold J. Toynbee, The Murderous Tyranny of the
Turks (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917).
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"^Arnold J. Toynbee, The Belgian Deportations (Lon-
don: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917).
180
Terror in Belgium, 170 The German Terror in France . 171 and
Turkey: a Past and a Future . 172
Apart from direct methodological notations, the
atrocity accounts must be observed as indicators of Toynbee 1 s
compelling interest in the future of the West, and of his
deeply-rooted sense of the impending perils of Western Civi-
lization. The graphic description of "our civilization" on
fire, the references to its remains as "smoke and ashes" that
introduced the Treatment of the Armenians
, is echoed in The
Destruction of Poland. Witnessing the action of the German
barbarians, as he had the action of the Turkish barbarians,
Toynbee gloomily predicts that: "The present fate of Poland
foreshadows with inexorable clearness the fate that such a
settlement could bring upon us all. . . . The triumph of
German organization would not bring the millenium? it would
bring darkness and the shadow of death."
It was during the opening days of the first World War
that Toynbee began to draw comparisons between the destruc-
tive wars of the West and the breakdown of the Hellenic soci-
ety.
"•'"Toynbee, The German Terror in Belgium .
171x/
-"-Arnold J. Toynbee, The German Terror in France (Lon-
don: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917) .
172Arnold J. Toynbee, Turkey; a Past and a Future (New
York: George Doran, 1917).
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The general war of 1914 overtook one reading for
Literae Humaniores
, and then suddenly my under-
standing was illuminated. The experience that we
were having in our world now had been experiencedby Thucydides in his world already. I was re-
reading him now with a new perception—perceiving
meanings in his words, and feelings behind his
phrases, to which I had been insensible until I,
in my turn, had run into that historical crisis'
that had inspired him to write his work. 173
The sense of catastrophe in the West which one can
trace in Toynbee » s pre-Study days, and the identifying of
that doom with the disaster of the Greek breakdown, is made
more explicit in a Volume Ten discussion of the effects of
catastrophic events on historians. Using himself as an exam-
ple of the intellectual inspiration that comes to a historian
from contemporary tragic events, he recalls the psychological
effects of the first World War upon himself.
He could not live through the experience of the
outbreak of war in A. D. 1914 without realizing
that the outbreak of war in 431 B. C. had brought
the same experience to Thucydides. As he found
his own experience revealing to him, for the first
time, the inwardness of Thucydidean words and
phrases that had meant little or nothing to him
before, he realized that a book written in another
world more than 2,300 years ago might be a deposi-
tory of experience which, in the reader's world,
were only just beginning to overtake the reader's
own operation. 17 4
This preoccupation with the fate of the West, this "intuition
of mortality" which had begun to plague Toynbee from the time
1 7 "i
-'-'-'Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New Yorks
Oxford University Press, 1948)
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of his traveling experience as a graduate student in 1912, is
intensified by the course of the war. Even after his
accounts of atrocities are behind him, and the war is nearing
its end, he is gravely troubled about the "common ruin of
civilization." Toynbee discusses his pessimistic, post-war
outlook on Western civilization in two separate contexts. In
1921, just three years after the experience had taken place,
and then again in Volume Ten, 175 approximately thirty- three
years after the event, he relives his post-war views in a
description of his own mental and psychological kinship with
Lucretius in his experiences of Roman disintegration. First
let us glance at the comment of Toynbee:
Lucretius wrote that: about a hundred and fifty
years after Hannibal evacuated Italy, but the
horror is still vivid in his mind, and his poetry
arouses it in our minds as we listen. The writer
will never forget how those lines kept running in
his head during the spring of 1918.
And then a look at Toynbee 8 s translation of the passage of
Lucretius in which he felt a sense of kinship with the Roman
poet *
So death is nothing to us and matters nothing to
us , since we have proved that the soul is not
immortal. And as in time past we felt no ill,
when the Phoenecians were pouring in to battle on
every front, when the world rocked with the shock
and tumult of war and shivered from centre to
175 Ibid .
l^Arnold j. Toynbee, "History," in The Legacy of
Greece
,
ed. by Richard Livingstone (London: Oxford Univer
sity, 1922)
, p. 315.
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firmament, when all mankind on sea and land must
fall under the victor's empire and victory was
in doubt— so, when we have ceased to be, whenbody and soul, whose unison is our being, have
been parted, then nothing can touch us—we shall
not be— and nothing can make us feel, no, not if
earth is confounded with sea and sea with heaven.
By 1920, Toynbee was out of government service. He
was appointed in 1919 to the chair of Byzantine and Modern
Greek Language, Literature and History at the University of
London. And in the summer of 1920, according to Toynbee the
first traces of the Study came into conscious focus. In the
perspective of 1951, Toynbee looks back upon a literary
effort of the summer of 1920 as the "first attempt ... to
write the present work." 177 This early attempt to write the
Study is, of course, extremely interesting to anyone con-
cerned with the motivation and the shaping of the methodology
of the later Toynbee. The references to the 1920 attempt are
provocatively brief, but yet rather revealing. Twice the
"attempt" is mentioned and commented upon; first in the pref-
ace to Volume Seven, and again in the "Acknowledgements" of
Volume Ten.
In the preface of Volume Seven the reference reads
s
In the summer of 1920, after the philosophic
contemporaneity of the Western and Hellenic
civilizations had been borne in upon me by the
experience of the First World War, I for the
first time consciously tried—and, at this
first attempt, signally failed— to write the
Toynbee, A Study of History
,
VII, Preface ix.
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present work in the form (dictated by a Late
Medieval Italian education in the Greek and
Latin Classics) of a commentary on the second
chorus (11. 332-75) of Sophocles' Antigone. Idid not succeed in finding my way into my sub-ject till more than a year later. 178
We do not have this "first attempt" of Toynbee
• s unless it is
contained in embryonic form in his address of May, 1920,
entitled "The Tragedy of Greece: A Lecture Delivered for the
Professor of Greek to Candidates for Honours in Literae
Humaniores at Oxford;" 179 and in the similar essay on "His-
tory," which was published in 1921 in Richard Livingstone's
Legacy of Greece
.
180 in the essay on "History" Toynbee does
devote eighteen pages to "The Plot of Ancient Greek Civiliza-
tion," dividing the account into three "Acts," and elabora-
ting on the course of the "tragedy."
But when one asks how this can be considered the
prototype of the massive ten-volume Study
, the answer is far
from apparent. In the context of this discussion on a plot
or drama of the Hellenic tragedy, there is a lengthy and
closely reasoned argument to the effect that a historian
ought to confine himself to the reading of one civilization,,
The discussion, so foreign to the familiar twenty-one civili-
zation surveys of the Study
, reads as follows:
178 Ibid„
179Arnold J. Toynbee, The Tragedy of Greece (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931)
.
180Toynbee, "History.
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But of course one asks: Why study Ancient HellenicCivilization rather than ours? The study of any one
civilization is so complex, it demands so many pre-liminary and subordinate studies—linguistic, insti-tutional, economic, psychological— that is likely to
absorb all one's energies. The greatest historianshave generally confined themselves to the study of a
single civilization, and the great Greek histori-
ans—Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius—concen-
trated on their own, and only studied others in sofar as their own came in contact with them. Clearlypeople who are going to be historians, not for life/but as an education for life, must make their choice.
They must practically confine themselves to studying
one civilization if they are to reap the fruits of
study at all, and in this case it is natural to ask:
Why study Hellenism rather than our own history? 181
The only suggestion in this discussion of Ancient
Greek Civilization that could lead to the law-making tech-
nique of the Study of 1927 is a brief reference to the possi-
bility that the "plot" might be repeated "in our own his-
tory. "
It is possible that the great tragedies of history
—
that is, the great civilizations that have been
created by the spirit of man—may all reveal the
same plot, if we analyze them rightly. Each civili-
zation—for instance, the civilization of Medieval
and Modern Europe and again that of Ancient Greece-
is probably a variant of a single theme. 182
This hopeful lead which seems but a step from the comparative
method of the Study is, however, carefully modified and
indeed directed back to the more traditional task of the his-
torian who confines himself to studying one civilization or
181 Ibid
. , p. 297
182 Ibid.
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one national community.
And to study the plot of civilization in a great
exposition of it—like the Hellenic exposition
or our own Western exposition— is surely the
right goal or a humane education. 183
A second argument in the context of "The Plot of
Ancient Greek Civilization" makes it impossible to view Toyn-
bee's literary efforts in the summer of 1920 as a methodo-
logical prototype of the Study
. Not only is there an
explicit argument for the concentration upon one area of his-
tory, as opposed to the "law-making technique" of the study
,
but Toynbee seems to align himself with the "history as art"
movement. He reasons,
The study of a civilization is not different in
kind from the study of a literature. In both
cases one is studying a creation of the spirit
of man, or, in more familiar terms, a work of
art.
Civilization is a work of art— in the literal
meaning of the phrase and not merely by a meta-
phor. ... It is a social work of art, expressed
in social action, like a ritual or a play. One
cannot describe it better than by calling it a
tragedy with a plot, and history is the plot of
the tragedy of civilization. 184
As soon as one recalls the emphasis on technical
apparatus and the "empirically demonstrated" laws of the
Study
,
the contrast is apparent. It is not a contrast
between the immature scholar of 1920-21 and the mature
183Ibid.
184 Ibid.
,
p. 296
.
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scholar of 1927-34. it is the contrast of a scholar with
strong convictions but an uncertain methodology as over
against the later Toynbee who has found a "sovereign methodo-
logical clue" with which he can reach his objective. In this
early context, Toynbee emphasized the subjective character of
Ancient Greek Civilization with the words:
This analysis is and must be subjective. Every-
one has to make his own, just as everyone has to
apprehend for himself the form of a work of
art. lut>
Toynbee' s second reference to the "first attempt" in
the summer of 1920 to write the Study contains an additional
point that is not found in the Volume Seven reference and
that may disclose the true link between the attempt of 1920
and the actual writing in 1930. In a Volume Ten footnote the
1920 experience is described in these words:
In my first attempt, made in the summer vacation
of A. D. 1920, I had tried to cast my ideas into
the form of a commentary on the second chorus in
Sophocles' Antigone (11. 332-75). The theme of
this poem— 'the Mystery of Man' —was apposite and
the poetry was magnificent, but the approach was
unpromising; for this expedient of referring a
question to some classical oracle was the Medieval
and Early Modern Western approach into which I had
been initiated at school, whereas the intellectual
enterprise on which I had now embarked was an
attempt to take bearings in the uncharted seas of
a post-Modern Chapter of Western history. My
appeal to Sophocles had, in fact, been a false
move, and it was therefore neither surprising nor
regrettable that it had been a failure. 186
185 Ibid., p. 304.
186 Toynbee, A Study of History
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In this second reference to the summer of 1920, Toynbee makes
more explicit the link between the "first attempt" and the
Study_. He can regard the effort of 1920 as a prototype to
the massive Study not because of the methodological likeness
but because of the similarity of the "intellectual enter-
prise." This distinction between the "form" or "approach"
and the "ideas" or "intellectual enterprise" makes it pos-
sible for him to stress the fact that the first "form" or
"approach" was a failure, while at the same time maintaining
that there is a continuity between his historical efforts of
1920 and the search as represented by the Study in 1930.
It is worthwhile to track down the origins of Toyn-
bee • s "first attempt" before analyzing the nature of this
"intellectual enterprise." Toynbee says that he had been
initiated at school into this method of "referring a question
to some classical oracle." He describes it as "the Medieval
and Early Modern Western approach." Whether Toynbee con-
sciously or unconsciously borrowed this approach from J. B.
Bury it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty, but
the words, the poet, the drama, and the lines are strikingly
parallel to the methodological hint thrown out by Bury in his
Inaugural Address of 1902. 187 In that year, John Bagnell
Bury succeeded Lord Acton as the Regius Professor of Modern
187Stern, The Varieties of History
, p. 210.
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History at Cambridge, and chose as the topic of his Inaugural
Lecture, "The Science of History." Still in the years of his
optimism as to the great future of the historical sciences
and the future progress of civilization, Bury was certain
that a more "scrupulously exact conformity to facts" would
bring about the "revolution which is slowly and silently pro-
gressing" 1^ in the historical profession. Along with his
faith in the ultimate triumph of the Rankean methodology Bury
commits himself to a concept of development which may be
briefly stated as faith in the progress of man. Trying to
express this "wider transformation" which he believed was
taking place but to which the "world is not yet alive," 189 he
refers the question of present progress back to the oracle of
Hellas; back to the Fifth Century B. C.
There is no passage, perhaps, in the works of
the Greek tragedians so instructive for the
historical student as that song in the Antigone
of Sophocles, in which we seem to surprise the
first amazed mediation of man when it was borne
in upon him by a sudden startling illumination,
how strange it is that he should be what he is
and should have wrought out, among other things,
the city-state. He had suddenly, as it were,
waked up to realize that he himself was the won-
der of the world, 'None is more wonderful than
man.
'
That intense expression of a new detached
wondering interest in man, as an object of curi-
osity, gives us the clue to the inspiration of
Herodotus and the birth of history.!90
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Bury's footnote, number six, notes the source of his quota-
tion as simply "Sophocles, Antigone
, lines 331-75." Toyn-
bee'
s reference as given above was, "I had tried to cast my
ideas into the form of a commentary on the second chorus in
Sophocles' Antigone (11. 332-75).
"
191 Bury may have picked
up his "clue" to history from the 1895 Inaugural Address of
Lord Acton who was his immediate predecessor as Regius Pro-
fessor of Modern History at Cambridge , 192 and who refers to
a "speech of Antigone " as one of the sources that "gives dig-
nity and grace and intellectual value to history, and its
action on the ascending life of man."
It is not likely that Toynbee at age seven heard the
speech of Lord Acton, or at age thirteen heard the Inaugural
Address of J
.
B. Bury, but he does note that ten years after
the Inaugural Address, "In the autumn of A. D. 1912 I had the
happiness of coming to know the great historian person-
ally," 193 and he shows familiarity with several of Bury's
194books. From the evidence already cited of Toynbee '
s
awareness of the mortality of Western Civilizations, and from
the pessimistic tone of his written material that is avail-
191 See page 69.
192Dalberg-Acton , Lectures on Modern History
, p. 3.
193Toynbee, A Study of History
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able from the years 1920-21, it is possible to see why Toyn-
bee in the post-war world might have found Bury's concept of
development somewhat "unpromising" and altogether a "false
move. "195 As he sees .,history is the plofc Qf the traggdy
of civilization." 196 And in his essay on "History" he
arrived at the two dark conclusions that we are just being
overtaken by experiences that had overtaken Thucydides in
431, 197 and that Hellas had broken down in 431 B. C. 198
If one can conclude that Toynbee, while picking up
the reference to Sophocles from Bury, was not at the same
time adopting Bury's immense confidence in the progress of
civilization, it is also likely that Toynbee was not adopting
Bury's superb confidence that just one school of history
would shortly emerge.
Bury was confident that when Ranke ' s text, "Ich will
nur sagen wie es eigentlich gewesen ist," was fully taken to
heart, though there be many schools of political philosophy,
there will no longer be diverse schools of history. 199 He
was fully convinced that history could no longer be regarded
195Stern, The Varieties of History
, p. 215.
196Toynbee, "History," p. 297.
197Toynbee, A Study of History
,
X, 94.
198Toynbee, "History," p. 317.
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as an art, 200 nor as a branch of literature . 201 m this
stage of Toynbee
• s methodological development it is evident
that he equates his study of Hellenic civilization with lit-
erature and art, and further insists that everyone ought to
make his own "subjective" analysis of Ancient Greek Civiliza-
tion, "just as everyone has to apprehend for himself the form
of a work of art."
The conclusion remains then that beyond the fact that
Toynbee accepts Bury ' s distinction that historians use both
data and clues, there is no further light to be gained for a
study of Toynbee' s methodological development by an addi-
tional examination of the "Bury" lead.
Turning back to the Volume Ten explanation of the
"first attempt," it is apparent that Toynbee makes explicit
the link between the 1920 failure and the 1930 success in
writing the Study
,
in the phrase, "the intellectual enter-
prise on which I had now embarked was an attempt to take
bearings in the uncharted seas of a post-modern chapter of
Western history." This characterization of the Study as "an
attempt to take bearings," and as preeminently a concern with
the future of Western civilization is important for an under-
standing of Toynbee 's choice of method. It brings together
the expressed pessimism of his work on the atrocity accounts,
200 Ibid.
, p. 212.
201Ibid., p. 214.
the strong penchant for prophecy in his journalistic essays
on current events, and his mystic intimations of mortality as
a youthful traveler. It sheds light on his developing inter-
est in the 'laws 1 of history, and explains the reason why the
original plan of the book was to climax in Part XI
,
"Rhythms
in the Histories of Civilizations
,
M and in Part XII, "Pros-
pects of the West," 202
Rather interesting corroboration of this interpreta-
tion is found in another of Toynbee * s references to the sum-
mer of 1920. Several critics 203 have pointed out the simi-
larities between Toynbee and Spengler, without being sure at
what stage in Toynbee 1 s development he became acquainted with
the work of Spengler. Toynbee himself clarifies the problem
in an essay on "My View of History" which was first published
in 1946 as a contact publication in the volume , Britain
Between West and East . 204 Referring to his first introduc-
tion to the works of Spengler he says:
This question was simmering in my mind when, in
the summer of 1920, Professor Namier . . . placed
in my hands Oswald Spengler f s Untergang des Abend-
la-ndes . As I read those pages teeming with firefly
flashes of historical insight, I wondered at first
whether my whole inquiry had been disposed of by
202 Toynbee, A Study of History
,
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Spengler before even the questions, not to speak
of the answers, had fully taken shape in my own
mind, 205 2
Toynbee's psychological reaction to his reading of Spengler
is of special importance. His first reaction was that Speng-
ler had possibly "disposed of" Toynbee's own "whole inquiry."
The grave concern for the West, the desire to "work out" its
prospects, to awaken others to the impending catastrophe are
implicit in this fear of Toynbee's that there may be nothing
left for him to do. The opening lines of Spengler's work
are
:
In this book is attempted for the first time the
venture of predetermining history, of following
the still untravelled stages in the destiny of a
Culture, and specifically of the only Culture of
our times and on our planet which is actually in
the phase of fulfillment--the West-European-
American.
And Spengler goes on to emphasize the prophetic mission of
the historian
,
This is what has to be viewed
,
and viewed not
with the eyes of the partisan , the idealogue,
the up-to-date novelist, not from this or that
'standpoint', but in a high, time-free perspec-
tive embracing whole millenniums of historical
world- forms if we are really to comprehend the
great crisis of the present. ^0?
A year later, in September of 1921, Toynbee has a
205 Ibid., p. 9.
2 0 6Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West , trans, by
Charles F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950)
,
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"plan" for the Study
,
but he is still without a method. He
describes the way the "plan" came to him in one of the most
interesting personal accounts of his study
.
On Saturday, 17 September, 1921, I was travelling
with my school-fellow and life-long friend TheodoreWade-Gery in the Orient Express en route from Con-
stantinople to England, Before dawn we had been
awakened by the rumbling of our train as it crossedthe bridge over the Maritsa, below Adrianople, and,for the rest of that day, we were travelling on
westward. ... As I stood, hour after hour, at
the corridor window, watching the stream glide
past, ... my mind began to dream of historical
and legendary events.
. . . These stimulating
sights and reminiscences must have released some
psychic wellspring at subconscious level,
.
before I went to sleep that night, I found that I
had put down on half a sheet of notepaper a list of
topics which, in its contents and in their order,
was substantially identical with the plan of this
book as it now stands printed in volumes I, IV, and
and VIII. The path that had thus unexpectedly
—
and, as it might seem, casually—opened at last
before my feet was to carry me farther than I then
foresaw „ , .
It is difficult to account for the emphasis in this
preface upon a mystic origin for the Study
,
except to refer
to Toynbee's obvious interest in mystic experiences and
introspection. Actually if his other explanations of influ-
ences of men and books upon his development are correct,
there is little need to speak of the arrival of the "Plan" as
"unexpected" and "as it might seem, casually—opened, at last
before my feet." For a year now he had been acquainted with
Spengler's attempt to predict the future of the West by means
208Toynbee, A Study of History
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of a morphology of civilizations. The similarities between
the West and the Ancient Greek Civilization had already been
borne in upon him by his war experiences, so he relates.
According to the reconstruction of his past in "My View of
History," he had been thinking about the problem of philo-
sophic contemporaneity of societies even before his reading
of Spengler, and had then criticized Spengler because he had
not treated the question of the genesis of civilizations. 209
Other than these broad references to the "Plan of
1921" the Toynbee papers and notes contain no copies of the
actual plan. it is probable that it bore the stamp of Speng-
ler ' s influence, if the contemporary writings of Toynbee are
sufficient witness to his general approach in the early
twenties. Biological analogies abound. Toynbee seems to be
fascinated with the thought that his description of the West
as a "child" of Greece, "may be something more than a meta-
phor, for societies, like individuals are living creatures,
and may be expected to exhibit the same phenomena.
. . .
" 210
On occasion the analogies to biological phenomena
become rather confusing to anyone who is accustomed to the
metaphors of the Study . For example Toynbee describes the
early Christian church as "the last phase of ancient Hellenic
209Toynbee, Civilization on Trial
, p. 10.
210Toynbee, "History," p. 289.
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or Greco-Roman Society; which died after it had intercourse
with other societies and had given birth to several chil-
211dren
• • •
in a further elaboration of the rela-
tions between societies as comparable to rape he argues that:
Civilizations, like individuals, spring from two
parents, and in all new civilizations whose par-
entage we can trace, the heritage from the civi-
lized mother has been more important than that
from the barbarian who violated her. 212
As late as January 1924, Toynbee still seems to be
writing under the influence of Spengler v s heady "analogies,"
which were supposed to lay bare the "organic structure of
history." 213 The Introduction to Greek Civilization and
Character
,
written in January of 1924 describes the first
part of the book as "occupied with the life history of Hel-
lenic civilization, its vicissitudes between genesis and
extinction, or what, in the case of an individual human
being, we should call his or her "career. '" Toynbee supports
his analogy by saying:
This is the dramatic side of life , and also the
side on which each particular life has most in
common with every other. . . • There is no human
interest in a 'career 1 unless the subject of it
is a "character 8 , which maintains its self-identity
through all its reactions to life and all the
enlargement of its experience . Characters are
211Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece
and Turkey ( London : Constable and Company, 1922) , p^ 32*8
.
^
^ Ikid .
^
12
.
213Spengler, The Decline of the West, I, 5.
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something permanent, and they are something indivi-
th:ir
a
:ariety:f?4
infinite
*S C— « ^fd in
In a companion volume of the same year, Greek His -
torical Thought, he reiterates his belief in the doctrine of
philosophical contemporaneity and supports it with a biologi-
cal analogy. Writing in the introduction dated January 1,
1924, he says:
In the philosophical sense, all civilizations
have been and are and will continue to be
contemporaneous with one another. They are all
the offspring of the same family in the same
generation.
. . .
215
And in the same introduction, when Toynbee speaks in a mat-
ter-of-fact way of the sinking of the Western civilization,
it is a distillation of his earlier mystic intimations, his
post-war pessimism, and of Spengler's Decline of the West
.
In other words, the world of Hellenism
. . . was
a world like that in which we live today, by
contrast with the Christian dispensation which
in the chronological sense intervenes between us
or with that religion, yet unborn, which will
undoubtedly lay up a new treasure in a new
heaven as our world sinks, to founder at last
like its predecessors in 'the abyss where all
things are incommensurable 216
However limited we are in our knowledge of the "Plan"
214Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Civilization and Character
(New York: New American Library, 1953) , Preface viii.
215Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Historical Thought (New
York j New American Library, 1952) ', Preface xv.
216 Ibid., xi.
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drawn up "on a half a sheet of notepaper" in September, 1921,
and how Toynbee intended to work it out methodologically;
however much one might speculate as to whether it would have
paralleled Spengler's intuitive and symbolic morphology of
civilizations, as one approaches the year 1927 there is a
clarification of the aims of the Study and the method through
which it might be accomplished.
Toynbee is quite explicit about the time in which the
studY to°k shape in the form of original notes. When he pro-
duced Volumes Four through Six he made a point of indicating
in the preface that, "the original sketch of Parts IV and V
[the contents of Volumes Four, Five and Six] was worked out,
like that of all the parts that precede and follow, in the
summers of 1927 and 1928, . . . " 2l7 Again in the preface to
the last batch of volumes he comments that, "more than seven-
teen years had now passed since the latest of the notes for
the book, which had all been written between June, 1927, and
June, 1929, had been put on paper." 218 On three occasions in
the same preface he refers to the relation of his present
thinking with his thinking and ""original notes'" of 1927.
Although it is an argument by implication, one is tempted to
217"
'Toynbee , A Study of History
,
IV, Preface viii.
218Ibid., VII, Preface vii.
219 Ibid., vii and viii.
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see in this constant reference to the notes of 1927 an indi-
cation that this planning was by far the more significant
starting point, as opposed to the notes of 1921.
In Volume Nine, Toynbee again emphasized the impor-
tance of the notes of 1927:
When the writer was planning the present Study
in the summer of A. D. 1927, he saw that he
would have to grapple with the problem of the
respective roles of Law and Freedom in human
history before he could attempt to win a Pisgah
sight of the prospects of the Western Civiliza-
tion. Yet in the winter of A. D. 1928-9, when,
with that ulterior objective in mind, he was
drafting his notes for eventually writing the
present part,
. . .
220
Also in Volume Ten, Toynbee underscores the signifi-
cance of 1927 for the origin of the Study
.
Speaking of his
desire to complete his study of the Arabic and Ottoman Turk-
ish languages and to begin learning Classical New Persian he
says that he regrets having been compelled to suspend work on
these languages by the new tasks of 1924 and 1927. The sig-
nificant dates are combined in the explanation:
After having started in A. D. 1924 to produce an
annual Survey of International Affairs under the
auspices of Chatham House, he had started in
A. D. 1927 to make systematic notes for the pre-
sent Study
,
which he began to write, 'pari passu 1
with the Survey in A. D. 1930. 221
Beyond these references to the importance of the work
220 Ibid., IX, 167.
201
of making notes in the years 1927, 28, and 29, there are
several significant passages which contain Toynbee's attitude
and purposes in those years in which the outlines of the
whole Study are under construction. Here the emphasis falls
upon the growing "intimations of mortality/ 1 the fear that
contemporaries are not aware of the crisis of the West, and
the desire to predict the immediate future of Western Civili-
zation .
An example of Toynbee's pessimism in 1929 can be
found in his reference to The Rime of the Ancient Mariner ,
This uncanny uniqueness of the contemporary
situation of the West first struck the writer
when he was putting on paper his original notes
for the last portion of this Study in the early
months of A. D. 1929; and the subject and title
of the present Part were then immediately con-
jured up in his mind by a sudden reminiscence of
a passage in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner .
In his mind's eye he saw the picture of the
stricken ship becalmed on the boundless expanse
of the South Seas, with the crew prostrated by
the torments of thirst; he saw the spectre of
bark shooting towards him from the horizon , on
which the ribs of its skeleton hull had shown up
sinisterly black against the blood-red disk of a
setting sun; . . . and his recollection of the
poem ran on to bring before his eyes a vision of
the dying sailors giving up the ghost one by one,
till, on board the spellbound ship, the Ancient
Mariner is left alone alive with his dead compan-
ions lying around him.
The many men so beautiful.
And they all dead did lie:
And a thousand thousand slimy things
Lived on: and so did 1.222
222 Ibid.
,
IX, 412.
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References to Toynbee
• s same grim sense of foreboding
may be found in other parts of the study
. In the Volume Four
introduction to the Problem of the Breakdowns of Civiliza-
tions, he refers to the same Rime of the Ancient Mariner as a
master description of the contemporary Western world. It is
expressed in such statements as, "For our present purpose we
have merely to take note of the fact that, among the civili-
zations which are alive at the present day, every one, appar-
ently, has already broken down and is now in process of dis-
integration, with the possible exception of our own." 223 And
he further comments, "As we cast our eyes around a world in
which the majority of the civilizations known to us are
already dead, while the rest of the survivors are all either
in decline of in extremis
, and as we remind ourselves that we
have not any means of divining what our own society's expec-
tation of life may be, we may be inclined to read into the
panorama of history the same grim motif that the poet divined
in the stones of Westminster Abbey,
Mortality, behold and fearl
What a change of flesh is herei" 22 ^
Moved by a deep fear for the future of the West and an inti-
mation that the "Time of Troubles" has descended upon us,
Toynbee speaks of the failure of his contemporaries to "look
223
Ibid
. ,
IV, 3.
224 Ibid., 4.
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at the facts of History as these presented themselves to the
naked eye." 225 He describes Westerners of the twenties as a
generation which continue "to peer at this formidable spec-
tacle through smoked glasses inherited from its grand-
parents." 226 In the same context he dismisses with strong
words the generation which included J. B. Bury and his faith
in the progress of civilization:
The generation of Homo Occidentalis that had
already been in its dotage in A. D. 1914 had
been the latest generation to hold, with an
unquestioning faith, a dogma which, by then,
had been serving for a quarter of a millenium
as the gist of a Late Modern Western Man's
mechanically desiccated and peptonized relig-
ion. This fallaciously comfortable doctrine
was that the Western Society could see ahead
of it an unbroken vista of progress towards an
Earthly Paradise, . , . 22 ^
In a significant reference to the years 1928-29
quoted earlier228 Toynbee says that as "he was drafting his
notes ... he was conscious that the fateful question then
still seemed academic to most people in Western coun-
tries ..." The context of the quotation identifies the
fateful question as the prospects of the Western Civiliza-
tion.
225 Ibid .
,
IX, 167.
226 Ibid .
227Ibid.
228See page 81.
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To Toynbee the failure of his contemporaries in 1929
to properly assess and heed the crisis of Western civiliza-
tion was such a prominent and pressing feature in his own
thinking that he even wonders if it might not be the result
of an "irrational imagination." Speaking of his own gloomy
estimate in contrast with the cheerful complacency of his
contemporaries, he asks, "what sense could be made of an
irrational imagination's oracular impulse to identify the
West's situation in A. D. 1929 with the Ancient Mariner's
plight after the death of his companions? Need a once more
prosperous Western Civilization take the other civilizations'
deaths to heart? In A. D. 1929 it had been easier than it
was in A. D. 1950 for Western common sense to dismiss this
disturbing question." 22 ^
In this analysis of the psychological motivation of
the author of the Study in the important years of 1927-29 one
can detect along with Toynbee ' s sense of the imminent mortal-
ity of the West, and his concern over the complacency of his
fellow-members of Western Society, an almost irresistable
desire to predict the future of the West.
In a Volume Nine reference to the writing out of the
original notes for the Study in 1927, Toynbee relates that in
the summer of 1927 he was grappling with the respective roles
229 Toynbee, A Study of History , IX, 413
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of Law and Freedom in human history. We know from the pref-
ace of Volume Seven that in those years, and indeed up to the
year 1946, the Part called "Law and Freedom in History" had
been originally developed as "Rhythms in the Histories of
Civilizations." He further states that he had to grapple
with this Part on "Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations"
before he "could attempt to win a Pisgah sight of the pros-
pects of the Western Civilization." Additional confirmation
that Toynbee was laboring over a question of the fate of the
West, can be seen in the next sentence when he adds, "Yet in
the winter of A. D. 1928-9, when, with that ulterior objec-
tive in mind, he was drafting his notes.
. . .
" 230
A close examination of the outline of Toynbee 's orig-
inal Plan of the book supports the view that it was not sim-
ply set up as a systematic morphology of civilizations, but
was a plan that led to a formulation of the "Rhythms" in the
Histories of Civilizations, and was to be climaxed by a
Part XII discussion of the "Prospects of the Western Civili-
zation." This is verified by Toynbee ' s description of
Part XII as an "experiment in prognostication." In an illu-
minating chapter on "The Need for this Inquiry," the by now
(November 30, 1950) reluctant author who had sketched out the
prospects of the West in 1929, but at the present could feel
only a sense of distaste for this speculative subject,
attempts to bolster his courage in order to proceed with the
prediction. During the course of the argument he remarks
that the passage of time has helped because, "this lesson
from the experience of twenty-one sinisterly illuminating
years had made experiments in prognostication less hazardous
by pinning the still patently open questions within a frame-
work of relatively sure prediction.
"
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The desire to predict, and thus to shake his contem-
poraries out of their complacency, is a prominent theme in
the Volume Six examination of the "Process of Disintegra-
tion." For example, after finding that the rhythm of disin-
tegration has had a regular pattern in societies such as the
Hellenic, Sinic, Sumeric, Orthodox Christian, Hindu, Syriac,
Far Eastern, Babylonic and Orthodox Christian in Russia,
Toynbee asks whether there are "Symptoms in Western History 1 "
of this familiar disintegration-pattern. While acknowledging
the problems that may make it impossible to plot out the
course and write up the log of the voyage of a still living
Western civilization, he nevertheless goes ahead with the
task of prediction.
Suppose that the pattern which we have now detected
in the histories of so many disintegrating civiliza-
tions were to prove to be discernable in our own
Western history, too. Might that not be regarded as
231Ibid. , 409.
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presumptive evidence that our own civilization
has already been overtaken by a process of
disintegration which is known for certain tohave been the fate of so many other represen-
tatives of the species? 232
This is followed by a series of analogies between the pattern
of disintegration in other societies and the events in the
West since the sixteenth century. Still couching his prophe-
cies in a tentative fashion as questions rather than direct
assertion, he asks,
Are these devils to dwell in our empty and swept
and garnished house till they have driven us to
suicide? If the analogy between our Western
Civilization's modern history and other civiliza-
tions' 'Times of Troubles' does extend to points
of chronology, then a Western 'Time of Trouble'
which appears to have begun sometime in the six-
teenth century may be expected to find its end
sometime in the twentieth century; and this pros-
pect may well make us trouble; ... We cannot
say for certain that our doom is at hand; and yet
we have no warrant for assuming that it is not;
for that would be to assume that we are not as
other men are; and any such assumption would be
at variance with everything that we know about
human nature either by looking around us or by
introspection
.
This dark doubt is a challenge which we cannot
evade; and our own destiny depends on our
response
.
233
With these considerations of the psychological state
of Toynbee in the crucial years of 1927 through 1929 in mind,
it is important to turn next to the question of the shaping
of his method for the massive Study . A normal point of
232 Ibid
.
,
VI, 314
233Ibid. , 320.
208
departure would be Toynbee 1 s Volume Ten "acknowledgement" of
his debt to Professor F. J. Teggart. In this paragraph with
its accompanying footnote, Toynbee suggests that Teggart'
s
contribution was methodological— that he rescued Toynbee from
the "baffling obscurities in any initial problem of method
and procedure
. . .
"
234
we have identified this initial
attempt with his early struggles of 1920 through 1924 to give
shape and substance to his pessimism about contemporary West-
ern civilization, his sense of impending disaster and his
great desire to awaken his contemporaries to the crisis by
accurate prognostication of the fate of the West. What Teg-
gart supplies sometime between the years 1925 when his Theory
of History first appears and 1927 when Toynbee' s "original
notes" are constructed is "a sovereign clue which has not
only initiated me into my subject but has piloted me through
it."
The question as to "What is the nature of this sover-
eign clue from Teggart?", or "What methodological principles
are taken from Teggart in shaping the methodology of the
Study ?" may be answered under four headings. Toynbee shares
Teggart' s strongly expressed desire to escape relativity,
which is coupled with a strongly-worded attack on traditional
historiography. Thirdly there is a heavy dependence by Toyn-
234 Ibid., IX, 232.
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bee upon Teggart's explanation for the errors of traditional
historiography as rooted in the eighteenth century. Finally
there is a close similarity between the proposed solution of
Teggart's "science of man" and the scientific motif in Toyn-
bee
.
As a preliminary and necessary observation one might
note that the Toynbee of the Study gives explicit and enthu-
siastic credit to Teggart for his methodological aid, but
Teggart in his Theory of History uses Toynbee as an example
of the type of historiography he is combatting. It is not
without significance that the Toynbee he attacks is the Toyn-
bee of the "first attempt"; the Toynbee who wrote the chapter
on "History" in the book The Legacy of Greece in 1922. This
is the Toynbee who had the "ideas" for his Study but could
not find an appropriate "form" for them. Teggart's criticism
reads
:
The picture varies from writer to writer, but
perhaps the most widely adopted type has been
that arrived at by instituting an analogy between
the life cycle of the individual and the entire
existence of humanity. The most recent example
of this mode of thought is not without interest. ^
Teggart then adds a lengthy quotation from Toynbee "s chapter
in The Legacy of Greece on the analogy between Western Soci-
ety and the birth and death of a person. Teggart dismisses
Toynbee 's theory and a variety of such theories advanced as a
235 Frederick J. Teggart, Theory of History (New Haven
t
Yale University Press, 1925)
,
pi 42.
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basis for a synthesis of world history, as "personal specula-
tions" which are the "unavoidable result of the adoption of
traditional historiography as the sole form for the statement
of the results of historical investigation. 1,236
It is difficult to know whether Teggart's criticism
led Toynbee to give up his "first attempt" at a history of
civilizations. Although there are in the Study several prot-
estations as to the limited value of biological analogies,
and direct assertions that societies are not organisms 237 it
is likely that Toynbee had already found his first approach
unpromising before his reading of Teggart's brief criticism.
Teggart's positive contribution to Toynbee may best
be seen as a "sovereign clue" or way to escape the relativity
of the historical observer. From the evidence in an earlier
chapter on "Toynbee the Explorer" it would be difficult to
deny that Toynbee was in his own view a methodological
explorer, grappling with the wilderness of historical data,
and the trackless wastes of as yet unframed historical ques-
tions. His problem is sketched out in his repeated use of
the phrase "shimmer of relativity" and his self-description
as an historian seeking for the "presence of some constant
and absolute object of historical thought in the background."
236 Ibid., p. 43
VI, 175.
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This approach to the study of history through a consideration
of the problem of relativity is not at all characteristic of
the writings of Toynbee before 1927. There is, however, in
the writings of Teggart an almost unvarying approach to the
theory of history by a posing of the problem of relativity in
one aspect or another.
As early as 1916, in Teggart' s Prolegomena to His-
tory, he introduces the subject of relativity by quoting from
Principal Caird's address on "The Study of History" given at
the University of Glasgow. Teggart selects Caird's question-
ing of the scientific status of the study of history, when
Caird declares: "Knowledge which has not yet been elevated
out of the domain of facts and details, which has not submit-
ted itself to the grasp of principles, or become in some
measure illuminated and harmonized by the presence of law,
cannot, I suppose, be regarded as a fit instrument of the
higher education." 238 Following this quotation Teggart adds
these words: "To this challenge there has been no adequate
response on the part of those who are professionally engaged
in the study and teaching of history. 11 It is interesting to
note Teggart 1 s use of the terms "challenge and response" in
1916 and to speculate on its appearance as a possible source
of Toynbee 8 s famous thematic use of the terms in his
2 38Frederick J. Teggart, Prolegomena to History
(Berkeley: University of California Press , 1916) , p. 3.
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Study, 239 but it is more important for this analysis to note
the fact that Teggart opens his subject with a series of con-
flicting views and opinions as to the validity and universal-
ity of historical knowledge.
In 1918, Teggart wrote a volume on The Processes of
History
,
u Again the introduction to the subject is con-
structed around the "wide differences that exist between the
many and various groups into which mankind is broken up."
The heterogenous points of view listed by Teggart include not
only the differences between French, Belgians, Italians, and
other Europeans, but differences between Europe and Asiatic,
between the Europeans and the Sikhs, Rajputs, Afghans, Bud-
dhists and Mohammedans.
By 1925, Teggart is able to give more systematic
expression to "present discontents" with the relativity of
the social sciences. In his introduction to the Theory of
History he summarizes his problem in this fashion:
The problem with which we are confronted is set,
then, by the fact that while publicists urge the
need of a science of society in the name of the
general welfare, and while teachers urge the need
of instruction in the elements of v social science 9
in the interest of the intelligence of the people,
the higher learning of the universities , in
response to these demands , offers only a series of
2 39For various views see Montagu, Toynbee and History
,
p. 207.
Frederick J. Teggart, The Processes of History (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1918)
.
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uncoordinated opinions as to the relationship of
certain academic subjects, each of which pursues
particular and separatist aims, by the employment
of exclusive modes of investigation
.
241
A final example of Teggart' s approach to the theory
of history through the problem of relativity may be found in
a 1927 address to the American Historical Association in
which Teggart poses a question strikingly like the question
in Toynbee' s opening chapter of the Study ,
The question, then, which calls for an answer is
whether our understanding of the greater problems
of history must, in perpetuity, remain subject to
the influence of transitory fashions in explana-
tion; whether the formation of our judgments as to
what f actually happened 8 in the past must continue
to be subordinate to interests—religious, philo-
sophical, political, economic or social—which
undergo change from generation to generation, if
not from year to year. 242
Our second area of investigation into the nature of
the "sovereign clue" given to Toynbee by Teggart concerns the
attack which both men make on traditional historiography.
Again an argument from silence , while limited in usefulness
,
is in order. One might argue that the lack of a sense of
methodological antithesis in the pre-Study writings of Toyn-
bee is due to the fact that no particular occasion presented
itself to the early Toynbee to discuss problems of method.
However the series of sharp criticisms in the Study combined
241Teggart, Theory of History , Preface xv-xvi.
242Frederick J. Teggart, Two Essays on History
(Berkeley: Privately printed by Bruce Brough Press, 1930)
,
p. 6 .
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with the fact that many of these criticisms repeat the Teg-
gart criticisms gives greater credence to the view that part
of the "sovereign clue" which Toynbee discovered in Teggart
was a deep discontent with contemporary historical methodol-
ogy-
Teggart 1 s general annoyance with the contemporary
world of historical scholarship may be found in his frequent
reference to the passivity and intellectual myopia of the
historians. Like the later descriptions by Toynbee , "tradi-
tional" and "academic" are terms of disapproval. When Teg-
gart sketches out his investigation in three successive
phases , he introduces the analysis with the argument that:
The critical aspect of the present inquiry has
its outcome in finding, first, that history, so
far from being 'scientific 8 has remained satisfied
with its traditional function of constructing nar-
ratives of happenings in the past,
. . .
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And as a more direct criticism of the historians, Teggart
says, "It is remarkable, indeed, that the fact should not
have impressed itself more generally on the minds of contem-
porary scholars that when established modes of procedure have
brought to the surface irreconcilable views as to method and
aim of inquiry in any field, the time has come for a far-
reaching inquiry into the theoretical foundations of the sub-
ject in question a " 244
243Teggart, Theory of History , Preface xix.
244 Ibid. 9 xiii.
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Again in his 1927 address to the American Historical
Association Teggart argues that, "The passive attitude of
historians, during the last century, has placed a serious
obstacle in the way of advance towards the scientific study
of Man; it has proved a barrier to the acquisition of that
knowledge which is required for the guidance of the world at
the present time." 245
The identification of traditional historiography with
the current professional historians had already been made by
Teggart in the book from which Toynbee. took his "sovereign
clue." There Teggart discusses the growing irritation of the
other social scientists with their historian colleagues. He
remarks that, "In the study of history, the activities of
scholars give evidence of a widespread dissatisfaction with
the conventional procedure of 'academic' historians." A
reader of the ninth volume of the Study is reminded of the
same observation put into a much more dramatic setting with
Toynbee ' s word picture of the sea gulls and the "comically
'know-nothing' air of the domesticated ducks" of Round Pond
in Kensington Gardens, London. As he describes it, the sea
gulls were catching the morsels of bread thrown to the ducks
by the visitors in the park, and the ducks "were saving their
face by pretending not to notice how aggressively the bois-
terous trespassers were behaving." The moral of the story is
245 Teggart, Two Essays on History
,
p. 11.
not left to the intuitive powers of the reader for "When the
writer heard his wife's voice asking him, in a tone of amused
surprise, why he had suddenly burst out laughing, he realized
that this comic encounter between ducks and gulls on the
Round Pond in Kensington Gardens had moved him to mirth by
presenting itself to his imagination as an animated allegory
of a drolly similar encounter between historians and social
scientists. 1,246 Toynbee, like Teggart, finds it difficult to
understand how traditional and academic historians can con-
tinue to act like ducks when the sea gulls are swallowing up
the food which belongs to the ducks by right of inheritance.
Our analysis of the elements of traditional histori-
ography which Toynbee wished to repudiate included a notice
of his sharp attack on "nationalistic" history. While it is
true that Toynbee ? s dislike of nationalism was rooted in his
experiences of the first World War and its bitter after-
math, 247 it is significant that his attack on nationalism in
historiography so closely parallels the Teggart criticisms.
If Toynbee ' s hostility to nationalistic historiography had
stemmed from his journalistic experiences it is likely that
his attack would have focused on the emotional prejudices of
English, French, Turkish or Greek historians. What actually
246Toynbee, A Study of History , IX, 194.
247Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey ,
pp. 361-362.
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takes place is not an emotionally based irritation with the
\ nationalistic prejudices of his fellow historians, but a
high-level criticism of the limiting nature of the work of
the universal historian when he has to work with the tradi-
tional units of national, political histories. In this sit-
uation the criticism is surprisingly like the Teggart criti-
cism from which the following excerpt is taken:
The type of synthesis dominant in the nineteenth
century is a product of the movement, in political
discussion, which has concentrated attention upon
the idea of the State. Nationalistic history and
the Theory of the State are products of one and
the same set of conditions. They are alike par-
ticularistic, and alike result in a narrowing of
sympathy and attention. The wealth of materials
available for the study of the past of a country
cannot be brought within the scope of any 'central
government 1 synthesis. Nationalistic historiogra-
phy can never do justice to the content of the
past* 2^
It is rather significant that Teggart and Toynbee
employ the same illustration of the limitations of national-
istic historiography. In 19 25
,
Teggart says s "The restric-
tions imposed upon historical study and historical writing
will be recognized at once if we consider any such phrase as
the "history of England. 8 " 249 A few years later, between
1927 and 1933, Toynbee says, "In setting out to look for some
objective "intelligible field of historical study,' it seems
best to start with what is the usual field of vision of con-
Teggart, Theory of History
,
p, 36
.
Ibid.
, p. 35.
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temporary Western historians, that is, with some national
state.
. . . Great Britain seems as good a choice as
i 2 50any." Both historians procede to argue that the national
unit cannot be considered as the basis for a universal his-
tory; Teggart in a brief way and Toynbee in a rather elabo-
rate second chapter discussion.
Included in this second topic of comparison between
Teggart and Toynbee should be the observation that Teggart
adds to his "nationalistic," "passive," " traditionalistic ,
"
"academic," "narrative" and "synthesis" criticisms of contem-
porary historiography, the further criticism that it has mis-
appropriated the title of "scientific"; and this criticism is
echoed by Toynbee. Teggart points out this narrow definition
of the term "scientific" in the statement: "As used by his-
torians, however, the word 'scientific' signifies merely the
use of a critical technique, and applies only to the mode of
procedure followed in the establishment of particular facts;
it does not suggest research directed to the solution of sci-
entific problems, or imply the adoption of the 'method of
2 51
science* as understood in other fields in inquiry." Con-
tinuing his description of contemporary "scientific" method-
ology in a later context, Teggart observes that:
250Toynbee, A Study of History , I, 17.
251Teggart, Theory of History , p. 4.
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Historical criticism yields only isolated 'facts 1
.
The academic historian pursues the activity of
determining these facts 'in the faith that a com-
plete assemblage of the smallest facts of human
history will tell in the end; the labour is per-
formed for posterity, 1 ... Hence the academic
historian holds to the belief that, having dis-
covered the facts, all that remains to be done is
to state what he has found without prejudice or
bias. 252
It is quite apparent that this is the source of Toyn-
2 5 3bee's attack upon the "scientific" historians of the Late
and Post Modern Western historians such as Mommsen and Ranke
who "have given their best energies to the "assemblage 8 of
raw materials. ..." And to one who has worked his way
through Toynbee 9 s polemic and back to Teggart's attacks, it
is not surprising to find that one of Toynbee's favorite
"whipping-boys," the Cambridge Modern History series, was
brought to the post a few years earlier by Teggart in what
figured to be a devastating rhetorical question at the con-
clusion of an attack on such synthetic histories:
In the world as it is today, is the historical
scholar to look forward to contributing the
result of his specialized researches to some
later Cambridge Modern History, or is he, on the
other hand, to entertain the hope that his
investigation may stand beside those of the
biologist, for example, as contributing, through
an added knowledge of the operations of nature,
to the welfare of the human race? 254
252 Ibid • 9 p *> 25.
253 See page 16.
254Teggart, The Processes of History , p. 35.
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The third part of this investigation into the nature
of the "sovereign clue" which Toynbee finds in Teggart has to
do with the explanation of the dilemma and roots of modern
historiography. Toynbee recognizes his dependence on Teggart
in his discussion of the antinomianism of modern historians,
when he not only quotes directly and at length from the
Theory of History
,
255 but bases his reconstruction of the
history of historiography on Teggart' s thesis.
Teggart' s explanation of how modern historians got
off to such a poor start begins with Aristotle. He argues
that "until recently, philosophy has asserted that history is
not science." "The distinction/' he adds, "goes back to
Aristotle, who regarded science as knowledge of the universal,
256history as knowledge of the particular." Although Toyn-
bee does not make explicit reference to Teggart until he
2 5 7
reaches Volume Five, in a Volume One annex on problems of
method in the Study , he gives an explanation of the origin of
popular views of history which closely approximates Teggart'
s
explanation . In his words s
According to the popular view, the ascertainment
and record of particular 'facts 1 is the technique
of 'History 1 ; . . . The elucidation and formula-
tion of general 'laws' through a process of com-
255 Toynbee, A Study of History
,
IX, 183.
256Teggart, Theory of History
,
p. 51.
257Toynbee , A Study of History
,
V, 10 , n . 2
221
parative study is the technique of 'Science 1 ; . . .
These popular equations have a respectable origin
—
they can be traced back to Aristotle— . . . . 258
From a discussion of Aristotle's primary error, both
historians move to a discussion of the eighteenth century as
the age in which modern historiography adopted a metaphysical
system with rueful consequences for the study of history.
Late in Teggart's Theory of History he summarizes the thesis
^
of the book and gives a capsule treatment of a theme we have
2 59already seen in Toynbee. Teggart's summary reads:
The thesis of this book is that our present
difficulties, in the field of the humanities,
are the direct result of a continued adherence
to certain methodological conceptions which
had their beginning in the seventeenth century
,
and which received their characteristic formula-
tion in the first half of the eighteenth century.
It is imperative that we should understand that,
in a sincere and devoted effort to reach a
strictly scientific basis for the study of man,
the humanists of the eighteenth century intro-
duced an explicit separation between the study
of 1 events 1 and the study of 1 change 1 . 1 Change 1
to them represented nature's orderly procedure
for attaining certain predetermined ends;
"events' to them appeared as accidental inter-
ferences with the 'natural order' of change.
Hence it was believed that the scientific study
of 'change' must proceed by making abstraction
from the 'events' recorded by historians. . . .
The influence of these methodological conceptions
is evident today in the continued separation
between history, on the one hand, and the 'sci-
ences' of economics, sociology, and anthropology,
on the other, . • «. 260
258
Ibid
. ,
I, 441.
259See page 14.
260Teggart, Theory of History , p. 198
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A student of Toynbee will recognize in the above statement an
argument employed by Toynbee in the annex to Volume One, and
in the Volume Nine section on the antinomianism of modern
historians. In both places Toynbee argues that there is no
intrinsic difference in method between the historian and the
various social scientists. Using the successes of the
anthropologists, economists, and other social scientists as
examples, he concludes that the historians' battle for a sep-
arate discipline had been won by Science and these "pictur-
esque antinomian" warrior historians had gone down to igno-
minious defeat. 261
A fourth way in which Teggart influences Toynbee v s
method is found in the similar proposals or antidotes the two
historians offer to the failure of traditional historiogra-
phy. It is related to the three sections just under observa-
tion as a positive proposal is related to three aspects of a
negative analysis, and will help us to see that Toynbee bor-
rows from Teggart much more than just the ammunition with
which to attack contemporary historiography.
One of the prominent questions asked by reviewers of
Toynbee 's Study is the question, "Is this History?" While
almost all of the critics treat this question indirectly or
261Toynbee, A Study of History
,
IX, 216.
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implicitly, some of them such as Barker, 262 Barnes, 263 den
Boer, 264 Brinton, 265 Geyl, 266 Renier, 26 ? and Walsh, 268
explicitly raise the question and use it as a framework for
their critique of Toynbee. Frequently this treatment of
Toynbee is misleading. It assumes that everybody, or almost
everybody, knows what "history" is, and that Toynbee is to be
viewed as a confused, albeit magnificently erudite person,
who somehow gets off the royal road of "history" into the
religious and psychological quagmires on either side. While
in a sense this jockeying for position in the contemporary
academic race is made in response to Toynbee' s attempts to
maneuver the post-Western historians out of the race as
anachronistic "warriors" or rather stupid "ducks" who are
completely out of the main line of progress, the argument on
this level shows little evidence of becoming fruitful. If
one is to understand Toynbee ! s method it must be viewed as a
2 6 2Ernest Barker, "Dr. Toynbee • s Study of History,"
International Affairs , XXXI (1955), 5-16.
263H. E. Barnes, American Sociological Review , XII
(1947) , 480-486.
264 den Boer, "Toynbee and Classical History," p. 221.
2 6 SCrane Brinton, "Toynbee' s City of God/' Virginia
Quarterly Review , XXXII (Summer, 1956) , 361.
266 Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," 260.
267G. J. Renier, History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950)
,
p. 215.
268Walsh, Philosophy of History , p. 215.
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deliberate attempt to supersede traditional narrative histo-
riography because of what he views as its inherent limita-
tions. Teggart offers a way to do this, and a very attrac-
tive way with Teggart 1 s insistent claim that what he is doing
is "scientific" as opposed to the pseudo-scientific approach
of the fact-gatherers. Under the banner of a "science of
man," or bearing the title of "a scientific student of his-
tory" Teggart proposes to do what the adherents of the tra-
ditional method have been unable to do. In a decisive pas-
sage he explains his program in the following words
:
As a result of such an examination, it becomes
apparent that the traditional method still adhered
to by the historian, the statement of what has
taken place in the form of narrative , does not lead
to any explanatory conclusion; and so, if the whole
attempt is not to be abandoned as vain and chimeri-
cal, it becomes necessary to find out how investiga-
tors have proceeded in other fields of history
.
This leads to the discovery that geologists and
biologists utilize the historical information at
their command , not for the purpose of constructing
narratives of happenings, but to determine what have
been the processes through which things have come to
be as they are.
The point of view thus gained at once clarifies
the situation , for it reveals the significance of
the chronological data which the human historian of
today has inherited from his predecessors; it throws
light upon the nature of the activities of a large
and increasing number of historical students; and it
displays the importance and utility of the great
residuary body of historical facts which historiog-
raphers have been unable to incorporate in their
narratives
.
Teggart 1 s attack on the traditionalist position is
2
6
^Teggart , The Processes of History , p. 38.
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directed at the method of traditional historiography and the
format in which this "history" appears. He argues that the
usual narrative format is the result of a supposedly scien-
tific method by which the historian gathers many facts, using
the critical technique, then he narrates the story of "what
happened." This narrative form means that the historian is
unable to incorporate into his story many facts of great
importance. The strictly chronological, narrative format is
too narrow and restrictive to achieve a non-partisan, truly
scientific, history. The use of the label "scientific" sim-
ply to designate the process of finding the facts without
prejudice, of going to the original documents, of having a
critical mind, is misleading, and the traditional historian
thereby cuts himself off from the possibility of attaining
truly scientific results. 27 ^ Teggart's point is not simply
that the narrative historian works with only part of the
"scientific method" and is hence only partly successful. He
insists rather that the narrative historian, while attempting
to be objective by merely relating the facts which are some-
how scientifically verifiable by a critical treatment of the
documents, is in actuality adding to his conception of the
facts by selecting only certain facts to narrate and by
inferring the motives of the actors in history in order to
270Teggart, Theory of History
, p. 26.
fill out the narrative. 271 Teggart concludes that narrative
history remains art and is not science.
In place of the narrative form which was based on an
incorrect definition of the term "scientific" by the histo-
rian, Teggart proposes an analytical history which will be a
search for the processes or the uniformities of the past.
Arguing that the archaeologists and orientalists have removed
the old barriers of insufficient data, he says, "With this
difficulty removed, we may face the situation that the ana-
lytical study of history must be founded upon a comparison of
the particular histories of all human groups, and must be
activated by the conscious effort to take cognizance of all
the available facts." 272
Teggart attempts to support his "analytical" history
over against the "narrative" history by pointing out certain
evidences of a new movement within traditional historiography
itself. His argument is that several historians, and fore-
most among them Lord Acton, are "reaching out in directions
unknown to the older historiography." According to Teggart '
s
analysis, these men are searching for the "elements" of his-
tory, whether those elements be "freedom," "class struggle,"
273
"sea power," or "religious revivals." Of course, Teggart
271Ibid., p. 66
272Teggart, The Processes of History , p. 37
273 Ibid., p. 36.
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does not conclude that these revolutionary historians are
therefore following his call for a new "science of man" but
he hopefully suggests that when they have found themselves
and have become methodologically self-conscious, they will
turn to analytical historiography as the school of the
future
.
In Teggart f s view the simple narrative format will
give place to a problem study. Stated generally the histo-
rian will pose for himself the problem, "how man everywhere
has come to be as he is." 274 As Teggart expresses it in
another context, we must view the present not as a situation
but as a condition of things:
Instead of the question, 'Why did a particular
individual do this? 1
, the inquiry, in the second
case will take the form: "How are we to account
for the differences
. • .which we encounter
among different peoples? 9
Like the natural scientist he will be interested primarily in
processes or uniformities. But he will differ from the natu-
ral scientist in that he will be dealing with dated events.
Teggart explains it in this fashion
:
It follows that, having dated events to work
from, the historian of man, when he comes to
investigate processes, will adopt a procedure
widely different from that followed by Darwin
and his contemporaries. Instead of confining
his attention to the present, utilizing the
Ibld
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facts of the past for purposes of verification
only, he will begin by examining the evidence
for the actual changes that have taken place.
Hence the procedure which is bound up with the
conception that the present is the key to the
past will, if one might so say, be reversed,
and 'History' will remain the study of the past
with a view to the elucidation of the processes
manifested in the present. 27 6
The explorer motif which we found in Toynbee and
which he coupled with the methodological explorations he felt
that he was undertaking, are similar to expressions Teggart
employs to describe his methodological reconstructions. In
a discussion of this new science of man, Teggart does not
hesitate to lapse into exhortations to other historians to
follow him in the discarding of the narrative format of tra-
ditional historiography. One example of these interspersed
exhortations may serve to illustrate this point.
We must, then endeavor to meet our obligation
through the utmost possible extension and
utilization of historical study. In making this
effort, we must recognize that we cannot rely
upon others for guidance. ... We are called
upon to face the responsibility of creating an
'historical science', ... we must set ourselves
to the performance of a task which has not
hitherto been undertaken, though its execution
has long been overdue. 2 77
In summary then, Teggart proposes a new history that
will discard the narrative format. In its place a new histo-
riography will be developed which in format and nature shall
276 Ibid
. , p . 12 7.
277Teggart, Two Essays on History , p. 11
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be analytical and comparative. "History" for Teggart will be
\ a search for uniformities and processes. In his own words,
"the older historical study will contribute the concept of
'events,' though the current acceptance of events as impor-
tant in and for themselves will give place to the concept of
events as the active element in change." 278
This sharp de-emphasis of events in favor of proces-
ses is, of course, what immediately strikes the reader of
Toynbee's A Study of History
. Here is little to remind one
of the traditional historical format; little to suggest a
calendar of events from some ancient past to the present.
What does impress the Toynbee reader is exactly the kind of
"analytical history" for which Teggart was contending. The
table of contents establishes not a series of subdivisions in
the story of a people, war, or even civilization, but sets a
series of problems for the author and reader to solve. As
soon as the introductory chapters concerning problems of
classification are out of the way, Toynbee launches into his
inquiry, "at the natural starting-point, by considering how
civilizations come into existence, . . . "279
A final objective in this general discussion of Toyn-
bee as the "social scientist" is to review the expectations
2 7 fi
Teggart, Theory of History
,
p. 148.
279Toynbee, A Study of History
,
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of Toynbee as he applied the "science of man" to the study of
the past. It is clear from the earlier discussion in this
chapter that Toynbee expected his law-making technique to
solve the age-old problem of historical bias and relativity,
and this in its most virulent form among his contemporaries
as nationalistic historiography.
Deliverance from the egocentrism, nationalism and
parochialism of the contemporary historians comes when he
adopts a scientific method which is able to reveal uniformi-
ties in the past and present of a universal character. These
uniformities or "laws" of history are not useful fictions nor
fabrications of the historian's mind, but are reflections of
the nature of the universe. In answer to the first major
question Toynbee frames as the "natural starting-point" of
his analytical history--the question of how civilizations
come into existence, he traces an alternating rhythm which is
common to all civilizations. Of this rhythm he remarks in
Volume One of the Study , "We have now ascertained the nature
of the geneses of civilizations. They are particular beats
of a general rhythmical pulsation which runs all through the
Universe." 280 J. viitl . .
Again in Volume Three, Toynbee expresses a similar
fear of historical relativism and counters with the faith
that his scientific, comparative method will rescue the his-
280ibid., 205.
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torian by enabling him to reveal underlying unities in the
lives of civilizations. The last page of Volume Three, which
marked the end of the first unit in the ten-volume study
significantly recapitulates the opening problem of Volume
One
:
And thus we have returned, at the close of thisthird part of our Study, to the point from which
we started at the beginning of the first part
when we dwelt upon the fact that in any age of
any society all social activities, including the
study of history itself, are governed by thedominant tendencies of the time and the place.
Yet if we were merely to dwell on this point once
again, we should be ending this part of our Study
on a false note; for, as we have observed in our
critique of the concept of Race, the variety that
is manifested in Human Nature and in human life
and institutions is a superficial phenomenon
which masks, without impairing, an underlyinq
unity. ZbL
The analytical approach to history seemed to provide a means
of escaping that species of relativity that Toynbee disliked
above all others— the "naively vulgar native Western egocen-
tric prejudice." This egocentricity seemed to be almost
inherent in narrative historiography. As Toynbee observes,
Such fixations of social emotion upon national
groups become almost universal, and historians
have been no more immune from them than other
people. Indeed, the spirit of Nationality has
appealed to historians with special force,
because it has offered them some prospect of
reconciling the common human desire for unity
of vision with the Division of Labour imposed
upon them by the application of the Industrial
281Ibid.
,
III, 390.
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System to their work. 282
The corrective to this prejudice was not the addition
of new narratives to those already constructed; a gathering
of more data to be worked up into new synthetic histories,
but the establishment of a new standpoint.
. . .
the unavowed and unavowable axiom of ego-
centricity ought to be ruled out by adopting the
contrary axiom that all representatives of any
species of human society are philosophically on
a par with one another. 283
Toynbee's effort to drive out the nationalistic bias
of his fellow historians was not restricted to writing such
volumes as A Study of History . He had accepted an appoint-
ment in 1921 as Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Lan-
guage, Literature and History at the University of London.
Sir Daniel Stevenson's intention in founding this Stevenson
chair of history as disclosed by Toynbee in the inaugural
lecture was to counteract nationalistic prejudice in the
teaching profession and in journalism by the provision of a
Chair of International History at the University of London
and the establishment of a Director of Studies in the Royal
Institute of International Affairs. Toynbee notes in his
address that the founder is persuaded that "in practically
all countries the teaching of History and the class-books
used therefore have had a strong nationalist bias. ..."
282 Ibid., I, 10.
283Ibid.
,
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Beyond the beneficial task of rooting out nationalism
Toynbee could see an additional benefit in the new methodol-
ogy. The discovery of laws in history provided a basis for
predicting the future. In the light of his earlier "intima-
tions of mortality" as he traveled in Greece and Crete before
the outbreak of the first World War, and his sense of impend-
ing catastrophe in the years following that war, it is easy
to understand why Toynbee would be fascinated with the ele-
ment of predictability that his law-making technique seemed
to promise in the 1927-1933 period.
This fascination with "prediction" is most clearly
seen in Toynbee ' s notes of June, 1927 to June, 1929. It may
be noted that many of his experiments with lengths of cycles
and periods did not become sufficiently verifiable to find a
place in the final text of the first three volumes of the
Study as published in 1933, but their appearance in Toynbee '
s
preliminary drafts is of great significance.
On one occasion in the notes for 1929 Toynbee
labored over the problem of the length of the cycles in a
disintegrating phase of civilization. To support his view
that four-hundred and two-hundred year periods appear uni-
formly and a uniform number of times in a disintegration
phase he turns to the phenomenon of wars in human history.
His research and charts reveal a constant interval of approx-
imately one hundred and three years between general wars so
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that he is able to predict the outbreak of the second World
War in the year 2035. It is a curious commentary on the fal-
libility of historians that nine years after this forecast
based on empirical evidence, Toynbee was busily engaged in
packing his forecast along with several chests of notes and
research material to be sent to New York in the hope that
they would survive the holocaust of the second World War in
Europe. The same incident of the optimistic forecast fol-
lowed by the unexpected arrival of a general war helps us to
understand not only the early faith of Toynbee in what his
new methodology promised to do, but sheds a great deal of
light on the growing despair of Toynbee in the thirties and
his disillusionment with his method as expressed in Volumes
Four through Six.
CHAPTER V
THE LATER TOYNBEE AS A "STUDENT OF LIFE"
"
. .
.it might begin to be possible for
pilgrim souls to feel their way towards an
angle of spiritual vision
. . .
"
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume Seven
Use of the Term "Student of Life"
Approaching Arnold Toynbee 1 s A Study of History as a
major methodological document in modern historical studies
we have sought to avoid artificial or imposed categories by
examining the metaphors with which Toynbee has classified his
methodological position. We stressed the repeated use of the
explorer imagery in the Study
.
By the use of this motif
Toynbee was able to indicate the two-fold nature of his tasks
he was to explore the validity and usefulness of new methodo-
logical principles amid the jungle of historical events 9
places f persons and interpretations? and he would explore the
future of the West in a world which resembled the uncharted
seas upon whose troubled surfaces most of the other ships of
civilization had met disaster,, The present study has brought
to light his growing use of the explorer metaphor as Toyn-
bee 1 s early methodological optimism was severely challenged
by a much more deeply-rooted historical bias than he had
supposed. The "shimmer of relativity," which Toynbee sup-
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posed would be readily brushed aside by his law-making tech-
nique, proved in later volumes to be deeply rooted. It was
rooted, not simply in the social conditions of the histori-
an's environment, but in the act of cognition itself. The
explorer motif expressed Toynbee's growing methodological
uncertainty, to the point where in the post- Study writings he
regards the twenty-seven year Study as a highly speculative
quest. He expressed the hope that somehow the variety of
people asking questions of all the various kinds may help
mankind "to take its bearing in a mysterious universe."
Having established the fact of a radical change in
Toynbee's methodology, it then became important to study the
basic "scientific" methodology with which Toynbee began his
Study in 1927, and from which he turned in 1936. Chapter
four of this study focused on Toynbee's effort to define him-
self as a "social scientist." By tracing all of the descrip-
tive phrases clustered around Toynbee's notion of "a science
of human affairs," we tried to determine the precise signifi-
cance of the scientific motif in Toynbee's methodology; to
explore its polemical usage within the Study ; and to under-
stand the vast confidence Toynbee had in the efficacy of the
empirical method to pierce the shimmer of relativity in the
foreground of the historian's vision.
The third self-characterization is the phrase "stu-
dent of life." Again we have an expression used by Toynbee
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in a significant way. It does not represent a casual refer-
ence to himself as a person who is interested in human life
as over against scholars who are mechanistically oriented.
The phrase emerges gradually in the Study as a particular
banner under which Toynbee attacks the influence of piecemeal
labor on modern historical studies. In the early volumes of
the Study the author adopts certain arguments from the roman-
tic or vitalist tradition in order to refute and dispose of
the distortions which industrialism and mechanism have intro-
duced into the historian's work.
He seems unaware of any antithesis in his dual roles
as "social scientist" and as "student of life." Our task is
to note in the early volumes, the infrequent yet nevertheless
interesting polemical use of the "student of life" motif. In
the later volumes there is a significant growth in the use
and meaning of this motif as Toynbee loses confidence in his
law-making technique , and turns increasingly to what had been
at first a supplemental tool, the intuitions of the "student
of life. 19
The "Student of Life" Motif Complements
the Researches of the Social Scientist
Because we are tracing a dynamic situation, namely a
reversal of roles within the corpus of Toynbee ? s master-work,
we shall proceed by examining successive references to the
student of life role in the Study . The first instance is
238
found in the opening chapter on "The Relativity of Historical
Thought." 1 As argued earlier, the chapter is a springboard
for Toynbee's whole quest to go beyond the "shimmer of rela-
tivity" in the confidence that there is "some constant and
absolute object of historical thought in the background." In
the chapter, two institutions are singled out as making such
a deep impress on the transient social environment as to
become almost a priori categories in the historian's mind.
Hence if the historian is to discern the "Lineaments of some
abiding form in the passing events" he must escape the influ-
ence of Industrialism and Nationalism. To be sure, when
Toynbee began his work in 1927, the sources of relativism
were easily identifiable and much more susceptible of treat-
ment than the deep-rooted and ineradicable relativity of
which he speaks in his later essay on "The Limitations of
Historical Knowledge."
Industrialism as an institution has put its impress
on historical thought in two ways. Historians have followed
the Industrial System by adopting assembly-line procedures
for writing history [as in the Cambridge History Series ] and
by trying to adapt Western scientific thought to the study of
history. 3
llbid
.
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At this point in the argument one might expect to see
Toynbee rejecting the positivist tradition in favor of a
position resembling that of Dilthey or Collingwood. And
indeed that hunch is strengthened by a footnote which refers
to Dilthey 's seventh volume. The similarity between Toynbee
and Dilthey at this point is, at first, striking. Toynbee
seems to argue that the methods of Physical Science are dis-
tinct from the methodology of the human sciences.
The same method, however, has latterly been
applied in many realms of thought beyond the
bounds of Physical Science— to thought which
is concerned with Life and not with inanimate
Nature, and even to thought which is concerned
with human activities. Historical thought is
among these foreign realms in which the pres-
tige of the Industrial System has exerted it-
Dilthey "s parallel argument is, "Die realen Kategorian
sind . . . in den Geisteswissenschaf ten nirgends dieselben
als in den Naturwissenschaften
.
B9 ^ The similarity in views is
especially noticeable in Toynbee* s emphasis upon the richness
and variety of life. He speaks of "thought which is con-
cerned with Life and not with Inanimate Nature/' 6 and arrives
at the conclusion that two methods of thought need to be dis-
tinguished in life,
4 Ibid.
W- Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig and Ber-
lin, 1927)
,
VII, 195.
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In the world of action, we know that it is
disastrous to treat animals or human beings
as though they were sticks and stones. Why
should we suppose this treatment to be any
less mistaken in the world of ideas? Why
should we suppose that the scientific method
of thought— a method which has been devised
for thinking about Inanimate Nature— should
be applicable to historical thought, which is
a study of living creatures and indeed of
living beings??
This emphasis upon the richness of Life is reminiscent of
Dilthey's theme of "life embracing life." 8 Nevertheless one
must pursue the matter beyond these similarities to the
really serious differences between the men. For example, if
we look only at the similarities how can we account for the
criticism of Collingwood, a man who has historical views
admittedly close to Dilthey,^ in which he argues:
As a contrast with Oakeshott's work, which
represents the transformation of historical
thought from a positivistic stage to a new
stage which I may perhaps call idealistic . . .
I may here mention Professor Arnold Toynbee's
great Study of History , which represents a
restatement of the positivistic view itself.
^
Obviously this search must be narrowed to the point
where we can isolate which aspects of nineteenth-century pos-
itivism Toynbee rejects and which he accepts. To see the
Ibid
.
, 7c
8H. A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey
(London: Rout ledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
, 1952) , p. 319.
9Collingwood, The Idea of History
,
p. 172.
10 Ibid.
,
p. 159.
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elements of positivism that he rejects one needs to under-
stand the goal he is trying to reach and what it is that hin
ders the attainment of this objective. From the evidence in
chapter one it would appear that Toynbee is attempting to
write universal history— in the sense of a history that is
capable of embracing all national groups and which will gain
the assent of all parochial viewpoints. This aim is
expressed in his praise of H. G. Wells 1 Outline of History
.
There is a strong tendency to depreciate works
of historical literature which are created by
single minds, and the depreciation becomes the
more emphatic the nearer such works approximate
to being "Universal Histories. 1 For example,
Mr. H. G. Wells' The Outline of History was
received with unmistakable hostility by a number
of historical specialists. They criticized
severely the errors which they discovered at the
points where the writer, in his long journey
through Time and Space, happened to traverse
their tiny allotments. They seemed not to real-
ize that, in re-living the entire life of Mankind
as a single imaginative experience , Mr. Wells was
achieving something which they themselves would
hatrdly have dared to attempt--something, perhaps
of which they had never conceived the possibility .
H
It is obvious from what follows that Toynbee had conceived
the possibility.
Toynbee objects to nineteenth-century positivism
because it hinders a whole view of history: "This deep
impulse to envisage and comprehend the whole of Life is cer-
tainly immanent in the mind of the historian; and such
-^Toynbee , A Study of History , 1 , 4-5
.
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violence is done to it by the Division of Labour which the
analogy of the Industrial System imposes on historical
thought.
. PiW r . * , .»• „
Toynbee's summary of the first chapter corroborates
that his goal embraces universal history:
These multiple tendencies can be summed up in a
single formula: In the new age, the dominant
note in the corporate consciousness of communi-
ties is a sense of being parts of some larger
universe » * • •
If this observation is correct , and if it
is also true that historians cannot abstract
their thoughts and feelings from the influence
of the environment in which they live, then we
may expect to witness in the near future a
change in the outlook and activities of Western
historians corresponding to the recent change
in the general conditions of Western Society . .
they will probably find their intelligible field
of study in some landscape where the horizon is
not restricted to the boundaries of a single
nationality, and will adapt their present method-
of work to mental operations on a larger scale
.
Given this goal of a universal history , the objection
to positivism was that it fractures the continuity of history
into discrete parts , and likewise narrows the historian 1 s
vision into a parochial framework rather than a universal
framework* To meet these shortcomings Toynbee turned to
Bergson and vitalism, 14 He shares with Bergson a feeling of
12 Ibid.
,
8.
13 Ibid. 15.
14 Ibid. 9.
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discontent with the scientific tradition, 15 and a turning to
the romantic traditions in order to off -set its deficiencies.
He resembles Dilthey in evincing a mutual interest in the
romantic tradition, and an anti-mechanistic attitude. But
the areas of agreement are fairly well circumscribed. Toyn-
bee elects to follow Bergson rather than Dilthey in the ini-
tial volumes of his study. The distinction between Dilthey
and Bergson occurs when Bergson defines vitalism in a biolog-
ical sense, while Dilthey thinks of "Life" in terms of a
human experience which is known from within. 16 Only a care-
ful disentangling of the text and the philosophical threads
will help explain why Toynbee can appear to dismiss the
"scientific method of thought" as a methodological principle
for the historian in chapter one; 17 then spend two hundred
and seventy-one pages of Volume One developing a scientific
method of thought and finally to conclude on that page of the
same first volume:
Have we not been guilty of applying to historical
thought, which is a study of living creatures, a
scientific method of thought which has been devised
for thinking about Inanimate Nature? In making a
final attempt to solve the riddle that has been
baffling us, let us follow Plato's lead and try the
alternative course. Let us shut our eyes, for the
Morton G. White, Age of Analysis (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955)
,
p. 19
.
x6 Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey , p. 320.
17Toynbee, A Study of History , I, 7.
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moment, to the formulae of Science in order to
open our ears to the language of Mythology. !8
This apparent contradiction in Volume One in which Toynbee
warns himself against the "Apathetic Fallacy," i.e., treat-
ing living creatures as though they were inanimate, then
falls victim in the succeeding chapters to the 'Apathetic
Fallacy,
'
and finally attempts to outgrow the "Apathetic Fal-
lacy ? by the use of mythology, is paralleled by what appears
to be an equally contradictory attack by the critics. On the
one hand Toynbee is taken to task for his dependence upon the
methods of the natural sciences and his attempts to revive
nineteenth-century positivism in historical thought. 1 ^ On
the other hand critics constantly point to his breach with
the methodology of the natural sciences,, either to praise or
blame him for it.
. • . no book that deals with human affairs has
been more free from the blatant parochialism of
our age and our civilization . . . , our naive
submission to the one-eyed methodology of the
physical sciences and 'objective scholarship.
Although we should acknowledge that criticisms of
such divergent nature are partly explained by the fact that
Toynbee seems to shift his ground in the course of the Study
18Ibid 271. »
1
9
Collingwood, The Idea of History
,
p„ 159
.
20Lewis Mumford, "The Napoleon of Notting Hill," The
New Republic , CXXXI (November, 1954), 17.
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and that Collingwood
' s criticism was raised after the appear-
ance of the first three volumes, it serves only to emphasize
that Toynbee begins his work with the hope of reconciling two
methodological positions. By refusing to follow Dilthey into
the position of recognizing a radical distinction in the
nature of the human science methodology, Toynbee appears to
be confident in the first three volumes that the historian is
not facing an either/or proposition.
Instead Toynbee was initially attracted to the new
philosophical hero of his day, Henri Bergson. As Tangye Lean
has observed:
The year in which Toynbee graduated saw the works
of Bergson, delayed by translation, sweep into
Oxford in an abrupt and surprising flood. They
came to Toynbee 8 s own intellectual world with the
force he has said, 'of a revelation* • ^
Here was an opportunity to reject the current methodology as
too mechanistic, deterministic, and rationalistic. Here was
the opportunity to use "intuition as superior to the scien-
tific intellect in its power to see all things and describe
them accurately."** Yet for all its emphasis upon the con-
tinuity of time and life, this brand of romanticism did not
seem to carry with it the rejection of "English empiricism."
This was an important consideration for Toynbee as can be
21Tangye Lean, "A Study of Toynbee," Horizon , XV
(January, 1947) , 25.
22White, Age of Analysis
, p. 65.
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seen in his argument against the views of Oswald Spengler.
Crucial in the argument is the characterization of Spengler's
position as German transcendentalism and his own position as
English empiricism.
In the foregoing series of passages, in which
Spengler carries his dogma of relativity from
the domain of Art into almost every other domain
of social life, there is a magnificent logic;
and an English empiricist might find this German
transcendentalist a formidable antagonist if he
were rash enough to challenge him to a tournament
with his own German weapons.
Hence it is not with the either/or of Dilthey but
with the both/and of Bergson that Toynbee confidently begins
his massive Study
. The proof that Toynbee supposed the
"Scientific method" is valid but not able to reach far enough
into the mysteries of life; that the language of intuition
can penetrate the mystery and then translate itself into
scientific truths, will unfold as we trace Toynbee 's growing
reliance on the intuition of the student of life. In this
section, let us simply note the awareness he seems to have
that we must "go beyond" the present methodological limits.
In the same controversial first chapter in which he reaffirms
his faith that relativity of viewpoint can be superseded, the
methodological change that Toynbee predicts is expressed in
the me.taphor of "lifting the horizon" and "operations on a
larger scale."
23Toynbee, A Study of History , III, 382.
.
. .
so, in the new age upon which we have
entered, they [the historians] will probably
find their intelligible field of study in some
landscape where the horizon is not restricted
to the boundaries of a single nationality, and
will adopt their present method of work to
mental operations on a larger scale. ^
Summarizing our results at the end of this attempt to
find out why Toynbee describes himself as a "student of
life," we can say that Toynbee the "student of life" must
supplement Toynbee the "social scientist" if he is to reach
his goal of writing universal history. To transpose it into
methodological terms one might say that the romantic tradi-
tion must supply the intuition because it sees life as a
whole, while the scientific tradition must supply the means
of testing the validity of the clues given by intuition, and
together universal and universally valid history will be pos-
sible. But this is to move somewhat ahead of our systematic
tracing of the role of a "student of life."
The next instance of the "student of life" motif is
found in a series of references to the planes of li fe . In
this running criticism of the parochial historian who has
used the scientific method in order to treat his subject in
building-block fashion, Toynbee argues that this parochialism
is due to a superficial view of life. While observing the
failure of the "Western historians" to write history in which
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other than western civilizations have had fair treatment,
Toynbee contends that: "In the first place, his vision of
the contemporary world must be confined to the economic and
political planes of social life and must be inhibited from
penetrating to the cultural plane, which is not only deeper
25but is fundamental." This repeated description of the eco-
nomic, social, and political planes as "superficial" in com-
parison to the fundamental cultural plane is clearly attached
to Toynbee 1 s search for "an abiding form" in the flux of his-
torical change. In almost the identical language with which
he expressed the hope of finding an escape from the relativ-
ity of social environment at the end of his first chapter,
Toynbee indicates that the "abiding form" is actually found
on this cultural level.
On this cultural plane, for those who have eyes
to see, the lineaments of the four living non-
Western civilizations are still clear. 6
The assertions about political, economic, social and
cultural levels of experience are not argued in the text but
are simply declared to be either superficial or fundamental.
The curious reader will ask the question, "On what basis is
the classification of 'planes 5 made"? The answer appears to
be that the cultural level is significant because it is here
25Ibid
.
, 151.
26 Ibid.
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that Life is dynamic and lasting.
If, however, their mental vision had penetrated
through the political plane to the cultural
plane beneath, they would have realized that,
even if the first appearances on the political
plane had been entirely confirmed by closer
investigation, the static condition, on this
plane, of the societies which they were studying
was of little or no significance in view of the
wealth and life which reveal themselves in the
histories of these same societies as soon as the
observer's attention is transferred from the
superficial to the fundamental plane of social
existence. By ignoring the cultural plane and
by equating politics with Life, Western observers
arrive at an opinion about non-Western histories
which exposes the confusion of their thought as
much as it ministers to their self-esteem. '
A similar occurrence of the "student of life" role is
found in the annex to Volume One. Here again the appeal is
made to planes of life in which "superficial" and "fundamen-
tal" are the descriptive adjectives. Again the economic and
political planes are dismissed as "material planes" and the
cultural plane is singled out as a deeper level. The context
of the argument is Toynbee's attempt to answer the "Diffu-
sionist doctrine." The Dif fusionists hold to the view that
the "geneses of civilizations can be accounted for by the
fact that certain techniques and aptitudes and institutions
and ideas can be proved historically to have been acquired,
by the majority of those who have eventually acquired them,
27Ibid. , 165.
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through the process of Diffusion." 28 Toynbee tries to counter
this position which is incompatible with his creative evolu-
tionary thesis by the argument that the Dif fusionists have
been betrayed by the "relativity of historical thought."
The ultra-modern Western scholar is apt to be
betrayed insidiously, by the mental atmosphere
in which his mind is constrained to work, into
persuading himself that, because Western serving-
machines and Western rifles and Western cotton
goods have been diffused throughout the Orthodox
Christian and Islamic and Hindu and Far Eastern
Worlds in these latter days, this diffusion of
Western knick-knacks is tantamount to the con-
version of these four other living societies to
our Western Civilization. 29
The argument proceeds a step further than its earlier form
when he goes on to state that this cultural plane is the area
of the soul. Here is the plane of "inner spiritual life" of
a civilization which is not superficial but is their "real
30life." Given that Toynbee is in search of historical truth
which is not subject to the relativity of the social environ-
ment, and that he continually speaks of finding the answer on
the cultural plane which is "real life," it is not difficult
to trace the steady progression from history as the history
of civilizations to history as the history of the soul.
However, this writing of "history" as the "history of
28Ibid
.
, 427.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 429.
religion" is still twenty years in the future for the Toynbee
of Volume One, so let us trace his increasing consciousness
of himself as a "student of life." In Volume One he remains
a "student of life" who tries to balance the opposing princi-
ples of Diffusion and of the Uniformity of Nature in order to
account for the richness and variety of life. This appeal to
"Life" and the "student of Life" as over against the steril-
ity of the purely intellectual approach of the scientist and
philosopher makes its hesitant entrance in this opening vol-
ume to be exploited in full development in the later volumes
•
Thus, in any objective study of the process of
acquisition ... we have to allow for the
operation, side by side, of two different
principles.
. • . The proper task of the stu-
dent of Life is not to magnify either principle
tendenciously at the other principle's expense
but to render to both principles their real
due„
Even though it involves slicing into a complex argument that
will be treated as a whole under a later heading, let us
observe a reference to the "student of Life" role in the
annex to I. C(iii) (e) . The implication that the historian
"student of Life" somehow goes beyond the researcher who is
limited to the technique of science is clearly set forth in
this attempt to distinguish the historian from the dramatist
or anthropologist*
Our historians are apt to pride themselves on
31Ibid., 426.
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the enrollment of these scientific auxiliaries
as being the greatest advance which the study
of history has made in recent times; and we may
venture to agree with them in this without
exposing ourselves to a charge of inconsistency;
for while we have criticized them at the begin-
ning of this Study for trying to apply the tech-
nique of Science outside its province, we have
never objected to their employing the sciences
in a menial capacity as hewers of wood and
drawers of water. ^
The next sustained use of the £lan motif in relation
to the historian's role as "student of Life" is found in Vol-
ume Three. The whole volume treats the growth of civiliza-
tions
,
and in the course of the argument Toynbee discusses
"Life" or the elan vital as that mysterious factor operative
in the growth of a society . Important for our analysis is
the series of warnings issued in the discussion to the effect
that the application of our Western Physical Science to Life
or the study of Life might have serious consequences. For
example, Toynbee develops the thesis of Aldous Huxley 8 s Brave
New World in order to show how dangerous it would be to "peg"
our Western Society at a certain level and thus rule out
33fresh spiritual creations. The fear that the life of soci-
ety might be arrested because of the sterilizing effect of
the application of Physical Science to human affairs, rests
upon Bergson's hypothesis, as Toynbee goes on to point out
32 Ibid
.
, 446.
33Ibid., Ill, 101
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that "the will has it genius, as well as the intellect, and
genius defies all prognostication." 34
The protection of the unique, unpredictable, spiri-
tual element of life leads Toynbee steadily toward a position
which undermines his original hope of finding laws in his-
tory. Still pondering the relation of elan to the question
of growth in civilizations, he concludes that although it is
possible to talk about laws in Inanimate Nature, the question
of uniqueness must prevail in any analysis of the relations
between Man and Man.
And it has been a harder task to domesticate
animals and plants than to dominate Inanimate
Nature— to harness the horse than to harness
the tide. Inanimate Nature obeys regular laws
which Man has merely to work out in order to
apply them mechanically for his own practical
purposes. It is infinitely harder to cope
with the waywardness and complexity of
Li f 6 / M « 0
It would be premature to conclude that Toynbee in
Volume Three turns away from his original plan of avoiding
the relativism and subjectivism of historical studies by
means of a discovery of the intelligible units of history and
the laws of their behavior . At the most we can detect here
a realization on Toynbee 1 s part that a dependence upon the
elan motif and an emphasis upon the complexity of Life makes
34 Ibid. , 118.
35 Ibid., 159.
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his goal much more difficult to attain.
How much more difficult is seen in his criticism of
H. G. Wells. We observed in the opening chapter of the study
that Wells was singled out by Toynbee as an historian who
sought a universal view of man in history. The "whole monu-
mental work" is again applauded in Volume Three but Toynbee
now lodges the complaint that Wells does not go far enough.
In dealing with Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Wells is content with "a
mere description and classification and docketing of the
outer man." 36 This criticism could come from Collingwood and
Dilthey; especially in the light of Toynbee ' s added phrase
that Wells should have exercised his imagination "by an intu-
itive sympathy of one soul with another." The criticism that
"he regards history as a mere spectacle, something consisting
of facts observed and recorded by the historian, phenomena
presented externally to his gaze, not experiences into which
he must enter and which he must make his own"^ could be
inserted into Toynbee ' s criticism of Wells with little dis-
turbance of the chain of thought. But this is actually the
criticism levelled at Toynbee by Collingwood! Can we then
conclude that Toynbee has now come around to the position of
Collingwood or Dilthey? Evidently not, because Toynbee is
36Ibid
.
, 195.
3
^Collingwood, The Idea of History
, p. 163.
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not applying a radical criticism to Wells' methodology.
Under the influence of the elan motif defined in a spiritual
rather than biological sense, Toynbee is arguing that Wells
does not do justice to Life by stopping with mere description
and classification. in Toynbee » s eyes, Wells' method is not
so much wrong as inadequate. The historian qua "student of
Life" must proceed via imagination to the inner man.
The close tie of the elan motif with the problem of
proper historical method is apparent in Toynbee • s discussion
of the disintegration of civilizations. He asserts that once
civilizations have started to disintegrate and the elan vital
has gone out of them, the student can then describe them in
"cause and effect" terms. In this case mechanism has
replaced creativity, and the civilization is now on a trav-
eling belt of interlocking cause and effect. Hence in Volume
Five we find several references to the possibility that the
historian may use two ways of description. He may describe
a broken-down civilization in mythological language as
"remorselessly condemned to eventual destruction," or in sci-
entific language as "mechanically dispatched to the same grim
goal on a traveling belt of interlocking cause and effect
3 8that can be neither reversed nor broken nor checked." A
later reference continues the distinction of describing a
38Toynbee, A Study of History
,
V, 13.
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civilization in "two different ways," but substitutes the
terms "Life" and "Inanimate Nature" for "mythological lan-
guage" and "scientific language."
... a profound change sets in if and when the
civilization breaks down and goes into disinte-
gration. This change can be described in two
different ways, according as we speak in the
language of Life or in terms of Inanimate
Nature
.
Jy
For the purpose of tracing the role of "a student of
Life" in Toynbee ' s Study , the distinction between two lan-
guages is not important. These "ways of describing" are not
mutually exclusive in this context. On the contrary the two
ways of description are put forward as supplementary to one
another for the "student of Life" who is trying to study
civilizations of the past. In the Seventh Volume Toynbee
pushes the distinction beyond the verbal level and develops
a thoroughgoing dichotomy between language and order of know-
ledge. But before we reach that major turn in the formula-
tion of his historical methodology, let us notice some inter-
vening references.
While pursuing references to the historian who deals
with "Life" rather than with merely Inanimate Nature, we
should notice a growing shift in language. Although it is
somewhat premature to discuss the fascination which Toynbee
develops for depth psychology later, there is a trend in that
39 Ibid. , 198.
direction even in Volume Five. We observed Toynbee 1 s inter-
est in an objective view of history which he argued could be
found on the cultural plane where the "real" life of a soci-
ety is in evidence as distinct from its passing and superfi-
cial politico-economic plane of existence. The category of
"planes" seems to lose ground as Toynbee proceeds with the
Study
.
The transitional phraseology between the "planes" of
the first three volumes and the "Collective Subconscious" of
his concluding volumes appears to be the "spiritual depths"
of Volume Five. Once again the context is concerned with the
mystery of "Life," with the complex, spiritual element in
life that can only be grasped by the "student of Life" who
goes beyond the work of the social scientist.
What are these two ways of life which produced
these vast spiritual effects when they were
respectively adopted in place of Archaism by
Cato and in place of Futurism by Peter? In
peering into spiritual depths which may prove
unfathomable, let us begin by taking note of
the common differences. . . .
The "Student of Life" Motif Raises an Epistemological
Dilemma Which Threatens to Invalidate the Method of
Toynbee the "Social Scientist"
Critics of Toynbee have noticed an increasing inter-
est in religion in the second half of Toynbee* s Study and we
have been tracing this trend in terms of the "student of
Life" role. In Volume Six the methodological problem resi-
40 Ibid. , 393.
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dent in this dual role of "student of Life" and "social sci-
entist" comes into sharp focus. We have heard Toynbee' s ini-
tial warning to beware of the dangers of dividing the histo-
rian's task into small unrelated units, as has happened in
man's technological endeavor under the impact of science and
industrialism. A universal view, Toynbee felt, could be
obtained by adding the intuitions of the past to the work of
the social scientist. It was further research as a "student
of Life" on the cultural plane which led Toynbee to a discus-
sion of spiritual dimensions in life. There arises a growing
question, not so much as to the inadequacy of scientific
methodology, but as to the adequacy of reason itself. In the
name of "Life" Toynbee begins to challenge Humanism in Vol-
ume Six, assailing its very presuppositions
.
However parochial the savage's horizon may be on
the plane of sheerly human life on the surface of
this planet, his soul still lives and moves in a
spiritual environment with a superhuman dimension
which the modern Western humanist has deliberately
excluded from his reckoning. The humanist pur-
posely concentrates all his attention and effort
upon a purely human cross-section of life which he
abstracts from the totality of his spiritual
environment by a mental operation that is performed
for the practical purpose of bringing human affairs
under the human control . ^
The analysis of the possibilities of mental opera-
tions is carried further in this same context by added obser-
vations on the "spiritual dimension." Toynbee here suggests
41 Ibid.
,
VI, 13.
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that the spiritual dimension may not be an aspect of life
\ which can be encompassed by a wider vision, i.e., by finding
an intelligible field of study that will enable us to escape
the relativity of the social environment. The spiritual
dimension in history is a "mode of spiritual being" which
greatly complicates the problem of knowing in the historical
process.
However large its area on Earth, Man's Universe
cannot give Man's spirit room to breathe unless
it also extends from Earth to Heaven; and our
modern Western school of humanists have perhaps
been peculiar, as well as perverse, in planning
to reach Heaven by raising a titanic Tower of
Babel on terrestrial foundations in these dimen-
sions— as though it were sheer physical distance,
and not any difference in mode of spiritual being,
that divided and distinguished Heaven from Earth.
^
2
With the distinction pressed beyond a distinction in methods,
Toynbee poses for himself the task of knowing by means of
spiritual intercourse. This way of knowing is distinguished
from an intellectual apprehension of reality by use of the
terminology "Head" and "Heart." For example, Toynbee seeks
to make this distinction in the case of the philosophers
knowledge as opposed to the saint * s knowledge.
Yet, for all their sublimity, these three attrib-
utes of the Divine Nature are in themselves no
more than conclusions of the human understanding?
they are not experiences of the human heart ; and
,
while it is no doubt possible for a human soul
which has made its first discovery of God on the
intellectual plane to enter into communion with
42 Ibid., 14
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Him thereafter on that higher level of spiritual
intercourse on which human beings are able to
love, as well as know, their human fellow crea-
tures, the attainment of communion with God. 43
If this train of thought is a faithful reproduction
of a growing dilemma in Toynbee, we find a further elabora-
tion of it in his crucial discussion of "Transfiguration."
Although often overlooked, this chapter rivals the initial
chapter of the Study in methodological significance. Vol-
umes Five and Six are concerned with the process of the dis-
integration of civilization, and more specifically with the
problem it presents to the Soul living in such intolerable
circumstances. Leading up to chapter eleven in which "Trans-
figuration" is introduced as the only possible alternative
for the searching Soul, Toynbee concludes that "we have
already passed in review three different attempts to find
one; but, so far, our survey has brought us each time to the
dead end of a blind-alley." 44
There follows a twenty-page description of the way of
Transfiguration for the Soul in a disintegrating civiliza-
tion. Does this "Soul" refer solely to past situations or
does Toynbee regard himself as suffering similar dilemmas?
It is my opinion, in the light of the following evidence,
that Toynbee identifies himself as a twentieth-century histo-
43
Ibid
.
, 41.
44 Ibid., 149.
rian with the Soul who finds an answer in "Transfiguration."
There are two kinds of evidence which can be cited.
First, the "Head" and "Heart" distinction is used to refute
the "Way of Detachment." We know from later discussion that
Toynbee is concerned as an historian to yoke together the
Heart and the Head "in a common enterprise of striving to
reach and grasp this hidden treasure [a unitary truth]." 45
In the final paragraph of chapter ten concerning Detachment
as a way of life he argues that Detachment is no solution to
the Soul. 11
. . . for in consulting only the head and
ignoring the heart it is arbitrarily putting asunder what God
has joined together." 46 The way of Detachment is linked with
the philosophers or the rationalists as distinct from the
saints and the men of faith. Furthermore the way of the
Head, or intellect, must be superseded by the way of the
Heart:. In concrete terms, "therefore the philosophy of
Detachment has to be eclipsed by the mystery of Transfigura-
tion. The Hinayana makes way for the Mahayana, Stoicism for
Christianity, the Arhat for the Bodhisattva, the sage for the
saint." 47
Second, the pronoun "we" is used to emphasize a sense
45 Ibid
. ,
VII, 505.
46 Ibid.
,
VI, 148.
47Ibid.
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of being personally involved. The passage on "Transfigura-
tion" begins with the usual phraseology of the student of
history who is examining certain phenomena of the past. As
in earlier cases the "we" has the sense of an observer;
We have found that the experience of being
constrained to live in the adverse social
environment of a disintegrating civilization
confronts the Soul with a spiritual prob-
lem. ... 48
So he continues to discuss the "Soul" in the light of an
historical observer until the second paragraph where he sud-
denly switches the "we" from a formal, stylistic usage to a
participant in this search for escape.
As we gird up our loins to take this fourth and
last turning a clamour of disapproving and deri-
sive voices assails our ears. Shall we allow
ourselves to be intimidated by this chorus of
protest? Shall we abandon at this point a course
of exploration which has hitherto proved so disap-
pointing as it has been laborious? It is tempting
to yield to the promptings of weariness and disil-
lusionment. Yet, before we do give in, it may be
well to consider whether we really wish to resign
ourselves to remaining imprisoned in a city of
destruction— like rats in a trap--so long as there
is still one possible egress left untried. . . .
When we look the hostile chorus in the face we see
before us nothing more formidable than the sullen
countenances of the baffled philosophers., . . «
The tie that connects the Soul in a collapsing soci-
ety with the historian hampered by a disintegrating methodol
ogy is a common search; the "Soul" is searching for the
48
Ibid., 149.
49 Ibid.
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lasting value, and the historian is searching for the abso-
lute behind the relativity of events. Keeping in mind the
initial passage of Toynbee in Volume One as to his search for
the "abiding form" behind the "shimmer of relativity/' notice
the similar way in which he describes the "Soul" in a disin-
tegrating society.
The painful perturbing dissolution of familiar
forms, which suggests to weaker spirits that the
ultimate reality is nothing but a chaos, may
reveal to a steadier and more penetrating spiri-
tual vision the truth that the flickering film
of a phenomenal world
. • • is an illusion which
cannot for ever obscure the lasting unity that
lies behind. ^0
The same identification of the historian and the
"Soul" is indicated in a later passage in which Toynbee
describes the self-transcendence of the futurist. The "Soul"
that turns to futurism as a way of escape from a disintegrat-
ing society will be disappointed, but in his disappointment
he might stumble upon the way of transcendence.
Through the disappointment of a mundane hope we
have been admitted to an apocalypse or discovery
of a reality which has been there all the time
behind the scenes of the narrow man-made stage
that has hitherto set the limits of our field of
vision and of action. ^
The significance of this passage rests upon the attached
footnote in which he spells out the direct relationship
0
between the Soul and the contemporary historian: "The quest
50 Ibid.
Ibid., 129.
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that originally led us into this Study was the hope of seeing
through the 'shimmer of relativity in the foreground of his-
torical thought.'" 52
Further evidence that chapter eleven on "Transfigura-
tion" focuses for us Toynbee 8 s methodological problem as well
as the problem of the Soul in a foundering society may be
found in a figure of speech common to both problems.
The figure of speech is that of a man who gains a
mountaintop view of the surrounding countryside. In this
context the overall view can be gained either by means of
flying in an airplane or climbing a mountain. The figure of
speech is applied to the Soul in a splintering society as a
situation in which he must escape the familiar collapsing
forms in order to see the larger whole. Toynbee frequently
uses the same figure of speech to describe the work of the
historian. For example he acknowledges the contribution of
Augustine to a supra-mundane range of vision. 53 The fre-
quency of appearance of this metaphor as a description of the
historian's task has been noted in an earlier section of our
discussion
.
If it is true, that Toynbee identifies his role of
an historian in a methodological dilemma with the predicament
52 Ibid. , n. 1.
53Ibid.
,
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of the Soul in a disintegrating society, then this section
sheds light on the methodological shift in the Study as well
as the shift in Toynbee from history to history of religion.
Of the. whole crucial chapter on "Transfiguration" the key
passage is the one in which Toynbee asserts:
To know Him—and, through Him, the Kingdom over
which He reigns— it is not enough for our yokel
in his airplane to see the world with the eye of
a hawk
.
We will break the quotation at this point to interject the
argument that this was precisely what Toynbee originally
hoped was possible— to find a large enough field of study,
the intelligible unit of civilization, to make parochialism
impossible
The man must be given an eye which not only
magnifies but also penetrates into other
dimensions. What he needs is the eye of the
poet, „ . .
Again one might observe that if Toynbee had stopped
at this point he would still be within the framework of his
original plan because he has earlier argued that a poet's
contribution to the historian's search can be valuable. The
poet has an insight that can be translated into the language
and work of the empirical historian. Now Toynbee adds a fur-
ther qualification:
And the poet who has this vision of the trans-
figuration of This World by the Kingdom of God
must also be something of a prophet, for he must
have an intuition of the Godhead which poetry
alone cannot give him. The act of Transfiguration
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is a mystery because it is an act of God and an
effect of God's presence--and this is a truth
which has been less obscure to the Jewish
futurist than to the Greek philosopher. 54
Far from being an isolated reference, the same chap-
ter contains a similar conclusion. In this case Toynbee is
attempting to describe the Civitas Dei . The point of inter-
est for our methodological analysis is the use of the phrase
"a supra-mundane spiritual dimension." This is the old "cul-
tural plane" of Volume One on which Toynbee hoped to find an
"abiding form" as distinct from the "shimmer of relativity."
Gradually, as we observed earlier, the cultural plane became
a "spiritual dimension." Now it is a "supra-mundane spiri-
tual dimension."
As far as this Civitas Dei enters into the Time-
dimension at all, it is not a mere dream of the
future but is a spiritual reality which is at
all times present in This World besides existing
—
and, indeed, just because it exists— as well in an
Eternity and an Infinity that are in a supra-mun-
dane spiritual dimension. 5
Put in relation to a question posed by Toynbee in
chapter one of Volume One where he asks if it is possible to
ascertain "the presence of some constant and absolute object
of historical thought," 5 *' the answer of Volume Six is that
this "constant and absolute object" is the Civitas Dei . How
54 Ibid
. ,
VI, 161.
55Ibid
.
, 156.
56 Ibid.
,
I, 16.
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the historian knows about this Civitas Dei is the vital ques-
tion for other historians. Toynbee
' s answer is that this
"problem may be intractable to attempts to solve it in terms
5 7of logic." In a footnote he compares our knowledge of the
Civitas Dei to the "rending of a veil in order to bring into
view a hitherto invisible kingdom that has been in existence
in the background all the time and has merely been awaiting
the hour appointed for its revelation." 58
Although there is considerable diversity among the
critics as to Toynbee 1 s relation to Christianity, and a
noticeable variation in Toynbee 9 s own convictions about
Christianity
,
we can observe in a preliminary way that Volume
Six contains his closest affirmation of a "Christian" view of
history. Espousals of Christianity climax this long argument
on the Soul in a disintegrating civilization
:
The member of a disintegrating mundane society
who has taken this road has a surer hope, and
therefore a deeper happiness, than the merely
once-born member of a mundane society that is
still in growth ; for he has learnt the saving
truths that 'the Most High hath not made one
world, but two, 1 and that the human wayfarer
who still finds himself a sojourner in This
World is not on that account beyond the pale of
the Other World but is travelling all the time
within the domain of the Kingdom of God and is
at liberty to live as a citizen of this omni-
present commonwealth here and now, if he is
willing with all his heart to pay allegiance to
57 Ibid
. ,
VI, 157o
58 Ibid.
,
156, n. 4.
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Christ the King and to take upon himself those
obligations of citizenship which Christ has
consecrated by voluntarily fulfilling them in
person. This entry into the Kingdom of God is
a second birth. 59
Effects of This Turning Point in the Study
It would clarify the significance of this turning
point to examine how critics of Toynbee have ignored changes
in his views. Some of their wholesale attacks apply either
to the early empirical, or the later religious Toynbee, but
not to both. It is usually claimed that Toynbee deliber-
ately abandons the Enlightenment criteria of empirical rea-
son.
The clearest spokesman for the charge of antiration-
alism is probably Karl Popper. He includes Toynbee "s work in
his study of The Open Society and Its Enemies . Popper care-
fully conditions his attack when he sayss "I wish to make it
clear that I consider this a most remarkable and interesting
book, and that I have chosen it because of its superiority to
all other contemporary irrationalist and historicist works I
know of." 60
The criticisms of Popper are directed toward the his-
toricist attitude in Toynbee 's Study , i.e., "the fashion of
59Ibid
.
, 168.
60Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies
(rev. ed. ; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950)
,
p. 435.
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not taking arguments seriously
. . . the attitude of looking
at once for the unconscious motives and determinants in the
social habitat of the thinker, instead of first examining the
general situation in the Study in the following way.
Thus I think that we have every right to make
the socioanalytical diagnosis that Toynbee 1 s
neglect to take serious arguments seriously is
representative of a twentieth century intellec-
tualism which expresses its disillusionment, or
even despair, of reason, and of a rational solu-
tion of our social problems, by an escape into a
religious mysticism. 6
Again stressing the change in Toynbee
,
Popper summarizes his
description of the Study thus:
A social science which cannot quite meet these
demands is therefore inclined to defend itself
by producing elaborate attacks upon the appli-
cability of science to such problems. Summing
up my historioanalytical diagnosis, I venture
to suggest that Toynbee 1 s historicism is an
apologetic antirationalism, born out of despair
in reason, and trying to escape into thg^past,
as well as into prophecy of the future.
Of course Popper is not alone in the criticism of Toynbee 8 s
antirationalism. Renier remarks that: "I dislike Toynbee*
s
method, because it dwells in the sphere of myth and allegory,
outside rationality, and because the intense loyalties he
validity of the argument itself. 61 Popper describes the
61 Ibid p. 436.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 440
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inspires are equally innocent of rationality." 64
A critic in the "London Times" argues that "in
another section there are some pertinent criticisms of the
antinomianism of modern historians; nevertheless r Dr. Toynbee
feels, the laws of history may be transcended in the f Law of
God which is perfect Freedom, ' thus turning a moral insight
into an epistemological principle which makes all reasoning
impossible .
"
A. J. P. Taylor in "The New Statesman and Nation" of
October, 1954 , makes a rather passionate attack on the irra-
tionalism of Toynbee. After quoting Toynbee 1 s intuition
about the superiority of higher religions over civilizations
as the vehicle for helping human beings make their pilgrim's
progress
,
Taylor retorts: "The echo from Bunyan is not acci-
dental. These monstrous volumes with their parade of learn-
ing are a repudiation of Rationalism."*^ In the same vein as
Taylor, Christopher Hill berates Toynbee as a betrayer of
rationalism.
Nevertheless, after all is said, A Study of
History can only be described as a very sad
book. It is sad because its final aim is to
lead us to a conscious and deliberate irra-
tionalism.
6 4Renier, History
,
pp. 215-219.
65Ibid
. , p. 117.
66Christopher Hill, "Time and Mr. Toynbee," Modern
Quarterly , II (n.d.), 291.
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Mr. Hill is not content to identify a general trend toward
religion in the Study but specifies the personal goal of
Toynbee in a rather dramatic fashion when he writes that
Toynbee "turns back in fear and horror when he perceives
where his own assumptions are leading his argument; and he
ends on his knees praying for a miracle. He has written him-
self into the Roman Catholic Church. . . . 1,67
These charges of irrationalism or antirationalism
have much in common with a series of criticisms which come
from several Dutch scholars. Verbally, the criticisms of
Geyl and Baudet appear to be quite unrelated to the "anti-
rationalist" charges , but actually both schools of critics
agree on the distorting effect of a Toynbee who has passed
this point under discussion in his methodological develop-
ment .
We have seen Toynbee ' s crucial decision to turn to
the spiritual dimension for his clue to history; or, as he
expresses it, to pay allegiance with all his heart to Christ
the King in order to gain a revelation of the "abiding
forms." This move has been interpreted as an escape mecha-
nism, or "despair in reason" by the rationalists. Obviously
the implication is that this escape into irrationalism leads
the historian to a distortion of history. Geyl and Baudet
67Ibid.
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begin with a discussion of the "vision" and argue that this
"compelling vision" is the distorting factor in Toynbee 1 s
Study
,
Geyl argues
:
But when a man comes to the past with a compelling
vision, a principle, or dogma, or such magnitude
and emotional potency as Toynbee
' s unity in the
love of God; with a system which causes him to
reduce the multitudinous movement of history to
one single criterion, rejecting most of them, and
incidentally his own, as unimportant; that man can
write a work full of color and striking theories,
. • .
but no history.
. . . The Student of History,
as Toynbee calls himself, may know more of history
than I shall gyer do, but he is no historian. He
is a prophet.
Baudet has a similar criticism. Describing the Study
as a theodicy and accounting Augustine as the chief contribu-
tor to Toynbee , Baudet observes
:
'Primary vision, 1 that is the original basic
thought, the idea with which Toynbee commenced
writing his book. One always begins with an
idea , a brain-wave . Many have criticized Toyn-
bee ' s primary vision as a theoretical ? a priori
.
1
Certainly , it is that, too. But is such an 1 a
priori 1 not a self-evident and inevitable basis
of theoretical thought ; a compelling necessity?
That is also the opinion of Romein, who has even
referred to the famous 'a priori* of Gibbon in
order to demonstrate that vision simply originates
in such a way.^9
uoGeyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," 269.
69"
i
p
r ima ire visie ? , dat is de oorspronkeli jke kern-
dedachte , de idee , waarmee Toynbee begonnen is zi jn boek te
schrijven. Men begint altijd met een idee, een inval. Vele
hebben Toynbee zi jn primaire visie theoretisch verweten als
,
f a priori' . Zeker dat is zij ook. Maar is 1 denktheoretisch
'
zulk een 'a priori 8 niet een vanzelf sprekend en onvermi jdeli jk
fundament; een dwingende noodzakeli jkheid? Dat is ook de
meening van Romain, die nog op het beroemde 'a priori' van
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If these two groups of criticisms are to have any
direct relevancy to Toynbee's work they must address them-
selves to this crucial point in the Study
. The temptation is
strong to digress from the study of Toynbee's methodology in
order to line up the two sides in the argument on a rational-
irrational axis. This could easily degenerate into a fruit-
less exchange of epithets, or a stalemate of mutually immov-
able faiths. Another temptation would be to follow Geyl on
this endless merry-go-round of whether or not Toynbee is an
historian. The question may be legitimate, and has certainly
been a bone of contention among the friendly and unfriendly
critics, but again it sheds very little light on the present
study of Toynbee's methodology. It would seem rather impor-
tant, on the other hand, to press the question at this par-
ticular place, of whether or not Toynbee's affirmation of
faith in a spiritual dimension has any effect on his histori-
cal views. It is important to ascertain the nature and
extent of this methodological turning point in the Study .
The two groups of critics tend to emphasize the radical
change in Toynbee. The rationalist critics in their general
criticism of Toynbee argue that this act of transfiguration
Gibbon heeft gewezen om te betoogen, dat nu eenmaal visie op
zulk een wijze ontstaat." H. Baudet, "Een beschowwing over
de beteeknis van het werk van A. J. Toynbee in het verband
van zign tijd cultuurkring, " Historie en Metahistorie (Lei-
den)
, (1952) , 46.
represents a break in methodology, or escape from reason or a
despair of finding a rational solution of our social prob-
lems. Geyl and Baudet also emphasize a breech in the method-
ology caused by this introduction of an "a priori" or
"vision. 11
Toynbee and his publishers emphasize in contradis-
tinction to these critics, the continuity of the historian's
methodology. This concern to couch changes in the Study in
terms of an expanded program rather than a repudiation of an
original program is interestingly expressed by the publishers
on the jacket of Volume Seven. This volume is the first in
the concluding batch of volumes of the Study , and appeared in
1954, fifteen years after Volume Six had been published. On
the jacket is the explanation:
In the course of the thirty-three years separating
the conception and the completion of an undertaking
on a scale comparable with Gibbon 1 s , Dr . Toynbee 1 s
outlook has inevitably undergone changes which have
vitally affected the trend of his great work. The
most significant of these changes
,
concerning his
estimate of the role of Religion in History , has
led him beyond the limits of his original purpose,
though without disrupting the basic plan .
™
This explanatory remark reflects Toynbee • s analysis
in the preface to Volume Seven where he speaks of recasting
his original notes . To express the continuity of this last
batch of volumes with the earlier ones he puts the descrip-
/uToynbee, A Study of History , Vol. VII, on the dust
jacket.
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tion in quantitative terms.
In the outcome, the original plan of the book
still stood and the execution of Parts VI, VIII
X, and XIII was carried out more or less on the'
lines of the original notes. The subjects of
Parts VII, IX, and XII, on the other hand, came,
in the event, to be treated very differently from
the original design— and the subject of Part XI,
in particular, so differently that the title of'
this Part had to be changed from 'Rhythms in the
Histories of Civilizations' to 'Law and Freedom
in History. '
Put in this way the reader might well say that the
changes are certainly minor if but one out of eight parts has
had to be changed in a minor sense. But this is very mis-
leading. Part XI was not simply one part in a series of
essays, but was to be the climax of the whole scientific
study. Looking back to Volume One where the plan of the
whole Study is outlined, and comparing this plan on page V
with the first chapter, it is obvious that Part XI would
harvest the careful, empirical researches of the first ten
parts. The problem, Toynbee argues, is to escape the distor-
tions of past historians who were subject to the relativisms
of time and social environment by discovering an intelligible
unit of study and by proceeding empirically. The second step
in the operation is to put these civilizations through their
paces in a comparative study in order to find the uniformi-
ties of behavior. Under this plan Parts II through X are to
be viewed as putting the civilizations through their paces.
So the "Plan of the Book" logically proceeds with such ques-
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tions as genesis, growth, breakdown and debris of civiliza-
tion in order to complete the study and to isolate the link
between these civilizations. All of this work, important as
it might be, is nevertheless preliminary to Part XI where the
results of the investigation would be set out as uniformi-
ties, or laws, or the "lineaments of an abiding form" behind
the "shimmer of relativity." That this is a fair analysis of
Toynbee's initial purpose may be seen in Part XII. Here
Toynbee proposed to deal with the "Prospects of the Western
Civilization." The whole point of including a section on the
"Prospects of the Western Civilization" depended upon his
finding empirically verifiable rhythms or laws by the time he
reached Part XI. Further evidence that the initially hopeful
plan broke down somewhere along the line is the apparent
reluctance of Toynbee to enter into Part XII when he finally
reached that topic on November 30, 19 50.
As he took up his pen to write the present Part
of this book, the writer was conscious of a sense
of distaste for this self-imposed task which was
due to something more than a natural shrinking
from the obvious hazards of a speculative subject.
When Toynbee goes on to analyze his 'sense of dis-
taste" he advances a reason for it which he cannot seriously
hope to maintain. While it may appear to be a reason, in the
light of Toynbee's earlier writing it can only be interpreted
71Ibid.
,
IX, 406.
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as a rationalization.
Why was it, then, that, so far from diminishing,
his distaste had been increasing steadily in the
meantime? The answer to this question was not
obscure to the writer himself. The reason was
that this growing disinclination of his had in
fact little or nothing to do with the difficulty
of estimating the Western Civilization's pros-
pects, but was rooted in a reluctance to throw
overboard one of the cardinal principles govern-
ing the writer's whole approach to this study of
History. He was distressed by a fear that, if he
allowed himself to single out any one civilization
for special treatment, he might be abandoning a
standpoint from which alone it was, in his belief,
possible to see in true perspective the whole his-
tory of a species of Society of which the Western
Civilization was one, but only one, representative.^
Toynbee tries to explain his distaste on the basis of
a "cardinal principle" that he ought not to single out any
one civilization for special treatment. Two considerations
immediately suggest themselves to the reader of the passage.
First, why did Toynbee promise the reader in his original
plan to treat "The Prospects of the Western Civilization,"
(Part XII in The Plan of the Book, Volume One) if it were
contrary to a "cardinal principle" of the study? To demon-
strate that this original intention was not simply a youthful
and temporary ideal, Toynbee repeats his plan to include a
study of "The Prospects of the Western Civilization" in the
second batch of volumes (preface to Volume Four) and in the
preface to the last batch of volumes (Volume Seven) . Fur-
Ibid. , 410
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thermore he argues in Volume Seven that, "the prospects of a
contemporary Western Civilization . . . had become clearer
and graver
. . .
"
73 It cannot be argued by Toynbee that
this matter of "singling out" the West is the violation of a
cardinal principle.
The second consideration that makes this violation of
a "cardinal principle" a specious argument is the fact that
Toynbee has repeatedly singled out the West in his earlier
volumes for unusually full treatment without expressing
reluctance. In these earlier cases the plea is always to the
effect that the West is still living, in contrast to the dead
civilizations of the past.
Toynbee" s reluctance to discuss the prospects of
Western Civilization is based on a disillusionment with his
original methodology and the results that this method seemed
to promise. If his original plan had been successful and the
"abiding form" had emerged from the "shimmer of relativity,"
then he would have been armed with empirically verified law
with which to analyze the prospects of the West. Now, how-
ever, the results of his study are valid only for the one who
has been through the act of transfiguration and can see his-
tory through this vision. Needless to say, those 'captious
critics 1 help to make the task even more disagreeable.
73 Ibid., VII, Preface vii.
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Before leaving the matter of Toynbee
' s reluctance to
write Part XII, let us point out a second major considera-
tion. Not only is his reluctance psychological and arises
from an apparent failure to reach the desired certainty, but
his reluctance is rooted in the fact that Part XII is now
quite superfluous. As long as Toynbee could proceed under
the assumption that civilizations were the intelligible unit
of study, and that the future of mankind was bound up with
man-in-the-process-of-civilization, then it was quite logical
and imperative that something be said about the prospects of
Western Civilization. But after the great change in Toynbee,
it is obvious that the Western Civilization has nothing in
prospect. Through Volume Four the question of the future of
the West was a very live issue. For example Toynbee rejoices
in the fact that the cyclic version of predestination is not
a legitimate inference from historical data and that "This is
a message of encouragement for us children of the Western
Civilization as we drift today alone , on the 'wide sea' of
human history, with none but dead or stricken civilizations
around us,"^ Toynbee argues that the West has the live
option of discarding war either by agreement or by a knock-
out blow. In the context of the passage he lapses into the
role of a warning or imploring prophet, and the point is
clearly made that the Western Civilization has to choose
74 Ibid., IV, 38.
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peaceful means in order "to reprieve mankind from the doom of
physical extermination." 75 m the same volume Toynbee empha-
sizes the importance of treating the prospects of Western
Civilization when he contrasts our position with the hopeless
ness of the Hellenes; "... for them the whole game is
over, for good and for ill, while for us, whose civilization
is still 'a going concern', the crucial part of this game is
probably still to play." 76
Now, however, following the major reorientation of
Volume Six, the need no longer exists for discussing the
prospects of Western Civilization. Man's future is tied to
the development of the Kingdom of God, and Western Civiliza-
tion is "only a vain repetition of the heathen." 77 Toynbee
argues
:
In this perspective the civilizations of the
first and second generations might justify
their existence, but those of the third genera-
tion would cut a disconcertingly poor figure.
If civilizations were the handmaids of Religion,
and if the Hellenic Civilization had served as a
good handmaid to Christianity by bringing this
higher religion to birth before that civiliza-
tion had finally fallen to pieces, then the
civilizations of the third generation would
appear to be 'vain repetitions' of the heathen. 78
75 Ibid
.
, 180.
76 Ibid
.
, 317.
77Ibid
. ,
VII, 445.
78Ibid., 444.
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In the same vein, Toynbee regards Western post-Chris-
tian secular civilization as at best a superfluous repetition
of the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization, and at worse "a
pernicious backsliding from the path of spiritual prog-
ress." To one who worried through the first six volumes
with Toynbee in the hope that some plan might be devised to
renew a faltering Western Civilization, his casual dismissal
of Western Civilization in Volume Seven involves a radical
psychological reorientation. At most in Toynbee «s new view,
the West can have a negative role that it might "inadver-
tently perform." This would be the task of "unintentionally
providing" a meeting ground for higher religions, and of
serving as a demonstration of a peculiarly vicious idolatry
—
man's corporate worship of himself. 80 It is not by accident
that Toynbee concludes this section with the statement, "as
for the civilizations of the third generation, they are now
right out of the picture." On the basis of this new view of
history, it is clear why Toynbee would be exceedingly reluc-
tant to discuss the "Prospects of Western Civilization."
The situation becomes even more difficult for a dis-
cussion of the "Prospects" as Toynbee continues in Volume
Seven. This changed view of history which grows out of
7
9
Ibid. , 445.
80 Ibid.
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Toynbee 's methodological turning point in Volume Six, has
increasingly radical implications for Toynbee
' s original view
as he begins to press it into service. For example, there is
a forced change in the categories of civilization. The old
"Western Civilization" which Toynbee once treasured, is now
divided without explanation into two entities, a "Medieval
Western Respublica Christiana " and a Modern Western secular
civilization. Notice that this clever distinction allows for
an amazing change in the discussion of the origin and growth
of the Western Civilization. This Western Civilization had
been described as an "intelligible field of Study" 81 and had
been worked out empirically in Volume One. 82 Although Toyn-
bee was not specific as to the date of its birth, he indi-
cated that it was in the neighborhood of 1200 years ago:
o . . since the time, now more than twelve hun-
dred years ago, when our Western Christendom was
born, --a feeble infant from the Church's womb. 83
When this early conclusion is placed alongside of a
Volume Seven conclusion on the same subject, the contrast is
striking:
It will be seen that the monstrous birth of a
Modern Western secular civilization from the
womb of a Medieval Western Respublica Chris -
tiana,
. . . was made practicable by the
81Ibid
. , 1, 51.
82 Ibid
. , 147.
83Ibid., V, 190.
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renaissance of the Hellenic institution of theabsolute' state in which Religion had been adepartment of Politics. 84
In the following paragraph he speaks of the civiliza-
tions of the third generation as an "unhappy delivery."
Hence if we have correctly represented Toynbee
' s position
regarding "Western Civilization/' as a "vain repetition/' as
a "monstrous birth/' and as "now right out of the picture/'
his reluctance to discuss "The Prospects of Western Civiliza-
tion" is quite understandable.
Once it is seen that Toynbee the student-of-lif
e
plays the dominant role after Volume Six and that Toynbee the
social scientist steadily loses ground, the series of contra-
dictory descriptions in the later volumes emerge as Toynbee
attempts to carry out the implications of his new position
while attempting to preserve the results of his earlier
investigations. We have argued above that this change should
have brought about a radical readjustment in the "Plan of the
Book" but that Toynbee attempted to complete his original
plan even though he himself had cut the foundation out from
under the plan to write on "The Prospects of Western Civili-
zation." We further argued that the tension which built up
as the Study approached Part XII, Toynbee explained away by
an appeal to a "cardinal principle."
84 Ibid.
,
VII, 539.
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The attempt to preserve the results of Toynbee
' s bold
plan for empirically establishing "intelligible fields of
study," putting these units through their paces, and then
jotting down the rhythms or uniformities, is found in several
places in the later volumes. One example is found in Volume
Eight under the heading "An Expansion of the Field of Study."
Here the implication is that the Study has gone somewhat
beyond its original intention but that the expansion is
merely supplemental. The problem for Toynbee is to salvage
as much as possible of the original position of "intelligible
fields of study." This is no mean task in the light of the
new view that civilizations are meaningful only in the meas-
ure that they contribute to the progress of higher religions.
Nevertheless, Toynbee makes the attempt when he sayss
Actually we have found that a civilization can
be studied intelligibly in isolation so long as
we are considering its genesis, its growth, or
its breakdown. Indeed, the historical evidence
that has presented itself in our empirical sur-
vey of breakdowns has seemed to warrant the con-
clusion that the breakdown of a civilization is
invariably due to some inward failure of self-
determination and never due to blows delivered
by external agencies. ®^
But even this hope of salvaging something from the
detailed investigation of the first five volumes by limiting
the empirical survey of civilizations to their "genesis,
growth, or breakdown" is open to challenge. As we have seen
85 Ibid.
,
VIII, 87.
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in the preceding argument, Toynbee was forced to reconstruct
the genesis of Western Civilization. As late as Volume Five,
Western Civilization was described as being born from the
womb of the church in the time of Gregory the Great. But in
Volume Seven the once "intelligible field of study" known as
Western Civilization has somehow been divided into an unde-
fined Medieval Respublica Christiana and a Modern Western
secular civilization which comes to "monstrous birth" out of
the mistakes and sins of the Medieval Western Church. Per-
haps the most disconcerting feature of this major change in
the treatment of Western Civilization is to notice Toynbee
'
s
repeated argument that this new thesis is validated by one
test case. In the light of the careful marshalling of cases
in the early volumes in order to establish uniformities it
is surprising to read, in Volume Seven,
If we take, as a test case for the verification
of this thesis, the eruption of a Modern Western
secular civilization out of a Medieval Western
Respublica Christiana
, ...
86
And in the same chapter,
If we take, as a test case for the verification
of this thesis, the genesis of the Christian
Church
. . .
It is difficult to see what Toynbee could have in
mind when he speaks of one case as verification for a thesis.
Earlier Toynbee had objected to Spengler's laws on the basis
86 Ibid., VII, 534.
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that they were induced from a "handful of facts," and that
Spengler employed a simile in order to mask "the inadequacy
of the evidential basis." 87 Toynbee
' s conclusions had always
been prefaced with the call, "Let us test, by making a sur-
vey, whether the phenomena which have thus presented them-
selves in a single case are unique and therefore of little
account or regular and therefore significant." 88 m Volume
Five a single case was "of little account"; now in Volume
Seven one test case somehow is supposed to verify a thesis.
In this exploration of the implications of Toynbee 's
methodological shift in Volume Six we have brought to light
the radical changes in the plan of the book, the forced
re-classification of Western Civilization, a complete re-ori-
entation of the prospects of the West and a sharply different
use of evidence. Because the Study is so lengthy and
detailed, many readers and reviewers simply glide over obser-
vations in the later volumes which do not harmonize with
their memory of observations made in the early volumes. One
such set of observations or "findings" we should like to con-
sider in this section on Toynbee the "student of Life,"
because it illustrates the view that a fundamental change has
taken place in Volume Six and that the findings of the his-
87Ibid
.
,
IV, 11.
88Ibid., V, 83.
287
torian in the second part often do not supplement or comple-
ment the earlier empirical findings, but rather contradict
them. The "findings" under discussion concern the relation-
ship between civilizations as propounded specifically in
Volumes Five and Eight.
The first picture developed by Toynbee is the domi-
nant scheme of the first five volumes. It is a view of
civilizations which attempts to escape the egocentric illu-
sion by means of a comparative study. In this comparative
study Toynbee hopes to avoid the question of value by the
assertion that these "civilizations are separate representa-
tives of a particular species of societies which are all
philosophically contemporary with one another and philosophi-
cally equal to one another in value." 89 Toynbee rejoices
that the old "magic bean-stalk" view of civilization with all
of its egocentrism and provincialism can be discarded in
favor of the "true image" of evolution as it has come to be
conceived by our Western botanists and zoologists. 90 This
image of the "pollarded willow" promises a way of escape from
the egocentric illusion and the relativism of "our Western
historians/' and Toynbee clearly states that "we have already
attempted to transpose it into terms of human history."
89 Ibid.
,
I, 178
90 Ibid. 168.
91Ibid. 169.
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Because we will refer to this image of the "pollarded willow"
on a number of occasions, let us notice its details in Toyn-
bee's own words.
The workaday willow, like the magic bean-stalk,
starts its growth perpendicularly in a singleline; but, before it has time to grow top-heavy
a man comes along with an axe and pollards itshead. will the tree die of the shock, orwill it adapt its manner of growth to the new
conditions that have been imposed on it from
outside? Possessing the will to live, the tree
chooses the latter alternative; and from its
mutilated summit it now puts forth half a dozen
shoots instead of one and sends those up in alldirections,
. . .
Each of these shoots attempts,in its own growth, to overcome the effects of theblow which the trunk has received and to carry
the life of the tree forward one stage farther. 92
When this image is applied to the history of civili-
zations it produces the standard picture we have come to
recognize in the first five volumes of the Study .
We have suggested that the histories of indivi-
duals and communities and societies fall into
successive chapters, in each of which a number
of representatives of which ever the species may
be are confronted by some identical challenge
which imposes an ordeal. Under each of these
common ordeals the parties react in different
ways. The majority succumb outright; some just
manage to survive
. . . ; others discover a
response to the challenge which is so satisfac-
tory that it not only carries them through the
ordeal of the moment but puts them in a favorable
posture for undergoing the next; others, again,
follow these path-finders as sheep follow their
leader into a gap which he has forced through a
hedge
.
9J
92 Ibid., 168
93 Ibid., 169.
Toynbee adds that "we shall be guided by this conception
throughout our Study .
"
Upon such a master-plan Toynbee develops elaborate
views on the relation of the creative minority to the other
members of the society. it harmonizes rather well with his
views about peaceful encounters and creative inspiration.
Indeed a number of passages rather lyrically describe the
results of a successful response on the part of a creative
minority.
For those who do not catch the inspiration intheir souls,
_
"like a light caught from a leapingflame
,
are induced to conform externally by the
enlistment of their faculty of mimesis. 94
Our interest is now narrowed to the results of this creative
response on peoples outside the growing society. The meta-
phor of light is employed to describe the results when Toyn-
bee affirms that
When this light strikes the walls it is not
arrested there, for the walls of a growing
civilization are walls of glass in a city that
is set on a hill and that cannot be hid. The
light streams out and on to shine before
men;
. . .
"
A further description of the effects of a growing
civilization speaks of the radiating civilization's value as
"a means of self-education for the party by whom the act of
94 Ibid
. , 196.
95 Ibid., V, 196.
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mimesis is performed, and as a tribute of admiration and
token of friendship for the party towards whom the mimesis i
directed .
"
Mimesis is evoked by charm; and we can now seethat the charm which is exercised, durinq thegrowth of a civilization, by a succession ofcreative minorities preserves the house not onlyfrom being divided against itself but also frombeing attacked by its neighbors
— in so far, atleast, as these neighbors happen to be societies
of the primitive species. 96
Toynbee describes this situation of "accepting and transmit-
ting" the radiation of a growing civilization as "the normal
relation between a civilization and the primitive societies
round about ..." when a civilization falls into collapse
it "ceases to be a whole on which other societies can model
themselves, or decline to model themselves, consistently and
integrally." 97 The tragedy of a disintegrating society is
carefully assessed;
In fact, while a disintegrating society surpasses
a growing society in its radiation on one, or
even two, of the three social planes, it simulta-
neously falls behind it on one plane at least:
and, if we now substitute qualitative for quanti-
tative standards of measurement, we shall be left
in no doubt that the net result is a moral loss
and not a moral gain. 98
In brief, this development is described by Toynbee as a "dis-
astrous miscarriage.' 11
96 Ibid .
, 198.
97Ibid
.
, 199.
98 Ibid., 200.
When we turn from this analysis of Volume Five to the
discussion in Volume Eight on the same problem of the rela-
tion between societies, quite a different situation is
described. The "findings" no longer follow the pattern of
the "pollarded willow"; the assumption of the philosophic
equality of the civilizations has been dropped, and the whole
pursuit of "civilization" as an intelligible field of study
has lost its meaning. Clearly the old tension between Toyn-
bee the "student of Life" and Toynbee the Social Scientist
has turned in favor of the "student of Life." Under these
circumstances a survey yields these conclusions:
In the field of encounters between contemporaries
in which both parties are societies of the species
that we have labelled 'civilizations', and even in
the wider field in which the 'agent's' role is
played by a primitive or semi-primitive society,
an Orpheus captivating all fellow creatures within
earshot by the enchanting harmony of his heavenly
music is a rare figure by comparison with a Char-
lemagne forcibly baptizing the captives of his bow
and spear or an Awrangzib morally alienating
intended victims who have proved more than a match
for him on the battlefield. The rule at which we
thus arrive inductively proves to be that normally
an encounter between contemporaries is culturally
sterile even when one party, and a fortiori when
either party, is in a healthy state of cultural
integration; and the historic evidence likewise
bears out the converse 'law' that a state of cul-
tural disintegration is favourable to cultural
intercourse, and most favourable of all when it is
the state of both parties to the encounter and when
on both sides it has gone to extremes.^
We have then two "normal" situations. The first
"ibid.
,
VIII, 507
"normal" situation as discussed in Volume Five rests on the
moral gain, the self
-education
, the tribute of admiration,
and the preservation from attack which ensues when a growing
civilization allows its light to stream out through walls of
glass to the "boundless field in which there is nothing to
limit their range except the inherent limitations of their
own carrying power." 100 in the second "normal" situation we
have the rule that encounters between contemporaries are
"culturally sterile." Stated in its most extreme form the
second "normal" situation reads;
The intrusion of any alien cultural element into
the life of any society, in whatever state of
life it may happen to be at the time, is mani-
festly a dangerously disruptive, and therefore a
painfully harassing, experience.
. .
,
Briefly stated, the "findings" in the first instance
support the early view of Toynbee that in a growing and
healthy civilization progress is possible through creative
leadership and the radiation of a healthy and integrated cul-
ture. In the second instance the "findings" point to the
opposite conclusion that the normal relationship between
societies is "culturally sterile," and proves to be "danger-
ously disruptive" to the passive society. It ought to be
pointed out that the master-plan of the second half of the
100 Ibid., V, 196.
101 Ibid.
,
VIII, 509.
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Study_ sees no creative possibilities in "civilizations," for
these civilizations are not the "path-finders" who lead the
other sheep "into a gap which he [path-finder] has forced
through a hedge." 102 The master.plan of the second half q£
the Study_ sees the real or "spiritual significance" in the
relationship between societies. This relationship must be
that of "encounters" from which a new creation springs.
At the time of writing, half-way through the
twentieth century of the Christian era, Chris-
tianity and the Mahayana were the two greatliving witnesses to the spiritual significance
of the social phenomenon of encounter between
civilizations.
. . . Humanly speaking, it was
a creative response to the challenge of one of
these encounters that had brouaht to birth
Christianity and the Mahayana and Islam and
Hinduism. 1U
J
One more task remains to be done in this section on
Toynbee as "student of Life." We have traced the growth of
this role in the Study as a means of identifying the methodo-
logical struggle. Our argument thus far has been that Toyn-
bee looked to the elan motif in order to supersede the paro-
chialism and subjectivism into which contemporary historiog-
raphy had been betrayed. To gain a whole view of Life was an
important complementary feature to the effort to induce laws
of history from the empirical study of civilizations. This
meant, as we have seen, the introduction of mythological and
102 Ibid
. ,
I, 169.
103Ibid., VIII, 628.
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religious intuitions in order to give the empirical historian
certain clues with which he might develop surveys leading to
the laws of civilizations. The uneasy working arrangement
between what Toynbee variously calls reason and intuition, or
science and religion, or head and heart, or science and Life,
was steadily breached in Volumes Five and Six, culminating in
the transfiguration argument of Volume Six. We have intro-
duced a number of those "captious critics" at that turning
point in the Study
,
and have raised the question as to what
extent does this methodological shift effect the original
purpose and actual results of Toynbee « s work. While it was
important to explore the extent of the methodological shift
in this present context, it might in one sense be considered
a deviation from our stated purpose of tracing Toynbee 1 s view
of himself as the "student of Life." So let us return to our
initial task with but one modification.
"Student of Life" Role Leads to a Solution
to the Problem of the Meaning of History
We began by a notation of the successive instances of
"student of Life" role from Volume One to Volume Six. Our
modification now involves a departure from the chronological
sequence to a topical treatment of the "student of Life"
motif. Three topics may cover the remaining references.
First we can note the reiteration of Toynbee 1 s position—the
view that religion makes sense out of the historian's task.
Then we turn to his discussion of the place of reason, point-
ing out his attack on rationalism in the first phase, and his
more moderate attempts later on to limit the extent and use
of reason. Finally we shall observe Toynbee
• s efforts to
reconcile reason with his religious commitment.
As a "student of Life" who goes beyond reason and
science to a mystic experience of transfiguration, Toynbee
stresses the value of this discovery both for society and the
historian within society. in Volume Seven he treats at
length the advantages of regarding the churches as a higher
species of society. This "reversal of roles" forced the dis-
missal of Toynbee' s original assumption that all civiliza-
tions are philosophically equal—an assumption that he had
depended upon to deliver him from parochialism and subjectiv-
ism. It has led him to discard his attempt to write a his-
tory of civilizations in favor of a history of religions.
But these are minor affairs compared with the advantages of
the new position, and Toynbee hastens to indicate "what light
the significance of the churches' past may throw on the prom-
ise of their future." 104 His plea for a new position reads:
This human fellowship with the One True God,
which had been approached in the primitive
religions and been attained in the higher relig-
ions, gave to these certain vital virtues that
were not to be found in either primitive socie-
ties or civilizations. It gave power to overcome
104 Ibid., VII, 506.
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the discord which was one of the inveterate evilsof Human Society; it offered a solution of theproblem of the meaning of History; ... 105
In a further elaboration he identifies the meaning-
lessness of history with the spatial and temporal limitations
of the historian. This of course was the problem with which
Toynbee opened his Study
. However, the difference between
Volume One and Volume Seven is quite apparent, for in this
context the hope of finding an abiding form is based not on
an empirical study of the rhythms of civilizations, but
rather in a religious experience.
Even in the most narrow-verged society the ablest,
most energetic, and most fortunate individual can-
not influence, or even survey, the action in which
he is concerned beyond the close-drawn limits of a
horizon which embraces no more than a fraction of
the human participant in it, is 'a tale told by an
idiot, signifying nothing. ' But this apparently
senseless 'sound and fury' acquires spiritual
meaning when man catches in History a glimpse of
the operation of a One True God who is both tran-
scendently infinite and intimately loving, and who
has the power and the will to take up His human
creatures into His own range of action and mode of
existence. . . . 106
If the meaning of history is found in the experience
of transfiguration, the historian then faces the problem of
accounting for the use of the intellect in historiography.
Two attitudes seem to reflect Toynbee 9 s struggle to find the
boundaries between reason and prophecy. There is a strongly
105 Ibid. , 507o
106 Ibid., 512.
hostile attitude expressed in the later volumes toward the
rationalists and rationalism. The attack is directed toward
what Toynbee regards as the excessive claims of Reason. m
Volume Seven the extended argument begins with the assertion
that the Hellenic minds discovered "Reason" and then 'idol-
ized it. ' He traces the idolization of Reason into the mod-
ern Western secular civilization where the Western rational-
ists have followed an Hellenic philosophy "in worshipping a
false 'God the Reason. ' "107 0ne Qf ^ chi&f objections he
has to rationalism is that it has become a parochial faith
which sees Western Civilization as the culmination of his-
tory, in addition, it cuts off from human experience those
areas of knowledge which come via religion and prophecy. 108
Just one example of the many criticisms of Western Rational-
ists suggests this double accusation:
.
. .
even if the traditional Western rationalist,
in an elegiac mood, were to acquiesce in seeing
the Western Civilization deposed from the place of
honor in the moving picture of human progress up
to date, he would be moved to indignation and
mockery at the notion of assigning the vacated
place to Religion. 1° 9
A third objection to Rationalism is the charge that
it leads to a constriction of the moral capacity of the
l° 7Ibid., 468.
l Q8Ibid
. , 450.
l° 9Ibid.
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individual and thence to an irresponsible abandonment of
Society. This charge is rooted in Toynbee
• s journalistic
experience of 1933. In that year he had written in the
Survey of International Affairs a critique of the World Dis-
armament Conference and the World Economic Conference in
which he had put his finger on the inadequate ideological
basis of those conferences. His argument was that Enlight-
ened Self-interest, "so far from being an automatic, self-
regulating psychological mechanism for making all things work
together for Man's good, was nothing more than an intellec-
tual abstraction which had no counterpart at all in the realm
of practical life." 110 in this present context the argument
of 1933 is incorporated into a general attack on Rationalism.
The ideology of enlightened self-interest is traced to a
parentage in Rationalism and the family tree boasts a griev-
ous collection of juvenile delinquents.
The association of the words 'enlightened' and
'self-interest' is, indeed, a contradiction in
adjecto--when 'enlightenment' is taken to mean
a blindness to everything supernatural and
superhuman in Man's vision of the Universe. In
such a Weltanschauung
, in which the Heavenly
Light has been 'blacked out', 'enlightened' does
not lead even to the common-sense conclusion
that the interest of the individual is insepara-
ble from 'the greatest good of the greatest num-
ber'. Within the narrowing moral horizon of a
godless universe, in which piety towards the
dead has become inept, and providence for the
unborn quixotic, a concern for the living
generation of his fellow men also ceases to be
110 Ibid., 517.
within the individual's moral capacity. Thus,
paradoxically, pure rationalism applied as a
rule of conduct leads to the conclusion that
the only 'realistic' course is to abandon Society
to the irrational play of Chance;
. . .
111
This outburst of hostility toward Rationalism and the
Rationalists of which the above quotations are examples can-
not stand as representative of Toynbee * s more considered
arguments concerning the use of the intellect. While strenu-
ously objecting to the claims of "Reason" to serve as the
foundation for a complete Weltanschauung, he does attempt to
mark out the spheres of experience in which the intellect
plays the dominant part. As an example of a situation in
which Reason might be said to transgress its proper limits,
Toynbee points out the strife between "two possible schools
of metaphysics." In this case the argument concerns the
regularity of the Laws of nature as observed by the Hellenic
and Indie World, and the regularity of the "Law of God" which
the Israelite and Iranian prophets discovered as the regu-
larity of a single constant aim pursued "unwaveringly, . . .
by the intelligence and will of a personality 2 Although
our interest is not in the "regularity" argument as such, we
are interested in Toynbee ' s handling of what he thinks may be
a theoretical inconsistency (i.e., "of being logically irre-
ducible to unity.") in the two kinds of regularity. His
111Ibid.
,
i
112 Ibid., IX, 174.
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comment or resolution of the theoretical inconsistency is to
subsume logic under "real life." As he says,
In fact, the apparent incompatibility between the
two kinds of regularity is merely a mirage in the
shadow-world of abstract logic; in real life they
are not only compatible with one another, but areinseparably complementary in a divinely inspired
interplay in which, at divers levels of Reality,
cyclic movements according to laws of Nature are
successively transcended in experience and endeav-
ors that, in turn, are subject to cyclic movements
at a higher level.
. . .
113
Narrowing the general problem of the limits of the
intellect to the specific area of historical method, we
observe the same procedure at work in Toynbee's formulation.
Here the intellect has a limited sphere of operation and a
limited value to the historian, as Toynbee remarks;
When we are investigating the relations between
the facts of History, we are trying to see God
through History with our intellects. The sorting
out of facts is essentially an intellectual
activity. The Intellect, however, is only one
faculty of the Soul. 114
Toynbee analyzes Augustine, as one of a group of out-
standing historians, in this two-phase operation of the his-
torian who sorts out the facts of history with his Mind and
then seeks the meaning of history with his Heart. In summary
his analysis reads . . . "in passing to the second part of
De Civitate Dei from the second installment of the first
113Ibid .
114 Ibid., X, 113.
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part, Saint Augustine is being carried by the Human Mind's
impulse to investigate the relations between the facts of
History into embarking on the Human Heart's quest to find a
meaning behind them." 115
If the historian uses his intellect to sort out the
facts of history and to investigate the relations between the
facts, then the question arises as to the adequacy of this
first operation in the historian's task. Clearly in the fol-
lowing notations Toynbee wishes to establish the necessary
part the intellect plays in the historian's performance but
at the same time the secondary and inadequate role it plays.
One example of this position can be found in his dispute with
Collingwood. In the argument he advances the point in sev-
eral different phrases that "Thought is not the whole of
Life"; and that Collingwood "is wrong in instructing the his-
torian to ignore all strands of experience except the intel-
lectual strand." This appeal to "real life" leads Toynbee to
the statement of his own position, which is that "the histo-
rian must discover for himself some additional means of
establishing psychic communications with the human objects of
his study beyond a reperformance of acts of thought. . . . 11 ^
The same argument as to the insufficiency of Reason
is found in the Volume Ten discussion of the "Inspirations of
115 Ibid., 91.
116 Ibid., IX, 732.
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Historians. Commenting on Ibn Khaldun's recourse to a tran-
scendental thesis, Toynbee observes:
His conclusion is that human affairs do not
constitute an intelligible field of study so
long as the inquirer is attempting to study
them in isolation from the action of Man's
Creation; and this is equivalent to saying
that Man's Oikoumene only becomes intelligible
when it is recognized as being a fragment of
God's Universe.
Ibn Khaldun is here saying, in. effect, that
Man on Earth is a denizen of two worlds.
. . .
Man has a franchise in a mundane commonwealth in
virtue of a human esprit de corps , and at the
same time a franchise in a supra-mundane common-
wealth to divine revelations
.
The task of tracing out the limitations of the use of
the intellect in the historian's work does not represent a
period of psychological exhaustion which might have influ-
enced the last volumes of Toynbee 's Study . It is a very
pertinent topic in his post-Study writings. He discusses it
in his post-mortem essay "What I Am Trying to Do," in connec-
tion with the problem of what human affairs are subject to
scientific law, i.e., open to investigation on the level of
the intellect. Summing up the results of more than twenty-
seven years of historical research, Toynbee concludes that
"there are some things in human affairs that have no pattern
because they are not subject to scientific laws. ... I
also think that the poetry and the prophetic vision that well
up out of the subconscious depths of the human soul are not
117 Ibid., X, 87.
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ammenable to law. " . ^
Again in a recent discussion in An Historian 's
Approach to Religion
, Toynbee includes a chapter on the
"Encounters between Higher Religions and Philosophies." In
this chapter he further develops his earlier thesis of two
"Truths." It is apparent that he wants to speak of two
truths, the Truth of the Subconscious Psyche and the Truth of
the Intellect, in order to avoid the conflicts between Sci-
ence and Religion. At the same time he does not want an
absolute dichotomy, so that he hastens to speak of the truths
as modes of apprehending the unitary Truth. Our interest in
the key passage below focuses on the inferior status of sci-
entific truth.
In either mode of apprehending the Truth, how-
ever, there can be either a vision of some
particular feature or aspect of the Truth or a
vision of the whole of it. On the poetic level
of the Subconscious Psyche, the comprehensive
vision is Prophecy; on the scientific level of
the Intellect it is Metaphysics . I f our fore-
going analysis of the difference between Poetry
and Science is correct, a comprehensive view of
poetic truth must, in the very nature of the
two modes of apprehension , be more feasible than
the attempt made by Metaphysics to present a
comprehensive view of scientific truth. 1*'
The footnote to this lengthy quotation further
defines the limitations of the Intellect in gaining the
118Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 4.
9Toynbee , An Historian 9 s Approach to Religion , p. 126
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vision of the whole truth.
^Prophecy' in the original and authentic sensein which the word means, not a forecast of the
future, but the revelation of a mystery that
is out of the Intellect's reach. The literal
meaning of 'prophecy' is the 'utterance' of
Truth from a hidden source from which Truth
cannot be extracted by intellectual processes.
Having examined Toynbee
' s hostility to the Rational-
ists and Rationalism of the contemporary West, and having
watched a more moderate and considered judgment emerge as to
the limits of the use of the intellect in historical studies,
let us now turn to our third topic.
The reconciliation of the findings of the Intellect
with the intuitions of the subconscious is attempted in terms
of two motifs we have found frequently employed in the Study
.
The first motif of the historian as an explorer or adventurer
sets the formal context of the reconciliation. He argues
that every historian is on a voyage of "spiritual adventure,"
indeed an "enthralling voyage of spiritual exploration." 120
In this adventure the historian depends upon Science (in this
passage used interchangeably with "Intellect" or "Head") and
Religion in a joint endeavor to solve the problem of the
meaning of history. So the motif or role of the historian-
traveller is used by Toynbee to suggest that theoretically or
formally the conflict is resolved by the historian who
120Toynbee, A Study of History
,
VII, 500.
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rejects neither, and draws from both, for "In this present
Study we cannot aspire to do more than follow our pair of
explorers— if Science and Religion can be imagined as setting
out hand in hand—on the first voyage of this new quest for
the Visio Beatifica ."
This verbal reconciliation in the metaphor of the
traveler implies an equality and harmony of Intellect and
Subconscious, "a hand in hand" relationship which is not
carried out in actual practice. It would seem to me that the
reconciliation is couched in these terms in order to preserve
the appearance of being philosophically unprejudiced or
uncommitted. The phrase "we cannot aspire to do more than
follow our pair of explorers" is the counterpart in Toynbee's
historical methodology to the one praise-worthy element he
defends in historic Rationalism. While agreeing with Martin
Wight that Rationalism imbibed a Judaic fanaticism and intol-
erance from Christianity, he yet admires Rationalism's prin-
ciple, "to follow the argument whithersoever it might lead,
without being willing to allow its pursuit of intellectual
truth to be arrested by any non-intellectual considera-
tions. " 121
The genuine as opposed to verbal reconciliation of
Science and Religion, Head and Heart, Intellect and Subcon-
scious, is made by Toynbee in terms of the "Student of Life"
121Ibid.„ 474.
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metaphor. Here there is no misleading imagery of hand in
hand effort unless it is the picture of blind Science being
led by visionary Religion.
.
The argument starts with the distinction between "two
kinds of Truth." in order to reconcile these two truths and
avoid an absolute dualism, Toynbee links the two kinds of
Truth to the concept of "planes of life," a concept which he
had introduced without discussion in Volume One; "Scientific
truth and prophetic truth are experiences on different
planes, as are scientific truth and ritual observance." 122
If the Intellect and/or Science are restricted to one
plane of experience and Religion to another level of experi-
ence the question still remains as to the relationship
between these levels of experience. Little doubt is left in
the mind of the reader as to the deeper level of experience
or the priority of the intuitive truth.
When this difference had been recognised— and
only then--it might begin to be possible for
pilgrim souls to feel their way towards an
angle of spiritual vision from which the real
nature of the relation between these diverse
kinds of experience would become apparent. 12 -^
Thus the reconciliation takes place on the grounds of
religion— a feeling one's way towards an angle of spiritual
vision,, and it would seem in the light of the passages now
122 Ibid., 475.
123Ibid
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being examined that without Religion the historian's task is
useless
.
In the Volume Seven exposition of the relation
between churches and civilizations, Toynbee summarizes the
three "vital virtues" that had been attained in the higher
religions. The second of the three reads: "it [human fel-
lowship with the One True God] offered a solution of the
problem of the meaning of History." 124 The elaboration of
this passage underscores the meaninglessness of history if it
is attempted apart from a "glimpse of the operation of a One
True God." Interestingly enough the objections to a non-
religious interpretation of history are the same objections
which Toynbee tried to meet in the opening chapter of Volume
One of the Study .
But this apparently senseless 'sound and fury"
acquires spiritual meaning when man catches in
History a glimpse of the operation of a One
True God who is both transcendently infinitely
loving, and who has the power and the will to
take up His human creatures into His own range
of action and mode of existence, in so far as
they respond to His challenging call to act in
This World as partners in His divine Work. 12 -"
The same emphasis upon the meaninglessness of human
history is found in the annex to this chapter as Toynbee
seeks to explore the assertion that higher religions alone
124 Ibid
.
, 507.
125 Ibid., 512.
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give value and meaning to History. He argues, "No doubt
every human life-trajectory does have this enduring effect,
just as the motion of a single atom or electron affects the
equilibrium of the whole physical universe. But this so-
called 'impersonal immortality' is no redemption of Man's
role in terrestrial history? it is the heart of the nightmare
of Human Life on Earth without the fellowship of
n A 126God;
. . .
In Volume Eight a similar conclusion regarding the
meaninglessness of history as seen from the standpoint of the
human observer is drawn. Only when the scientific labor of
the historian is placed in the framework of Religion can
there by any significance to history.
Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and
Herodianism the last word that the oracles of
History and Mythology had to speak when asked
for light on the spiritual consequences of
encounters? If it were indeed the last, then
the outlook for mankind would be forbidding.
Perhaps the true answer to this anxious
question was that this might well be the end
if the whole story was comprised in the history
of civilization, but not if Man's attempt at
civilization was no more than one chapter in
the story of a perennial encounter between Man
and God.i 27
Again in Volume Nine the reconciliation of the find-
ings of the Intellect with the intuitions of the Subconscious
126 Ibid., 756.
127Ibid., VIII, 624.
i
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takes place in a religious framework. The context of the
crucial passage is a discussion of the "Laws of Nature" and
the "Law of God." The "Laws of Nature" are obtainable in
Toynbee's view by an empirical study of the rise and fall of
civilizations. But the pessimistic conclusions from this
Study^ of the vain repetitions of civilizations must be res-
cued by religion.
'Laws of Nature' display the regularity of a
recurrent movement— for instance, the motion of
a wheel revolving any number of times round its
axis. If we could imagine a wheel coming into
existence without owing its creation to a wheel-
wright, and then revolving ad infinitum without
ever serving any purpose, these 'repetitions'
would indeed seem 'vain'; and this was the pes-
simistic conclusion drawn by Indie and Hellenist
philosophers from a Weltanschauung in which, by
a tour de force of intellectual abstraction they
had set the sorrowful wheel of existence turning
for ever in vacuo
. . . . 'Laws of Nature' make
sense when they are pictured as being the wheels
that God has fitted to His own chariot;
. . .
In Volume Ten Toynbee turns to his own experience and
the experiences of other historians for insight into the role
of the historian as a 'Student of Life." The reader is
strongly tempted to lose the thread of the argument in favor
of an enjoyable hour with this modern Plutarch's Lives . But
for our purposes in this chapter the argument itself is more
relevant and important- The whole volume might be described
as an attempt to make and hold to a distinction between the
128Ibid., IX, 174.
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facts of history and the meaning of history. Although the
distinction has not been systematically advanced in the ear-
lier volumes, it does have points of likeness with the dis-
tinction between the two kinds of truth of Volume Nine. The
"facts" of history, like "scientific truth," are in the pro-
vince of the Intellect, while the "meaning of history," like
the "religious truth" is in the province of poetry and the
subconscious. This distinction, however, does not represent
two distinct fields such as "history" and "theology"; for we
notice that Toynbee emphasizes that a true historian must
know the facts and the meaning of the facts.
... if the child is to become an historian in
very truth and deed, it must learn to harness
its curiosity about the facts to the service of
something more purposeful and creative than
curiosity itself. It must come to be inspired
with a desire, not just to know the facts, but
also to divine their meaning;
. . .
^- 29
This same two-fold division of the historian's labor,
the collecting of facts and the divining of their meaning, is
again related to two separate faculties of the historian's
Soul in a later reference of Volume Ten.
When we are investigating the relations between
the facts of History, we are trying to see God
through History with our intellects. The sort-
ing out of facts is essentially an intellectual
activity. The Intellect, however, is only one
faculty of the Soul. When we think about some-
thing, we are apt also to have feelings about
it, and our impulse to express our feelings is
129 Ibid., X, 42
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er than
°Ur imP"lse to ««PresB our
"Facts" and "meaning behind the facts" is linked to
the activity of one of Toynbee
' s historian-heroes Augustine;
again with the Mind/Heart or Intellect/Feeling distinction in
the historian's Soul. Toynbee sees the greatness and immor-
tality of Augustine's De Civitate Dei in the fact that the
author was "carried by the Human Mind's impulse to investi-
gate the relations between the facts of History into embark-
ing on the Human Heart's quest to find a meaning behind
them.
"
131
Another of his selected list of historians has the
same experience as Augustine. Ibn Khaldun is described as an
historian who attempted to write history in secular socio-
logical terms or in a "would-be strictly scientific explana-
tion." 132
It will be seen that the failure of a secular
sociological explanation of the rises and falls
of empires to account for the course of history
in the Maghrib has led Ibn Khaldun to introduce
a new actor onto the stage of History and, in
doing so, to give History itself a new dimension.
His conclusion is that human affairs do not con-
stitute an intelligible field of study so long as
the inquirer is attempting to study them in iso-
lation from the action of Man's Creator; and this
is equivalent to saying that Man's Oikouniene only
130Ibid., 112.
131 T , . ,Ibid. t 91.
132 Ibid.
,
85.
312
becomes intelligible when it is recognized asbeing a fragment of God's Universe. 13 3
The ^intelligibility or meaninglessness of history
that is not placed in a larger religious context is clearly
argued by Toynbee in what appears to be the climax of the
thesis of Volume Ten. We have noticed the basic distinction
between facts and the meaning of the facts as it is developed
in this volume and illustrated by autobiographical and bio-
graphical references. Of the five sections in Volume Ten,
section "E" reads, 'The Quest for a Meaning Behind the Facts
of History. 8 Here one finds the most emphatic pronouncements
on the radical difference between the findings of the Intel-
lect and the intuitions of the Subconscious. As late as the
third section of this volume , in the discussion of Ibn Khal-
dun's historical work, Toynbee had argued that even though
the "big questions" of history could not be solved by Khal-
dun's secular sociological explanations, at least "a fraction
of the phenomena" had been explicable . 134 In this climactic
and summary section of the whole argument, however, Toynbee
seems to find little value in the historian's intellectual
endeavors if it is not rescued by religious intuition. For
example, he comments on Gibbon's definition of history as the
"register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind"
133 Ibid
.
, 87.
134 Ibid., 86.
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and the "all is vanity" of Ecclesiastes that they are an
anthropocentric angle of vision. His further comment is that
from an anthropocentric angle of vision, "Life presents the
mirage of a wilderness, not only for mankind but for the
135gods." Added emphasis upon the uselessness of the find-
ings of the historian working by intellect alone is given in
the descriptive phrase "this spiritual cul-de-sac," and in
the statement that "a spectacle in which no meaning can be
found, so long as the meaning of it is sought in the crea-
ture's vain endeavors, proves to be meaningful as soon as the
meaning of it is sought in the Creator's indwelling pur-
pose , "136
One last reference from this section is noteworthy
for in it Toynbee refers to the "riddle of Life" which
appears to be without solution from a secular viewpoint:
When 'Dominus illuminatio mea" is taken in lieu
of 'Man is the measure of all things* as Man's
key to the riddle of Human Life, the vanity of
Man is transfigured in this divine light. ^7
135 Ibid
. , 127.
136 Ibid
. , pp. 127-12
137Ibid., 127.
CHAPTER VI
TOYNBEE'S QUEST ENDS AS "CHRISTIAN HISTORIAN"
"But this apparently senseless 'sound and fury'acquires spiritual meaning when man catches inHistory a glimpse of the operation of a OneTrue God ..."
Arnold J
.
Toynbee in Volume Seven
"God alone knows the truth."
Arnold J. Toynbee in 1947 Civilization on Trial
Explanation of Approach Used
This study of the historical methodology of Arnold
Toynbee began with a discussion of the various self-charac-
terizations which Toynbee has used, such as the "explorer,"
the "scientific historian," the "student of life" and the
"Christian historian." By following the use of the
"explorer" role one could trace the problem of change in
Toynbee' s A Study of History and see his early confidence in
what his "new history" would accomplish steadily dissolve
into the deep questionings and ambivalence of his summing up
of the "haunted enquiry." Clearly the change in Toynbee '
s
attitude toward his Study rested in part upon the methodo-
logical framework he employed, and through the frequently-
used terms, the "Social Scientist" and the "Student of Life"
we traced the shift in Toynbee ' s position from the confident
"laws" of the early volumes to the religious intuitions of
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the concluding volumes.
If the law-making method of the Social Scientist
seemed to provide an inadequate framework for Toynbee
• s Study,
and failed to reveal the "lineaments of some abiding form,
»
or that "which is absolute and not merely relative to the
particular social environment of particular historians," and
if the "Student of Life" had to first complement and finally
dominate the "Social Scientist," then this task is not com-
plete without one further stage of analysis. We must seek to
analyze the theoretic structure of reality upon which Toyn-
bee ' s method depends, and on the basis of which theoretic
view Toynbee discards one method for another. This analysis
may best be attempted by investigating a final self-charac-
terization of Toynbee »s choosing, the "Christian historian."
One might expect to find in a chapter entitled "The
Christian Historian" some kind of a systematic study of Toyn-
bee ' s religious views. From the remarkable profusion of Bib-
lical texts which fill the pages of A Study of History
, the
many discussions of theological doctrines, and the recent
involvement of Toynbee with a Religio Historici
, such a
systematic study is surely possible. But it would be some-
what irrelevant to an investigation of his methodology and
could be challenged also on the grounds that it lacked
intrinsic value. Another approach one might anticipate in
this chapter would be a discussion of Toynbee" s view of the
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Christian church in history. Again this approach is a pos-
sible one, and might be of value to students of Church His-
tory, but for a study of methodology it offers only an inter-
esting diversion. What will be attempted in the following
pages is to trace the self-characterization of a "Christian
historian," and to investigate the meaning of the term
"Christian" as it relates to the working historian. Argu-
ably, Toynbee discloses his view of "ultimate reality" when
he speaks of himself as a "Christian historian," and it is
this theoretic view of reality which becomes the final
arbiter in his methodological problems. As a further exten-
sion of this argument we will examine two theoretic views
which Toynbee holds which can be identified as early and
later, and views phrased successively as the "pollarded wil-
low" versus "bean-stalk," as the "growth rhythm" versus
"encounter rhythm" or as the "Humanist" versus "Christian"
poles in Toynbee 's thought. This analysis should result in
the clarification of many of the changes that take place in
the course of the Study among which are the re-evaluations of
certain historical figures and movements, shifts in forecast-
ing, the curious indecision as to whether a civilization is
dead or alive, and sharply divergent estimates as to the
"crisis" of the West.
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Use of Term "Christian Historian"
Does the term "Christian Historian" or its equivalent
occur often enough to demonstrate that this self-characteri-
zation is neither an incidental nor irrelevant role? As one
might expect from the earlier examination of the "Social
Scientist" designation which Toynbee equates with a "discreet
attitude of neutrality" or a refusal to make value judgments,
any such designation as "Christian Historian" is unlikely to
appear in the early volumes of the Study
. Interesting refer-
ences to a committed position begin to appear in the sections
of Volume Six in which Toynbee chooses to follow Augustine
out of the City of Destruction and into the Civitas Dei .
Volume Five contains an annex discussion of "Marxism, Social-
ism, and Christianity" 1 and in the course of the argument
Toynbee speaks of himself as a "Christian critic," a "Chris-
tian observer" and as a "latter-day Christian."
Briefly the references are:
The Christian critic will have no quarrel with
the Marxian Socialism for going as far as it
does: he will criticize it for not going far
enough.
. . .
Thus, from the Christian standpoint, the
Marxian experiment in Socialism is a tragedy;
but this cannot be the Christian observer's
last word; ... We latter-day Christians may
still turn a Marxian attack upon Christianity
1
Ibid., V, 481.
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to good account. ... 2
The identification of himself with the pilgrim who
follows Augustine into the Civitas Dei has been examined in
chapter four, and we can refer to it here as the Volume Six
link in the chain of identifications Toynbee forges in the
last part of the Study
. It may be sufficient to note that in
this section he refers to the new standpoint as a "Christian
Weltanschauung," and as possessing a "supra-mundane spiritual
dimension .
"
A Volume Seven identification of his position with
that of a Christian historian may best be found in the sec-
tion called "The Bow in the Cloud." In an attempt to explore
the implications of the new standpoint
r Toynbee poses the
question,
If we adopt this Augustinian Platonic Weltan -
schauung as our own and attempt , in the light
of it, to envisage terrestrial history sub specie
aeternitatis
, what significance shall we find in
the idea of progress in this world?**
In Volume Eight, Toynbee again links his work as an historian
with the religious standpoint,
• . . a twentieth-century historian might venture
to predict. ... A Christian-bred historian,
however, would be a traitor to the genius of his
2 Ibid
. ,
pp* 586-587
3Ibid
. ,
VI, 156.
4 Ibid., VII, 561.
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ancestral faith if ... 5
A Volume Nine reference to the "Christian historian" appears
in the middle of a paragraph devoted to the question of the
relative merits of the higher religions. Toynbee introduces
his view by saying:
. . .
it seemed unlikely to a latter-day Chris-
tian historian that either Hinduism or Islam
would be placed on a spiritual par with the
Mahayana or Christianity. ... 6
There are scattered references throughout Toynbee 1 s
volumes to his personal experiences, and this part of our
study of his methodology may be clarified by bringing them
together. Three comments on his early life suggest that his
boyhood was molded by a religious training. In his Volume
One attack on "The Protestant Background of our Modern West-
ern Race-feeling," he thought it necessary to append this
footnote
:
As the following analysis of the historical
relation between Protestantism and modern West-
ern race-feeling might conceivably be misinter-
preted as an expression of religious prejudice
in the mind of the writer, it might be pertinent
for him to mention that he was brought up as a
Protestant and that he has not become a Catholic.
Further explanation of his Protestant childhood can be found
in the final volume reflections on the influences which
5 Ibid
. ,
VIII, 627.
6 Ibid .
,
IX, 394.
7 Ibid., I, 211.
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inspire historians. Contrasting the valuable influences of
home and church that teach the "Biblical vista of History
from Creation through the Fall and the Redemption to the Last
Things" with the "well-meaning but myopic-eyed organizers of
national systems of compulsory education" that teach paro-
chial, secular historians, Toynbee rejoices that he had been
"taken to church as a child every Sunday as a matter of
course .
"
°
The next phase in his life followed his education at
Winchester (1902-1907) and he speaks of it as a "forty years"
wandering in the wilderness. 9 This phase is similarly des-
cribed as agnosticism.
The third period in Toynbee' s religious experience
begins in the year 1936. He describes it as a turning "on
the road back to Religion from Agnosticism.""^ The best
observer of that experience may be Toynbee himself, as he
lapses into a favorite form of third person description:
In the summer of A. D. 1936, in a time of physical
sickness and spiritual travail, he dreamed during
a spell of sleep in a wakeful night, that he was
clasping the foot of the crucifix hanging over the
high altar of the Abbey of Ampleforth and was
hearing a voice saying to him Amplexus expecta
8 Ibid., X, 5.
9 Ibid
. ,
VII, 544.
10 Ibid., IX, 635.
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( 'Cling and wait 1 ) .
The resemblance of Toynbee's religious experiences to
Augustine's description of his own conversion in the garden
at Milan is not accidental. By recalling the stages in which
the Study was written one is able to understand the emergence
of the "Christian historian" designation in Volumes Five and
Six. The Study was completed in three "batches of volumes."
The first three volumes were being written from June, 1927,
when the systematic plan for the Study was started, until
May, 19 33. The second batch of volumes numbering Volumes
Four, Five, and Six, was being written from the summer of
1933 to March, 1939. The last four volumes were written
after Toynbee returned from war-time government service, from
194 7 to 1951. It can be seen that the middle batch of vol-
umes coincides with the time of Toynbee's religious turning
point, and that the classic passage in Volume Six, where he
chooses to follow Saint Augustine into the Civitas Dei
, is an
interesting methodological elaboration of a personal relig-
ious experience.
As a precaution against reading too much into this
experience before we have analyzed the concept of a "Chris-
tian historian" let us note that as late as 1952, Toynbee
speaks of himself as a "semi-penitent agnostic" and as a
12twentieth-century Western " ci-devant Christian agnostic."
12 Ibid.
In his own account of his religious orientation, Toynbee
refers to the impossibility of taking "a traditional form of
Christianity as he found it." 13 He prefers to view his
experience as that of one who is making a perilous passage,
or as a "disciple of Saint Francis," whose present require-
ment was "to hold on his course and to trust in God's
grace.
"
14
We have recorded Toynbee ' s direct testimony to the
effect that he has become a "Christian historian," and this
has been correlated with references to his religious experi-
ence. Additional corroboration may be found in his attitude
toward "Humanism" over the span of years from 1922 to 1958.
In 1922 an essay by Toynbee on "History" was published in the
book / The Legacy of Greece . In the essay he expressed his
admiration for the Greeks and argued that the Renaissance in
the West was "one of the greatest and most fortunate deci-
sions in the career of our civilization." 15 His approval of
the Greek way to civilization was so strong, and his delight
in the West's determined and successful attempt to learn
everything our predecessors could teach us so enormous that
he enthusiastically concluded that this decision "largely
13Ibid.
14 Ibid
. , 644.
15Toynbee, "History," p. 294.
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accounts for the wonderful impetus which has revealed itself
in Western Civilization during the last four centuries." 16
By 1927 the same attitude was reinforced and made
explicit in the plans for the Study
. He pleads for Humanism
as the final and proper attitude of the ideal historian. The
non-religious character of the remedy for Western problems,
under the striking paragraph heading of "What must we do to
be saved?", carried a three-fold remedy consisting of eco-
nomic, political and cultural reforms.
Toynbee' s turning away from "Humanism" as a dangerous
idolatry can be found where one might anticipate it if this
reconstruction has been correct up to this point, namely in
the second batch of volumes. In a Volume Four section on the
"nemesis of creativity," Toynbee identifies the worship of
self, which "leaves none but God out in the cold" as the
creed of Communists and Positivists, and "the more numerous
adherents of a vaguer,
. . . school of humanist thinkers and
humanitarian men of action whose outlook has become the domi-
nant Weltanschauung of our Western Society in its Modern
Age." 1 ^ The Greeks are linked with this movement as those
who have idolized the state. The Papal Encyclical of
March 14, 1937, is called in as a parallel view of man's
16 Ibid.
17Toynbee, A Study of History
,
IV, pp. 302-303.
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temptation to idolatry:
Whoever detaches race or the Nation or the
State
. . .
from the temporal scale of values
and raises them to be the supreme model and
deifies them with idolatrous worship, falsi-
fies the divinely created order of things. 18
A final reference to "humanism" shows Toynbee in com-
plete revolt from his early glorification of the Greek spirit
and the Renaissance. The circumstances are most intriguing
to anyone interested in the development of Toynbee ' s views,
because they come close to providing a clear test of a com-
plete about-face on the same subject. In 1914 Professor Gil-
bert Murray asked the twenty-five year old Toynbee, a promis-
ing young historian-don at Oxford to write a book on Hellen-
ism for the Home University Library. A draft of four chap-
ters, or about forty-two pages, was written before war-time
government service interrupted the author's work. In 1950
when Toynbee was finishing the twelfth part of the thirteen-
part Study , he speaks of resuming his work on the Hellenic
world. A footnote adds: "As he wrote these words, he took
these sheets out of a drawer in a bookcase, given him by his
mother in his study at No. 45 Pembroke Square, Kensington,
19
London." He made a new plan in 1951 for the book, and the
writing was completed in 1956 and 1957. In the preface to
18Ibid
.
, 303.
19 Ibid.
,
X, 22, n. 1.
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Hellenism Toynbee struggles to emphasize the completely new
approach that he is using by asserting that, "Since then
(1914) I have not re-read either this draft or the notes." 20
It is difficult to conceive of an author so intensely curious
as Toynbee taking out a forty-two page manuscript in 1950
with the declared intention of planning "the completion of a
history," and yet refusing to "re-read" the material he had
already collected and written. The probable explanation is
that the views in 1951 had so little in common with the views
of 1914 that Toynbee decided to act as though the early manu-
script had not even been written.
At any rate the book on Hellenism wastes little time
in charging the Greeks with developing a civilization that
"was the most wholehearted and uncompromising practice of
man-worship that is on record up to date." 21 "Man-worship or
Humanism" is the distinctive mark of Hellenic history. As
Toynbee now sees Hellenism:
. . .
the mere institution of city-states is not,
in itself, the distinctive mark of the Hellenic
way of life. What is distinctive of Hellenism is
the use that it made of this institution as a
means of giving practical expression to a partic-
ular outlook on the Universe. In the fifth century
B. C* the Hellenic philosopher Protagoras of Abdera
expressed this in his celebrated dictum that 'man
is the measure of all things'. In traditional Jew-
ish-Christian-Muslim language we should say that
20 Toynbee, Hellenism (London: Oxford University
Press, 1959) , Preface.
21
Ibid. 9 p. 8
.
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the Hellenes saw in man 'the Lord of Creation'
and worshipped him as an idol in place of God. 22
At the end of the book Toynbee deals with the legacy
of Greece. In his 1922 essay he had expressed enthusiastic
praise for the legacy of Hellenism, but now the "spirit of
Hellenism" is a "Demon" which the modern world must exorcise
if it is to save itself from meeting with its Hellenic prede-
cessor' s fate. In place of the 1922 version of a "fortunate
decision," which, "largely accounts for the wonderful impetus
which has revealed itself in Western Civilization during the
last four centuries," Toynbee now warns that this "Hellenic
form of idolatry is a ghost of Hellenism that we harbour at
our peril."
Toynbee ? s First Theoretic Structure of Reality
In addition to Toynbee 1 s avowal that he regards him-
self as a "Christian historian," one can profitably explore
the theoretic structuring of reality with which he starts his
study, and against which he reacts in terms of an Augustinian
Weltanschauung.
Toynbee' s initial view has its roots in ancient Greek
vitalism, which regards man and the universe as the expres-
sion of a basic monistic principle. This elan or Life prin-
ciple has a rhythm of rest and action. To this rhythm Toyn-
22 Toynbee, A Study of History , III, 223.
23 Ibid., I, 197.
bee attaches a teleological principle of conditional progress
from the lower to the higher, which may have its roots in his
Platonic studies. The addition of this concept of develop-
ment saves Toynbee from the pessimism of Spengler, and is
reiterated whenever his laws of rhythm come to the point of
grim contemporary application. The secondary principle, how-
ever, forms the bridge for a new theoretic view of reality
and a reconstruction of the study.
Vitalism comes to Toynbee through four favorite
sources in the years when his Study was in preparation. The
footnotes, sources, and authoritative guides of the first
three volumes are J. G. Smuts' Holism and Evolution (1927),
"The South African philosopher-statesman whose guidance we
have sought on many occasions"; 24 Gerald Heard's The Ascent
of Humanity (1929), whose "standpoint is almost coincident
with ours"? 25 Henri Bergson's L'Evolution Creatrice (1921);
and J. Murphy's Primitive Man ; His Essential Quest (1927).
In the Volume Ten "Acknowledgements and Thanks," Toynbee sin-
gles out General J. C. Smuts, who "in his 'Holism and Evolu-
tion', communicated to me his insight into the cosmic move-
ment in which Reality passes through different orders of
being without losing its continuity or its identity." 26 when
24 Ibid
. ,
in, 223.
25 Ibid .
,
I, 197.
26 Ibid., X, 234.
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we recall that before the Studv. began Toynbee was depressed
about the future of the West and that he was seeking to gain
a "Pisgah" view of the prospects of the West, the promise
offered by Murphy, Smuts, Beard, Wells, and Spengler that an
overview elaborated out of biological evolution was the key
to the science of human affairs must have been most attrac-
tive. Teggart's contribution to the crucial shaping of the
Plan of the Study in 1927-30 was to assure Toynbee that a
scientific method could be applied to historical studies
which would give the researcher "laws" instead of opinions.
The "laws" of the historian would have predictive value, and
would be of universal validity because they reflected the
very nature of reality itself.
In a revealing phrase in Toynbee ' s Volume One expla-
nation of his method, he explains it as an attempt "to trans-
pose it (the botanists and zoologists image of evolution)
2 7into terms of human history." The view of reality with
which he begins is that there is a basic life principle in
the cosmos which reveals itself in "non-human fields" under
the evolutionists* image of the pollarded willow, and in
human fields as a multiplicity of civilizations. It is
important to recognize that for Toynbee the acceptance of a
"pollarded-willow" view of human life excludes the "old-
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fashioned image of the bean-stalk." m histor iographical
terms Toynbee is saying that to see human life in its histor-
ical forms as the expression of a cosmic rhythm, is to forego
any value judgments about civilizations ("the bean-stalk
view") in favor of the view that all civilizations are philo-
sophically equal. The "bean-stalk view" is disposed of as a
"christian scheme of history," which survives in modern Wes-
tern historiography as the "relic" of an "egocentric illu-
sion," and even as a "malicious trick" 28 to which Western
historians have fallen victim.
On this foundation, or as we have termed it a theo-
retic structure of reality, Toynbee attempts to account for
all the phenomena of the historical scene. His remarks in
Volume One show a confidence which subsequently proved ill-
founded. He states, "we shall be guided by this conception
throughout our study." 29 in his eyes, it explains the
dynamics of society, accounts for the crisis of the West,
provides a criterion for success, makes clear the mystery of
religion, makes possible a series of predictions, and inter-
prets the place of Toynbee himself in the historical process.
However the failure of this framework, explained at first as
merely an inadequate methodology, leads Toynbee to the major
28Ibid
.
, 170.
29 Ibid., 169.
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reconstruction that we have seen emerging under the banner of
the "Christian historian."
Throughout Toynbee's first three volumes there is an
overview or general framework, contained in a number of bril-
liant metaphors, which is familiar to readers of the early
Toynbee and which best express the various parts of Toynbee's
initial view. Under the imagery of the "Ancient Mariner" he
outlines a melancholy picture:
As we cast our eyes around a world in which the
majority of the civilizations known to us are
already dead, while the rest of the survivors
are all either in decline or in extremis
, . .
we may be inclined to read into the panorama ofhistory the same grim 'motif that the poet
divined in the stones of Westminster Abbey.
Mortality, behold and fear!
What a change of flesh is here! 30
Or as he records it elsewhere
. . . "among the civi-
lizations which are alive at the present day, everyone,
apparently, has already broken down and is now in process of
disintegration, with the possible exception of our own.*' 31
The most dramatic presentation of the "panorama" of history
is repeated a little later:
This is a message of encouragement for us children
of the Western civilization as we drift today
alone, on the 'wide wide sea' of human history,
with none but dead or stricken civilizations
around us
. . . .
The dead civilizations strew the
deck of the ship of human fortunes? and we, and we
3Q Ibid .
,
IV, 4.
31 Ibid., 3.
only, are left. 32
The parallel overview of the mountain climbers with
its primitive societies lying dormant on lower ledges and the
ci-devant civilizations lying dead on higher ledges, a simile
made famous in the United States by the cover of "Time Maga-
zine," likewise expresses Toynbee
' s theoretic view of reality
as a rhythm "fundamental in the nature of the Universe." 33
The mountain-climbers or civilizations are viewed as channels
of elan
,
and the problem of history is viewed as one of mak-
ing certain the elan is not baulked by the hardening or
institutionalizing of society. The rhythm of challenge-and-
response is always the same, whether the society is growing
or passing into disintegration, argues Toynbee, for the some-
what astounding reason, that,
Challenge-and-Response cannot fail to be found
anywhere where there is Life, since our formula
is simply a description of Life itself in terms
of Will. 34
In Toynbee 's analysis of the West one can see the
application of his view of reality worked out in a particular
case. Motivated by concern for the future of western civili-
zation, he invariably brings the result of his analysis to
bear on the western contemporary situation. The "crucial
32 Ibid
. , 38.
33 Ibid
.
,
I, 197.
34 Ibid., VI, 177.
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question on which the destiny of our civilization hangs," the
"crux of the crisis," and the "crisis of the West," are
favorite expressions in the Study
. In Toynbee • s first read-
ing of the "crisis" of the West, the problem is envisaged in
terms of the elan vital
. Later he shifts to a second reading
of the crisis in terms of a "Christian Weltanschauung."
The first reading of the "crisis" is found in the
Volume Three analysis of growth, where Toynbee turns to the
question of why the advances of a creative minority in the
modern western world are being brought to a standstill. At
first it is suggested that the "Yellow Press" might be
responsible for "debauching the rest of Society" but this is
rejected on the grounds that the "Yellow Press" was only a
reflection of the retardation of the masses. When Toynbee
has "really probed to the bottom of the mischief" he finds
that, "This stagnation of the masses is the fundamental cause
of the crisis with which our Western Civilization is con-
3Sfronted in our day."
When the "crisis" is viewed in terms of institutions
rather than people, the same blockage of elan is the ultimate
explanation. In the section of the "Intractability of Insti-
tutions" Toynbee sees the "pernicious institutional anachro-
nism" of the Parochial Sovereign State as that which "has
35 Ibid., Ill, 242.
become the chief obstacle to human welfare and indeed the
archenemy of the Human Race." 36
The general circumstances of breakdown of which the
crisis. of the West is but one case, are explained by refer-
ence to this ultimate view of reality as a rhythm. At the
beginning of Volume Four Toynbee collects the various similes
he has used in the first three volumes, the drivers of the
backsliding cars, the climbers who fall to their death, and
the piper who can no longer conjure the feet of the multitude
into a dance. Then he restates his argument that they
"define the nature of the breakdowns of civilizations" as a
"loss of creative power in the souls of creative individu-
als," and "this failure of vitality on the leaders' side
divests them of their magic power to influence and attract
the uncreative masses."^
It would not be accurate to suggest that Toynbee'
s
initial theoretic view of reality contains only the one prin-
ciple of life as a rhythmic movement between rest and action.
This universal rhythm is made more sophisticated by seeing it
in a dynamic relationship between higher/lower, spirit/matter
poles. This view has had many precedents, notably among the
Gnostics in the late Roman empire, and it is not wholly
36 Ibid., IV, 221.
37Ibid., 5.
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coincidental that Toynbee
- s one great hero among the Church
Fathers, Origen, was strongly attracted by the advantages of
explaining Christianity in a Gnostic framework.
Toynbee picks up his teleology from Smuts, and "pur-
pose" in life is now subsumed as simply a manifestation of
the universal movement of elan
. Toynbee 's analysis of the
nature of growth is summarized and supported by Smuts'
assertion that:
Evolution is a fact of observation and experience,
and it shows a persistent trend: from Matter to
Life; from Life to more Life and to higher Life;
from higher Life to Mind; from Mind to more and
higher Mind and to Spirit [sicl in its highest
creative manifestations ... 38
With his primary principle that the nature of reality
is a pulsating rhythm alternating between rest and action,
and the assertion that this elan moves upward through a
series of stages in a great chain of being from matter to
spirit, Toynbee 's dynamics of society can be completed by the
elaboration of an already implicit criterion of growth. As
he sees it, "... Civilizations grow through an elan that
carries them from challenge through response to further chal-
lenge and from differentiation through integration to differ-
39entiation again." As in any system that begins with a
monistic principle of elan , the problem of the individual and
38Ibid
. ,
III, 127.
39 Ibid., 128.
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of separate "wills" soon comes to the fore. For the histo-
rian this problem poses itself in the form of the dilemma of
whether "history" is the result of some unconscious factor,
what Bergson calls the "great subterranean currents of
thought," or is in some sense the work of individual person-
alities. With the help of Bergson and Smuts, Toynbee argues
that the fundamental elan throws off smaller representations
of elan .
... so there have arisen privileged souls who
have felt themselves related to all souls, and
who, instead of remaining within the limits of
their group and keeping to the [restricted]
solidarity that has been established by Nature,
have addressed themselves to Humanity in general
in an elan of love. The apparition of each of
these souls has been like the creation of a new
species composed of one unique individual— the
thrust of Life arriving at long intervals, in
the person of a particular human being, at a
result which could not have been attained all at
once for the aggregate of Mankind. 40
In Toynbee 's interpretation of Bergson' s passage he
links the elan of the cosmos with that of society when he
describes the "new factor" of "Personality" as that which
breaks the vicious circle of primitive human social life in
order to "resume the work of creation." 41 These new centers
of elan must not be construed as moving billiard balls which
set the others in motion through direct contact, but are seen
40 Ibid.
, 232, from H. Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la
Morale et de la Religion
,
pp. 96-97.
41 Ibid., 233.
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by Toynbee in the context of his scale from matter to spirit.
The problem seems to be one of distinguishing an 4lan of
repetitive motion from an ^lan of creative or progressive
motion. The solution is to measure the action of one man
upon another according to whether it is a direct exertion of
will-power, as in the case of the soldier and the statesman;
or the indirect evoking of a response from another person, as
in the case of the poet or artist. Direct action of will
upon will is labelled "crude/' and is written off as a
"duress that has been imposed on it (another's will) 'more
mechanico' or 'manu militari . •
"
42 Spiritual action as high
on the scale of being is expressed most clearly in this pas-
sage :
In every kind of action, the agent's scope is
limited by the nature of his field; and the
scope of the 'practical' man of action is bounded
by the confines of the personal and institutional
relations through which he is operating. It is
only when human action is transmuted—by the
purging out of all its human passion and its human
animus— from the gross medium of will into the
etherial media of perception and thought and feel-
ing and imagination, that it is able to transcend
all limits of Time and Space to win its way into a
field that extends to Infinity. 43
This same distinction between a higher spiritual
action and a lower mechanical action can be discerned in the
action of a healthy and unhealthy civilization. A healthy
42 Ibid., 288.
43 Ibid.. 289.
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Civilization is one that has "inspired a voluntary allegiance
in the hearts of people below its surface or beyond its bor-
ders." On the contrary the "ailing civilization pays the
penalty for its failure of vitality by becoming disintegrated
into a dominant minority which attempts to find a substitute
for its vanishing leadership in a regime of force,
. .
.
» 44
So far we have been concerned to sketch out the main
outlines of a study of history as seen from the perspective
of Toynbee's early theoretic view of reality. A whole series
of explanations of historical events rest upon the social
dynamics just outlined.
As pointed out earlier Toynbee's analysis of the
present crisis recapitulates his vision of reality as an elan
vital. Stagnation, baulked energy, failure of creativity,
and paralysis, were the clues with which one could understand
the problems of the present. Toynbee's preoccupation with
the present crisis and remedies for the crisis make it at
least possible to interpret his Study as a tract for the
times. There is considerable evidence for the argument that
Toynbee resembled Marx in his attitude toward the "use" of
historical studies. Walsh sees Marx as one who "needed the
theory not so much for its speculative content as for its
predictive properties." 45 Of Marx he says, "He wanted to
44 Ibid
. ,
I, 336.
45Walsh, Philosophy of History
, p. 161.
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find his way through the thicket of contemporary events, to
make sense not of history as a whole but of what was happen-
ing at the time and what had happened in the comparatively
recent past." This aspect of Toynbee as the prophet of the
present and the future is noted by many of the major critics.
Barraclough argues that Toynbee » s concern with a survey of
other civilizations was only "a preliminary task" and that
his great concern was with the breakdown of the West. 46 Den
Boer regards his effort as going far beyond the historian's
task, and as adopting the role of the prophet. 47 Brinton
notes "the predictor's purpose" of the "City of God" in the
Study ,— the efforts of Toynbee to answer questions about
where we are going. 48 Dawson's analysis sees two parallel
motives in Toynbee * s work, the second of which he labels the
"Hebraic prophetic mission" to justify the ways of God to man
and to find a religious solution to the riddle of civiliza-
tion. 49 Frankfort speaks of Toynbee and Spengler as writers
born under the shadow of an impending war, and of Toynbee'
s
"preoccupation with decay." 50 Geyl as one of the most
46Montagu, Toynbee and History
, p. 118.
47 Ibid
. , p. 241.
48Brinton, "Toynbee 's City of God," 363.
49 « .Christopher Dawson, Dynamics of World History (New
York* Sheed and Ward, 1956)
,
p. 400
.
50Henri Frankfort, The Birth of Civilization in the
Near East (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1954)
, p. 23.
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emphatic of the Toynbee critics, argues that he only pretends
to investigate the phenomena, in reality he is a prophet. 51
Gottschalk thinks that Toynbee
' s tendency to transcend the
usual concept of historical sources is due to the "boldness
of [his] quest for the lessons of history." 52 Kohn credits
Toynbee as being by far the most serious and reasonable of
all the prophets who tell of decay, and refers to his study
as a "tract for our own age and its predicament." 53 stone
points out that the general reading public has sensed the
contemporary concern in Toynbee
' s Study and that the public
looks upon it "as a work of prophecy by which may be unlocked
the secrets of the future." 54 Perhaps the contemporary rele-
vancy of Toynbee' s Study could not be better made than by
glancing at the excited concern it has raised among contempo-
rary statesmen. Mr. Abba Eban, in a 1955 address at Yeshiva
University puts Toynbee' s concern with the contemporary cri-
sis in a somewhat more dramatic way by saying, "Professor
Toynbee is not merely the historian of the twentieth century;
he is the Attorney-General of the Almighty upon the Day of
51Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet."
52J<£,Louis Gottschalk, "The Historian's Use of Generali-
zation," in The State of the Social Sciences
,
ed. by Leonard
D. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956),
p. 438.
53Montagu, Toynbee and History
, p. 351.
54Ibid.
, p. 111.
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Judgment. "
^
5
When one assembles Toynbee • s prophecies of what or
who might rescue the West from complete breakdown and disin-
tegration, the list is astonishing in its variety and dissim
ilarity of rescuers. A reader might wonder what kind of a
"rescue" is in store for the West if the possible rescuers
include the American Negroes, Communist Russia, the Papacy,
Protestant Revivalism and the Oxford Groups, the Bahai Move-
ment, and possibly even the African Pygmies.
Taking these prophecies in order of their appearance
the negroes are put forward in Volume Two as a possible con-
ductor of elan in a Western society that is showing signs of
joining the other civilizations in breakdown:
The Syrian slave-immigrants who once brought
Christianity into Roman Italy performed the
miracle of establishing a new religion which
was alive in the place of an old religion which
was already dead. It is possible that the Negro
slave-immigrants who have found Christianity in
America may perform the greater miracle of rais-
ing the dead to life. With their childish spir-
itual intuition and their genius for giving
spontaneous aesthetic expression to emotional
religious experience, they may perhaps be capable
of rekindling the cold grey ashes of Christianity
which have been transmitted to them by us, until
in their hearts the divine fire glows again. It
is thus, perhaps, if at all, that Christianity
may conceivably become the living faith of a
dying civilization for the second time . ^6
5 5Ibid. f p . 335 .
56Toynbee, A Study of History
,
II, pp. 219-220.
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Twenty years later, Toynbee decides that the Negroes
have turned "soft" under the "fascinating mirage of a middle-
class Earthly Paradise which had been conjured up there at
the North and in the West since the Civil War." 57 But it is
much more credible to suppose that a historian whose judg-
ments were usually based on a survey of milleniums was in
this case expressing not so much a change in the "negroes" as
a change in his requirements of any would-be saviors of the
West.
The changing views of modern Russian Communism that
Toynbee has held over the span of his historical work would
make an interesting essay in themselves, but at present we
are interested in the view of the "Russian Communist Move-
ment" as a possible channel for the elan in the predicament
of the Western Civilization's immanent disintegration. Here
"salvation" is articulated in terms of the elan motif:
Can we explain the apparent contradiction of
Communist Russia's simultaneous centrifugal and
centripetal movement vis-a-vis the Western Soci-
ety in the formula that Russia, while resigning
herself to her incorporation into the Great
Society, is at the same time attempting to make
a temporary withdrawal from the general life of
the society in which she has been enrolled by
force majeure ; and that she is making this
attempt to withdraw in order to play the part of
a creative minority which will strive to work
out some solution for the Great Society's current
problems?58
57Ibid
. ,
VII, 417.
58Ibid., Ill, 365.
This view of the "Russian Communist Movement" as
playing a "creative role which will enable her to recast the
general shape of Western life on a more or less Russian pat-
tern" seems even more startling when it is advanced as "an
explanation of the present posture of Russian Orthodox
Christendom." 59 Again the view that will aid in understand-
ing this "prediction" as part of a series of predictions is
to see the "Negroes" and the "Russian Communists" as possible
exemplars of the challenge-and-response rhythm, and thus as a
possible breakthrough for the creative eian.
The next savior of Western Civilization that Toynbee
sees--the papacy--is equally as difficult to harmonize with
his earlier predictions of the American Negroes and the Rus-
sian Communist Movement, unless one understands the predic-
tion as part of his search for a release of elan . The date
is 1938, five years after his optimistic look at the Russian
Communist Movement, and two years after his religious experi-
ence of the summer of 1936. The setting of this "hour of
decision" or the "zero hour" is, of course, the eve of the
outbreak of the second World War. Toynbee 's sense of impend-
ing catastrophe finds expression in the phrase, "As we gaze
round our spiritually devasted world in our generation,
59 Ibid . , 364.
60 Ibid., IV, 581.
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and was urgent enough to impel him to send his notes on the
unfinished volumes to New York for safe-keeping as the war
broke out. The "papacy" (on the basis of its earlier suc-
cess) is called upon to establish a new Christian Republic;
The creative spirits in the Roman Church who set
themselves in the eleventh century to rescue ourWestern World from a feudal anarchy by establish-ing a Christian Republic then found themselves in
the same dilemma as their spiritual heirs who are
attempting in our day to replace an international
anarchy by a political world order. The essence
of their aim was to substitute a reign of spiri-
tual authority for the reign of physical
force, . . . bi
The measure of the success of Hildebrand and those
who followed him was the measure in which they used spiritual
weapons rather than physical or material. This criteria
comes out of Toynbee's view of the creative elan proceeding
from matter to spirit. It leads him to posit a highly ideal-
istic account of Hildebrand' s early victories. For example,
he says, "No physical force was exerted in Hildebrand' s act
of deposing and excommunicating the emperor Henry IV; yet the
moral effect of the Pope's winged words upon the hearts of
the Emperor's Transalpine subjects was so intense that within
a few months it brought Henry to Canossa. " The explanation
of the failure of Hildebrand, is given in an appeal to the
theorem, "for the substitution of the material for the spiri-
61 Ibid., 535
62 Ibid.
tual sword is the fatal and fundamental change of which all
the rest are corollaries." 63
When Toynbee issues his plea in 1938, there lurks in
his remedy a dangerous contradiction with his day-by-day
experience as a working historian. 64 The plea that in this
"zero hour of sin and shame" a second Hildebrand should come
"to the fight and the rescue/' 65 and his program that all
Westerners, both Christian and "Gentiles," "should call upon
the Vicar of Christ to vindicate the tremendous title which
Pope Innocent III has bequeathed to subsequent successors of
Saint Peter," 66 carries with it an inescapable plea for paci-
fism in the face of the threat of German militarism. Toynbee
recognizes the dilemma toward which his system is pushing
him, and hastens to work out a second analysis of Hildebrand
only a few pages after his clear assertion that the "substi-
tution of the material for the spiritual sword is the fatal
and fundamental change of which all the rest are corol-
laries." The recognition of his problem can be seen in the
63Ibid
. , 538. *ti
6 4Toynbee worked for five years in the Foreign Office
of the British Government (Turkish Affairs in Political
Intelligence) and was responsible among other things for the
writing of the atrocity accounts so effective in swaying
American public opinion in the early years of the war. In
the second World War he again entered government service
„
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statement
And in our own later generation, when we find
ourselves confronted once more by Hildebrand'sdilemma, with the advocates of an uncompromising
pacifism arrayed ancipiti Marte against the
advocates of enforcing peace, we cannot pronounce
that Hildebrand's choice was intrinsically the
wrong one simply because it resulted in a disas-
ter in Hildebrand's case. 67
Toynbee's second explanation is an attempt to argue
that it was not so much the use of force as the fact that
Hildebrand and his successors "persisted in the use of
6 8force." The argument here is an appeal from a consequence
of his matter-spirit teleology back to a more fundamental
assumption that Life is rhythmic action, and to stop this
rhythm with one successful swing of the pendulum is to become
petrified. The explanation then follows that the "Papal
aegis that had been stretched over the devoted heads of the
Plebs Christiana had turned into a cope of lead. This
increasing top-heaviness was the mistake in the pontifical
architecture which was bringing the building down in ruin." 69
The "history of the papacy" as interpreted from the stand-
point of Toynbee's first theoretic structure of reality is
envisaged as a series of routs and rallies beginning with
Hildebrand's mistake of choosing to fight with physical
67 Ibid
.
, 546.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 572.
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weapons down to the nineteenth century when "a Papacy which
had once been the heart of the Western body social seemed to
have become an atrophied member, in which the blood no longer
coursed and the life no longer throbbed." 70 it is important
to take a closer look at the "Papal aegis" that "had turned
into a cope of lead." Toynbee defines it as "a modern cen-
tralized autocracy" and as "papal pretensions." He praises
the Conciliar Movement as an offer of salvation to the
Papacy. He speaks of the "price ... of its rehabilitation"
as the "introduction of a parliamentary element into the
constitution of the Western body ecclesiastic." 71 With char-
acteristic confidence in his interpretive principles Toynbee
dramatizes the scene in these words:
Would the Papacy be willing to atone for its
past and assure its future by bowing, in this
matter, to the will of Western Christendom?
Once again a Pope had to make a decision which
was momentous for the fate of the Western World
as well as for that of the Roman See; and, once
again, the answer was in the negative. The
Papacy rejected the parliamentary principle and
opted for an unrestricted sovereignty in a
restricted field as the alternative to accepting
a limited constitutional authority over a loyal
and undivided Christian Commonwealth. 72
Nine years after his plea for a second Hildebrand,
and following the end of the second World War, Toynbee issued
70 Ibid.
,
579.
71Ibid. 572.
72 Ibid. 573.
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a 1947 version of his view of the future. m this version,
"what may happen is that Christianity may be left as the
spiritual heir of all the other higher religions.
. .
.
"73
And in view of the 1938 prediction of a second Hildebrand, we
notice that the 1947 version has two parts. Not only will
there be a universal Christianity, but the "Christian Church
as an institution may be left as the social heir of all the
other churches and all the civilizations." 74 The reader is
not left in doubt that Toynbee has a vision of the triumph of
the "Church herself in her traditional Catholic form, which,
on the long historical view, is the form in which one has to
look at her." In even greater detail he marks out the fea-
tures of Roman Catholicism:
The Church in its traditional form thus stands
forth armed with the spear of the Mass, the shield
of the Hierarchy, and the helmet of the Papacy. 76
Many critics have noted the fascination that the
Roman Catholic Church has for the pilgrim-author of the
Study
,
but our interest in the 1938 and 1947 predictions is
related at present to the two different interpretations of
the "history of the papacy" that are involved. In 19 38, the
73Toynbee, Civilization on Trial
, p. 240.
74 Ibid .
75 Ibid
. , p. 242.
76Ibid.
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history of the papacy was sketched out as a sad and deplor-
able decline, analogous to the history of Athens, in which
the papacy became fatally rigid and finally atrophied. The
1947 version of papal history has cut itself away from the
old theoretic structure of reality, and the Papal aegis is no
longer a "cope of lead" but his "heavy panoply of institu-
tions, (the spear of the Mass, the shield of the Hierarchy,
and the helmet of the Papacy) in which the Church has clad
herself is the very practical one of outlasting the toughest
of the secular institutions of this world, including all the
7 7civilizations." Toynbee continues in the same vein, that
these institutions "are the toughest and the most enduring of
any that we know and are therefore the most likely to last
—
and outlast all the rest." The complete break with the first
view, which Barraclough pointed out as the old Creighton
78view,' 0 but which was an adaption of Creighton' s Protestant
Liberal interpretation placed on Toynbee ' s elan foundation,
can be seen in the reconstructed judgment of the 1947 ver-
sion. Now he argues that "The history of Protestantism would
seem to indicate that the Protestant act of casting off this
armour four hundred years ago was premature." He then makes
the startling suggestion that a way to universal order would
77Ibid .
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be to have the secular power "subordinated to religious
authority .
"
79
While it is instructive to bring together differing
interpretations of the same historical events, clearly Toyn-
bee's second version of papal history grows out of a differ-
ent orientation which we shall shortly consider. One more
prediction in the early volumes of the rescuers of the West
should be noted. If the Negroes in the second volume are
possible conductors of creative elan in the crisis of Western
stagnation, and Volume Three holds out hope that the Russian
Communist Movement may play this role, and Volume Four shifts
to a hope in the universalism of a regenerated papacy, we
should not be surprised that a new channel of e"lan is
glimpsed in Volume Five. Protestant Revivalism and the
Oxford Groups may seem to have little in common with the
ideology and program of the Russian Communist Movement and
not much more with the papacy, and the American Negroes, but
the common link is the fact that they may be a symptom of
spiritual life in a civilization which shows all the signs of
sterility, materialism and stagnation.
Protestant Revivalism and the Oxford Groups are symp-
toms of spiritual life because they reveal an "awakening to
the sense of sin. M This is a valuable symptom in a civiliza-
79Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 241
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an
tion because it offsets the sense of drift which acts as
opiate. in contrast, "the sense of sin has the effect of a
stimulus because it tells the sinner that the evil is not
external after all, but is within him and is therefore sub-
ject to his will. ... -80 Toynbee finds this valuable
"sense of sin" in the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations and
tentatively in the Mayas and Sumeric societies. An interest-
ing example of a 'sense of sin' in the early Hellenic society
shows how Toynbee clearly abstracts the "sense of sin" from a
Hebrew-Christian context in which "sin." is defined in terms
of a divine-human relationship, and generalizes it into a
feeling of dissatisfaction. On an £lan foundation the
"sense of sin" becomes "the pent-up religious feeling for
which the Hellenes of the sixth century B.C. were eager,
above all, to find a normal outlet." 81 Turning to the riddle
of the destiny of our Western Civilization in the "critical
act of the tragic drama," Toynbee again phrases his predic-
tion in a dramatic rhetorical question:
But we may anxiously scan the landscape of our
contemporary spiritual life for any symptoms that
may give us ground for hope that we are regaining
the use of a spiritual faculty which we have been
doing our worst to sear and sterilize. Dare we
allow ourselves to see at any rate a favorable
omen in the emphasis that is laid upon a conviction
of sin in the 'revivalist' version of Protestantism
80Toynbee, A Study of History
,
V, 432.
81Ibid. » 438.
which has been rife on the English-speaking frinaeof the Western World during the last two hundredyears and which—winning its first foothold in aT™T^n*Ut^lal P^tariat, and spreading
In a chapter designed to explain the meaning of the
self-characterization "a Christian Historian," Toynbee
'
s
changing views of Christianity are of great significance. It
has been noted that this self-characterization appears in the
latter volumes, that it coincides with the religious experi-
ence of 1936, and that it can be correlated with a change
from an early Humanism to the later hostility to Humanism.
We have regarded as of prime importance the first volume
assertion that the Study was an attempt to transpose the bot-
anists* and zoologists' image of evolution into terms of
human history, that this conception should be a guide
"throughout our Study," and that it excluded the bean-stalk
or "Christian scheme of history." An objection might be
raised at this particular way of grouping the evidence, that
it overlooks the repeated use of Christian terminology,
Christian institutions and examples in the early volumes, and
altogether attempts to establish a false antithesis in the
Study
., The answer to this objection can be found by compar-
ing his early view of Christianity with discussions of
82Ibid.
,
439.
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Christianity in the later volumes. Briefly stated it may be
argued that up to the fifth volume passage in which Toynbee
exhorts man to follow St. Augustine out of the City of
Destruction to the " civitas Dei ," and which he describes
methodologically as adopting the Augustinian-Platonic Weltan-
schauung, he sees Christianity in terms of the 6lan view of
reality. After this turning point, Toynbee becomes concerned
with Christianity as it affects his fundamental outlook, and
he writes his last four volumes in an attempt to explore and
apply a "religious meaning" to history. This attempt to
reconstruct the study of history without discarding an ear-
lier foundation results in the many ambiguous interpretations
of his last four volumes, and his final summation of ambiva-
lence expressed in the phrase "wavering between the bean-
stalk and the pollarded willow."
To avoid confusion, it is advisable to look first at
Toynbee' s treatment of various doctrines generally identified
with traditional Christianity, and then examine the place he
gives to Christianity in his scheme of world history.
Although the term "God" appears repeatedly in the
Study
,
in the early volumes the term is abstracted from its
traditional context and defined in relationship to the elan .
There is actually a rather free use of the term in Volume
One. Sometimes it is used to designate the "eternal and
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ubiquitous" power or action in the universe. 83 As a synonym
for the rhythm of the universe, Toynbee argues that it makes
little difference whether we call it "God" or " Elan Vital ."
But on other occasions he uses the term "God" to designate
just one phase of the two-phased rhythm of the Universe.
This is clearly the case in the discussion of the nature of
the geneses of civilizations when he selects the Sinic
expression of the rhythm of the universe as being more apt
than the exposition of Empedocles and Saint-Simon. The term
"God" is made synonymous not with the rhythm of the Universe
as a whole, but with the "static condition" or the Yin phase
of the rhythm. Here is the Sinic expression with which Toyn-
bee agrees
,
84
The Ultimate Principle has operated from all
eternity, and now ceaselessly operates by a
dynamical process in virtue of which Animate
and Inanimate Nature has existed from all
eternity.
. . . The Ultimate Principle, in
its active expansive operation, constitutes
and produces the Yang or Positive Essence, in
its passive intensive operation it constitutes
and produces the Yin. . . . Not only did all
material and mental existence of which we are
cognizant originate by the process described--
if we may speak of the origination of that which
has existed from eternity—but all existences do
now subsist in virtue of the same process, oper-
ating in ceaseless repetition.
This Sinic conception of Yin and Yang is equated with
8
3
Ibid.
,
I, 249.
84 Ibid., PP. 202-203
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a "modern Western Physical Science" explanation of a change
in equilibrium. in Smuts' explanation a change in equilib-
rium "is an inherent character of the physico-chemical struc-
ture as such, and is explicable on purely physical and chemi-
cal principles which do not call for the intervention of an
extraordinary agent." 85 Toynbee then proceeds to reduce the
many religious and mythical explanations of change into the
terms of an immanent rhythm of the cosmos, as a change in
equilibrium. The various religious interpretations of change
in life are easily disposed of by Toynbee
' s dicta, "The
essence of the act is not its moral character but its dynamic
effect." 86 On this reading the "God" and the "Satan" of the
Biblical account become the "divine equilibrium" and the
"Satanic instability" of the universal elan:
The Devil's intervention has accomplished that
transition from Yin to Yang, from static to
dynamic, for which God had been yearning ever
since the moment when His Yin-state became com-
plete, but which it was impossible for God to
accomplish by Himself, out of His own perfection.
And the Devil has done more for God than this;
for, when once Yin has passed over into Yang, not
the Devil himself can prevent God from completing
His fresh act of creation by passing again from
Yang to Yin on a higher level. When once the
divine equilibrium has been upset by the Satanic
instability, the Devil has shot his bolt; ... 87
85 Ibid.
,
284 .
86 Ibid. 288.
87 Ibid. 284.
Toynbee 's reduction of Christian doctrines to the
elan motif follows this same pattern. Just as the terms
"God" and "Satan" are removed from any transcendent and moral
connotation in order to appear as phases of a general rhythm
so the figure of "Christ" and the doctrine of the incarnation
in the New Testament "are readily translated into the lan-
guage of our Modern Western Physical Science." Toynbee
argues that it would not matter whether the incarnation is an
"incarnation of God" or an "incarnation of the Devil" as long
as the rhythm of the universe passed over from rest to
action. This complete indifference as to the character of
the person who provokes the struggle between God and Satan,
between Yin and Yang, is justified by Toynbee's appeal to
Smuts' "Physical Science" explanation that, "The individual
and its parts are reciprocally means and end to one another;
neither is merely self-regarding, but each supports the other
in the moving dynamic equilibrium which is called Life." 88
With this explanatory principle in hand, Toynbee
declares that the essence of many myths can be readily
extracted. The imagery of the myths can be translated into
the formula of science "that genesis is a function of inter-
89action.' 0 An interesting example of this process of reduc-
tionism is found in his treatment of another part of the
88 Ibid., 286
89 Ibid., 299
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Christian corpus, the temptation of Jesus in the wilderness.
Based on the formula that it is the action of the ^lan that
matters, the "change from passivity to activity, from rest to
motion, from calm to storm, from harmony to discord, in fact
from Yin to Yang," the story of the temptation is interpreted
as follows:
The action may be either dynamically base, as
when the Ancient Mariner shoots the Albatross
or Loki shoots Balder with the blind God Hoder'shand and the mistletoe shaft; or dynamically
sublime, as when Jesus, in the temptation in the
wilderness which immediately follows his baptismm Jordan, rejects the traditional Jewish role
of the militant Messiah who was to raise the
Chosen People to dominion in this world by the
sword. The essence of the act is not its moral
character but its dynamic effect. The Ancient
Mariner's act changes the fortunes of the ship
and her crew; Jesus' act gives the conception of
the Messiah a new turn and therewith a power
which had not resided in it before. 90
The Genesis account of the Fall of Man goes through
the same process of a reduction to the elan motif. Toynbee
describes it as a symbolic representation of the truth per-
ceived by an earlier generation that there is a universal
rhythm in the affairs of men from an achieved integration to
a fresh differentiation. Stripped of any religious, moral or
transcendent significance, the "Fall of Man" is in essence a
dynamic act in which Eve's eating of the fruit of the Tree of
Knowledge "symbolizes the acceptance of a challenge to aban-
don the achieved integration and to venture upon a fresh
90 Ibid., 288.
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differentiation out of which another integration may-or may
not—arise.
"
91
One must be careful in this analysis of the elan
motif not to reduce Toynbee
' s exposition to a simplistic Hob-
besian mechanism. Toynbee seeks to avoid any necessitarian
doctrine by allowing for an act of will on the part of indi-
viduals in the drama of life. The individual will seems to
have the choice of acting and thus becoming the vehicle of
elan, or of refusing to act and consequently remaining ster-
ile and uncreative. This means that every creative moment
consists of two decisions to act. First an individual will
take a dynamic action which re-liberates the elan from the
Yin stage to the Yang, and then the individual will must make
an act of resignation [called by Toynbee "this activity
through passivity"] which "brings on another cosmic change."
As Toynbee expresses it, "Just as the dynamic act in the
first phase of the ordeal shook the Universe out of Yin into
Yang, so the act of resignation in the second phase reverses
the rhythm of the Universe
—
guiding it now from motion
towards rest, from storm towards calm, from discord towards
harmony, from Yang towards Yin again."
On this distinction between a cosmic rhythm of the
91 Ibid., 290.
92 Ibid., 293.
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universe and man's freedom either to cooperate or not to
cooperate with it, Toynbee builds his vast structure of man-
in-process-of-civilization. As long as an individual or a
group of individuals act dynamically they liberate the |lan
to seek new levels on the matter-spirit cosmic graph. if
their decision is to be truly creative it must reflect a
willingness to participate both in the action of differentia-
tion [the Yang stage variously described as Satan by Chris-
tian theologians, as "Hate" by Empedocles, and as the active
expansive operation of the Ultimate Principle by Sinic think-
ers] and in the action of resignation [the Yin phase vari-
ously described as God by Christian theologians, as "Love" by
Empedocles, and as the passive intensive phase of the Ulti-
mate Principle by Sinic thinkers].
By equating God and Satan with two phases of elan,
both necessary in the cosmic rhythm, Toynbee has discarded
any explanations in which transcendent interruptions are con-
ceivable or desirable. As he describes it 'no demon is,' or
can be, 'at work.' This seems to mean in Toynbee's view that
an adequate analysis of growth or disintegration can be made
in terms of the change in equilibrium, and need not have
recourse to a transcendent God or devil. It leads to his
insistance upon analyzing civilizational breakdowns as sui-
cides
, from within rather than from any external factor such
as military attacks. The empirical analysis of breakdowns as
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suicides is actually a process of rounding up a series of
examples to illustrate a principle to which he is committed
in the 4lan motif. m Volume Eight when Toynbee has given up
the £lan explanation he is able to find evidence of break-
downs which are not suicides but are the result of a militant
encounter between civilizations. 93
With "God" and "Satan" interpreted as necessary
phases of a cosmic rhythm, it is apparent that Toynbee
'
s
analysis earlier of how a "sinful soul comes to grief," or
how a civilization comes to destruction, can not imply that
it was "by the impact of some external agency's immoral or
unmoral exercise of power." 94 The explanation must be that
the sinner refuses to cooperate with the creative cosmic
rhythm. As a prime example Toynbee gives the case of the
Jews who, after responding to the challenge of a 'Time of
Troubles' by rising to a higher conception of Religion,
'rested on their oars' and thus "they 'put themselves out of
the running' for serving once more as pioneers in the next
advance of the Syriac spirit." 95
Ibid
.
,
VIII, 447. "In both tragedies a hard-pressed
civilization responded to the challenge of barbarian aggres-
sion by succumbing to a militarism that had originally been
foreign to its nature; and in both, likewise, this militarism
was eventually fatal to its addicts as well as to their vic-
tims . "
94Ibid.
,
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Toynbee tries to give content to the term "moral" by
relating it to the "cosmic tug-of-war between Life and Mat-
ter." He still speaks of the "moral responsibility for the
breakdowns of civilization" even though his system constantly
threatens to explain the failure simply as the "flagging of
the Promethean elan " or "the failure of the Promethean
elan." 96 An example of his problem is his desire to condemn
the Spartans, Osmanlis, Nomads and Esquimaux while advancing
as an explanation of their predicament the simple description
that there is no margin of energy left over for reconnoi-
tering the course of the road ahead. The whole passage
reads
:
The equilibrium of forces in their life is so
exact that all their energies are absorbed in
the effort of maintaining the position which
they have obtained already, and there is no mar-
gin of energy left over for reconnoitring the
course of the road ahead, on the face of the
cliff above them, with a view to a further
advance
.
97
On the basis of the cosmic tug-of-war between Life
and Matter Toynbee can call an action bad if it tends toward
the mechanization of Life, and good if it tends toward the
spiritualization or etherialization of Life. Applied to
individual action in the context of a civilization, good
interaction between individuals achieves growth, and bad
96 Ibid
.
, 132.
97Ibid., 130.
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interaction brings disintegration . 98 Bad integration is
equated with mechanization, resorting to total mimesis, or
the use of force, in short "the mastery of matter over
Life." 99 Good interaction on the other hand, is equated with
leadership by illumination and example, the radiation of the
major charm of genius, in short, "the triumph of Life over
Matter.
"
A whole series of applied judgments follow from this
criterion. The breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civiliza-
tion can be traced back through a fatal chain of causation to
Leo Syrius's enforcing of the claim of the superiority of the
state over the church, which was in effect "to check and
sterilize the tendencies towards variety and elasticity and
experimentation and creativeness in Orthodox Christian
life;
. . .
"
10 ° St. Francis and St. Dominic were able to
put fresh life into the Christian institutions of monachism
because "Saint Francis wholeheartedly followed the path of
Gentleness while Saint Dominic did not walk exclusively in
the path of Violence." 101 Athens brought tragedy on the
whole of Hellas because she "transformed herself from a
98 Ibid.
,
122 .
"ibid., 125.
100 Ibid., 353.
101 Ibid., 370.
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'liberator of Hellas' into a 'tyrant city. '102 Hildebrand,
"in choosing the alternative of meeting force by force"
started the fatal and fundamental change of substituting the
material for the spiritual sword103 and brought spiritual
disaster on the Western World. Zealot reaction to the impact
of an alien culture is both a disastrous error and a deadly
sin because it is an attempt to fight the aggressive culture
with its own weapons. 104
While this discussion has primarily focused on the
relationship between Toynbee
' s early view of Christianity and
his elan structure of reality, and has sought to avoid the
introduction, however tempting, of later changes of view, it
may be legitimate to digress for a moment to show the conse-
quences of the moral criterion Toynbee has worked out in or
with his elan motif. This brief digression will help to
emphasize the fact that Toynbee is working out of a system
which he buttresses by illustrations, and that his criterion
of growth does not follow from the evidence but from his root
view of reality. The strange interpretations of historical
events which grow out of the system are perhaps nowhere bet-
ter illustrated than by his treatment of Machiavelli. It may
also be noted that Toynbee 's trouble over "Machiavelli" is
102 Ibid. , 503.
1Q3 Ibid
. , 538.
104 Ibid., V, 331.
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one of the important indications to him that his original
foundations are inadequate. While he ruled out by re-defini-
tion a traditional Christian concept of "sin," he yet finds
himself confronted with problems which call for a more ade-
quate frame of reference than an immanent elan en route from
Matter to Spirit. Creative personalities, he argues, are
those individuals who have followed the path of etherializa-
tion rather than mechanization, of gentleness rather than
force. Toynbee exhibits eight historians, in an "empirical
survey" of the working of the rhythm of withdrawal-and- return
who provide "a conspicuous example of that process of etheri-
alization which we have taken as our criterion of growth." 105
These historians in the first chapter of their careers "set
themselves to produce an effect upon their fellow men by the
obvious and crude and finite 'direct method' of bringing
their wills to bear upon the wills of their neighbors. Com-
pelled to withdraw from practical life these men have found
a new form of action on a new plane.
The ci-devant soldiers and statesmen who once
produced an effect on their fellow men by the
direct exertion of will-power, have been taught
by necessity to invent the alternative method of
creating works of art; and just because it is
more etherial, this alternative method is more
effective. ... It is only when human action
is transmuted—by the purging out of all its
human passion and its human animus--from the
gross medium of will into the etherial media of
perception and thought and feeling and imagination,
105 ibid., Ill, 288
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that it is able to transcend all limits of Time
and Space and to win its way into a field that
extends to Infinity. 106
Machiavelli is one of these eight creative spirits
discussed in Volume Three of the Study
. Toynbee finds that
Machiavelli and Italy were facing a challenge similar to the
contemporary challenge confronting the European states in
1927. The challenge was how to transmute "political plural-
ism and political strife into political concord and political
solidarity." 107 Toynbee suggests that both the Italian chal-
lenge and our present European challenge can only be solved
by a stroke of Machiavellian genius:
It will be seen that the task which confronted
Italian statesmanship in Machiavelli ' s genera-
tion, and which likewise confronts European
statesmanship in ours, is a task of peculiar
difficulty; if the problem can be solved at all,
it can only be solved by some stroke of genius;
and, in the Italy of Machiavelli ' s generation,
Niccolo Machiavelli himself had many of the
qualities for serving as the man of the hour. 108
After a discussion of Machiavelli 1 s qualities and
experiences
,
Toynbee concludes that he was the man of the
hour and he did make an effective response. As he puts it,
"The break in his career was complete: yet, in putting him
to the proof of this tremendous personal challenge
,
Fortune
did not find Machiavelli wanting in the power to make an
106 Ibid., 289.
107 Ibid., 305.
108Ibid., 306.
365
effective response ." ^9 Spurred on by ^ perfection Qf
"Machiavelli" as a case of creative withdrawal-and-return,
Toynbee praises the work of the Florentine:
This was the origin of The Prince; ... He wasaddressing himself once more to the one vitalproblem of contemporary Italian statesmanship inthe hope that perhaps, even now, he might helpto bring that problem to solution by transmutinginto creative thought the energies which had beendeprived of their practical outlet. if The
? rince had happened to inspire some living-Ital-ian princeling—if a Medici or Este or Sforza orGonzaya had employed the author's methods to
attain the author's ends— it is not inconceivable
that Machiavelli might have lived to see thepolitical union of Italy accomplished; ... 110
The conclusion reached by Toynbee is that Machia-
velli 's The Prince is not a failure even though its immediate
effect was not achieved. His return to the World "on a more
etherial plane on which his effectiveness has been vastly
greater" is proven by the fact that Machiavelli the political
philosopher has influenced the course of history to a much
greater extent than Machiavelli the practical politician
could have hoped to do. In a summary paragraph his achieve-
ments are these;
For, in finding his 'true nourishment" in his
communion with the Ancients, Machiavelli was
really finding his opportunity to perform his
life-work. In those magic hours of 'catharsis'
when he rose above his vexation of spirit,
Machiavelli succeeded in transmuting his 'prac-
tical' energies into a series of mighty
109 Ibid., 307.
110 Ibid.
, pp. 308-309.
intellectual works-The Prince and the Discourses
°n LlvV and The Art of War and TheHist^fFlorence—and these fruits of a~Florentine poli-tician s broken career have been the seeds of ourmodern Western political philosophy. The thought
which these famous books put out into the Worldis still living and working in our thought today. 111
Toynbee soon changed his mind about Machiavelli
•
s
'creative thought' and his "effective" solution. The rather
astonishing reversal of judgment begins in Volume Four,
although it is relegated to the sixth annex in a series of
seven. However one must take into account that Toynbee 1 s
first interpretation of Machiavelli in Volume Three belongs
to the first set of volumes, that it was planned and written
between 1927 and 1933, and that it represents the results of
his initial enthusiasm for the elan rhythm. His change of
interpretation of Machiavelli begins in the second batch of
volumes in an annex which may have been written as late as
March, 1939. It occurs in the volumes in which Toynbee tes-
tifies to a change of religious orientation, and undoubtedly
reflects as well the sobering shift in world affairs. The
emergence of Hitler and Mussolini and the threat of a second
World War, which Toynbee in 1927 did not expect to happen for
at least another century, must have had a strong effect on
his earlier enthusiasm for the genius of Machiavelli. It is
also pertinent to note the effect of the critics on Toynbee '
s
views. After the first three volumes had appeared at least
11:L Ibid. , 310.
two important historians addressed themselves to Toynbee
•
s
criterion of ether ialization
. On a closely related matter
G. F. Hudson of Oxford wrote:
Wha
n
^r
??
bled me in m
^ reading of the chapters
on Challenge-and-Response" was the fear that
too much emphasis on the role of hard conditionsin producing Civilization may work in favour ofthe 'heroic' Nazi idea, ... It seems to me
essential to distinguish between the value ofdifferent kinds of responses
. . .
112
And H. A. L. Fisher questions the ambiguities of a
Withdrawal-and-Return pattern which allows Toynbee to include
such a minor figure as Ollivian in the list of great men,
while ignoring such dynamic personalities as Napoleon and
Darwin because they do not have such a clear-cut withdrawal
experience in their lives. 113
Whatever the full explanation of the motives for a
change may be—the change itself is unmistakably set out in
the annex essay on "Militarism and the Military Virtues."
Toynbee now sees Machiavelli against a background in which
the West is compared with a spiritual void, a house unten-
anted by the Christian spirit that had formerly dwelt in it.
Machiavelli is no longer the genius, or the 'man of the hour'
who finds his "true nourishment in his communion with the
Ancients," but is rather a false prophet worshipping on the
112 Ibid
. ,
IV, 650.
XXJH. A. L. Fisher, Pages From the Past (Oxford:
University Press, 1939), pp. 219-220
.
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altar-steps of the Abomination of Desolation. The passage
reads
:
As it happened, these two religions were virtuallythe same; they were, both of them variants of thepunitive idolatrous worship of the tribe or state-
and therefore the modern Western apostate from
Christianity, in a search after a new god, found
the same idol awaiting his adoration in whichever
of the two alternative directions he cast his eyes.
Machiavelli consulting his Livy and Rousseau his
Plutarch and De Gobineau his Sturlason and Hitlerhis Wagner were each led, by his respective liter-
acy or musical oracle, to the altar-steps of the
same Abomination of Desolation: the Totalitarian
Parochial State. 114
Machiavelli reappears in Volume Five and on this
occasion is used as a manifestation of the phenomenon of
"abandon" in the disintegration of the medieval Italian city-
state cosmos. Unlike his heroic and praiseworthy creative
withdrawal-and-return as noted in Volume Three, Machiavelli
becomes the incarnation of the mood of "abandon." This
unheroic role as Toynbee defines it,
. . .
implies something more than a mere external
rack and ruin. It means a state of mind in which
antinomianism is accepted—consciously or uncon-
sciously, in theory or in practice—as a substitute
for creativeness
.
115
Toynbee "s change of interpretation of Machiavelli
cannot be explained away by identifying one interpretation
with Machiavelli ' s theory and the other with his person. In
both cases Machiavelli 1 s political theory is the focus of
114Toynbee, A Study of History
,
IV, pp. 645-646
115 Ibid., V, 399.
attention, and The Prince is singled out in Volume Three as
creative thought, as a stroke of genius, as a living and
inspiring effective response. In Volume Five "the Thrasy-
machean political theory of Machiavelli" 116 becomes a mani-
festation of the characteristic behavior of individuals in
disintegrating societies.
By Volume Eight Machiavelli
• s decline and fall is
complete. Now he is enrolled among the prophets of a West-
ern Gentile Nationalism, responsible only for 'inspiring' a
secular Zionist act of impiety and presumption in the modern
Zionist movement, and stripped of his mantle of political
philosopher, author of "mighty intellectual works," he is
dismissed as "the Florentine publicist Niccolo Machia-
velli." 117
Finally in Volume Ten when Toynbee intended to recon-
sider the "Pleiad of historians," 118 Machiavelli is quietly
dropped from the list of five creative historians.
The second phase of the effort to account for Toyn-
bee 's view of Christianity under the elan motif is concerned
with his assessment of Christianity as a factor in world his-
tory. By isolating discussions of the role of Christianity
in history there is further support for the above argument
116 Ibid., 403.
117Ibid
. ,
VIII, 300.
118 Ibid.
,
III, 290.
370
that his interpretation rests upon a more basic assumption as
to the structure of reality.
Toynbee's usual treatment of the role of Christianity
is to see it in relation to Greek civilization and Western
civilization. The relationship is usually stated in biologi-
cal terms and a summary list of the interrelationships shows
one rape, 119 one normal birth, 120 one "monstrous birth," 121
one miscarriage, 122 and one marriage. 123 The first case
appears in Toynbee's pre-Study works. In the writings of
1922, Toynbee describes the Christian Church as the last
phase of Graeco-Roman Society, argues that this Society was
violated by the barbarians, and the result of this inter-
course was the birth of our Western civilization. In the
second case, found in the early parts of the Study
,
Toynbee
has excised the violence of the rape but has continued the
use of the birth analogy as a significant description of the
relation between the Western Civilization and Greece. The
account may be paraphrased as follows s the Hellenic Civili-
zation died by its own hand, the internal proletariat escaped
119x
^Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey
,
p. 12 and p. 32 8.
120Toynbee, A Study of History
,
V, 190.
121Ibid.
,
VII, 539.
122Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion
,
p. 117
121JToynbee, Hellenism, p. 177.
from the disintegration, formed itself into the Catholic
Church and succeeded in bringing to birth our Western Civili-
zation. The barbarians in this second version did not have
"the spirit to compete with the Catholic Church for the
paternity of a new civilization . "124 The date Qf birth To^_
bee fixes as sometime between 600 A.D. 125 and 800 A.D. 126
The first two versions of the role of Christianity as stated
above can be reconciled without much difficulty. The first
case may be considered as a tentative, and preliminary ver-
sion of the second. One should recognize that in both
accounts Christianity plays the role of the culture-bearer,
and that the chrysalis view of the early volumes of the study
is the fully developed product of the pre-Study tentative
versions. In this chrysalis role of the church two matters
are of great importance. The description of the church as a
chrysalis or womb of the West is grounded upon Toynbee's
first theoretic structure of reality. History as the con-
stant rhythm of the elan vital provides an interpretive
framework within which the church finds a place as a channel
of the elan
. On one occasion Toynbee describes the church as
a "sucker" sent out by the Hellenistic Society which fastens
on to the West. The second matter of interest in the
124Toynbee, A Study of History
,
II, 321.
125 Ibid
. ,
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126Ibid., V, 190.
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chrysalis role of the Church is the interpretation of Chris-
tianity which grows out of it. Throughout the early volumes
of the Study
,
Toynbee reiterates the view that "Christianity
was a syncretism or nothing." 127 Consonant with his assump-
tions that the elan moves upward from matter to spirit, from
crude force to peaceful persuasion, Toynbee depicts Chris-
tianity as a peaceful and hence a successful response to Hel-
lenism. His interpretation reads that "Judaism had only
defied Hellenism as a forlorn hope and Catholic Christianity
had not defied Hellenism at all but had found its field of
action in the Hellenic World as a Syro-Hellenic syncre-
12 8tism. ..." This syncretism consisted of translating
the Christian Syriac spark into the terms of Hellenistic
philosophy. Arguing according to his system that the new
spark must be made attractive, and to be made attractive it
must be made intelligible, he not only speaks of the "legiti-
mate/" "successful" Hellenizing of the Syriac spark, 129 but
of the necessity of this syncretism. 1 ** 0
Toynbee 's rather superficial views on the content of
Christianity as a syncretism into which he was led by the
biological thrust of his elan motif, come under review in the
127 Ibid
. ,
II, 287.
128Ibid
.
, 374.
129 Ibid.
,
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final volumes of the Study
. In Volume Seven he succeeds in
reversing his earlier account of Christianity as a peaceful
response—as a movement which did not defy Hellenism at all,
into an account of the first seven centuries of Christian
history as a contest between Paganism and Revelation. 131 The
"successful," "legitimate" and "necessary" synthesis of a
Syriac spark with Hellenistic philosophy, turns out to have
been merely a verbal, "would-be reconciliation." Not only
did it fail to solve the problem of reconciling a religious
truth with a scientific truth, but this verbal accommodation
made it harder for souls born in a later generation to solve
the problem "than it would have been for them if their prede-
cessors had shirked the issue and refrained from med-
dling." 132
It is clear that such a radical re-reading of the
history of the early Christian church cannot be described as
a modification or development of his earlier views. Some
light can be shed on the change by returning to explore the
shift Toynbee makes from his Volume Five description of the
"normal birth" of the West to his Volume Seven description
of the same relation as the "monstrous birth" of the West.
The reader who has followed the "intelligible units of Study"
as outlined in Volume One, and has regarded Western civiliza-
131 Ibid
. ,
VII, 474.
132 Ibid., 475.
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tion as a fairly sharply defined society which has existed
from about 600 A.D. to the present, finds considerable con-
fusion in the Toynbee version of Western civilization that
dominates the later volumes. From Volume Seven onward Toyn-
bee begins to talk about Western civilization as two civili-
zations
.
The new picture of the Christian Church and Western
Civilization as Toynbee works it out in his post-second World
War volumes may be sketched in this way. Following the dis-
integration of the Graeco-Roman Civilization, the Christian
Church attempted to fashion itself into a Respublica Chris -
t-ana. This Respublica Christiana
, which Toynbee calls an
"ecclesiastical civilization" 133 was a spiritually higher
order of society than the civilizations Toynbee had been
describing up to that time. The shaping of this ecclesiasti-
cal civilization was in the hands of the papacy, and its for-
mative period seems to extend from Gregory in the seventh
century to a climax in the time of Hildebrand and his suc-
134 , .
cessors. In this Civitas Dei
, "The secular parochial
princes of a Western Christian World were to dwell together
in unity under the presidency of an ecclesiastical shep-
herd; ..." But this ecclesiastical civilization
13 3XJ
J
Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion
, p. 202.
134Toynbee, A Study of History
,
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suffered what Toynbee calls a "breakdown," 136 or a "miscar-
riage," 137 or it was "politically debauched by its own foun-
138der." Aside from the question of the cause for its break-
down, it is apparent that Toynbee has divided the Western
Civilization of Volume One into these two civilizations. For
example he speaks of the non-Western World as one which "had
rejected the Early Modern Western ecclesiastical civiliza-
tion," and now, "found itself constrained in the end to adopt
the Late Modern Western secular civilization unreserv-
139
edly." He adds the Western ecclesiastical civilization to
his former list of twenty-one civilizations, making now
"twenty-two known civilizations." 140 The footnote explains
the additional civilization in the words, "On a count in
which a Medieval Western City-state cosmos is given the
status of a civilization distinct from the main body of the
Western Society." The status of a distinct civilization is
also given to this Medieval Western City-state cosmos in the
annex of Volume Seven, where Toynbee traces out its break-
downs and its reaching of a "universal state" in the emer-
136 Ibid
.
137Ibid .
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, p. 117.
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,
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gence of the Napoleonic Empire. 141
The division of Western Civilization into two dis-
tinct civilizations leads to an interesting reconstruction of
that society which the reader of the Study would customarily
regard as the West. in place of the view that Western civi-
lization was born a feeble infant from the womb of the church
in the time of Gregory the Great, is a new description of a
thirteenty-century "monstrous birth of a Modern Western secu-
lar civilization from the womb of a Medieval Western Respub-
lica Christiana." 142 The "monstrous birth" is described in
an alternate phrase as a secular civilization "that breaks
out of a body ecclesiastic." 143 On the basis of a new con-
cept of development this new civilization in Toynbee ' s eyes
has little claim on the historian's time or interest. As he
remarks, "
. .
.on this showing, a Western post-Christian
secular civilization might at best be a superfluous repeti-
tion of the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization, and at worst
a pernicious backsliding from the path of spiritual prog-
ress." 144 From Volume Seven onward this civilization is
called the "Late Modern Western secular civilization," the
"post-Western Christian Civilization," or "deconsecrated
141 Ibid
. ,
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society," and is regarded as a "supreme tragedy." 145
It is obvious that this view of the West as a "mon-
strous birth" and as a "supreme tragedy" cannot be part of
the original interpretative framework provided by the |lan
structure of reality. On the assumption that Life is a uni-
versal rhythm of Yin and Yang and that human history can be
understood as an extension of this rhythm Toynbee was led to
conclude that, "Every species of living creature is an ear-
nest of growth, inasmuch as it is the fruit of some past
creative mutation of an antecedent species and might become
in its turn the seed of some further creative mutation into
yet another species?
. . .
"
146 But here is the case of a
new civilization coming to birth whose very existence is a
mistake. Instead of being a new opportunity for the elan to
attain its goal, it requires some kind of an evil life force,
and to think of it in these terms is to break apart the
monistic life principle with which Toynbee began his Study
into a radical dualism of a good and evil elan.
The situation is similar in epistemology where Toyn-
bee had felt that this elan motif delivered him from egocen-
trism by eliminating subjective value judgments and by
affirming the philosophical equivalence of all representa-
145 Ibid
. , 447.
146Ibid., IX, 392.
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tives of the species. 147 The view that the Christian Church
served in a chrysalis role, as a channel of 6lan, is a logi-
cal extension and application of this basic position and
seemed to maintain the "discreet attitudes of neutrality"
that a scientific historian should possess. It is evident
from his Volume Five struggle to admit the possibility of a
judgment of value with regard to higher religions that Toyn-
bee felt that he had maintained a scientific, and neutral
historical position, quite free from value judgments. He
asks
,
Are we warranted in taking a liberty with relig-
ions that we have scrupled to take with civili-
zations? At an early point in this Study we
debated whether we should take account of possible
differences of value in comparing one civilization
with another, and in this case we decided not to
presume to act as judges or dividers. When we
pass from the study of civilizations to the study
of religions, are we going to abandon this dis-
creet attitude of neutrality and to take the
perilous plunge into passing judgments and meting
measures?14 °
The argument that "Christianity was a syncretism or
nothing" and that its various doctrines could be understood
as mythical constructions of primitive intuitions of the uni-
versal rhythm, is also a logical extension and application of
his prior assumptions as to the elan motif. But when Toynbee
has developed the view that the Church is a higher species of
147Ibid
. ,
I, 175.
148 Ibid., V, 371.
r an
society, that the birth of a civilization can be eithe
aberration or a success on the grounds that it interferes
with or assists in the growth of a higher religion, it is
clear that he is revising his "previous tacit and uncritical
assumptions" 149 not only about the value of religion, but
about the neutral epistemology and the theoretic structure of
reality with which he began his Study .
From the comparatively minor place of religion in the
early volumes, when it is treated descriptively by a scien-
tific historian holding a "discreet attitude of neutrality,"
Toynbee has moved to the position that religion provides the
intelligible unit of historical study, 150 and becomes the
criteria for "good" and "bad" civilizations. 151 Furthermore,
religion holds out the hope of deliverance from an epistemo-
logical dilemma posed by relativity, 152 and addresses itself
15 3with destructive force to Toynbee ' s earlier faith that
ultimate reality is a universal rhythm, and that the study of
history is the task of uncovering this rhythm in human
affairs. One may speak of Toynbee e s initial assumptions
149 Ibid
. ,
VII, 422
150Ibid
. , 449.
151Ibid .
152 Ibid., IX, 402.
153Ibid.
,
VII, footnote on p. 421.
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about the nature of reality as a faith not only on purely
theoretic arguments but also because Toynbee himself recog-
nizes in Volume Seven that his Volume One "discreet attitude
of neutrality" was really not what it seemed. This recogni-
tion comes to light when Toynbee discusses the inadequacies
of his own "chrysalis" interpretation. At this point he
readily admits his earlier view rested on a judgment with
regard to absolute value.
On this view, universal churches have their raison
d ' etre in keeping the species of society known as
civilizations alive by preserving a precious germ
of life through the perilous interregnum between
the dissolution of one mortal representative of
the species and the genesis of another. In this
repetitive process of the reproduction of civili-
zations, which is assumed to have an absolute value
as an end in itself, the churches are useful and
perhaps necessary, but secondary and transitional
phenomena.
. . . The writer of this Study had to
confess that he, too, had been satisfied for many
years with this rather patronizing view. „ . . I* 4
As we have argued above, there is a coherence in
Toynbee 's early views when they are recognized as the super-
structure built on the elan motif. An overview of civiliza-
tions, cultural dynamics, crisis analysis and the place of
religion in history are made intelligible in Toynbee ' s esti-
mation by referring them back to the universal elan . His own
action as an historian is similarly made intelligible to him
by seeing it as an expression of the elan motif. When he
154Ibid.
, pp. 392-393.
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comes to a "parting of the ways" in Volume Five and decides
to follow Augustine, Toynbee begins a reconstruction of his
Study_ on a new theoretic structure of reality, and begins to
see himself in a new role as a "Christian Historian." One
might state it briefly that in the first part of the Study
Christianity is interpreted in the light of the elan motif,
whereas in the later volumes, Christianity, as one of the
great intuitions of mankind, becomes part of the basic inter-
pretive foundations.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the
period of Toynbee 's historical labors, few historians would
deny that the fashion in historical literature had been set
by the monographs and specialized studies. And very few of
the historian-critics of Toynbee have failed to conclude
their criticism of A Study of History without expressing
admiration for the courage and ambition of this attempt to
reverse the tide of monographic historical studies in favor
of an attempt at a universal synthetic history. There may be
a psychological explanation yet to be uncovered by some Toyn-
bee biographer for this drive to write a universal history,
but for the student of Toynbee 's historiography there is an
interesting ideological explanation for the ambition to write
a universal history which can be found in the intellectual
development of Toynbee. The ideal of a universal history
enters Toynbee ' s thinking sometime between the years 1921 and
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1927. Toynbee finds the justification for his synthetic uni-
versal history by an appeal to the rhythmic nature of schol-
arship itself. just as there is an alternating rhythm in the
universe of nature and the universe of events, so there is
the same rhythm in the universe of knowledge.
For the alternation perpetually recurs in virtue
of the very nature of thought. When the mind is
employed in finding facts, its sheer successinhibits it sooner or later from fact-finding
uninterruptedly ad infinitum
. . . . Then the
mind changes its activity perforce and employs
itself for a season in making syntheses and
interpretations.
. . . This rhythm is native tothought in all its different channels. 155
The alternating rhythm according to Toynbee
• s calcu-
lation not only makes rational his drive toward a new synthe-
sis, but offers an explanation of a state of affairs in which
the dominant trend is toward fact-finding. The fact that the
great majority of his contemporaries are in disagreement with
him can be explained by regarding them as involved in a stag-
nant, sterilized, mechanized Yin phase of historical scholar-
ship. On this view Mommsen is illustrative of the encyclo-
pedic, historical worker who has been caught in the subjuga-
tion of this ancient kingdom of historical thought by the
modern "Industrialism of Western life." 156 The tendency of
Lord Acton and the Cambridge History series to compose a uni-
versal history (in a manner quite contrary to the Toynbee
155 Ibid .
,
I, 3.
156Ibid.
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method) by joining
, ogether a number of m0nographic facfc. !
finding studies is Gained b roynbee as the tragic "ster-
ilizing infiuence of iustria
, sm upon historical
thought.
"
157
By an appeal t Lhmic nature Qf scholarship
Toynbee can argue that it is time for a change in historiog-
raphy, even though only a few historians such as H
. G. Wells
and himself recognize this need. 158 By a further development
of his view that the 4lan finds expression only in creative
individuals, he can explain his own breach with his fellow
historians, the mystic inspiration that accompanies it, and
the hostility of those who remain in the Yin stage. The
argument for a new creative synthetic history of almost
superhuman magnitude by a creative historian who will give
expression to a new Yang phase in historical studies is an
extension and application of Toynbee *s general theory of cul-
tural dynamics and may offer a psychological explanation for
Toynbee' s vast undertaking.
Drawing on Bergson and Smuts, Toynbee analyzes the
process of growth as the work of creative individuals.
The individuals who perform this miracle of
creation, and who thereby bring about the growth
or the societies in which they arise, are morethan mere men. They can work what to men seem
157 T , .,Ibid
. , 46
158Ibid., 4.
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TnT }?J be^aus^ theY themselves are superhumanm a literal and no mere metaphorical sense. 159
The explanation for the vision which carries Toynbee into
such an enormously ambitious universal history may be found
in the Bergsonian teaching which Toynbee finds so inspiring
that, "Henceforward, the soul has a superabundance of life;
it has an immense elan ; it has an irresistible thrust which
hurls it into vast enterprises.
. . .
" 160
Again by referring to the elan motif with its con-
comitant theory of cultural dynamics Toynbee seeks to explain
the sharp and even hostile criticisms of the professional
historians. In 1933, before his Study came into the hands of
his critics, his theoretic view was that:
The emergence of a superman or great mystic or
a genius or a superior personality inevitably
precipitates a social conflict. The conflict
will be more or less acute, according to the
degree in which the creative individual happens
to rise above the average level of his former
kin and kind. But some conflict is inevitable,
since the social equilibrium which the genius
has upset by the mere fact of his personal
emergence has eventually to be restored either
by his social triumph or by his social defeat. 161
And the response of the creative individual to his time-
bound, Yin stage contemporaries is dictated by the elan
motif. As the elan is attractive by virtue of its quality of
159 Ibid.
,
III, 232.
Ibid. t 234.
Ibid. 236.
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living-ness, so the creative "personalities that have suc-
ceeded in attaining self-determination through self-mastery
find,
. . .
that, having been lifted up, they cannot rest
until they have drawn all men unto them;
. . .
» 162 Quoting
from Bergson, Toynbee describes this action of the creative
soul who is faced by hostile critics as an act of addressing
"themselves to Humanity in general in an elan of love." 163
The curious way in which the Toynbee controversy has
developed since the publication of A Study of History is a
witness to the enduring attitudes and views which Toynbee
derived from the elan motif. One might normally expect that
the scientific study of the past, based on empiricism rather
than transcendentalism as Toynbee avers, would lead to a
sharp exchange of views as to the validity of the laws and
the evidence which supports them. Many of the critiques of
the first batch of volumes started to follow this expected
pattern, but the controversy since then has been marked by
Toynbee 's refusal to become involved in a battle over the
evidence.
In 19 60 Philip Toynbee, the son of Arnold J. Toynbee,
described the 1950 's as the years of the "Toynbee hunt." He
is correct in underscoring the one-sided aspects of the
162 Ibid
.
, 234
163Ibid., 232
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controversy, and the bitter tone of the polemic directed at
his father. However the tone of the polemic may in part be
explained by the sense of frustration which the critics often
express in their tilt with the author of the Study
.
164 Toyn-
bee's defense of his Study has been marked by these charac-
teristics: an attempt to disarm the historian-critics by an
appeal to the rhythmic felan of historical scholarship; a
studied effort to respond to the critics in an felan of love;
and the suggestion that his "insights" are the mystically
received intuitions which have not yet been vouchsafed to the
pedestrian, time-blinded professional historian. First his
major defense of his system has been a Volume Nine argument
that professional historians are men who have been by-passed
in the creative advance of the new sociologist-historian.
The figure of the typical antinomian latter-day
Western historian caught fast in bondage to an
invisible pattern whose dominion over him was
secure just because he believed himself to be
proof against ever entertaining any such idea,
was, of course, a living witness to a relativity
of historical thought that was the looking-glass
through which we forced our entry into the vista
of our present Study. This captive mammoth was
a unique twentieth-century relic of a now old-
fashioned- looking Western intellectual fauna
which, save for this single surviving representa-
tive, had become extinct because its habitus had
been too nicely adapted by the goddess Natural
Selection to the temporary exigencies of an
164Professor Geyl fi s shift from a moderate, considered
critique in 1946 to a harsh and censorious rebuttal in 1956
is the best example of this growing sense of frustration
among the Toynbee critics
.
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eighteeoth-century Western intellectual environ-
ment
.
u J
Secondly his response to the critics in direct con-
troversy, apart from this Volume Nine attack on their anach-
ronistic views has been characterized by the mellow, tolerant
spirit one might expect to find in Bergson's creative person-
ality, who addresses himself to Humanity in an elan of love.
A good example of this gentle response is found in Toynbee's
1956 rejoinder to a very strong attack by Professor Geyl in
t
^
ie Journal of the History of Ideas . Toynbee's one-page com-
ment begins:
What struck me in reading the two reviews of my
book by Professor Fiess and by my old friend
Professor Geyl is that they agree with one
another, and that I agree with them in their
view of what I am trying to do.* 66
Another example of the gentle response may be found
in the "Toynbee-Jerrold Controversy"; one of the few occa-
sions in which Toynbee allowed himself to be brought into a
published debate on his views. The London Times carried an
interchange of correspondence between Arnold Toynbee, Douglas
Jerrold and other interested parties in the Spring of 1954.
Toynbee's four brief replies to Jerrold reveal a remarkably
conciliatory and gentle spirit in the midst of a sharp
165Toynbee, A Study of History
,
IX, 197.
166Toynbee, Journal of the History of Ideas , XVI
(June, 1955), 421.
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exchange of views between Toynbee's defenders and detrac-
tors. 167
Thirdly, the belief that the nature of reality is a
rhythmic elan is employed by Toynbee to support the argument
that there are advanced souls who gain an intuition of the
meaning behind the facts, which must be passed on to histo-
rian-contemporaries still caught in the Yin stage. Thus
Toynbee's defense along the lines of an esoteric mystic expe
rience has shifted the development of the controversy from a
systematic rebuttal on empirical grounds to a more nebu-
1 ft ftlous X00 and frenetic attack on Toynbee 8 s abilities, claims,
169
and influence. Toynbee's seven mystic experiences in the
"process of progressive initiation" 170 into the Beatific
• 171Vision by which a meaning may be found in the human spec-
172tacle, are recorded in Volume Ten.
The relation between Toynbee's defense of the Study
and his view of reality as a rhythmic elan even continues
^^^Counsels of Hope (London: The Times Publishing Com-
pany, 1954) .
*
°
Ibid « See the editor's leading article entitled
"Clouds and Sledge-Hammers , " p. 26.
i69 ibxd.
170Toynbee, A Study of History , X, 129.
171Ibid
.
, 126.
172 Ibid.
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into the later volumes of the Study and into the post-Study
controversy. This is unusual in the sense that one does not
expect this appeal to the elan motif after it has been
dropped out of the Study from Volume Five onward as the basis
for an overview of history , a cultural dynamics , and an
explanatory principle of the Western crisis. But the appeal
to the elan motif in the later volumes is limited to polemi-
cal usage—as a convenient and effective rebuttal of the
critics along historical lines.
In the question of the purpose of history-writing,
the normal early volume exposition of the purpose or inspira-
tion of history-writing is framed as an aspect of the univer-
sal elan rhythm. Toynbee returns to the same subject in a
later volume but this time there is a reconsideration or
restatement of the subject in terms of a second structuring
of reality.
Toynbee 's first view of what history is
,
using the
t l
word in Herodotus 8 sense of tffTOpli* B may be found in the
opening pages of the Study . After developing the analogy
between biological life and the life experiences of human
societies as multiple expressions of the universal elan ,
Toynbee comes to the following conclusions about the histo-
rian 8 s task:
In the light of these conclusions on matters of
historical fact, we can draw certain other con-
clusions regarding History as a humane study.
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Its true concern is with the lives of societies
in both their internal and their external aspects.
The internal aspect is the articulation of the
life of any given society into a series of chap-
ters succeeding one another in time and into a
number of communities living side by side. The
external aspect is the relation of particular
societies with one another, which has likewise to
be studied in the two media of time and space. 173
A full and fair exposition of what Toynbee includes
in the "purpose" of the historian would have to record his
view that there is a secondary purpose or cultural by-product
to the historian's task. This purpose is referred to as the
experience of "catharsis." We come across the first refer-
ence to catharsis in the 1921 draft of the Study which may be
the one composed on the Orient Express in September of that
year. During this time Toynbee was attempting to write his
Study as a drama and specifically opposes the view that
history is a search for scientific laws . One can speculate
in the absence of any further information about "catharsis w
that Toynbee envisaged the use of history as a kind of purg-
ing experience for the historian and his reader? probably to
purge out the nationalistic and parochial spirit that had
brought earlier societies to a tragic end*
By the time the systematic notes of 1927-1929 were
completed, Toynbee had accepted the methodological clue of
173 Ibid. r I, 46.
^ 74We have discussed his use of Sophocles 8 Antigone as
a possible master-plot in chapter four.
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Teggart and had begun the attempt to establish the scientific
law pattern which the universal rhythm of the elan
, in his
view, should provide. But even though he had rejected the
analogy of history and drama as the basis for a historical
method, he retained the idea that the study of history serves
the purpose of a catharsis. The cathartic purpose is now
attached to the elan motif by the argument that the historian
is moved from the Yin, [passive, receptive state] into the
Yang, [creative, writing state] by means of several stimuli,
among which is the cathartic experience of the "Communion of
Souls."
In the later volumes of the Study
,
the major purpose
of historical study has shifted from an analysis of the
internal and external aspects of the lives of societies to a
religious calling. The Volume Ten passage to be put along-
side the Volume One discussion of purpose reads
:
Why do people study History? Why, to put the
question ad hominem , had the writer of the
present work been studying History ever since
he was a child and been spending thirty years
on this book which he was now finishing? . . .
The present writer's personal answer was that
an historian, like anyone else who has had the
happiness of having an aim in life, has found
his vocation in a call from God to 'feel after
Him and find Him ? . ... In beginning by asking
ourselves why we study History we have begged
the question. What do we mean by History? And
the writer, continuing to speak simply for him-
self from his personal experience, would reply
that he meant by History a vision—dim and par-
tial, yet (he believed) true to reality as far
as it went—of God revealing Himself in action
392
to souls that were sincerely seeking Him.
.
The historical angle of vision
. . . shows ushuman souls, raised to a sixth dimension by the
gift of the Spirit, moving, through a fateful
exercise of their spiritual freedom, either
towards their creator or away from Him. 17 ^
In this comparison of a Volume One definition of the
nature and purpose of history with a Volume Ten definition
one is able to see the shift from an elan motif to some kind
of a religious transcendental framework and the case is simi-
larly as interesting and instructive with regard to Toynbee 1 s
views on catharsis. In the notes of 1927 the cathartic value
of historical scholarship was noted as an important feature
of the historian's motivation and purpose. By the time the
Study is completed in 1952, the West has lost its historical
significance for Toynbee and it appears from the absence of
any mention of catharsis that there is no longer any driving
need to purge the Western historians of parochialism and the
Westerners of nationalistic spirit in order to save the Wes-
tern civilization. A call to repentance seems to have
replaced the earlier hope that by holding up the tragedy of
past civilizations Westerners would emerge from a cathartic
experience and open up new channels of elan . By Volume Six
the shift from a hope in catharsis to a hope in repentance
has taken place, and the historian breaks into a direct plea
to his contemporaries that "we may and must pray that a
175Toynbee, A Study of History , X, pp. 1-2.
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reprieve which God has granted to our society once will not
be refused if we ask for it again in a contrite spirit and
with a broken heart." 176 The same shift from catharsis to a
call for repentance is given epistemological application as
Toynbee addresses himself to his fellow historians. In the
Toynbee-Jerrold controversy of 1954, Toynbee v s major conten-
tion is that Jerrold has misinterpreted history because of
pride , The antidote is s
In this grave hour let us in the West beware of
asserting: °God, I thank Thee, that I am not as
other men are. 1 Christ counsels us to pray:
'God, be merciful unto me a sinner. 9 Christ's
is the counsel of hope* The publican is laying
himself open to the possibility of salvation;
the Pharisee is making himself fatally proof
against it. 177
And to re-emphasize the direct plea to Jerrold the historian,
Toynbee' s next letter continues, "Mr, Jerrold has not yet
told your readers what is his response to the Baptist 8 s cry.
In the present correspondence , so far, "Only the echoes
,
which he made relent, Rung from their flinty caves, Repent 1
Repent! v " 178
Toynbee 's Second Theoretic Structure of Reality
This investigation of the term "Christian historian"
176 Ibid
. ,
VI, 321.
^^Counsels of Hope
, pp. 15-16.
178Ibid.
,
p. 29.
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has carried us through an initial stage of Toynbee ' s work
where he attempted to develop a coherent historical view on
the basis of an elan structure of reality. In place of the
discarded "beanstalk view" which he called the relic of a
Christian scheme of history, he envisaged reality in terms of
a universal rhythm which in the world of events takes the
form of innumerable civilizations, like the suckers that
spring to life from the trunk of the pollarded willow. The
absence of the self-characterization of "Christian historian"
in the early plans of the Study from 1921 through the comple-
tion of the first three volumes in 19 33, and the correspond-
ing personal references of Toynbee to his agnostic period
helped to confirm the argument that Toynbee ' s Study began as
179
naturalistic historicism. The many references to Chris-
tianity as a theology and as an institution which can be
found in the first three volumes did not refute the thesis
but on closer analysis demonstrated more clearly the perva-
sive power of the elan structure to reinterpret traditional
This term is effectively used by Carlo Antoni, dis-
ciple of Croce and professor of the history of modern philos
ophy at the University of Rome, in his excellent study From
History to Sociology (Detroit: Wayne State University,
1959) . He defines ''naturalistic historicism" [as distinct
from metaphysical historicism and aesthetic historicism] as
the tendency to assume that the similarities between nature
and history are more significant than the differences. As a
consequence these historians attempt to apply the categories
of positive science to historical phenomena, thus resolving
history into sociology » Preface xix.
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doctrines as mythical expressions of the universal rhythm.
The role of the church in the historical process was
described as a temporary vehicle for a baulked elan in the
transitional state between a dying civilization and a new
civil izational form.
Toynbee' s use of the adjective "Christian" before the
word "historian" is greatly clarified when one sees that he
is using the word "Christian" with reference to a second
theoretical structuring of reality with which he hopes to
resolve his earlier difficulties. This second theoretic
structure is introduced into the second batch of volumes,
which were written in the years 19 33 through 19 39. But its
major outworking comes in the final batch of volumes, as is
evidenced by Toynbee' s need to reconstruct the format of the
post-war volumes, and by the number of reconstructed inter-
pretations which he develops in Volumes Seven to Ten.
This second view of reality can be distinguished from
the first by recognizing that it is dualistic as opposed to
the monistic universal rhythm Toynbee uses in his early
Study , The dualism usually appears as a distinction between
the mundane and the supra-mundane. In the Preface to Volume
Four, written in March of 1939 (although the fourth volume
itself was begun in 1933) , Toynbee thanks Augustine for a
glimpse of a supra-mundane vision* His comment is that "Of
course the author of this tale of two cities had a supra-
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mundane range of vision in comparison with which no apprecia-
ble difference is made by a few thousand terrestrial miles or
years more or less; and a glimpse of this vision is the boon
for which the present writer is the most deeply grateful to
the writer of De Civitate Dei , 180
The section in the Study to which this Preface refers
is the familiar Volume Five "turning point" where Toynbee
elects to follow Augustine "out of the shattered prison-house
of the City of Man into the infinite liberty of an inviolate
181
and inviolable City of God," and the companion passage in
Volume Six which relates Augustine's way of "transfiguration"
to the individual soul who is caught in a disintegrating
civilization. These are parallel and complementary passages
in the Study even though they appear in succeeding volumes.
In the context which includes both discussions, Toynbee is
dealing with "The Process of Disintegration." In Volume Five
Augustine is introduced as a way of escape from "Schism in
the Body Social . " In Volume Six Augustine is again intro-
duced as a way of escape from "Schism in the Soul." Both
1 R2passages may be called "turning points" in the Study ; the
180<pOynkee ^ a Study of History , IV, Preface p. ix.
181 Ibid
. ,
V, 374.
l^We have recognized the importance of the Volume Five
"Augustine" passage in the chapter on "Toynbee the Explorer,"
on page sixty-one, and the importance of the Volume Six
"Augustine" passage in the chapter on "Toynbee the Student of
Life" on page two hundred and sixty-six*
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first with regard to the history of societies, and the second
with regard to the history of individuals. It is significant
that the insights of Augustine do not appear in any of the
early outlines of the Study .
It is important to recall these epistemological turn-
ing points in this chapter to show that there is a deeper
significance to the passages than the epistemological shift.
Toynbee is in effect discarding his monistic principle of the
universal rhythmic elan for a second structuring of reality.
His search for an abiding form in the flux of historical
change no longer rests on the assumption that the elan moves
rhythmically in an objectively verifiable law-pattern, but
that reality has a supra-mundane dimension—that there exists
a "Unique and Omnipotent God." As Toynbee expresses it, "The
closing sentence of this last quotation brings us back to the
now familiar forking-point of the road which we are attempt-
ing to survey; but this time we have not to follow out the
branch leading towards a cosmic Law, which we have explored
already, but the other branch which leads towards a Unique
and Omnipotent God.""^^
It is instructive to note that Toynbee distinguishes
himself from "our modern Western school of humanists" on the
basis of his second structure of reality; namely, that they
183Toynbee, A Study of History
,
VI, 34.
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fail to recognize a basic distinction in the mode of terres-
trial and spiritual being. He accuses them of "planning to
reach Heaven by raising a titanic Tower of Babel on terres-
trial foundations in three dimensions—as though it were
sheer physical distance, and not any difference in mode of
spiritual being, that divided and distinguished Heaven from
it 1 8 4Earth." Gibbon is mentioned in Volume Ten as an example
of the humanist who constructs his historical views on a nar-
rowly mundane view of reality.
Instead of asking the historian's elemental
question 'How has this come out of that? 1 with
the spiritual humility that would have allowed
his answer to expand to the full measure of
its potential dimensions , the self-assured
child of a post-Christian Western secular
enlightenment cramped the fruitful question
from the outset by introducing into it a spe-
cious qualification. 'How on Earth has this
come out of that?' was the form in which Gibbon
recast, in his own style, the question that had
been planted in his mind by its heavenly visi-
tant; and, in thus automatically ruling the
suipra-mundane dimension of Reality out of his
reckoning, he was unconsciously precluding him-
self from finding the treasure hid in his
field, . . . 185
As long as Toynbee remained within the framework of
his original monistic view of reality his task as historian
could be directed toward the uncovering of the universal
rhythm in its law-patterns, and toward a description of 'man
184 Ibid
.
, 14.
185 Ibid., X, pp. 106-107.
in process of civilization,
' but a different conception of
history follows from Toynbee's changed assumptions as to the
nature of Reality. Now history is more than man in process
of civilization, it is a "perennial encounter between Man and
God . "
An example of this change may be found in Volume
Eight. The context is similar to the Volumes Five and Six
passages in which Augustine was introduced respectively as a
way out of the "schism in the body social" and a way out of
the "schism in the soul." It revolves around the question of
the "responses of the soul" in a civilization which has suf-
fered an assault from a neighboring contemporary society.
Toynbee discards the various reactions of the victim to the
assault as unsuccessful attempts to re-perform the miraculous
act by which a creative minority of Primitive Mankind had
once succeeded in passing over from the Yin-state of an
apparently hard-set stagnation into the Yang-movement of an
astounding renewal of progress . Just as in the Volume Five
and Six passages in which the inescapable pessimism of the
monistic rhythm was avoided by recourse to a supra-mundane
Reality, so in Volume Eight the answer to the pessimistic
question "Was this the end of the story?" is found in an
appeal to a view of Reality which transcends the earlier
monism,,
Perhaps the true answer to this anxious question
was that this might well be the end if the whole
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story was comprised in the history of Civiliza-
tion, but not if Man's attempt at Civilization
was no more than one chapter in the story of a
perennial encounter between Man and God. 8 °
A few pages later, the "perennial encounter" which
gives significance to the repetitious clash of civilizations
is described as a situation into which there comes "a new
revelation of the nature of God and of the character of Man's
187relation to Him." And a concrete example of this "erup-
tion of eternity into time," to use the phrase Toynbee bor-
rows from Berdyaev, is the story of the encounter between
Jewry and Hellenism. Toynbee carefully points out that the
significant moment in the encounter "was thus not achieved in
any episode among the vicissitudes of alternating victory and
defeat in these two civilizations' long-drawn-out duel" but
'It was manifested in the transcending of both these civiliza-
tions by a newly revealed higher religion that had made its
epiphany 'above the battle' which Judaism and Hellenism were
fighting with one another."
In the last thirty pages of the Study there is con-
siderable evidence to show that Toynbee was coming to the
realization that the "encounter" theme of history and the
"man- in-process-of-Civilization" theme are irreconcilable,
186 Ibid .
,
VIII, 624
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and that they rest upon different views of Reality, and that
the "encounter" theme has a Christian origin.
As for the grand epic whose theme is Historyherself, this stands in two rival versions which
cannot be reconciled, ... H . G. Wells in TheOutline of History has written an epic poem oTTthe theme 'Man Makes Himself which is explicit
in the title of a subsequent book from the pen
of an eminent Western archaeologist of the next
generation. This bleak assertion is a post-
Christian Western Man's defiant answer to the
Psalmist's joyful assurance that 'the Lord He isGod' and that 'we are His People and the sheep of
His Pasture' because 'it is He that hath made us
and not we ourselves » ; and that verse enunciates
the theme of History as a series of encounters
between Man and his Creator in which a Paradise
that has been lost through a Fall is regained
through a Redemption, and in which this deliver-
ance of God's creature is achieved at the cost of
a passion that Christ has suffered 'for the means
of grace and for the hope of glory.' 189
If Reality is viewed as a dualism of Time/Eternity
,
Mundane/Transcendent, and historical events are to be under-
stood as an encounter between Man and God rather than as Man-
in-process-of-civilization, the historian ought to focus his
attention on the encounters of the past in order to help his
contemporaries to understand the past and the present. This
re-focusing of the historian's work takes place in the Study
as Toynbee writes the last four volumes. It may be described
as a re-focusing, or as a second "overview" of history which
replaces the first "overview" of the early volumes.
In the first overview as Toynbee states it in the
189 Ibid., X, 118
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first four volumes, he uses the poetic metaphors of the
"Ancient Mariner" and addresses himself to his contemporary
"children of the Western Civilization as we drift to-day
alone, on the 'wide wide sea' of human history, with none but
dead or stricken civilizations around us
. . . and we, and we
only, are left." As argued earlier this overview is not a
temporary flight of poetic fancy but a consistently worked
out expression of his early monistic principles, and is
repeated in a series of parallel metaphors.
The second overview is also expressed in dramatic
metaphors, and is likewise rooted in a theoretic structure of
reality. What strikes the eye of the casual reader of the
studY is th e dynamic aspects of the second overview as con-
trasted with the first. To one accustomed to the dead and
dying civilizations of the early volumes, to the solemn ques-
tion of whether or not the West will have sufficient elan to
make a creative response to its internal problems, the later
volume dynamic encounters between the World and the West, the
sudden coming to life of the Mexic and Andean Societies, the
awakening of the Jewish fossil, and other appearances of
unexpected life, unmistakably suggest that a radical
re-focusing of the contemporary scene has taken place.
Before analyzing the second overview, and this expan-
sion of the whole Study in terms of encounters, it would be
worthwhile to observe several remarks Toynbee makes in the
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early volumes. In the Preface to Volume Four there is an
interesting indication that as late as 1939 Toynbee felt that
the greater part of his work had been accomplished with the
completion of the first six volumes. He remarks that "these
three volumes contain Parts IV and V of the thirteen parts
which are set out in the plan of the book on p. v above. The
writer hopes to publish the remaining eight parts in one more
batch of volumes, as he believes that the five parts con-
tained in the first six volumes will prove to amount, in
aggregate length, to rather more than two-thirds of the whole
work." 190 As a matter of fact the first six volumes of the
Study_ contained two thousand, three hundred forty-seven pages
of text, but Toynbee "s changing views were about to extend
the remaining eight parts into an almost equal-length second
half. After the second World War he completed the study with
the last four volumes containing two thousand, fifty-three
pages of text. While one should not read too much signifi-
cance into this expansion of the text, yet it serves as sup-
porting evidence for the argument that the theoretic changes
which began in the middle batch of volumes required consider-
able alteration in the historical reconstructions in the
final batch of volumes. The most significant change takes
place in Part XI which had been scheduled as a discussion of
190 Ibid.
,
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"Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations" and was changed
to "Law and Freedom in History." In the preface to Volume
Seven Toynbee speaks of it as being "treated very differently
from the original design." The expansion of this Part is in
terms of a major textual addition of two hundred twenty pageS
on the topic of the encounter between the modern West and
contemporary societies. The curious way in which Toynbee
introduces the topic of the "World and the West" may reveal
his underlying feeling that the change is not at all in har-
mony with his early overview and original plan. For example
he gives the reasons why the history of the encounters
between the Modern West and its contemporaries is "compara-
tively unilluminating" and notes that it is "an imperfect
specimen." However he then proceeds to devote the next two
hundred twenty pages to an analysis of the encounters with
the Medieval West, and merely the last forty-eight pages to
an analysis of encounters between an assortment of other
civilizations
.
One other preliminary task remains before we can
sketch out the new "encounters" overview, and see its rela-
tionship to the second theoretic structure of Reality in the
Study
. It is important to examine Toynbee' s assertion that
the "encounter" is simply an extension of the Study in terms
of the universal rhythms with which the Study began. The
argument is stated in Volume Eight, just prior to the full
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exposition of the encounter overview. Briefly the argument
reads that history has not been fully intelligible to us
because we have been studying single civilizations instead of
the encounters between civilizations. He concludes, "It thus
appears that the genesis of each of the higher religions that
were still alive in the twentieth century of the Christian
Era becomes intelligible only when we expand our field of
study from the ambit of a single civilization to embrace
encounters between two civilizations or more." 191 But it
requires only a return to the first volume arguments to see
that this is a falsification of his own previous methodology.
The hope of the Study rested upon the use of the comparative
method; so that "having decided to attempt a comparative
study of the twenty-one representatives of the species which
we find at our command, we may now start our inquiry ... by
considering how civilizations come into existence." 192 The
crux of the Volume Eight argument for expansion of the Study
is the word "intelligible." The early volume attempt to make
history intelligible did not fail because Toynbee restricted
himself to the "ambit of a single civilization," but because
the elan structure of reality was unable to provide an ade-
quate principle of historical explanation. Actually the
191 Ibid .
,
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shift he is advocating in Volume Eight is not from the con-
sideration of one civilization to a consideration of the col-
lisions of several civilizations, but from an earlier belief
that the comparison of civilizations would reveal the univer-
sal law-patterns of societal life to the belief that only in
a transcendental framework of Reality will the "thread" of
history become apparent.
Before examining the second overview, a summary of
the first, drawn from a Toynbee source outside of the study
may provide useful insights. In the interwar years, Toynbee
gave a summer lecture at Oxford on the topic, "The Graeco-
Roman Civilization." Relating the failure of the Greek civi-
lization to the present experiment of Western civilization,
he cautioned Western optimism by saying,
No known civilization has ever reached the goal
of civilization yet. There has never been a
communion of saints on earth. In the least
uncivilized society at its least uncivilized
moment, the vast majority of its members have
remained very near indeed to the primitive human
level, and no society has ever been secure of
holding such ground as it has managed to gain in
its spiritual advance. All the civilizations
that we know of, including the Greek, have
already broken down and gone to pieces with the
single possible exception of our own Western
civilization. . . . 193
The second overview of Toynbee 's Study is in sharp
contrast to the first. Instead of an internal challenge that
\
19 3Toynbee , Civilization on Trial 9 p. 5 6
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the West faces in its aloneness on the sea of life, Toynbee
now sees a series of external dynamic encounters between the
West and its living contemporaries. Instead of a problem to
be solved by the West in order to release its creative 4lan
Toynbee now sees the Western civilization "as an aggressor"
in a concatenation of military and cultural encounters.
Instead of a hope that the West will find a creative solution
that will lead the rest of the World by imparting the divine
fire of the elan from one soul to another 'like light caught
from a leaping flame,' Toynbee hopes that the bitter encoun-
ter between the World and the West may give "occasion for a
higher religion to make its appearance on the stage of His-
tory/ 8 for, "the entry of this new actor signifies the open-
ing of a fresh play with a different cast and plot." 194
This second overview is advanced by Toynbee as a
master-plan which accounts for both the past and the present.
As an account of the past the encounter then makes intelligi-
ble all of the higher religions and almost all of the civili-
zations .
In fact, the histories of all the higher religions
and all the civilizations except the Mayan and the
Sumeric and the Indus Culture and the Shang Culture
could have been housed by an imaginary twentieth-
century Herodotus in the authentic Herodotus' capa-
cious house of many mansions; and in taking a con-
catenation of encounters as the ground plan for his
masterpiece of literary architecture, Herodotus was
194 Toynbee, A Study of History
,
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showing a penetrating insight into the structof an oecumenical historian's subiect-
matter;
. . .
195
ure
As an account of the present the "encounter" overview
yields this dramatic setting for the twentieth century.
Future historians will say, I think that thegreat event of the twentieth-century was theimpact of the Western civilization upon all the
other living societies of the world of that dayThey will say of this impact that it was so
powerful and so pervasive that it turned the
lives of all its victims upside down and inside
out—affecting the behavior, outlook, feelings
and beliefs of individual men, women, and chil-
dren in an intimate way,
. . .
196
While this change in overview from the early-volume
picture of the lonely, drifting West to the late-volume pic-
ture of the dynamic encounters between an aggressive West and
its living contemporaries appears obvious to the general
reader of the whole Study
, one must still substantiate the
fact that a real change has taken place. If this is more
than merely a shift in dramatic metaphors, it is then impor-
tant to relate the change in overview to the more fundamental
change which is taking place in Toynbee ' s theoretic structure
of reality.
The fact that a real change has taken place may be
established by observing that Toynbee has had to re-vitalize
a number of the dead civilizations of the first overview in
195 Ibid. , 463.
196Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 214
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order to develop his second overview. It is instructive to
note than an "encounter rhythm" does not simply complement
the growth rhythm but actually drives out the earlier notion
of a "disintegration rhythm" projected in Volume Five as the
true completion of the rhythmic theme. But first let us turn
to the resurrected societies.
Toynbee's Universal history as the history of the
Promethan elan
,
the "inner creative factor" led him to make
decided judgments on contemporary history which found expres-
sion in his first overview. A review of these judgments will
show that the picture of the West drifting alone with none
but dead or stricken civilizations strewing the deck of the
ship of human fortunes, is not merely poetic fancy. In Vol-
ume Four Toynbee says,
On this showing, we may pronounce that the
ci-devant Central American Civilization, as well
as the cT-devant Andean Civilization, has now
been completely incorporated into our Western
body social? and we can point to other ci-devant
civilizations which have been incorporated into
other bodies social with comparable completeness
in other times and places. The Babylonic Society,
for example, merged its identity in the Syriac
body social.
.
In Volume Five the same view of the contemporary
scene is repeated
•
This a priori probability can be tested in the
case of our own Western Civilization, which by
now has swallowed--and in some degree digested
Toynbee, A Study of History
,
IV, 81
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and assimilated—at least eight alien societies-the Mexic, the Andean, the Hindu, the Iranic' ?heRussian Orthodox Christian, the Japanese Far East-ern and the main bodies of the Far Eastern andOrthodox Christian societies in China and in theNear East. The number of victims rises from eiqhtto ten if we reckon in the Yucatec and Arabic soci-
eties, while their Mexic and Iranic neighbors had
respectively succeeded in devouring on their ownaccount before these two gorged beasts of prey werepreyed upon in their turn and disappeared down ourWestern Society's all-devouring throat. 198
Toynbee concludes the picture of the contemporary
scene with the prophecy that, "If we do live to see a West-
ernized Japanese governing class share a Westernized Russian
governing class's fate, then we shall have seen the whole
•man-power' of ten disintegrating civilizations absorbed—
with all previous social distinctions now confounded and
effaced into the gigantically swollen internal proletariat of
the single civilization of the West," 199
This overview depends for its validity upon the elan
structure of reality, with its accompanying theory of social
dynamics to the effect that a disintegrating civilization is
one which has broken down and is consequently "mechanically
dispatched to the same grim goal on a travelling belt of
interlocking cause and effect that can be neither reversed
nor broken nor checked." 200 As far as the West is concerned
198Ibid
. ,
V, 89.
199Ibid
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200Ibid., 13.
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in the above picture of the contemporary scene, it is part of
Toynbee's early view that the West was entering into its
"universal state."
The bringing to life of the disintegrated or absorbed
civilizations in order to complete the "encounter" overview
takes place in Volume Eight. The passage is lengthy but of
sufficient importance to warrant its reproduction.
A striking example of a subjugation that had
every appearance of being definitive was theprostration of the Mexic and Andean societies
after the military overthrow of the Aztec and
Inca powers by the Castilian pioneers of one
of the civilizations of the Old World. Yet thejudgment, hazarded in an earlier passage of
this Study, that these two subjugated civiliza-tions of the New World might be considered tohave been completely incorporated into the
Western Christian body social by the time of
writing, might have to be suspended in the
light of the surprisingly different denouement
that had eventually declared itself in certain
comparable cases.
Toynbee's rapid change of historical judgment on
these New World civilizations is at first confusing, and can
only be understood as it is related to the change he has made
from the elan foundation to that of encounter. Just as Mach-
iavelli was praised in the early volumes as long as Toynbee
needed an example of an elan response to the Italian chal-
lenge, and then was condemned in the late volumes when Toyn-
bee decided that Machiavelli
• s response was nationalistic and
20L,Ibid.
,
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secular instead of religious, so we have the case of the New
World civilizations making several appearances in the study
according to the changing demands of Toynbee
' s overview.
As long as Toynbee labored under the first overview,
in which he saw the Western Civilization as the sole survivor
in the experiment of Man-in-Process-of-Civilization, and put
his hope in the radiation of creative elan through gentleness
and inspiration, he could value highly the colonizing of the
Spanish in the New World. On several occasions Toynbee con-
trasts
.
their peaceful occupation of the decadent Aztec and
Inca societies with the ruthless brutality of the Protestant
colonists of North America. 202 He speaks of them as "step-
ping into the shoes of the Aztecs and Incas—
-sparing the con-
quered in order to rule them as subject populations, convert-
ing their subjects to their own religion, and interbreeding
with their converts." 203 The strong attack on the North
American "Protestant method of conversion by extermination"
is a negative example in his general theory of progress in
the early volumes as has been observed earlier.
By the time Toynbee has begun to reconstruct his
viewpoint in the middle batch of volumes, the Spanish activ-
ity in the New World is no longer held up as a case of
2Q2 Ibid .
,
I, 464
203 Ibid., 212.
conversion by example but is recorded as "the atrocities com-
mitted by the Spanish conquistadores in Mexico and Peru sur-
pass the misdeeds of the Roman Army which pillaged Asia Minor
in 189-188 B.C." 204
When the transition of the middle volumes works
itself out into a systematic overview of oecumenical history,
and the encounter thesis becomes the framework of explana-
tion, Toynbee's interest in the New World civilizations
revives. Now the Spaniards appear in the Study as an example
of sophisticated barbarians, 205 who plunder the New World in
a "heinous crime." A little later he compares the "Span-
iard's suppression of the indigenous civilizations of the
Americas" to the barbaric suppression of the indigenous civi-
lizations of the Old World by Alexander the Great's succes-
sors. The Spaniard's conquest of Mexico, Central America,
the Inca Empire, and the Andean World is described as an act
of crude violence and shattering subversiveness
,
206 and Toyn-
bee concludes in Volume Nine, "As for the living civiliza-
tions of the New World, they were at that moment losing con-
sciousness through being brutally knocked on the head by Cas-
tilian conquistadores." 207 The Spaniards are not even left
204Ibid
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205Ibid
. ,
VII, 229.
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with the praiseworthy virtue of having made the ethereal cul-
tural advance of persuading their subjects to accept their
religion. in Toynbee «s post-Study works he describes the
Spaniards as converting the Indians to Christianity by
force. 2 °8 Alongside Toynbee
• s very fluid interpretation of
Machiavelli, and of the New World civilizations and of the
Spanish activity in the New World, one may place his inter-
pretation of Russia.
The difficulties of adequately interpreting the mod-
ern history of Russia should be granted from the outset, and
it is not surprising that Toynbee 1 s interpretation of Russia
reflects the ever-changing contemporary optimistic or pessi-
mistic phase of European relations with the Soviet Union.
What is legitimate and instructive however, is to recognize
the interpretive framework within which Toynbee "s optimistic
and pessimistic attitudes toward Russia are expressed.
In the early volumes Russia is regarded as part of
the Orthodox Christian Civilization; Russian Communism as a
regime which is "attempting to transform the complexion of
society in Russia out of all recognition," 209 and the whole
thing as having passed through the breakdown into the stage
of disintegration, and assimilation by the West. 210 By
08Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion
, p. 163.
209 Toynbee, A Study of History
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seeing Russia in terms of the 4lan overview, and describing
the Communist experiment as a part of the great process of
assimilation and Westernization, Toynbee is able to advance
his most optimistic view of Russian Communism. He sees it as
the withdrawal of a creative minority in order to return with
an answer to the problems of the West. "There are, of
course, creative individuals at the back of all creative
minorities, on the hypothesis that some individual human
being is the ultimate author of every creative human act." 211
This Volume Three optimistic view of Russian Communism
closely parallels his optimistic reading of Machiavelli dur-
ing the same pre-1933 period. And just as Machiavelli loses
his place in history as a praiseworthy example of a creative
response, so the Russian experiment when lifted out of the
elan framework rapidly becomes a "notorious example" of a
Western philosophy which became a violent proletariat relig-
212ion. x ^
When we come to the Volume Eight discussion of
encounters, and Toynbee introduces the new overview of the
«
West in dynamic encounter with the other living societies,
Russia is brought back from the process of disintegration
which was earlier described as "the travelling belt of
211 Ibid .
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interlocking cause and effect that can be neither reversed
nor broken nor checked." Like the civilizations of the New
World, Russia is re-vitalized to fit the new pattern.
Yet this concentration of the World's attention
and apprehension on this particular encounterbetween two contemporary civilizations was inno sense presumptive evidence that the Russo-Western conflict would continue to occupy the
whole field. 213 Fy
At first glance one is inclined to accept Toynbee
'
s
Volume Eight assertion that history as-a-series-of-encounters
is the same as his Volume One history-as-a-rhythm-of-
challenge-and-response. But what betrays this argument is
the point made at the end of the following quotation that one
particular encounter is "the stem from which all living
branches of human history had ramified."
If Herodotus had happened to be born into the
post-Alexandrine instead of the pre-Alexandrine
Age of Hellenic history, his unrivalled genius
for finding a clue to the tangled skein which
is every oecumenical historian's raw material
would assuredly have led him to take this post-
Alexandrine Kulturkampf
, in preference to a pre-
Alexandrine military conflict between the
Achaemenian Empire and the city-states of Euro-
pean Greece, as the point of departure for his
own reconstruction of a history of Mankind which
presented itself to his eyes as a concatenation
of encounters between divers civilizations in
which the Spirit of Man had expressed itself.
And indeed this brilliant Hellenic discoverer of
the historical phenomenon of concatenations
could have found no better vantage-point if the
chance that so capriciously allots the time and
place of each individual's birth had condemned
213Ibid., VIII, 113.
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Herodotus to be born into a twentieth-centuryWestern World: for, in the perspective of anobserver posted in that society in that age?the story of the post-Alexandrine competitionbetween the Syriac culture and Hellenism for
^V^r^0" ° f SOuls sti11 manifested itself
o? hi fr0m WhiGh a11 HYin9 branchesf uman history had ramified. 214
Here is a return to the "primitive image of the magic
bean-stalk" which Toynbee had so vigorously opposed in Vol-
ume One. He had dismissed it as an unhappy relic of a Chris-
tian scheme of history, and as the view of men who had "suc-
cumbed to the egocentric illusion by treating the transition
from the one dispensation to the other as the turning point
of all human history." 2^ The fact that the encounter thesis
means a return to a discarded bean-stalk view of historical
reality is recognized by Toynbee in 1955 when he reflects on
the writing of the Study in the essay "What I Am Trying to
Do .
"
.
. .
and my own belief is that there are some
things in human affairs that have no patternbecause they are not subject to scientific laws.
One such thing, I believe, is an encounter
between two or more human beings
. ... I think,
in fact, that here we are in the presence of
genuine acts of creation, in which something new
is brought into existence; and this leads us back
towards the Biblical view of history which was
accepted in the West from the fourth century till
the end of the seventeenth. 216
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The bean-stalk view of historical reality had been
discarded by Toynbee because it had appeared to impose arbi-
trarily chosen fixed points or turning points or absolutes in
the flux of time. The adoption of the master metaphor of the
pollarded willow and the assumption of the "philosophic con-
temporaneity" of all representatives of the species of civi-
lization seemed to be a way of escape from the egocentric
\ illusion. But now Toynbee fixes upon the "post-Alexandrine
competition between the Syriac culture and Hellenism for the
conversion of souls" as the "stem from which all living
branches of human history had ramified." From this fixed
point the history of the Graeco-Roman civilization no longer
appears as the Greek struggle for self-articulation, the cri-
sis of the Fifth Century B.C. and its resultant breakdown.
Earlier in a summary statement in Volume Four he had dis-
cussed Graeco-Roman History in terms of the elan motif.
From the opening of the fifth century B.C. onwards
the whole of the rest of Hellenic political his-
tory can be formulated in terms of an endeavor to
transcend City-State Sovereignty and of the resis-
tance which this endeavor evoked. Before the fifth
century closed, the obstinacy of the resistance to
the accomplishment of this urgent political task
had brought the Hellenic Civilization to its break-
down; and though the problem which had baffled an
Athenian first attempt to solve it was eventually
solved in a fashion by Rome, it was not solved in
time to prevent the disintegration of the Hellenic
Society from running its course to its final dis-
solution . 217
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Toynbee's first attempt to make intelligible the his
torical experience of the Greeks was to put them in the
framework of the monistic 4lan view of reality. The
-judg-
ment of history" consisted of noting their failure to solve
the problems of a dynamic living society; their baulking of
the creative 4lan and the resulting inability to inspire "a
voluntary allegiance in the hearts of people below its sur-
face or beyond its borders."
Toynbee's second attempt to make intelligible the
historical experience of the Greeks is to see them in the
framework of the dualistic encounter view of reality.
Looking back on Graeco-Roman history to-day,
about thirteen hundred years after the date'
when the Graeco-Roman civilization became
extinct, we can see that, in this perspective,
the most important thing in the history of the
Graeco-Roman world is its meeting with other
civilizations; and these encounters are impor-
tant, not for their immediate political and
economic consequences, but for their long-term
religious consequences. iy
Events in the Graeco-Roman civilization are no longer
intelligible or important in the measure in which they give
expression to creative elan—to the solution of civiliza-
tional problems, but gain their significance in relation to
the religious bean-stalk. The historian's interpretation of
Hellenism takes its perspective from the second century B.C.
rather than the fifth century, for "Hellenism's encounter
218Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, pp. 219-220.
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with Judaism in and after 17S tt r +.uI ,t> B * c
-
was the most portentous
single event in Hellenic history." 219
The turning-point, the significant encounters, the
fixed points in the time-flux for the historian are provided
by the bean-stalk, or what Toynbee begins to refer to as the
"key" or "stem" or "thread" of history. in an important
footnote exchange with Dr. Edwyn Bevan in Volume Five, Toyn-
bee starts to make explicit the "thread" of history that
occupies the later-volumes of the Study
. The discussion
reached this agreement:
In the present writer's view 'a unique beginning
of something new in the history of Mankind' is
to be seen, if anywhere, not in the flowering of
a brilliant rationalism in the springtime of
Hellenic history, but in the discovery or revela-
tion of a new conception of God, and of Man's
relation to God, which was made in the last phase
of the dissolution of the Sumeric Society (if
that is indeed the date and the provenance of
Abraham), and which, ever since then has gone on
gathering light through a series of epiphanies of
which the culmination has been Christianity. This
view ... is not at variance with that of Mr.
Bevan, as he has communicated it to the writer of
this Study in a later letter in the same correspon-
dence: 'I see I didn't make my view quite clear in
one respect. I should hardly say that the signifi-
cant central thread of History is the rise of
Rationalism: I should say, rather, with you that
the central thread is the preparation for the King-
dom of God and its partial coming*
. . .
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Later on in Volume Five the "bean-stalk" that Toynbee
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has adopted, despite his protestations against a bean-stalk
view of history in Volume One, is further elucidated.
It will be seen that while Judaism and Chris-tianity appear to be 'philosophically contemporary
and equivalent'
. . . there is another angle of
vision from which they present themselves in thequite different aspect of successive stages in a
single 'ascending' process of spiritual enlighten-
ment. In this picture Christianity stands, not
side by side with Judaism, but on its shoulders
while they both tower above the primitive relig-ion of Israel.
. . . Before and below the
Prophets, the Biblical tradition presents us with
a Moses, and before and below Moses with an
Abraham. Z1
When one re-reads Toynbee ' s polemic against the bean-
stalk view in Volume One, his dismissal of contemporary his-
torians who "dispose their periods in a single series end to
end, like the sections of a bamboo-stem" ; and his contempt
for those who succumbed to the egocentric illusion of the
Christian Weltanschauung by treating the transition from the
Hellenic Civilization to the new dispensation of the Chris-
tian Church as the turning-point of all human history, it is
hard to see how he expects to exempt his own Volume Five
bean-stalk view from this same Volume One critique. To
recognize that he does not subject his later views to his
early historical relativism is to see in Toynbee a human foi-
ble often repeated in the history of scholarship, but it
would seem to be a more serious criticism of an historian
1Ibid. , 119
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when his later views are portrayed by him as simply an expan-
sion of the adequate foundations of his life-long study.
In Volume Seven Toynbee continues the task of
describing his religious thread of history. The bean-stalk
appears as "the story of progressive spiritual experience of
which Christianity was the climax." 222 In other descriptive
phrases the bean-stalk is compared to "Stations of the Cross
in anticipation of the Crucifixion," and the sections of the
bamboo-stems are the "successive sufferings through which
they won a progressive enlightenment." 223
Clearly we have left the elan structuring of reality
in which Toynbee claimed to be able to scientifically deter-
mine the laws of the universal rhythm. In its place is the
structuring of reality into a dualism of mundane and supra-
mundane, and behind the apparent flux of events there is no
longer the immanent rhythm of Yin and Yang, but a transcen-
dent 'friend behind the phenomena." The historical method of
a scientific, i.e., empirical induction of the laws of his-
torical change has given way to an ambivalent historical
methodology whereby the facts are scientifically ascertained
but the meaning behind the facts is reached by religious
intuition, divination or revelation. 224
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\CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
"How can these things be?"
Arnold J. Toynbee in 1952
In this paper, we have traced the methodological
odyssey of one of the twentieth century's foremost histo-
rians. It would be easy for us to represent Arnold Toynbee
as an a-typical historian, the curious and innovative scholar
who has wandered from the main stream of historical thought.
Indeed, the sheer weight of criticism has tended to support
this view by appearing to isolate Toynbee and by masking the
wide differences among his critics. Philip Toynbee, his son
and a noted literary critic in his own right, described some
phases of the Toynbee controversy as the "Toynbee hunt"; and
it can be argued that the controversial aspects of the Toyn-
bee question frequently obscure his proper relationship to
the historical discipline.
The tendency to emphasize the peculiarities of Toyn-
bee against the uniformity of the historical profession, the
unity of the hounds versus the individuality of the fox, is
immediately checked when we recognize the consensus of
affairs in the profession itself. In the most recent presi-
dential address of the American Historical Association,
423
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R. R. Palmer describes historians as being in an "identity
crisis." m his words, "As historians we claim to be a pro-
fession, but we do not quite know what the profession is." 1
By attempting to understand the dynamic character of histori-
cal thought in the twentieth century, we have opened up the
possibility of understanding what Toynbee was trying to do.
In A Study of History, our analysis has shown that Toynbee »s
struggle to become an effective historian was shaped by the
tensions in British historiography in the early twentieth
century. At first he identified "historian" in terms of the
dominant "science of history" school that had developed in
England between 1870 and 1910. To Toynbee, it seemed only a
natural extension of the scientific motif to move from the
fact-gathering stage of the British Rankeans to the law-
making techniques of his own A Study of History in the
1920 v s. He expressed this sense of progress in methodology,
indeed in scientific methodology, in the metaphor of the
explorer. Toynbee used this metaphor sparingly but effec-
tively in the early volumes of the Study to re-define the
historian and to convey his sense of confidence and exhilara-
tion in his huge new project. But the explorer metaphor also
provided a clue to a basic change in Toynbee 's methodology
*-R. R. Palmer, "The American Historical Association
in 1970," The American Historical Review, LXXVI (February,
1971), 1.
and outlook. As his early confidence in the "law-making-
technique began to evaporate, and as the problem of relativ-
ity grew more intractable, Toynbee turned to the explorer
motif, not simply as a stylistic and romantic metaphor, but
as a way of describing his methodological dilemma. In the
later volumes of the Study
, and in the post-Study writings,
the explorer motif allowed him to hold to several unresolved
and contradictory positions, justifying his methodological
uncertainties by describing them as inherent in life itself.
Thus, the epistemological problem had become a metaphysical
dilemma—the ego-centric illusion could not be banished
because in the nature of existence "we are bound to be self-
centered
.
"
In view of this important methodological shift that
came to light in the explorer motif of chapter two, it became
important for us to review the major methodological basis of
the early part of the Study
,
and in chapter three we under-
took this task. By tracing his view of historical method
from his earliest writings, we were able to observe that
Toynbee' s development in his Oxford and London University
years accorded with the pattern established by Stubbs and the
"exact school of history" for professional and scientific
historiography. It became apparent that Toynbee ' s experi-
ences in the first World War were propelling him to reevalu-
ate the nature of historical thought, and to demand that the
historical sciences be re-defined. This study showed that he
felt cramped by the narrow definition of history as fact-
gathering, and that he saw in Spengler's work in 1920 a
breakthrough into a wider definition of the nature of history
and the task of the historian. Although other historians had
shared his distress with the limitations of the scientific
school in a growing Methodenstreit in British historiography,
it was an American historical theorist, F. J. Teggart who, in
Toynbee's eyes, offered the clearest explanation for current
problems in historical method and the best solution to them.
By looking closely at the notes and early efforts of Toynbee
up to 192 7 and comparing them with his post-Teggart formula-
tions, we were able to identify the extraordinary influence
of Teggart on Toynbee's dream of writing a universal history,
valid for the delineation of the past, and capable of provid-
ing prognostications for the future. In one sense, we may
summarize chapters five and six of this study as a descrip-
tion of Toynbee's long wrestling with the law-making tech-
nique; his effort to use Teggart 's "sovereign methodological
clue" and then to extricate himself from it. But Teggart'
s
influence on Toynbee cannot be measured only by the degree to
which he uses or refuses to use the law-making technique.
This study revealed Toynbee's strong emotional identification
with Teggart' s repudiation of traditional historiography.
One could see it most clearly in Toynbee's attack on
contemporary British historians. It is unfortunate that
Toynbee 's sense of the inadequacy of Rankean historiography
in the decade of the nineteen twenties, and his fear of what
was happening to Western civilization in the postwar period
should have been brought together and shaped by Teggart's
conviction that the Western historical profession was travel-
ing on a dead-end street. The coalescing of these fears and
assessments added a very large emotional element to the situ-
ation. What might have been a fairly straightforward case of
a historian testing the limits of contemporary historiography
and electing to try to overcome these limits becomes, under
Teggart's tutelage, a case of challenging the entire histori-
cal profession. By linking the failure of Western historians
with the failure of Western civilization, and by offering his
own law-making technique as a sharp and exclusive alterna-
tive, Toynbee turned the methodological discussion into a
vast and often unfruitful controversy. Spurred on by Teg-
gart's theory, Toynbee developed his own method as an either/
or situation, and buttressed his position with descriptions
of the antithesis between the anachronis tically-inclined his-
torians and the progressive sociologists. It is not surpris-
ing that the historians perceived the situation more as a
threat to their existence than as a reasonable advance in
historical method. As the controversy mounted, Toynbee felt
it necessary to make greater claims for the scientific
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validity of his method-a value-free, comparative study of
civilizations. When Toynbee went over to a normative study
of history in Volumes Four and Five, he was so entrenched in
his earlier claims that he continued to treat the study of
History in its original framework and, as we saw in chapter
three, to issue frequent defenses of his law-making technique
throughout the entire Study
. it would seem to me that the
historical profession was not faced with the exclusive alter-
natives of continuing with the traditional Rankean fact-
gathering historiography or of turning to a Teggart-Toynbee
sociology. This essentially false dilemma pressed by Toynbee
tended to short-circuit the methodological debate and created
acrimony harmful both to the historical profession and to
Toynbee himself. It is evident that the historian's task as
envisioned by Stubbs and his scientific school of history was
simplistic and inadequate. The British Rankeans, by offering
a naive theory of historical facts and by reducing the com-
plicated process of reaching historical understanding to a
matter of seeing the facts or collecting the evidence, had
routed the literary and amateur historians of the nineteenth
century. But, in practice, they had covertly assumed various
concepts of development by which they had selected the
"facts" and turned them into an intelligible account. We
have seen that in his early training as a history student and
then as a professional historian, Toynbee had accepted at
face value this explanation by the scientific school of what
the professional historian's method should be. In the nine-
teen twenties when Toynbee recognized the failure of this
official version of historiography, he turned not to a more
critical study of what he had been taught, but to Teggart's
view that fact-gatherers needed to give way to law-makers.
When Toynbee presented his fellow historians with the alter-
native either of remaining with the fact-gatherers (and hence
becoming more and more anachronistic) or of turning their
discipline into sociology, he overlooked the option of sub-
jecting the entire process of historical thought to a fresh
analysis. Unaware of the weaknesses in the Rankean model,
yet unsatisfied with its results, he constructed an artifi-
cial dilemma for his fellow historians with his insistence
that they join him in the re-definition of the historian as
a law-discovering scientist.
It was far from reassuring when, in the last two
chapters of our study,, we found Toynbee himself expressing a
growing lack of confidence in the law-discovering ability of
the historian-sociologist, and an inclination to re-define
the historian as a historian- theologian
. If Toynbee had not
forced an artificial breach between the historian as fact-
gatherer and the historian-sociologist as law-discoverer, he
might have avoided the largely fruitless controversy in the
historical profession and, at the same time, galvanized
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himself to a reconsideration of the basic processes of the
working historian. In my opinion, when he undertook the task
of law-discovering, he was not creating a new science of his-
tory, such as was implied in the romantic and heroic picture
of "the Explorer." Instead, he was actually raising the
problem, integral for every historian, of what concept of
development the historian uses to make historical events
intelligible
,
W. H. Walsh, following Croce ' s distinction between
chronicle ("a simple narrative") and history ("a significant
narrative") describes the historian's task as follows,
The Historian is not content to tell us merely
what happened; he wishes to make us see why it
happened, too. In other words, he aims
. .
.
at a reconstruction of the past which is both
intelligent and intelligible .
^
Bury, Acton and others spoke of this problem as a search for
the "key" of history or the "significance" of history and
thought they found it in the idea of progress, the growth of
freedom or a social version of biological evolution. In
1920, Toynbee thought he had found an adequate concept of
development in the classical-humanist notion of the "wonder
of man" as expressed in Antigone
,
then "groped for an answer"
in Spengler's biological analogies. When he followed Teg-
gart's lead after 1927, it was doubly exhilarating because he
^Walsh, Philosophy of History
,
p. 32
hoped to define certain uniformities in history which would
provide a concept of development for him, and to do it in an
utterly objective and value-free way. If he had been able to
keep the effort of 1927 in proper perspective as another
attempt to define and test out certain uniformities that he
had discerned as occurring repeatedly, in similar fashion and
in roughly comparable societies of the past, his initial fame
might have been less but the long-term value of his writings
might have been greatly enhanced.
What we face now is the prospect of having a very
impressive set of volumes in the library of historical
thought, which will remain largely unread because so much of
the work represents a negative example of historical method.
As a result, Toynbee's valuable insights into certain events
and societies which are scattered throughout his volumes may
well be overlooked. Even if this judgment is correct, it
must be balanced with the recognition that Toynbee's personal
odyssey is one of the fascinating chapters of twentieth cen-
tury intellectual history. It is a welcome change in the
history of historical thought to break with the cult of
impersonality professed by historians of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century. Toynbee's struggle and his can-
did discussion of his own changing views, values and perspec-
tives help us to understand that historians are not comput-
ers, anonymous recorders, or chapter-writers in a chronicle
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of history, but are human participants in a human history
and, like Everyman, they live in a continual struggle of par-
tial answers, unclear but inescapable choices, and the need
to understand the present in the light of the past.
\
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
The basic bibliographical guide for a study of his-
torical method in Arnold J. Toynbee
' s A Study of History is
Monica Popper's A Bibliography Of The Works In English Of
Arnold Toynbee, 1910-1954 (London: Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 1955). This guide was carefully and
exhaustively compiled with the support of the Royal Institute
of International Affairs (where Toynbee served as Director of
Studies from 1925 to 1955), and carries a foreward by Arnold
J. Toynbee. It is structured chronologically and contains
both published works and periodical articles, totaling two
hundred and ninety-six entries. When it was compiled in
1955, Toynbee had already published the first three volumes
of A Study of History in 1934, Volumes Four through Six in
1939, and the four concluding volumes in 1954. But his vol-,
ume called Reconsiderations in which he re-evaluates his
study in the light of contemporary criticism, was not pub-
lished until 1961 as Volume Twelve. Although not all of
Toynbee' s publications since 1955 are significant for a study
of his methodological problems in A Study of History , it is
imperative to include his Reconsiderations (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961) both for Toynbee ' s own reflections on
his work and for the bibliography of critics appearing on
pages 675 to 690.
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Since the completion of A Study of History and the
various lectures and books dealing with that project as noted
in the Popper bibliography, Toynbee has continued his writing
and publication in several fields. While his books on
travel, East to West (New York: Oxford University Press,
1958); Between Oxus and Jumna (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1961); Between Niger and Nile (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1965); and Between Maule and Amazon (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967) are of interest to the histo-
rian and the biographer of Toynbee, they are not essential to
a study of his problem of historical method. Likewise, his
books on religion, Christianity Among the Religions of the
World (New York: Scribner, 1957); and his editing of Man's
Concern With Death (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), and
The Crucible of Christianity (London: Thames and Hudson,
1969) as well as his books on cities, Cities of Destiny
,
edited by Toynbee (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967) and
Cities on the Move (London: Oxford University Press, 1970)
may be regarded as peripheral to the problem of historical
method. Two books which he started to write early in his
career, Hellenism (London: Oxford University Press, 1959),
and Hannibal's Legacy (2 vols.; London: Oxford University
Press, 1965) are of limited value in ascertaining Toynbee *
s
historical method. Several scholars have pointed out that
his Hannibal's Legacy is an attempt to prove to his critics
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that he could write history books in the more traditional
mode
.
One other group of Toynbee
' s post-Study books does
interest the student of Toynbee historical method. in 1963
Arnold and Philip Toynbee published Comparing Notes: a dia -
logue across a generation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1963) which contains many interesting biographical insights
into the formulation and writing of A Study of History
, and
the reactions of Toynbee to the hostile critics of the 1950s
and 1960s. His Change and Habit; the challenge of our time
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) and Surviving the
Future
<
New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) are essen-
tially efforts to review the problems of our time and the
historical precedents which might suggest a solution. As
such they serve as an interesting basis of comparison to the
problems which Toynbee outlined in A Study of History
. Two
autobiographical books, Acquaintances (London: Oxford Uni-
versity
.
Press
, 1967) and Experiences (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1969) have been harshly received by the critics
but contain many valuable references to the historians who
influenced Toynbee, and to the personal and methodological
struggles which shaped A Study of History .
Popper's Bibliography of the primary sources should
be supplemented by the unpublished materials of Arnold J.
Toynbee as well as by the above mentioned published works
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from 1956 to the present. Much of the unpublished material
for A Study of History was purchased for a private collection
in this country and is to be released for public use upon
Toynbee's death. It is described by Toynbee as the "Debris"
of Parts I through XIII, and consists of large folders con-
taining extensive notes, letters from various scholars who
were consulted on that particular section, various lectures,
and many undated scraps of paper on the topic under consider-
ation. The most valuable part of the large collection of
materials for a study of Toynbee's changing method is the
collection of early outlines of A Study of History
. There
are two drafts of Toynbee's "first conscious attempt" to
write the Study in the summer of 1920 as he describes it in
the preface of Volume Seven. The first draft of thirty-four
pages is written in ink and has the note "(done at Galscombe,
[sic] in the cottage, summer of 1920)." The second draft of
thirty-eight pages contains many word changes but remains
substantially the same in content and appearance. Another of
the early outlines appears to be an expansion of the draft
written on the Orient Express enroute from Constantinople to
England on Saturday, September 17, 1921, and is dramatically
described in the Preface to Volume Seven as the beginning of
his thirty-year intellectual journey to write A Study of His-
tory .
There is also an abortive draft called "Outline I,"
consisting of twenty-nine pages of hand-written materials in
pencil, written sometime after 1925, and probably absorbed in
the large outline of 1927-29. The major document for a trac-
ing of Toynbee 's historical method is a five hundred and
forty-eight page outline, written in pencil throughout except
for a later correction in ink, and entitled "Outline of
June 1927 to June 1929." it appears to be the crucial set of
notes that Toynbee had sent to the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions in New york in 19 39 for safe-keeping during the second
World War, and which enabled him to resume his writing seven
years later.
With reference to the secondary sources two develop-
ments have occurred which are invaluable for a study of Toyn-
bee ' s method, and contemporary methodological debate. In
1960 the journal History and Theory was established to
encourage studies in the philosophy of history, and is the
only international journal devoted to questions of the
methodology of history. It brought together an outstanding
editorial committee and has provided scholarly contributions
from many countries of the world on the general problems of
historiography. In addition to the advancement and clarifi-
cation of problems in the field, the journal has published
important bibliographies in the Toynbee controversy and in
the philosophy of history.
In 1965, John C. Rule and Barbara S. Crosby published
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a very comprehensive
"Bibliography of Works on Arnold J.
Toynbee, 1946-1960/' nis_tory_^nd_Th^ 4 (1965), 212-233.
Although it deliberately excludes the books and articles pub-
lished in the non-Western languages and the very brief news-
paper and periodical reviews, it contains the major materials
for a critical study of Toynbee from the time he began to
emerge into international prominence in 1946 until the abate-
ment of the Toynbee controversy in 1960. During that
fourteen-year period Rule and Crosby record three hundred and
thirty critical articles on Toynbee 's work and forty-nine
books which gave major, if not complete, attention to Toyn-
bee
.
As a further aid in what has been one of the most
rapidly growing fields of study in the last two decades His-
'
tory and Theory began to publish a very extensive bibliogra-
phy in philosophy of history. It has covered the years from
1945 to 1968 and has limited itself to books and articles in
Western languages. To date it has appeared as Beihefte of
the journal under the heading Bibliography of Works in the
Philosophy of History 1945-1957 (Beiheft 1, 1961) with Sup-
plement thereto ( Beiheft 3, 1964) by John C. Rule; 1958-1961
( Beiheft 3, 1964) by M. Nowicki; 1962-1965 ( Beiheft 7, 1967)
by Lewis D. Wurgaft; 1966-1968 ( Beiheft 10, 1970) by Lewis D.
Wurgaft and others, with A Supplement to Bibliography of
Works in the Philosophy of History 1962-1965
. This general
s.
439
bibliography has included the new Toynbee material since the
end of the special Toynbee bibliography in 1960.
Since the publication of the bibliography up to 1968,
several books have appeared on the problem of identifying and
analyzing civilizations, thus renewing the debate on Toyn-
bee '
s comparative method of historical study. Matthew
Melk°' S ^e Nature of Civilization (Boston: Porter Sargent,
1969) attempts to supersede earlier primitive efforts by set-
ting up a model for the comparative study of civilizations,
and Roger Wescott's "The Enumeration of Civilizations" His-
tory and Theory 9:1 (1970) seeks to reconcile the various
lists of civilizations as advanced by Spengler, Toynbee,
Danilevsky and others. But it is Talcott Parsons' Societies:
Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966) that may offer a more suc-
cessful analysis of societies by providing a more adequate
distinction between culture and society than Toynbee was able
to do. On a related problem in Toynbee it is interesting to
note the appearance of Robert A. Nisbet's Social Change and
History (London: Oxford University Press, 19 69) because it
represents a contemporary effort by a prominent American
sociologist at the University of California to revive the
views of Frederick J. Teggart in an analysis of a Western
theory of development. Also not yet on the printed bibliog-
raphies is a brief but judicious treatment of Toynbee in The
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Heritage and challenge of History (New York: Dodd, Mead ,
Company, 1971) by Paul K
.
Conkin and Roland N. Stromberg. it
attempts to place Toynbee's writings in the framework of the
twentieth century's "crisis of historiography," and in the
wider setting of this century's "anarchy in the world of
knowledge." Roland Stromberg promises to further develop
this theme in a forthcoming book on Toynbee (Southern
Illinois University Press)
.


